January 30, 2013
By Anna Lührmann
On 23 January Jordan elected a new parliament. Prior to the elections and in response to opposition protests, the electoral law was amended significantly. For King Abdullah, credible elections are an important milestone on the road towards a “properly functioning democracy.” But how democratic were last week’s polls?
At first sight, elections in Jordan seem clean and transparent. In most polling stations, election officials followed state of the art procedures to ensure the credibility of the electoral process. Voter IDs were duly checked. In most cases voters were able to express their will in secrecy. Unlike during the 2010 elections, security forces did not seem to openly influence the electoral process. Freedom of speech and assembly seems to have considerably improved in Jordan during the last year.
For the first time in Jordan’s history, an independent election commission was charged with conducting elections. Professional safeguards were in place to ensure that results could not be rigged. Unlike during last elections, international and 7000 national election observers were accredited. There were only few instances in which their work was obstructed.
However, these significant improvements of the election-day procedures should not distract from the systemic problems: These elections have failed to meet several fundamental standards for democratic elections. Shortcomings can be attributed to the regime as well as to the society.
Limiting Democratic Elections from Above
Procedural certainty is a major characteristic of a democratic regime. However, here in Jordan voters did not know what powers the parliament they were about to elect will actually have. In the past, the Jordanian parliament lacked decision-making power on major issues (including determining the Prime Minister). This rendered parliamentary elections relatively meaningless.
King Abdullah announced that after the elections a transition to a “true parliamentary government” will begin. However, it remains to be seen how this announcement will be implemented. In a democracy, credible elections and hence the will of the people have to be the ultimate source of authority. As long as there are no fundamental improvements of Jordan’s institutional design, Jordanian elections fall short of this key democratic standard.
Prior to the election, the electoral law has been improved significantly. For the first time in Jordan’s history, national lists are part of the electoral process. Now, each voter has two votes: One for a national list and one for district candidates. There are also several quotas for women and minorities. These reform measures respond to wide-spread demands for an increased role of political parties in Jordan’s political process.
However, less then 20% of the Parliamentary seats are allocated to national lists. This clearly falls short of the demands and expectations of Jordan’s opposition parties. The current electoral law still severely limits the formation of strong political parties that are essential for democratic elections.
It is additionally problematic that seats are allocated disproportionately to the electoral districts. For example, in Aqaba a candidate won a seat in parliament with less then 2,600 votes whereas in districts in Amman around 5,000 votes were needed.
These shortcomings of the electoral law significantly limit the representativeness of parliament and hence severely impact the democratic quality of these elections. Overall, the current electoral law strongly favors individual candidates with strong tribal allegiances in rural areas. In general, urban candidates without clear tribal affiliation or strong clientelistic networks have fewer chances of winning. This is often the case for candidates favored by Jordanians of Palestinian origin.
Therefore, major opposition forces such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF) have decided to boycott the elections. Nevertheless, voter turnout has exceeded the level of the 2010 elections.
Limiting Democratic Elections from Below
However, it is not only the legal framework that has limited the democratic quality of Jordan’s elections. It is evident that the electoral law favors local notables and tribally backed candidates. At the same time, most violations of the new legal provisions for transparent elections can be attributed to local non-state actors - not to government officials. This is particular true for the persistent practice of vote buying and family voting.
I will illustrate this point with an example of an intrusive candidate’s agent from a polling station in a village in the district of Jarash, where I was deployed on Election Day. In Jordan, candidates’ agents had the right to be present in polling stations and observe the proceedings. This measure is intended to enhance transparency and credibility of the electoral process. However, in this polling station, the presence of a candidate’s agent had the opposite effect.
The agent was sitting in the front row of the observer chairs right in front of the ballot box. Most voters first greeted him and then turned to the head of the polling station to receive their ballot. After a while it became clear that many voters “accidentally” folded their ballot in front of the candidate’s agent in order to make him see who they voted for. In one case a voter claimed to be disabled and asked the agent to “help” him mark the ballot. Even while international observers were present, it was clear that the candidate’s agent and not polling station officials was running the show here.
It is clearly the duty of polling station officials to stop practices of this kind. They failed to do so in this particular polling station. However, in many other polling stations they were more effective in implementing the secrecy of vote. Government authorities have also responded harshly to prominent cases of alleged vote buying. At least six candidates and nine other people were arrested for this criminal offense prior to Election Day.
Hence, not only legal provisions but also the actions of non-state actors as well as cultural traditions limit the democratic quality of the Jordanian elections. This is particularly true for the participation of women and youth in the electoral process. On paper women have equal rights as men, but nevertheless they remain significantly underrepresented as candidates, in the national, regional, and local election commissions, and ultimately as MPs. The number of women MPs is not expected to significantly exceed the women’s quota which stands at only 10%.
The road towards a “truly parliamentary government”
Election day procedures have improved significantly in Jordan comparing last week’s elections to the last electoral exercise in 2010. However, elections can only be as democratic as the society and regime in which they take place. Elections need to become a more meaningful contest between different parties and programs, and result in a strong parliament with true representation of the people’s will. Representativeness of the parliament must increase through electoral law reform. Only with meaningful and far reaching reforms, Jordan has a chance to really move toward a “properly functioning democracy,” which King Abdullah on numerous occasions has declared his own ultimate goal.
Anna Lührmann (*1983) was elected Member of Germany's National Parliament (Bundestag) at the age of 19. After two parliamentary terms for the Green Party, Anna moved to Sudan in 2009 where she acquired a M.Sc. degree in Gender and Peace Studies at Ahfad University in Omdurman. She has advised various development agencies on governance issues in Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. She is currently based in Berlin, where she has started a PhD project on international electoral assistance.
This essay reflects the personal opinion of the author only and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of NDI or any other institution.