Nation or Industry: The Non-Electrification of Nablus
Fredrik Meiton

Patrick Geddes: Luminary or Prophet of Demonic Planning
Nazmi Jubeh

The Atarot Exception? Business and Human Rights under Colonization
Marya Farah

Materializing Palestinian Memory: Objects of Home and the Everyday Eternities of Exile
Dima Saad

Kamal Boullata: A Walk through Memory
Raja Shehadeh
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* Peer reviewed article.
The contributions to this issue of the Jerusalem Quarterly coalesce around a number of themes central to Palestinian experiences – the relationships between materiality and memory and between space and power. Two articles in this issue, Fredrik Meiton’s “Nation or Industry: The Non-Electrification of Nablus” and Dima Saad’s “Materializing Palestinian Memory: Objects of Home and the Everyday Eternities of Exile,” are the final pieces that JQ will publish from the sixth annual New Directions in Palestinian Studies workshop held at Brown University in 2018, thematically organized around “The Shadow Years: Material Histories of Everyday Life.” (Other articles that emerged from this workshop were published in the Autumn 2018 issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies and in the Autumn 2019 issue of the Jerusalem Quarterly.) Each, in its own way, focuses on the materiality of Palestinian experiences and their afterlives.

Meiton, author of Electrical Palestine: Capital and Technology from Empire to Nation (University of California Press, 2018), reflects here on a “non-event” – the circumstances and decisions that resulted in the city of Nablus remaining disconnected from the electrical grid throughout the Mandate period. The Palestine Electric Corporation (PEC) was established by Pinhas Rutenberg, a Russian-Jewish engineer and Zionist to whom the Mandate authorities granted an exclusive concession to provide electrical power throughout Palestine. This linkage of electricity with Zionism meant that connecting to the electrical grid was always a politically contentious decision for Palestinians, and while Nablus’s politicians sought to negotiate work-
arounds that would allow for the electrification of Nablus as a joint venture of the PEC and the municipality, the PEC had little interest in pursuing such measures. As negotiations between the two stretched on, and were then largely interrupted by the 1936–39 revolt, the power supply system and the Jewish economy in Palestine became increasingly interconnected. Meanwhile, the exclusivity clause of the concession prevented the development of an infrastructure of electricity to serve Palestine’s Arab communities.

Technological momentum thus deepened ethno-national segregation in ways that would shape the day-to-day experiences of Palestinians during the Mandate period, but also the map of Palestine post-1948. Although we are inclined to understand such boundaries as the product of military conflict or political negotiation (or both), Meiton shows them also to be the product of infrastructural developments that are less obvious and more insidious – cloaked as they are in the seemingly neutral language of technological development. By the mid-1930s, “the areas most densely populated by [Palestinian] Arabs were clearly discernable on the power company’s technical blueprints because of their densely engridded borders.” As Meiton writes, the region between Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm – what the British referred to as the “Triangle of Terror” during the 1936–39 revolt – “appeared on the maps of the PEC as an area demarcated by thick borders of wire along each side, and blank within – wires and violence implying each other.” This implication continued in the decade following the revolt and during the 1948 war. As Meiton notes, the boundary produced by the 1949 armistice lines, the so-called Green Line along the western border of the West Bank, follows the same line as the high-tension line that ran from the Jordan River to Tel Aviv, constructed in the 1930s.

The prehistories of boundaries made by war and political decision-making also emerge in Nazmi Jubeh’s article on Patrick Geddes and British urban planning in Jerusalem. As Jubeh describes, Geddes drew up plans for Jerusalem based on a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European biblical imaginary. He envisioned the Mughrabi Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City destroyed to allow for an uninhibited view of the “Western Wall” (al-Buraq) and sought to forestall the expansion of villages in Jerusalem’s hinterlands (including areas like Silwan and al-Tur that were and are intimately connected to Jerusalem) in order to preserve Jerusalem’s imagined singularity. Ultimately, his plans, according to Jubeh, “split the city into two parts: a restricted eastern part with no chance of developing or becoming modern; and a western part with all the features necessary for modern development.” Though largely unrealized during the Mandate period, Geddes’s plans are remarkably prescient in their alignment with Israeli polices, especially after 1967, indicating the persistence of an Orientalist colonial vision shared by British imperial and Zionist planners – a vision in which the local Palestinian population is at best an irrelevance to be ignored and at worst a hindrance to be eliminated.

The implementation of this vision has produced an environment in Jerusalem that, for its Palestinian residents, obstructs the economy, expropriates and restricts land resources, and restricts movement. Marya Farah’s “The Atarot Exception? Business
and Human Rights under Colonization” (recipient of honorable mention for the 2019 Ibrahim Dakkak Award) explores how these restrictions impact the ability of Palestinians in Jerusalem to sustain themselves, and the decision by some to establish businesses in the Atarot industrial settlement bordering Qalandiya. For Jerusalemites who reached their maturity during the 1967 war, Qalandiya evokes the “gold days” of the 1960s, when Jerusalem Airport (called Qalandiya Airport because of its proximity to the village, and later refugee camp, of the same name) was the gateway to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and beyond. This gateway was transformed after 2000 by the hellish mechanisms of checkpoints, Israel’s West Bank wall, and “border controls” supervising the entry – or, more accurately, the non-entry – of Palestinians into Jerusalem and points west. The massive changes of the past century overlap in Qalandiya: from the now-abandoned airport that had once served as a replacement for the loss of Lydda Airport to the refugee camp that is increasingly absorbed into the suburban sprawl of Ramallah, and from the perspective of Israeli planning, both a major center to control and constrain movement and, the site of the Atarot industrial settlement at the seam lines.

The politics of establishing Palestinian-owned businesses within Atarot are fraught. Business-owners who take this decision explain that their options are constrained by Israeli policies, as Palestinians are denied permission and opportunity to build or expand within Jerusalem, and see the possibility of moving to the West Bank as economically unviable and risky from the standpoint of maintaining their Jerusalem residency. Farah interviews others who frame their decision as no different from setting up shop anywhere else occupied by Israel, including inside Israel’s pre-1967 boundaries: “Atarot is an occupied area and not a settlement,” one business-owner tells Farah, and “in my opinion everything is occupied.” It is no different than Tel Aviv, another affirms. A third goes even further: the Palestinian Authority should encourage Palestinian businesses in industrial settlements, which offer Palestinian workers an alternative to exploitation by Israeli settlers – “This is how we are going to liberate the land.” Meanwhile, Palestinian and international actors urging a boycott of settlement products have to decide whether this boycott applies to Palestinian-owned businesses in Atarot. This conundrum is reminiscent of that facing Nabulsis and other Palestinians vis-à-vis electrification during the Mandate period, what Meiton describes as a question not of nation and industry, but nation or industry.

While Meiton, Jubeh, and Farah approach materiality from a macro level – the domain of infrastructure, planning, economic development – Dima Saad takes new approaches and raises new questions to think about the intimacy of personal memory, material objects, and Palestinian identification. Based on anthropological fieldwork among Palestinians in Jordan, Saad challenges the narrative focus of structured memory-work, including various endeavors to collect and record Palestinians’ oral histories; instead, Saad calls for the recording and collecting of “practices of remembering that adhere neither to testimonial genres of telling nor to the plotlines of event-centered histories.” By doing so, scholars might begin to portray the “refracted personal catastrophes of the Nakba,” appearing in material form: an embroidered love letter; floor tiles made of stone quarried in Nazareth; the contents of a suitcase found in a
grandmother’s attic. For generations of displaced Palestinians, Saad reminds us, “the distance between 1948 and everyday exile is furnished with the remembered belongings of the lost home. Doorbells, vases, curtains, books, forks, plates, carpets, blankets, dresses, and photographs crowd everyday currents of longing; they orchestrate plots for daydreams, they color overwhelming fantasies of return. They offer clues to a past that persists, codes to a past that haunts.” Saad explores these unsettling approximations of home that manifest in exile. The uncanny settings and objects that remind one of home and, at the same time, of loss.

In “Traces of the Nakba,” a review of four different art exhibitions from 2018 and 2019, Penny Johnson and Raja Shehadeh engage similar themes of “materiality and ghostliness,” as the shadows of 1948 creep into the art spaces of Herzliya, Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Johnson and Shehadeh find themselves unsettled, frequently pulled between the powerful evocations of loss in the artwork and the erasure of context that characterizes the institutional or curatorial framing of the exhibitions, between the dismal political situation of Palestine in the present and the ability of current artists – mostly by Palestinians from inside the Green Line, but some as well by Israeli Jewish artists – to offer “sparks from these ashes to stir the imagination.”

Johnson and Shehadeh remark on the inclusion of the painting Refugees (1957) by Abed Abdi – who was born in Haifa 1942, forced into Lebanon with his family in 1948, and returned to Haifa in 1952 under a limited family reunification scheme – in the Haifa City Museum’s exhibition “1948.” Absent from the exhibition, however, are works from those Palestinian artists who remained in Lebanon – or in other refugee camps and places of exile. Here, Johnson and Shehadeh turn to the foundational work on Palestinian art by Kamal Boullata, who passed away in Berlin this August. In this issue of the Jerusalem Quarterly, Raja Shehadeh remembers his relationship with Boullata, which began in 1979, when the two met in Washington, DC. Shehadeh recalls Boullata as a friend and companion, an artist and a scholar, a patriot and an exile. As an artist, Boullata consistently returned to two basic shapes, the circle and the square and, Shehadeh writes, “throughout his life he seemed to be trying to square the circle of the various influences on his life, whether Christian and Islamic cultures or Jerusalem and the rest of the world.” Needless to say, the Jerusalem of Boullata’s birth was not the same Jerusalem in which he was laid to rest, a city transformed and in which Boullata seemingly no longer felt comfortable in his later years. Shehadeh wonders: “Could he have lived there if the bureaucratic obstacles were removed and it was possible to move to Palestine?”

In Donn Hutchison’s remembrance of Mildred White, “From “Rag-and-Tatter Town” to Booming-and-Bustling City,” the lives of the two Ramallah Friends School teachers are likewise intimately connected to the changing cityscape. White arrived in Ramallah in 1949, and described the impact of the Nakba on the city, as refugees struggled to eke out a life and a living in the aftermath of catastrophe. Ramallah had already undergone significant changes when Hutchison arrived seventeen years later, as Palestinians displaced in 1948 and 1949 “put down tentative roots that eventually grew into sturdy trees.” And, of course, the Ramallah of 2019 is a city completely
transformed. On Radio Street, “Ramallah’s version of a lover’s lane” in the 1960s, the trees and stone houses have been replaced by “high-rises, shopping centers, malls, Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Popeye’s.” The Ramallah of 1965 or 1949 is only a memory. But then again, as contributions to this issue of *JQ* remind us, what does it mean to say that something is “only” a memory?

This issue of the *Jerusalem Quarterly* is rounded out by an article that takes us back another century still, before living memory, to the Centennial Fair held in Philadelphia in 1876 and to the issue of cultural representation of Palestine in the nineteenth century. Linda K. Jacobs’s quest to unearth the Palestinian presence at the fair is yet further evidence that material culture can travel in unexpected directions and map onto historical metanarratives in surprising ways. The exhibition of items from Jerusalem within the official Ottoman display was dominated by Vester and Company – the business established by German missionary and cabinet-maker Ferdinand Vester, who moved to Jerusalem to join the Swiss-German Mission in 1853 and whose son Frederick continued in the woodworking business and married Bertha Spafford, daughter of the founder of the American Colony. But Jacobs turns her attention primarily to the two small stalls, called bazaars, operated by groups of Palestinians from Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Selling olive wood and mother-of-pearl crafts, these merchants were forerunners of Palestinian participation in a global trading economy, in which items associated with religious tourism in the Holy Land became available to those who would never set foot on Palestinian soil, as well as Palestinian migration to the Western hemisphere.

In the only extant photograph of the Palestinian presence at the fair, meanwhile, three blurry figures man a stall attached to the exterior of the fair’s Brazilian café. Jacobs wonders whether they were the merchants who set up the Jerusalem or Bethlehem bazaars, or perhaps they were the three Panayotti (Banayuti) brothers who had arrived from Bethlehem with hundreds of items in olive wood, mother-of-pearl, and seeds to sell at the fair; or maybe they were imposters, trading on the allure of the Holy Land to sell fake goods. Whatever the case, these ghostly figures are a reminder of the way the past haunts the present, the persistence of loss in various forms, and the need to excavate the shadows of history to capture the breadth and depth of Palestinian experiences.
This article highlights one component of the historical conjuncture that generated the two most salient facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict: that in the nationalist struggle over Palestine, Jews achieved statehood and Palestinians did not. Since what is at issue here is as much why something did not happen as why something did, this paper approaches the topic from the perspective of a non-event, namely the fact that the Palestinian town of Nablus, located in what is today the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was never connected to Mandate Palestine’s electric grid.

Our built environment is not just a social construct in the sense that it is built through collective effort; an element of ideology is always present in the design. Infrastructures serve as material expressions of the forces that built them. The influence, moreover, runs in the other direction, too. Infrastructures never fully obey their makers’ designs, but act back on the designs and the designers. These insights, central to Science and Technology Studies, have been taken up by a number of Middle East scholars in recent years, giving birth to rich new lines of inquiry. The following teases out a strand of my recent book, Electrical Palestine, in order to shed light on a critical component in the process that drove a wedge between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, securing a state for the former and dispossessing the latter.

Following the growth – and non-growth – of the grid does not just provide a new perspective on other things. It also makes it obvious that the grid itself played an important role in shaping the course of events. As the power system reached critical mass in the early 1930s, it obtained
a momentum by which it propelled not just itself, but also the ideas, ideologies, and institutions from which it had grown. By virtue of its technological momentum, the power system continued to expand through the Arab Revolt and redirect its oppositional force toward a definitive social and economic break between Jews and Arabs. The grid also shaped resource pathways, channeling resources toward the Jewish sector, and away from the Arab, priming the outcome of the 1948 War.

**Nablus and Electricity**

In 1921, the British mandatory government granted an exclusive countrywide electrification contract to the Russian-Jewish engineer and Zionist Pinhas Rutenberg. The concession included an exclusivity clause, according to which Rutenberg was the only person legally permitted to generate electricity for commercial purposes anywhere within the borders of the Palestine Mandate. By the early 1930s, the Palestine Electric Corporation (PEC), the company Rutenberg founded and to which he transferred his statutory rights, was operating four power stations and an electric grid that reached most of the Jewish settlements and towns along the Mediterranean coastal plain. The power system was comfortably ensconced in the land, both in a physical sense, as a massive material structure, and in the sense of being firmly embedded within the land’s legal and institutional apparatus. In other words, it had achieved what the historian of technology Thomas Hughes refers to as “technological momentum,” making it increasingly resistant to diversions from its charted path.

The picture on the Palestinian Arab side was starkly different. Few communities were connected to the grid, in large part because of the widespread opposition to doing business with “the Zionist Rutenberg company.” By the mid-1930s, opinion was widespread that “the electricity concession stole British policy from the sons of the country [abna’ al-balad] and gave it to a Zionist Jew who works with all his might to turn this country into a Jewish national home.” Nevertheless, a significant proportion of Palestinians, especially among economic elites, was anxious to have access to the large quantities of cheap electricity that only a large power system could provide. They were confronted with a serious obstacle in the form of strong political opposition to making a deal with a company that was explicitly supporting the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

This was especially so in Nablus, a town widely regarded throughout the country as a Palestinian nationalist stronghold. Al-Jami’a al-‘Arabiyya claimed that most Nabulsis “would rather light their homes and stores with Arab oil than to light them with foreign electricity.” According to an editorial in *Mir’at al-Sharq*, “Lighting Nablus with Rutenberg electricity is considered the first step toward settlement by Jews in Nablus.” This, of course, made those in favor of doing so, as al-Jami’a al-Islamiyya put it, “traitors to their city and their homeland.” Al-Karmil urged that Arabs in favor of accepting “Rutenberg” should “wake up before it is too late” and realize that the
linemen, surveyors, and engineers that had recently visited Nablus were “the soldiers of the future Jewish state.”

In the face of this opposition, those who favored connecting Nablus to the grid were forced to find a work-around. Starting in the late 1920s, they repeatedly approached the power company with various proposals to set up a company, owned jointly by the municipality and the PEC, that would serve as a buffer between the members of the municipal council and Rutenberg’s operation. Municipal representatives insisted that while it would not be possible to submit a formal request to the power company because of its Zionist character, virtually all of the town’s inhabitants supported extending the grid to Nablus. Given the fraught politics surrounding the PEC, mediating between the town and the company left the PEC’s Nabulsi interlocutors in a vulnerable position. “You should not disclose our name to anybody,” one of them insisted in a meeting with the company, “before the definite settlement of the matter between us.”

The power company, for its part, had no interest in a face-saving work-around. If the municipality could not make a deal publicly, the risk of sabotage was too high. As the power company explained over and over to those who approached it, whether businessmen hoping to make money or newspapermen hoping to make headlines, it was not interested in undertaking electrification in any way other than “officially and openly”: “Under no circumstances will we [electrify] against the wish of the population.”

While the power company thus kept Nablus and other Arab towns at arm’s length, the importance of electricity for economic growth increased. A few years into the 1930s, as the Jewish sector was booming and the Arab sector contracting, many were concerned with the issues confronting commercial life in Palestine, and especially in Nablus – a long-standing commercial hub. The town’s main industry, soap production, was facing difficulties. It had just lost its main export market in Egypt because of new import tariffs; its second-largest market, in Syria and Lebanon, saw growing competition from domestic production. Even domestic markets in Palestine were beleaguered, as new Jewish-run ventures in Haifa and Tel Aviv claimed a growing share. Economic development, observers noted in the press, was sorely needed, and economic development depended on the supply of electricity at the low rates that only became possible with a large system, enabled by economies of scale to keep the unit price low. (A handful of electric generators were in operation across the town, including one powering a modest street lighting system, but the diminutive scale ruled out industrial use.) As Filastin concluded in an article on the topic, “the Arabs of Nablus prefer to be poor and faithful over being rich and unfaithful.”

This was not exactly true, of course, and as the 1930s wore on the divide between the choices outlined by Filastin – faithful and poor or faithless and rich – grew starker. A few years into the decade, most major Arab population centers had been connected to the grid through direct agreements with the power company. Not so Nablus. To those in favor of connecting the PEC grid, it had now become clear that a direct agreement was the only available option. As a result, their advocacy turned public. Tensions quickly rose. Nablus’s mayor, Sulayman Tuqan, was physically assaulted during a visit to the
mosque over his pro-Rutenberg advocacy. Undeterred, Tuqan along with other members of the local council, the chairman of the chamber of commerce, and other merchants, industrialists, and landowners continued their efforts to negotiate an agreement with the power company. They made their case at public meetings and in mosques and circulated a petition that received many signatures. The issue also became a magnet for other political concerns, such as the long-standing division between the majlisi faction supporting Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and the mu’arada (opposition) faction. Outside observers, however, failed to grasp the complex political context in which the municipality was operating, and instead lambasted it for, as the Palestine Post put it, “setting its face resolutely against modernization.” In part, the failure to reckon with these complexities was deliberate, as the simpler interpretation played into the hands of a longstanding Zionist narrative portraying Arabs as anti-modern.

Throughout the first half of the 1930s, talks continued fruitlessly between the company and representatives of the municipality. Soon the tension rose in the town and in the country as a whole. This was not entirely electricity’s doing.

The Great Arab Revolt versus Technological Momentum

The Arab Revolt of 1936–39 began with the announcement of a general strike on 19 April 1936. Over the course of the summer, it turned increasingly violent, on the part of both the British and the Arabs. The revolt had two distinct phases, the first lasting until October 1936, when the general strike ended. The second phase began with the assassination of the district commissioner of the Galilee, Lewis Andrews, on 26 September of the following year. The grid emerged as a major target of the Arab rebels. This should not surprise us. Sabotaging the grid had been a tactic, both formal and spontaneous, of the Palestinian national movement and its supporters from the first. In 1936, there were repeated attacks on the coastal high-tension lines between Haifa and Jaffa, and twice the whole south lost power. The cost of a single damaged pole, including repair and loss of income, was about seventy-five Palestine pounds. To that must be added the cost of the repairmen’s armed escort of as many as ten soldiers in some places. Nevertheless, the power company had learned its lesson from earlier instances of sabotage and put several contingencies in place in order to handle the risk of interrupted circuits.

When the revolt entered its second stage in the fall of 1937, sabotage of the power lines intensified, and all work related to the power company’s operations became vastly more difficult and took on an increasingly military character. The most vulnerable section of the grid, as well as the railway, telephone, and telegraph lines, was located between Hadera and Kfar Saba, which ran past the Palestinian towns of Tulkarm and Qalqiliya, a stretch of about twenty-five miles that was part of the area the British nicknamed the “Triangle of Terror.” At the height of the revolt in 1938, the company had to increase its staff of supernumerary policemen accompanying the repair squads. After several supernumeraries were killed and wounded on the job, Rutenberg appealed
to the government and the company was allowed to acquire their own armored cars and Lewis guns, and the British even provided military training for the company’s employees. The controversial counterinsurgency officer Captain Orde Wingate was commissioned to train a special company unit in the tactics from which he and his men had recently garnered such notoriety. Two “night squads” of twenty-five men and two officers were taught how to prepare ambushes along the power lines from Zichron Ya’akov to Rosh Ha’ayin.

On the whole, however, the grid prevailed. Service interruptions were brief and local. At no point during the revolt was there a real threat of widespread system failure, mostly because the system was designed to be able to absorb Palestinian violence. If sabotage had been a constant from the start, it soon became a routine feature of grid maintenance. Even on the far larger scale of the Great Revolt, sabotage was not as much of a problem in 1936–39 as it had been in the initial phase of electrification in the early 1920s, when the company had had to contend with widespread, and occasionally violent, opposition. The experiences of the 1920s had taught the company about the importance of a thick electric grid. It had absorbed the lesson with such fervor that by the mid-1930s, the areas most densely populated by Arabs were clearly discernable on the power company’s technical blueprints because of their densely engrided borders. Indeed, the “Triangle of Terror” appeared on the maps of the PEC as an area demarcated by thick borders of wire along each side, and blank within – wires and violence implying each other. Thanks to these measures, the grid continued to grow through the revolt years.

By May 1939, the revolt had been suppressed, having drained treasuries and ruined lives. The overall defense expenditures in Palestine rose ten times with the outbreak of the revolt, totaling PP 1.5 million. Sabotage of citrus and other trees and the destruction of crops covering an area of over seventeen thousand dunams amounted to additional losses of several hundred thousand pounds. The biggest loss, however, was sustained by the Arab community, measured in Palestine pounds and, especially, in lives: five thousand Palestinians killed and ten thousand wounded.

The fortune of the power company stands in sharp relief to these grim facts. For the PEC, the revolt was probably a windfall, primarily due to the way it deepened and broadened the gap between the Jewish and Arab sectors, especially in the agricultural domain. Except for land sales, foodstuffs trade was by far the biggest economic interaction between Arabs and Jews. Before the revolt, the Jewish sector consumed Arab produce at an estimated value of six hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand Palestine pounds a year. But as Arabs ceased selling produce to Jews, Jewish agriculture had to become the main supplier. The price of produce increased, both on account of the higher wage levels of Jewish workers and as a result of the reduced supply. This put a strain on the urban quarters of the Jewish community. But in practice, the increased cost of living that resulted in the cities merely amounted to a wealth redistribution from the Jewish city to the Jewish countryside. “As time goes on,” one report assessing the impact on the Yishuv predicted, “Jewish agriculture will be increasingly more able to supply the Jewish requirements of those products formerly purchased from the Arabs,
namely, fruits and vegetables, eggs and poultry, milk, cattle, fish, etc.”31 And because the increasingly mechanized Jewish agriculture was a far larger consumer of electricity – Arab farms by and large not being connected to the grid – increased productivity in the Jewish agricultural sector meant a further rise in electricity consumption. From the end of 1935 until the end of the Arab Revolt in 1939, the yearly amount of electricity consumed for irrigation almost doubled, from about 16 million to 28.5 million kilowatt hours (see table 1).

Clearly, the power company had grown in the revolt years and so too had the economic gap between Arabs and Jews, a dynamic reinforced by and reinforcing of the differential impact of the grid. By the end of the 1930s, the most intense period of industrialization and grid expansion, the PEC generated and sold more than one hundred million kilowatts annually, producing a value of about one million Palestine pounds. The government-produced statistical abstract of Palestine for 1940 noted that “the development of electric power production in Palestine in the past decade has been remarkable.”32

In sum, the Great Arab Revolt not only failed in its goals to arrest Zionism’s advance in Palestine; thanks in part to the technological momentum of the power system, the oppositional force of the rebels was redirected toward developments that deepened preexisting trends and disparities, not least on the political and economic levels. The revolt deepened the ethno-national differentiation that the grid, at an earlier stage, had been instrumental in producing.33 In the starkest indication of the uneven development that had taken place over the course of the decade, over 90 percent of the electricity was now consumed by Jews.34 Per capita consumption among Jews grew from 164 kilowatt hours in 1936 to 232.4 kilowatt hours in 1942. By contrast, the Arab per capita consumption of electricity was 11.5 kilowatt hours in 1942.35

Table 1: The Palestine Electric Corporation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of PEC Consumers Connected</th>
<th>Units Sold by PEC (in kWh)</th>
<th>Gross Revenue (in PP until June 1952; then IP)</th>
<th>Length of Transmission and Distribution Network in km</th>
</tr>
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Table 2: Electricity Consumption in Palestine in kWh
1941 | 103,031,247 | 33,298,000 | 32,865,000 | 44,197,000
1942 | 123,105,000 | 37,411,000 | 41,497,000 | 54,272,000
1943 | 149,540,000 | 45,767,000 | 49,501,000 | 67,272,000
1944 | 173,636,900 | 49,965,000 | 56,401,000 | 78,871,000
1945 | 199,125,538 | 53,954,000 | 66,301,000 | 94,298,000
1946 | 233,058,000 | 64,228,000 | 74,532,000 | 122,149,000
1947 | 281,341,000 | n/a | 86,109,000 | 119,000,000
1948 | 246,247,651 | 57,000,000 | 70,000,000 | 154,000,000
1949 | 315,007,523 | 66,000,000 | 95,000,000 | 221,000,000

The Non-Electrification of Nablus Continues

A few months after the end of the Arab Revolt, interests to connect Nablus to the grid again announced themselves and rekindled the tension between commerce and nation. In January 1940, Robert Newton, the assistant district commissioner in Nablus, approached the power company with a request for a connection to Nablus. Shortly after receiving Newton’s letter, the power company received a message from a group calling itself the Arab Association of Nablus. The letter stated that “the traitors” who had been interested in bringing the company to the city were “afraid” and could be “counted on one hand.” The letter went on:

Director Rutenberg, we are not interested in you nor your people or in the power of your rule or your distinction or your money, for our organization is able to set upon you and your workers and your works regardless of your strength. To not consider entering Nablus would be safer for your life and the lives of your workers.36

The Arab Association of Nablus could have spared themselves the effort. A new conflict, in the form of world war, hung over the renewed initiative, and the PEC was generally loath to commit to further extensions.37 In any event, as Rutenberg noted, Nablus was a “peculiar case,” best avoided.38

Toward the end of World War II, negotiations between the municipality and the PEC resumed and the particularities of Nablus’s politics remained prominent. At a meeting on 28 January 1945, representatives of the Nablus municipality made their opening bid to the power company. They again proposed forming a company, 51 percent of which would be owned by Nablus and 49 by the PEC. The new company would install a small diesel generator, operated outside the PEC grid. It would power the water supply system, a small street lighting scheme, and a few houses. They justified the arrangements in two ways. First, the scheme would be compatible with the generator currently pumping water from a nearby spring and in which there were strong “vested interests” by certain
residents of the town. The second reason was that “the special psychology of the people of Nablus has to be taken into consideration, which has caused it to remain, unlike all other Arab towns, without an organized supply of electricity for nationalist reasons.” The separate company would function as a “device” that little by little would acclimate nationalists to the idea of accepting the PEC’s open involvement in Nablus, ultimately enabling it to take full ownership of the works. The power company was reluctant, as always, to agree to any scheme that did not involve an open and direct agreement between the municipality and the company, and during a phone conversation the following week, the PEC secretary, Yaktuiel Baharaw, rejected the proposal.39

Yet the Nabulsi representatives continued to press their case, marshaling technical arguments about costs and benefits to justify their place outside of the countrywide grid. During a follow-up meeting on 11 February 1945, they made use of the nous of the electrical engineer and Nablus resident Dawud ‘Arafat to bolster their case. ‘Arafat elaborated on the reasons why a smaller, separate scheme would be preferable to connection to the grid. Most important, he said, there was not enough demand in the town to meet the minimum consumption normally stipulated in the municipal contracts. Thus, extending the high-tension line from Tulkarm to Nablus and connecting the town to the countrywide system would be uneconomical. Only when the town had undergone considerable economic development would such a scheme make sense. For the moment, however, a local solution that could be incorporated into the existing local system and run on diesel would be preferable both politically and economically. The power company, as expected, rejected the proposal. Nevertheless, the young engineer seems to have left an impression on Secretary Baharaw, who noted in his report that ‘Arafat “was clearly very smart.”40

Indeed, ‘Arafat had put his finger on a critical element of the power system’s impact on Palestine. The kind of large-scale electrification that the power company was engaged in was not well suited to many Arab towns, which would have been better served by a smaller system, requiring more modest front-end capital expenditure and obviating the need to commit to relatively high minimum levels of consumption demanded by the standard PEC contract, with reference to justifying the expense of extending the high-tension lines and constructing a transformer station. But the exclusivity clause of the power company’s concession prevented any alternative undertakings, while the considerable opposition to the power company made it even more difficult to make the kind of full-throated commitment that would have been required to make the power company connection profitable.

In other words, ‘Arafat had identified another element of how technological momentum can deepen ethno-national segregation. The power supply system and the Jewish economy had created and molded each other; power supply spurred the growth of energy-intensive irrigation and energy-intensive irrigation spurred the growth of power supply. But these technologies, and thus too the synergies of technology and economic growth that obtained in the Yishuv, remained absent from much of the Arab economy. Especially in the wake of the devastation wrought by the Arab Revolt, Nablus had neither the power infrastructure nor the mechanized agriculture to justify committing to the high energy consumption
that the standard PEC contract required. That in combination with the power company’s statutory monopoly meant that Nablus was left without power.

Looking globally, this is not the usual order of things. To this day, electricity is first introduced in a society not as a commercial systems technology, but for subsistence use. Individual generators are set up to supply small amounts of electricity for lighting and modest motive force (powering a water pump, say). Large electric power systems, like the one operated by the PEC, usually come into being when electricity consumption has grown to the point that there is a sufficiently large number of small stand-alone generators that economies of scale conduce to interconnecting them into a larger system. And even as such systems become increasingly common, people not in a position to enjoy the benefits of the scale economies continue operating stand-alone generators, either in place of or in addition to relying on the power system.41

In any event, negotiations between the PEC and Nablus lumbered on for another two years, reflecting the commercial logic of large-scale systems electrification versus a small-scale stand-alone system. The same political tensions as before were manifest in the Palestinian press, and provoked new threats against the power company and the managing director personally.42 One letter to the PEC signed by the Arab League Committee to Boycott Zionist Goods asserted that Mayor Tuqan, in his negotiations with the PEC, “does not represent anybody but himself.” The letter promised that “any worker, engineer or surveyor entering Nablus will die. Each pole will be torn down.” The letter ended by addressing the director directly: “You should know that you too shall die in your own house . . . You have been warned.”43

By the fall of 1947, Nablus and the PEC made an agreement whereby the town would borrow sixty thousand Palestine pounds from the mandatory government and lend that money in turn to the power company to cover the cost of the power connection. The arrangement was justified by the fact that Nablus was incapable of giving adequate guarantees for minimum consumption levels. In fact, however, the power company’s invocation of this logic was selective; on numerous occasions, the aspirational dimension of power supply had overridden concerns about actual consumption levels. The scheme was approved by Government House in Jerusalem and by the Colonial Office in London, and on 10 February 1948, the supply agreement between the PEC and Nablus was signed.44 The agreement, however, was never implemented. Large-scale violence between Jews and Arabs erupted in Palestine in late 1947, shortly after the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution 181 for the partition of Palestine, and by May 1948 it would expand into a full-blown regional war.

In the event, Nablus was never electrified by the PEC. By the end of the 1948 war, Nablus found itself in the territory occupied by Jordan. In the 1950s, no longer hamstrung by the exclusivity clause of Rutenberg’s concession, the town built its own electric supply system. When, in June 1967, Israel captured the West Bank, the then-mayor of Nablus immediately brought a suit against what had then become the Israel Electric Corporation for breach of contract and demanded repayment of the sixty thousand Palestine pounds that the municipality had paid the company in late 1947 for a connection, along with 9 percent annual interest.45
Conclusion: Electricity and Partition

“Palestine,” wrote the liberal journalist Herbert Sidebotham in 1937, “jumped from a medieval into a modern economy with one leap.”46 Like so many observers at the time, the first concrete expression of that leap that Sidebotham went on to name was electrification, which he referred to as “one of the most significant aspects of Palestine’s industrial development.”47 Before World War I, Sidebotham remarked, the poor majority was lucky if it had an oil-soaked rag to light; the wealthy few if they had kerosene. Now, he noted, electricity was used for lighting and powering household appliances and industrial machinery, and much else besides, and therefore, “the current consumed is a very useful barometer of the modernization of its industries and its social life.”48

By the time Sidebotham wrote those words, over 90 percent of electricity in Palestine was consumed by Jews, whereas four-fifths of Arab lighting needs were met with charcoal and kerosene. It is easy to imagine the conclusions drawn by those using Sidebotham’s metrics. Indeed, the grid figured prominently in discussions over how to draw the borders between the Jewish and Arab entities in deliberations over partition in the last decade of the Mandate. For instance, the British partition commission that followed up on the Peel Report’s proposal for partition argued that since “only a small part of the electric energy produced by the Palestine Electric Corporation is sold to consumers in the Arab State outlined,” the borders of the Jewish State “should be modified so as to include” vital points of the power system, including the hydroelectrical station on the Jordan River.49 In fact, every partition proposal after this one included the PEC’s hydroelectrical power station on the Jordan River as well as the entirety of the company’s high-tension network in the area proposed for the Jewish state. Even the Morrison-Grady plan from 1946, which recommended allocating only 17 percent of the land to the Jewish state, nevertheless supported the inclusion of the area around the hydroelectrical works, as well as all high-tension transmission lines.50

Of course, in the end, none of the numerous partition proposals that were presented in the decade from 1937 to 1947 ended up deciding the borders. It was troop placement and armistice negotiations that decided the shape of the future Jewish state. Nevertheless, the obvious importance of industry and infrastructure in considering the border proposals demonstrates the central role they occupied in the minds of colonial officials and the international community at the time. And the fog of war notwithstanding, it is hardly a coincidence that the transmission network remained wholly within the borders of Israel by the end of hostilities in 1949. What is more, the high-tension line that ran between the Jordan powerhouse and Tel Aviv and had been built more than a decade before the 1948 War, clearly traces out the border between Israel and the West Bank, which since 1967 has been under Israeli occupation. Almost all of the Arab towns that the powerline passed – Kawkab al-Hawa, Danna, Kafra, Sirin, Lajjun, and so forth – were depopulated in 1948.51

The rapid expansion of the electric supply system was critical to allowing the continued growth of the Yishuv, enabling it to go on taking in large amounts of immigrants every year. This further increased demand, which allowed the company to
continue growing, and so on, in a virtuous circle of exponential growth of the system and the Jewish population. The number of Jews in Palestine jumped from about 175,000 in 1931 to 474,000 in 1939. With the immigrants came capital; an estimated fifty million Palestine pounds arrived with the immigrants of those years, four-fifths of which was private.52 During the same period, the size of the grid more than doubled and electricity consumption grew by a factor of ten.

The Palestinian Arab experience was starkly different. To begin with, the Mandate period witnessed a mass exodus of Arabs from the Jewish labor market. In 1922, Arabs made up 13.6 percent of the labor in Jewish-run enterprises; by 1935, that figure had declined to 8.5, and the following year, with the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, it underwent another precipitous drop to 3.7 percent. The trend held through the Mandate period, and by 1945 it was down to 1.7 percent. Thus, the decline predated the revolt, which lasted until 1939, and continued steadily after it.

During the period of the Yishuv’s exponential growth, the Arab economy raised almost no new capital at all.53 Thus, as Amos Nadan has argued, the different strategies of Arabs and Jews – in which, to most outside observers, the Arabs compared unfavorably – was a function on each side of rational responses to widely differing circumstances, especially with respect to the relative cost of labor and capital. Whereas in the Jewish sector, capital was easily come by and labor dear, the opposite obtained in the Arab sector. For the Jews, it made sense to invest in capital-intensive cultivation methods and industry. In the Arab sector, by contrast, where labor was cheap and credit largely unavailable, it made sense to employ people for the tasks that fell on machines in “modern” agriculture.54 (Of course, conditions in the Arab sector were no less products of “modernity” than the Jewish sector.) The same conditions explain why Arab agriculture did not transition into specialization; the sizable investment required in the short-to-medium term made such a move prohibitive.55

The same dynamic obtained in the domain of electrification, where in the Arab community the benefits of electrification did not, by and large, justify the initial capital outlay required. Moreover, as we have seen through the case of Nablus’s non-
electrification, the electricity market was keyed to the Jewish economy, thus making less capital-intensive, slower, and more gradual growth impossible, while the exclusive rights of the power company under the concession prevented the Arabs from undertaking any alternative electrification schemes. What is more, as a result of the nature of the power system, to Zionists industry and nation evolved together in a mutually supportive way. To the Palestinians, the opposite was true. As we saw in Nablus, connecting to the PEC’s power system was seen as a threat to national aspirations. Not nation and industry, as was the case for the Zionists; nation or industry.

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Endnotes


2 Because of a prior concession granted by the Ottoman government in 1914, Jerusalem constituted an exception. Jerusalem will not be discussed here.


4 Letter from “the Arab Association” in Nablus to the PEC, 26 February 1940, Israel Electric Corporation Archives (hereafter IECA) 0429-1135.

5 Al-Jami’a al-Islamiyya, 7 September 1932.


7 Editorial, Mira at al-Sharq, 19 December 1934.


10 Minutes of conversation between Shapira and the deputy mayor of Nablus, Afif Ashour, and the Nablus notable Hilmi al-Fotiani on 2 December 1934; report dated 31 December 1934, IECA 0429-1135. See also letter from A. Koch, 31 May 1934, and the PEC’s reply, 4 June 1934, IECA 0429-1135.

11 M. Jakobson to PEC, 18 December 1933, IECA 0429-1135; Nur Match Company to PEC, 24 December 1933; Baharaw to Nur, 10 January 1934, IECA 0429-1135.

12 Unsigned and undated internal PEC memo, IECA 0429-1135.


14 “Arab Nablus,” Filastin, 24 June 1933.


[ 20 ] Nation or Industry: The Non-Electrification of Nablus | Fredrik Meiton
Nablus Mayor Tuqan was part of the opposition faction and was in favor of bringing electricity to Nablus. So were all the other members of the municipal council who supported the idea: Ahmad al-Shak’a, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nabulsi, Taher Masri, Nimr al-Nabulsi, Rashid Masri. M. Jakobson to PEC, 18 February 1934, IECA 0429-1135; Imil al-Ghuri, “The Crime in Nablus,” al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, January 1, 1935; Filastin, whose editor ‘Isa al-'Isa was also a member of the opposition, published a reply to Ghuri, rejecting his accusations: Filastin, 12 January 1935.

“Nablus Wants Electricity,” Palestine Post, 16 December 1934.


The triangle’s three points were Tulkarm, Nablus, and Jenin. Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 58.

Rutenberg to Board, 3 October 1938, IECA 2372-1.


It is true, however, that 1937 saw a marked slowdown as the growth rate fell to 14 percent, the slowest of the mandate period. 19 March 1938, IECA 2372-1.

_Filastin: Economic Annual of Palestine_ 1937, 20, ISA M-5331/5.

Matthews, *Confronting*, 258.


_Palnews_, 22, ISA M-5331/5.

Prices in the Jewish market were 21 percent higher on average. Nadan, *Palestinian Peasant Economy*, 24.

_Palnews_, 20–22, ISA M-5331/5.

*Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1940*, ISA M-4512.


Letter signed “Arab Association” in Nablus to PEC, 26 February 1940, IECA 0429-1135.

Newton to Shapiro, January 10, 1940; Shapiro to Newton, 31 January 1940, IECA 0429-1135.

Rutenberg’s report to the Board, 21 May 1940, IECA 2372-1.

Minutes of meeting at the Haifa head office, 11 February 1945.

Minutes of meeting at the Haifa head office, 11 February 1945, IECA 0429-1135.


See article giving a critical account of the Nablus Municipality’s negotiations with the PEC, _Nida’ al-Ard_, 11 August 1947; two days later in a letter to the editor, Mahmud Nabih al-Bitar, Nablus town clerk, defended the negotiations and the agreement that was about to be made between Nablus and the
PEC, *Nida’al-Ard*, 19 August 1947. An article by special correspondent, Nablus, titled “The Lighting of Nablus by Motors Instead of Rutenberg,” *Filastin*, 26 August 1947, describes the group of “hidden hands” who are working against the negotiations with the PEC; another article by special correspondent, Nablus, titled “Electricity in Nablus and the Government’s Loan to the Municipality,” *Filastin*, 27 August 1947, contains, among other things, an interview with the mayor of Nablus, defending the negotiations.

43 Letter signed by the Arab League Committee to Boycott Zionist Goods to the PEC, 8 July 1946, IECA 0429-1132.


45 Actually, this matter was first pursued through Jordanian courts in 1958–61; the suit was settled in Nablus’s favor, but no payments were made. PEC to counsel, Lifshitz and Associates, 28 December 1858, IECA 0429-1132-28; S. Horowitz and Co. to Israel Electric Corp., December 14, 1967, IECA 0429-1132-8; unsigned legal opinion, dated 10 January 1968, IECA 0429-1132-7; and “Schem toaat mechev’ hacheshmal 60,000 lirot falastinit,” *Ma’ariv*, 25 March 1968, IECA 0429-1132.


54 Nadan, *Palestinian Peasant Economy*, 200.

Introduction

When we review Israeli plans for the so-called national parks, which include archeological sites and “green areas,” we can see that they are drawn more or less in accordance with British urban planner Patrick Geddes’ scheme, as presented in the maps below. The various Israeli plans, all based on Geddes’, are clearly propaganda aiming at minimizing the Palestinian cultural landscape of the Old City and its environs and maximizing its Israeli-Jewish narrative. The result of these policy documents, if fully implemented, would be the destruction of most of the neighborhoods of Silwan and the expulsion of a great number of families. The term “national parks” is very attractive, but misleading. Simultaneous with approving the “national” and archaeological plans
for the area located to the south of the Old City, the Israeli authorities also approved the construction of a huge multilevel Kedem settler compound just twenty meters to the south of the city wall: while Israel claims that protection of the cultural landscape must be implemented in Silwan’s Bustan neighborhood (500 meters south of the Old City), it has no problem with the construction of the settler Kedem compound in the buffer zone adjacent to the city wall.

Much has been written about the use of planning for human settlement structures as a tool for political, ethnic, and religious control, in addition to, of course, controlling social classes, and there is no need to discuss this here.1 Also much has been written on the successive building plans for Jerusalem, whether during the British Mandate or after the Israeli occupation of the city. These plans have become a factor in the expulsion and impoverishment of Palestinian Jerusalemites, and an essential tool for controlling the smallest details of their daily lives; it dictates their housing conditions, livelihoods, and development or the lack of it, as well as population growth or decline, the quality of life, daily movement, and even the quality of the air they breathe – not to mention the scenery a Jerusalemite is allowed to set eyes on. On the other hand, these plans opened the door for the colonizers to build their colonies on Palestinian lands and enjoy the breathtaking nature of Jerusalem’s mountains. They provided the incentives needed to encourage settlement in the eastern part of the city, where Palestinians live under the grinding grip of settlement activity and the segregation wall. Moreover, these same plans turned the western part of the city, which was more developed even before 1948, into a flourishing modern city that attracts investment and functions as a modern urban hub.

In the eastern part, Jerusalem’s Palestinians remain to suffer from cultural and social pressures, population overcrowding, political repression, and lack of a political horizon, all in the name of the law, which was drafted precisely and amended numerous times throughout the more than fifty years of occupation, exactly for that purpose. Appropriate mechanisms were put in place to ensure implementation of the plans and to enable the expropriation and demolition of homes, paving of roads, separating Palestinian neighborhoods from each other, and stripping them of all elements crucial for economic and social viability, to keep them absolutely dependent on the western part of the city, its services and labor market.2

Moreover, successive building plans, especially after 1967, aimed not only to control the territories occupied in June 1967 – the plans resulted in Israeli control of almost 87 percent of the eastern part – but also to achieve a Jewish majority. In this way, Palestinians could be turned into a minority living in isolated neighborhoods, and with the reality of the segregation wall, surrounded by Jewish settlements that can be further expanded and developed. In fact, the majority of the population in the eastern part is Palestinian still, and control over the population in what is known as “unified Jerusalem” has not been successful. Palestinians make up more than 40 percent of Jerusalem’s total population, but all these developments have been at the expense of Palestinians who now live in isolated neighborhoods, suffering very complicated and dire social and economic circumstances. In principle, these quarters cannot be improved without
a revolutionary change in the city’s components, which cannot be attained without a long wearisome journey, and only decades after ending the occupation and drawing master plans that cater to the various developmental needs of the residents. Of course, master planning cannot be separated from legislation and bylaws that complement what master planning does not manage to address.3

This brief review assumes that initial principles for Israeli master plans were not set up after June 1967 and the occupation of the rest of Jerusalem, despite the numerous amendments that were introduced, but actually much earlier than that. The master plan foundations for the city were in fact developed by the urban planner Patrick Geddes (1854–1932). But before explaining and commenting on his plan, we should acknowledge that British occupation did not waste any time in drawing up plans for Jerusalem according to its own vision of the city’s future, with the vision of establishing a Jewish entity in Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital according to the Balfour Declaration.

William McLean, the Beginning

The first city planner brought by the British occupation to Jerusalem was William McLean, who worked as an engineer in Alexandria, Egypt, to present ideas for town schemes for Jerusalem.4 In his plan, McLean divided Jerusalem into four zones. The first was the Old City; here, according to his plan, building was absolutely impermissible in order to preserve the historical and cultural identity of the city, being part of world (Western!) heritage. The second zone, located in the environs of the Old City, was vacant of any structures. He suggested that any unnecessary structures in that zone should be removed to create a green belt to protect the Old City from urban development and recreate the imagined ancient biblical Jerusalem. The third zone was located in the north and northeast of the Old City, where building would be possible according to specific conditions and permits (he possibly had in mind some projects that he did not reveal).5 Finally, the fourth zone was located to the north and west of the Old City; this zone was to be developed and expanded, and consisted mainly of the Jewish neighborhoods near the Old City, meaning that the only development intended was mainly for the Jewish neighborhoods.

McLean had established the intellectual foundations for the formation of Jerusalem: a Jerusalem with an eastern part that is denied development and growth, while the Old City will be preserved as a museum for the Western world to keep the portrayed image of Jerusalem alive, as if the city is still living in biblical times, while development and growth happens in the western part of the city, where a Jewish majority lived, or was on its way to becoming so.6 The separation between the Old City and the rest of Jerusalem, growing outside the gates, assumes that the fate of old Jerusalem should substantially differ from that of new Jerusalem, instead of new Jerusalem being an extension of it. McLean’s plans for the Old City, encircled by the Ottoman walls, reinforced this separation and surrounded it with a green
protective belt extending east to include the Mount Olives and al-‘Ayzariya until the south of Silwan, where the water system and the archaeological sites are located. It also extended several kilometers to the northeast to include Mount Scopus, which is actually the northwestern extension of the Mount of Olives.7 Indeed, McLean’s ideas are considered the foundation on which his successor Patrick Geddes built his work, but with clearer and closer connections to the Zionist movement.

Sir Patrick Geddes: Delegated by the Zionest Movement

Many researchers have written about Patrick Geddes and in a number of languages8 due to his place as one the most important – if not the most important – of city planners in the early twentieth century. He left his mark around the world, especially in the United Kingdom, India, and Palestine.9 Geddes, of Scottish origin, lived during the apex of the British colonial era in India and the Middle East. He was a product of the conservative orientalist movement which aimed to tighten its grip over the colonies, and grew up glorifying the empire on which the sun never sets. The man excelled in multiple disciplines, from biology to sociology and geography, but he was most famous for being an urban planner who utilized his knowledge in other disciplines in an innovative way. Many consider him a kind of prophet in the field of urban planning, as his name was associated with unprecedented innovation and sensitivity to all that is humanitarian and environmental. In fact, Geddes’ concepts in urban planning have been used as principles in many schemes in various parts of the world.10 We do not intend to discuss here his high environmental awareness and his social approach to planning; he proposed undeniable innovations and led a school that had significant influence for decades in the field of urban planning, and in world culture. It will suffice here to look at his plans for the city of Jerusalem, and not examine his plans for Tel Aviv, the first Zionist urban colony in Palestine.11

First, we should note that Geddes was celebrated and praised in Israeli fora by urban planners, geographers, and historians alike. They commended his innovative work in the “Land of Israel,” which reflected a nationalist (Jewish) vision. He is considered the godfather of using the tools of urban planning for the protection and renovation of Jewish physical culture (not very different from the idea of renovating the Land of Israel that was popular within Evangelical/Messianic circles).12 Geddes’ plan for Jerusalem can only be understood as reflecting his desire to realize the Jewish dream in the land of Palestine – which makes him a firm Zionist – who was employed by the Zionist movement to realize its goals. For Geddes, Jerusalem was an integral part of “Jewish Heritage,” and developing plans to protect this heritage was of utmost importance, while other factors become complications that required an innovative approach to solve.

Geddes came with ideas from his Western Evangelical Zionist background to develop a plan for the realization of the Jewish State in Palestine.13 It is indeed possible to review Geddes’ work using post-colonial theory, and the concepts of preservation of physical cultural heritage, which were new at the time. His work, in fact, can be
examined as an employment of the excessive planning powers by a representative of the authority and a reflection of its planning intentions. It is important to refer here to the European Western influence, as it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on Eastern societies, including Jerusalem. These societies were considered to be underdeveloped and unaware of their own interests, and requiring the machinery of colonization, including its experts, intellectuals, and urban planners who were more capable of understanding the reality of the East, even more than the locals themselves.

This understanding excludes the historical, cultural, and social contexts of the city, as if the planner might be drawing up the scheme in London. A planner today cannot think in the same way Geddes did: urban planning has developed using concepts of participatory planning that involves local communities in planning the space they will
be active in, and the responsiveness of the plan to the social and economic needs of the city they are planning. Otherwise the outcome would defeat the purpose of the plan, by turning it into a restrictive factor to urban development instead of a driver for it. Since Jerusalem is still under occupation, Geddes’ concepts are still relevant, and have been implemented to a great extent. Indeed, the Israeli occupation does not take into consideration the interests of Palestinians in Jerusalem while planning for the city; on the contrary, it excludes Palestinians and aims to control them.

From an objective point of view, Geddes could only have presented a plan that meets the needs of the British colonization in Palestine, mandated by the League of Nations, and facilitate the establishment of a Jewish entity there (the Mandate document). As for the Palestinian population, they were perceived as a complication that should be solved or an obstacle that should be removed.

Geddes was known to be creative in social and organic planning, and in integrating nature in urban planning, but while working on Jerusalem’s scheme, he failed to adopt any of his theories and followed an ideology instead. He lost his insight – for which planners sang praises for decades after his passing – and became a tool for the British Zionist colonization project.

The British colonization in Palestine commissioned Geddes in 1919 to present town planning schemes in full coordination with the Zionist movement and its leadership, especially Chaim Weizmann and others in London. Geddes’ ideas, which are actually an amendment to McLean’s scheme which failed to impress the Zionist movement, became a foundation for a master plan scheme for Jerusalem. He presented a brief report that included the main principles (the report was never published), accompanied by a map of the Old City and its vicinity. The year before, in 1918, he was commissioned by the Zionist Federation to design the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which he developed with his son-in-law, Frank Mears. Geddes chose a location for the university overlooking al-Aqsa Mosque, which to his mind represented the “Temple Mount,” from which inspiration was to be taken for sources of knowledge as well as for its political project, especially that they would be linked on the scientific and cultural level, and that the university should embody all of these concepts.

Structures in old Jerusalem lacked a formal plan, since they developed in an organic accumulative manner at almost consistent heights, and reflected the various historical periods and the spirit of the different eras they witnessed, integrating between the different architectural schools and making up a rather beautiful intricate fabric. However, Geddes’ scheme of the Hebrew University portrayed organized buildings, including a number of magnificent castles that belonged more to the world of “biblical” myths. The scheme of the Hebrew University expresses the Orientalist spirit that was popular during Geddes’ time; some of the sketches are comparable to drawings made by European travelers and researchers after visiting Jerusalem in the nineteenth century, which portrayed the city from the Western perspective, and reflected more of what they wanted Jerusalem to look like rather than how it really was.

What is interesting about the scheme is that its focal point is a large dome, mirroring the Dome of the Rock, which performs the function of the temple inside the university.
The dome attracted much attention and has become one of the university’s distinctive symbols, and a holy body on its own. In his design of the dome, Geddes kept in mind the idea of synagogues built in late Ottoman style in Jerusalem (Classic Ottoman), such as Hurva synagogue and Tiferet Yisrael synagogue. To be fair, Geddes tried very hard in his design of the main hall to insert some elements from the culture of monotheistic religions – and this may be the reason behind the rejection of the Zionist movement for the design of this hall, because they insisted that all buildings should reflect pure biblical Judaism.

The Hebrew University was a Zionist priority, promoted internationally to prove the “exceptional capability” of Jews, as well as their right in the land of Palestine. They invested significantly in it, and considered it a religious and national symbol of the utmost importance. The Zionist movement decided in its conference in Vienna in 1913 to build the Hebrew University, to revive the “Hebrew Identity” and the old heritage in the “Land of Israel.” Indeed, the idea of the Hebrew University, including the design of its buildings, was linked to the idea of rebuilding the third temple on the ruins of al-Aqsa Mosque.

The association of the suggested university with the rebuilding of the temple had a significant impact on the university’s image. Since then, the university has become one with the temple in an identical prominent mythical image. Mount Scopus became the selected location for the erection of the university, as if it was chosen by a divine decree. Geddes’ Presbyterian upbringing (some attribute the origins of Presbyterianism to Scotland, Geddes’ home), which respects the Zionist idea of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine, was evident in his work.

Jerusalem’s Scheme

The short, thirty-three-page report in which Geddes presented his vision for Jerusalem’s scheme was never published and remained a written document. The report does not include many details, but it does contain guiding principles and a map demonstrating his vision. In the introduction, Geddes writes that Jerusalem’s military governor, Colonel Ronald Storrs, summoned him on July 1919 in London and asked him to develop a report to improve Jerusalem’s scheme. After coordinating with representatives of the Zionist movement in London, Geddes travelled to Jerusalem in September of that year. Since the time he spent in Jerusalem was not enough to complete the assignment, he considered his report to be a guide for the main ideas and preliminary planning concepts. He mentioned that he will visit Jerusalem again to discuss the matter with specialists in various disciplines and will accordingly write a detailed report.

The main challenge that faced Geddes in drawing up a plan for Jerusalem was that at that time the city was traditionally oriental in every sense. Only recently emerging from World War I, Jerusalem, despite the appearance of modern neighborhoods around it, had an Arab, Islamic, and Eastern Christian style. Modernity could only be seen in the new European style neighborhoods that had adopted modern urban development approaches.
Western organizations from various religious and civil fields flourished in these neighborhoods, situated in buildings that were exaggerated in size, beauty, and national and religious symbols, in a city that was otherwise relatively humble. Moreover, several modern European buildings were planted in the Old City in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. But in the Western mentality and consequently Geddes’ mentality, Jerusalem in its essence is the Old City, where the buildings and religious sites were concentrated, and where the religious and historical heritage accumulated within its walls and in their close vicinity. Interestingly, for Geddes, his perception of all that is old in Jerusalem and its vicinity was his understanding of the Old Testament and the Jerusalem landscape. The terraces surrounding the foothills of Jerusalem’s mountains evoked for him the Old Testament. Of course, these terraces can be found on most of Palestine’s mountains and date mainly to the Ottoman era; so how do they remind him of the Old Testament? The issue at hand here is the imagined Jerusalem, while the historical reality was of no importance to him. Noah Hysler Rubin writes about Geddes’ biblical aspiration:
He later expressed his admiration of the Zionist society in Palestine, picturing its recent homecoming as the re-instatement of a biblical entity in the Holy Land and assigning it the ancient role of a regional leader among its neighbouring countries.22

To begin, Geddes conducted an intensive survey of the city to identify its topography and main landmarks. He then studied the available maps and gathered information on the population. He used statistics to create a database, and through that tedious work he developed an impression of the city. Geddes stated at the beginning of the report that the dimensions used in the available maps of the city were not accurate; there was a deviation of about one hundred meters, and an accurate map of Jerusalem should be drawn. He reported being glad to learn that Jerusalem’s municipal engineer was working on that, and using the maps of the Palestine Exploration Fund (1872–77) as the foundation for the new survey.

Taking a somewhat different approach from that of his predecessor, McLean, about the relationship between the old and new parts of the city, Geddes stressed that any planning process should start with the Old City, and afterwards it would be possible to think about the new city which should be connected to the old one. According to the report, he held that planning should begin in the Old City and the area located directly to the east of it, where only a minimum number of buildings should be erected since it was possibly the most important and holiest park in the world (as simple as that!). The planning for urban development should concentrate on the area north of Damascus Gate and Jaffa Street, which means the areas to the north, northwest, northeast, and south of the Old City. He recommended that work begin along the “New Axis,” beginning at the Ottoman train station, and organized in a way that immediately gave arrivals (coming from Europe, of course) the impression that they are in the Holy City that they have dreamt about, and hence that their fate is manifesting directly in front of them.

His ideas for the Old City were consistent with the expected outcome of his assignment: protection of the city’s cultural heritage and identity by forbidding new construction, and renovating the city and developing the services provided for its residents and visitors, of which both goals are important and unobjectionable. One problem for him about the Old City was al-Buraq Wall (he refers to it only as the Wailing Wall in the report). In order to expose the wall and the area around it, he suggested the demolition of a number of buildings known as “the Moroccan Village” (the Mughrabi quarter) located closest to the wall, until the rest of the residents were relocated and the remaining buildings could be demolished by the municipality.23 In this way, the visible area of al-Buraq Wall could be doubled easily (as simple as that!). He also suggested demolishing a building next to Tankaziyya School (located to the west) and building steps that would lead directly to al-Buraq Wall from Bab al-Silsila Road without passing through the Mughrabi Quarter, to stress the centrality of al-Buraq Wall and improve accessibility.24 Geddes writes:
The decongestion of the southern and mainly the Jewish portion of the Old City is thus easily practicable. The village of the Moghrabi Arabs should also be attended. Some of those who require to remain in the city may be rehoused along the vacant areas immediately west or south of their present homes; while it also need not be impossible by and by, when archaeological enquiries are fully satisfied, to house a small group of them outside the walls upon some portion of the southward slope.25

In his vision for the future of Jerusalem, Geddes focused on the centrality of the Old City given its religious significance and biblical background, on the one hand, and the idea that this city will become the Jewish capital (Balfour Declaration), on the other. His basis was that the historical Hebrew state formed the foundation of Western Christian civilization, and so he allocated the east and south part of the Old City, including Silwan neighborhood, for a “national park,” where construction was not permitted. With that decision, he denied the eastern part of the city any chance of development, leaving the possibility open only in the north, where structures had been built decades earlier, and
where a number of Western organizations were already rooted (such as the German Paulus House, known as Schmidt Girls School, opposite Damascus Gate, École biblique et archéologique française, the British Mutran School, and St. George Cathedral), and cannot be touched. If otherwise, he would have presented a different suggestion for the northern area; instead, he allocated a green belt in front of the city’s northern gate, which would require tearing down several buildings erected near Damascus Gate.

Noticeably, the scheme extends over Mount Scopus, taking a shape that resembled a long tongue, which allowed abundant land on which to build the Hebrew University. Geddes considered the university project to be vital to support the ideas of Judaism and biblicism, and in the interests of the project he did not hesitate to give up the idea of the green zone which he imposed on the whole of the surrounding area. This was consistent with the idea of Zionism, given the importance of the university’s role in reviving biblical heritage and embedding it in Jerusalem through the university’s various disciplines: archaeology, history, geography, and Jewish theology. Moreover, there was the possibility of turning the Hebrew University into a regional university, and, if that evolved, then there was no harm in violating some of his principles.26

The rest of the report includes useful principles that relate to the western part of Jerusalem, while development in the eastern part was restricted as much as possible. Thus, Geddes actually split the city into two parts: a restricted eastern part with no chance of developing or becoming modern; and a western part with all the features necessary for modern development.

Geddes also did not mention the relationship between the city and the rural area surrounding it, because his vision was completely city-centric. He thought only about preventing the expansion of villages surrounding Jerusalem, although in fact they are considered to be city neighborhoods (Silwan south and southeast of the Old City, and al-Tur on the Mount of Olives, for example). To guarantee their limitation, Geddes included the lands and structures of these neighborhoods in the “holy” green belt which protects the archaeological and architectural remains from the Old Testament and “Great Israel” with all its manifestations as described in the Old Testament. As for the complementary relationship between rural and urban areas, which has existed forever, he did not address this since it was not within his vision for the Holy City: reviving the Holy Landscape as portrayed in the Old Testament and as he believes it should be.

Geddes did not undertake the next step as promised in his report; no information is available on why he did not complete his plan, which was completed by Charles Ashbee, the civic advisor to the British Mandate, and chairman of the Pro-Jerusalem Society.27

It is not possible to understand Geddes’ scheme without referring to McLean’s scheme and the architect Charles Ashbee’s directions, which he included in his vision of the biblical city, after he polished them according to his planning vision. Geddes even stressed that buildings should maintain the traditional shape – flat roofs or small domes. He advised against using tiled saddle roofs, which were beginning to be seen in the city, although they reflect modernity and introduce new construction material, nevertheless they deform the holy scene as imagined by Geddes.28 His plan was built on the basis of the imagined past, the past that had become popular in the UK in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the publications of that era were replete with details about the glorious past of the “Jewish State,” that will be rebuilt.

For Geddes, planning the city of Jerusalem was a realization of a dream built on a religious vision, in addition to being a chance for him to leave his fingerprint on one of the most important cities in the world, which would guarantee him professional and personal esteem. Geddes never tried to hide these facts while working in Palestine. His work was shown in an important international exhibition in London before touring various cities in India. Through his participation in the exhibition, Geddes wanted to show how the great cities that have contributed in writing human history can be approached. The same exhibition was organized in Jerusalem in 1920 and inaugurated by the mayor at the time, Ragheb al-Nashashibi. It is interesting to read here from a press release summary of the inaugural speech:

Mr. Nashashibi, the mayor of Jerusalem, stressed the importance of bringing Eastern and Western cultures together, and he expressed his hope for the success of the High Commissioner’s ambitious program to improve the situation in Palestine. Mr. Ussishkin, who welcomed the audience in the name of the Zionist Movement, said that the Zionist Movement is the organization that brought Geddes to Palestine.

Geddes did suggest establishing a museum near the location of the current Palestine Archaeological Museum (Rockefeller Museum) as part of a series of museums, including a museum of war history in the citadel of Jerusalem, to document the various battles the city was involved in throughout its glorious history. The museum he suggested was meant to exhibit the glory of David and Solomon, and Israel’s long history, as well as present the development of the city throughout history. History has a major role to play: it will lead to the establishment of the state of Israel and the turning of Jerusalem into a Jewish capital, and the conclusion that the city needs to be revived and modernized to recover its glorious deep-rooted past. This is how Geddes imagined the Jerusalem museum, to which he did not give a name:

In fact, the long history of Israel, from the Patriarchs to the present . . . how attractive will be a series of good Relief Models of Jerusalem, illustrating . . . the extent and character of the city from its earliest Jebusite days, to its glories under David, its greatness under Solomon, and so on throughout its chequered history. In the sketch it will be noted that those Galleries, namely: (1) those of Geography (2) general history and (3) of Hebrew and Jerusalem history, all lead into a final Gallery, for the renewing Palestine with its developing Cities and Capital.
Figure 7. “National Parks in East Jerusalem,” Emek Shaveh; online at alt-arch.org/en/national-parks-in-jerusalem/ (accessed 29 July 2019).
From Geddes to Israeli Occupation

The British Mandate was not able to implement all of Geddes’ suggestions due to factors relating to its lack of absolute control over the ground, and the expansion of the city in the eastern part, which except for the Jewish quarter in the Old City, did not have any Jewish residents. The separation and segregation of Palestinians and Jewish settlers, which began after al-Buraq uprising in 1929, and the Arab Revolt in 1936–39, concentrated Jewish settlement in the western part of the city. The city in fact turned into two cities; even the Jewish quarter in the Old City was isolated from the rest of the city by cement walls and barriers erected by the British Mandate, although there were some mixed neighborhoods in the western part. The 1948 war put an end to urban development plans in Jerusalem, although the comprehensive building scheme was completed by Henry Kendall.34 Israel commenced the planning process based on what was already completed, but against a background that focused on controlling more territory while controlling population growth.

Israel did not wait long to implement Geddes’ plan and remove the Mughrabi quarter: bulldozers tore down the quarter in June 1967, even before the war was over. It also went much further and turned al-Buraq plaza into a huge Jewish center, established more projects there, and connected them with a series of tunnels.35

As for green areas, most of which Jordan had preserved when Jerusalem was under its administration (1948–67), Israel started to gradually implement all of these plans through successive master plan schemes under various names and numbers after 1967 – according to Kendell’s plan36 which was based on the concepts Geddes laid out in 1919. It legislated these schemes through urban planning laws and bylaws and called them “national parks.” It can be noticed through the enclosed parks map that most of these parks are located in the eastern part of the city, and isolate the Old City from nearby Palestinian neighborhoods, especially those in the east and south, as if it is a segregation wall disguised as a civilized front of “green parks” surrounding the eastern part of the Old City. They vastly exaggerated implementation in the southern (Silwan) area: the parks extended much farther than Geddes suggested, and were clearly linked to settlement aspirations in this area. This is where environmental and settlement goals mixed to force Palestinians out of the area through non-stop excavations, and aggressive activities by settler associations, especially Elad, in this area.

What is known today as the “National Park” in East Jerusalem is in reality a Palestinian residential neighborhood where tens of thousands of people live, hence making the “green” area a weapon pointed at the heads of residents, restricting their movement and growth, and rendering them incapable of dealing with long lists of restrictions and prohibitions written in Hebrew. This area also includes Muslim cemeteries, which extend along the eastern wall of the Old City, where even the dead are paying the price of the “national parks.”37

The changes Israel made to Geddes’ plan are obvious: they excluded the Jewish cemetery, located on the western foothill of the Mount of Olives, from the National Park, because Jewish holy graveyards cannot become “parks,” while Muslim cemeteries
located along the eastern wall of the Old City can be categorized as parks, as they are not as holy as the Jewish ones. Thus they can even be obliterated for purposes of development as has happened to the historic Mamilla cemetery.38

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Endnotes
1 See example Rassem Khamaisi, “Restructuring the Urban Perimeter for Jerusalem, the Heart of the Palestinian State,” Hawlayat al-Quds 16 (Fall/Winter 2013): 37–50.
4 William McLean, “PALESTINE 18, City of Jerusalem Town Planning Scheme, 1918,” National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, UK. The report was never published.

5 This area was already occupied by several western institutions as well as a Muslim cemetery (maqbarat bab al-sahira). It is not clear why Geddes wanted to restrict building activities there.

6 The idea of the division of the city into two parts in the urban plans of the British Mandate and the occupation was pointed out by researcher Nicolas Roberts. For his important article, see Nicolas E. Roberts, “Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 42, no. 4 (2013): 26–70.


9 He developed master plans for Tiberias, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, focusing on cities that had considerable numbers of Jews at the beginning of the British Mandate. We can infer the obvious objectives for planning these cities under the Zionist project.

10 Geddes is celebrated in Scotland: the University of Dundee named an institute in his honor, the Geddes Institute for Urban Research, online at www.dundee.ac.uk/geddesinstitute/ (accessed 29 July 2019); and Edinburgh has named an educational and cultural center in its Old Town for him, the Patrick Geddes Centre at Riddle’s Court, online at www.patrickgeddescentre.org.uk (accessed 30 July 2019).


13 Geddes was celebrated in Israel for his awareness and deep knowledge of Jewish heritage in Palestine, and employing this knowledge in planning for the establishment of a Jewish state. He was even considered a partner in the dream of establishing Israel, as his plans and ideas are still important elements in the planning of cities in Israel. His creativity was his ability to combine
the colonial policy of the British Mandate, with his adoption of Zionist aspirations in planning. He was able to demonstrate his vision by using architecture, artefacts, and holy sites in Jerusalem to prove Jewish history there, and hence turn Jerusalem into a Jewish city that serves this heritage. See the debate in Noah Hysler-Rubin, “Geography, Colonialism, and Town Planning: Patrick Geddes’ Plan for Mandatory Jerusalem,” Cultural Geographies, 18, 2 (2011): 231–48.

14 The complete unpublished report is available in several libraries. My thanks to Jack Persekian for providing me with a copy. Patrick Geddes, “Jerusalem Actual and Possible: A Report to the Chief Administrator of Palestine and the Military Governor of Jerusalem on Town Planning and City Improvements,” November 1919.

15 Frank Mears (1880–1953) was a Scottish architect and urban planner from 1930–50. In addition to his work with Geddes he worked from 1925–29 with the Jewish architect, Benjamin Chaikin, designing a number of buildings in the Hebrew University.

16 See, for example, sketches in William Henry Bartlett, Jerusalem Revisited (London: A. Hall, Virtue & Co., 1855).

17 The Zionist movement did not adopt all of Geddes’ schemes for the Hebrew University, as there were some disagreements. It was partially implemented, including the library, and the math and physics building. His son-in-law continued the work on the university’s schemes.


20 Several letters were exchanged between the office of architect Richard Kauffmann in Kristiania (now Oslo) and the Zionist Organization in London. One dated 23 January 1920 concerns the Geddes report (the report was annexed to the letter for Kauffmann’s comments). Kauffmann moved to Palestine later that year and became chief architect of the Zionist movement.


23 Geddes stressed that the demolishing should be implemented by the municipality and not by the Jewish community; see Geddes, “Jerusalem Actual and Possible,” 11.


26 In his report Geddes celebrates the Hebrew University: “It is gratifying therefore that the long dreamed University will now soon begin its work. Dr Weizmann having decided to bring his distinguished research experience to the initiative of research laboratories in the outbuilding of the Gray Hill House”; Geddes, “Jerusalem Actual and Possible,” 30.

27 British architect and designer Charles Ashbee (1863–1942) was appointed civic adviser to the British Mandate of Palestine in 1918, overseeing building works and the protection of historic sites and monuments as the chairman of the Pro-Jerusalem Society. Ashbee wrote a kind of terms of reference for the Geddes mission in Jerusalem. In the Geddes report there are several references to the Pro-Jerusalem Society, which means actually Ashbee. For details regarding Ashbee, see Wendy Pullan and Lefkos Kyriacou, “The work of Charles Ashbee: Ideological Urban Visions with Everyday City Spaces,” in Jerusalem Quarterly 39 (2009): 51-61. The other city plans of Jerusalem are reviewed by Henry Kendall, Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development during the British Mandate.
29 Ragheb al-Nashashibi (1880–1951) was appointed mayor of Jerusalem by the British Mandate after Musa Kazim al-Husayni was removed from office in 1920. He stayed in his position as mayor until 1934; afterwards Husayn al-Khalidi was elected mayor before he was removed by the British Mandate and a Jewish mayor (Daniel Esther) was appointed as mayor in 1937.
30 Quoted in Rubin, Geography, Colonialism, and Town Planning, 238. Menachem Ussishkin (1863–1941) was a Russian Zionist leader who settled in Jerusalem in 1919 and became president of the Jewish National Fund; he remained in that position until his death.
31 The idea of war museums was popular in Britain and Scotland at the time. The museums exhibited old and modern weapons and detailed the glorious battles in the history of the nation. Therefore, it was not unusual for Geddes to suggest establishing a war museum in Jerusalem where many battles were witnessed that are described in detail in the Old Testament.
32 Geddes, “Jerusalem Actual and Possible,” 27. Israel turned Geddes’ dream into reality, as it established a museum for Jerusalem’s history in the citadel after 1967 that serves the goals he mentioned in his report. For more on the museum, see Tower of David museum, online at www.tod.org.il/en/ (accessed 12 July 2019). As for the National Museum, the British Mandate established it a few meters away from the northeast corner of the Old City, and called it the Palestine Archeological Museum. It later became known as the Rockefeller Museum. For more on the Rockefeller Museum, see online at www.imj.org.il/en/wings/archaeology/rockefeller-archaeological-museum (accessed 12 July 2019). In this context, it is important to mention that the Ottoman state established a museum in the Old City thirty years earlier. For more on this, see Beatrice St. Laurent and Hımmet Taşkömür, “The Imperial Museum of Antiquities in Jerusalem, 1890–1930: An Alternate Narrative,” Jerusalem Quarterly 55 (Autumn 2013): 6–45.
33 Geddes, “Jerusalem Actual and Possible,” 29.
34 See Kendall, “Jerusalem: The City Plan, Preservation and Development.”
35 Nazmi al-Ju’beh, The Jewish Quarter and the Moroccan Quarter in Old Jerusalem: History and Fate between Destruction and Judaization (Beirut-Ramallah: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2019), 257–71.
36 Kendall presented two structural schemes for Jerusalem: the first was in 1944, before the city was divided into two as a result of the Nakba in 1948; and the second was for the eastern part of the city, which the Jordanian administration commissioned. In both schemes, which cannot be discussed within this review, Kendall used the concepts laid out by Geddes.
Between the neighborhood of Bayt Hanina and the Qalandiya checkpoint in East Jerusalem sits Atarot industrial settlement, currently the largest industrial park in the Jerusalem area and the site of businesses ranging from Coca-Cola’s distribution center to a waste treatment plant.\(^1\) Atarot can be accessed either through its innocuous main entrance off of highway 45 or by driving alongside the annexation wall.\(^2\) One entrance depicts the grandeur of a well-financed industrial zone; while the other reveals the stark contrast between Palestinian residential areas and hallmarks of occupation, such as the checkpoint and wall, that surround it. As one United Nations agency expressed, “Every square meter in East Jerusalem is a plot of politics.”\(^3\) Most often, the focus is on highly symbolic land in and around the Old City. But Atarot, one of an estimated nineteen Israeli industrial settlements in the West Bank—illegal under international law—is home to a less visible but an equally complex set of political issues.\(^4\)

Underlying these various “plots of politics” is Israel’s aim of establishing Jerusalem as its undivided capital, with a demographic majority of Israeli Jews to Palestinians at a 70:30 ratio. Toward this objective, Israel has established residential and touristic settlements, as well as the industrial settlement of Atarot, to forcefully establish “facts on the ground” in the city, while simultaneously imposing an array of policies and practices to deepen its control over the Palestinian population therein. As a result, Palestinians in Jerusalem face choices in relation to their lives and livelihoods that are partially or wholly defined by the occupation, requiring them to continually adapt to and resist the Israeli measures that target

**Editor’s Note:**
A notable contribution to the 2019 Ibrahim Dakkak Award for Outstanding Essay on Jerusalem.
them. Their reality is characterized by an obstructed economy, scarce land resources, and movement restrictions, among countless other policies.

This paper examines the situation faced by Palestinians holding Jerusalem identity cards and more specifically the decision by some Palestinians to establish businesses in Atarot. Forced to operate in an environment shaped by a web of ever-expanding policies that target them as well as the cumulative impact of over fifty years of occupation and nearly a century of British and Israeli colonial rule, Palestinian business owners, workers, and consumers inevitably draw their own lines on matters ranging from “crony capitalism” to boycott.

Although this paper draws on interviews conducted with a number of Palestinian business owners operating in Atarot in 2017, it does not contend to be a comprehensive reflection of the opinions or motivations of all Palestinian business owners in the settlement. Rather, it seeks to highlight Israeli policies – including those that have been systematically documented by the UN and international and local organizations, among others – and consider how such policies have informed the choices and perspectives of Palestinians in Jerusalem, including those interviewed. The article also considers the application of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights within the manipulative and coercive environment created by Israel.

Creating Atarot

Zionist settlers first established a settlement of Atarot in 1912, following the purchase of its land by a company for the Jewish National Fund (JNF). The lands were abandoned before World War I and in 1920 British Mandate authorities built the Jerusalem Airport (also referred to as Qalandiya Airport or Atarot Airport) in the area. The settlement was reestablished in 1922 following the purchase of additional land by the JNF. In 1945, an estimated 433 dunums in the Atarot area were Jewish-owned and 68 dunums were public land; only 33 dunums of this total area was considered “built-up.” Between January and May 1948, British Mandate authorities urged the Jewish community in Atarot to evacuate, and by 14 May, the remaining inhabitants left the settlement to join fighting in Neve Ya’akov.

Having occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank in June 1967, Israel unilaterally expanded the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and immediately began expropriating land in and around East Jerusalem. Since the start of the occupation, the Israeli government expropriated some 26,300 dunams (approximately 6,499 acres) of land in East Jerusalem, most of it Palestinian-owned. Atarot industrial settlement was established by the Jerusalem Economic Corporation in 1970, on the lands of Bayt Hanina, and has a detailed outline plan that covers 1,530 dunums (378 acres). Atarot industrial settlement is thus significantly larger than both the 33 dunums of “built-up” land comprising the first Jewish settlement and the lands controlled by the JNF in 1945. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other sources often ignore this fact, and
instead assert that the settlement in its entirety reestablishes a historic site and ties.\textsuperscript{12}

In 2001, following the start of the second intifada, the Jerusalem airport closed and was taken over by the Israeli Ministry of Defense;\textsuperscript{13} meanwhile, the occupancy rate in the industrial zone fell to 30 percent.\textsuperscript{14} The situation allowed for Palestinian businesses to increase their presence there.\textsuperscript{15} The Atarot website currently notes that the settlement has 160 factories with 4,000 employees, three-quarters of whom are Palestinian and the remainder Jewish.\textsuperscript{16} Despite making up a significant majority of the workforce in Atarot, as one report noted “most Palestinians working in Atarot are non-professional workers, while most Jews are in positions of management, sales, and clerical work.”\textsuperscript{17} While this disparity is representative of the power imbalance driving Israel’s prolonged occupation, it is apparently insufficient for Israeli authorities: Atarot’s website asserts that “many factories . . . are now considering bringing additional Jewish workers in the place of Arab workers who are leaving the factories.”\textsuperscript{18}

To facilitate this, and its broader demographic aims throughout the city, Israel provides a variety of incentives to attract Israeli settlers and foreign and Israeli businesses to Jerusalem, including Atarot, which is considered “national priority A.”\textsuperscript{19} As detailed by the Jerusalem Development Authority (JDA), businesses operating therein receive an array of benefits:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Land costs, expenditures and development costs, as well as rental prices, are significantly lower than those in the rest of the industrial zones, within the city and outside of it. Atarot has recently been graded to pay the lowest property tax rates in the city, as well as having additional benefits for distribution center warehouses with a minimum area of 1,000 square meters.\textsuperscript{20}
  \item The JDA also provides grants to companies that relocate to Jerusalem or expand their businesses already located therein.\textsuperscript{21}
  \item In addition to the industrial settlement, Israel has long considered building a residential settlement in Atarot. These plans were tabled for years due to pressure from the United States.\textsuperscript{22} However, on 7 December 2017, one day after Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, Israeli media reported plans for the construction of five thousand housing units in Atarot.\textsuperscript{23} The Israeli Minister of Construction and Housing later emphasized the strategic importance of Atarot, stating, “We must continue to establish [our] hold on the Jerusalem area from Maaleh Adumin in the east to Givat Ze’ev in the west, from Atarot in the north to the area of Bethlehem . . . .”\textsuperscript{24} The establishment of a residential settlement would not only further divide Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, but would also appropriate land and infrastructure, including the area of the airport, crucial for any future Palestinian state.
\end{itemize}
The Environment

Atarot must be contextualized within Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory and the deliberate fragmentation of Palestinian land and people. This includes a range of Israeli policies and practices that both carve, divide, and appropriate Palestinian land, and separate Palestinians by physical barriers and an identity card system that exacerbates movement restrictions. While these measures are found throughout the West Bank, Israel also implements policies specific to Jerusalem and Palestinians holding Jerusalem identity cards as a means to consolidate its annexation of the city.25 Facing an obstructed economy and markets saturated with Israeli products, Palestinians in Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank are forced to adapt to and, at times, cooperate with the repressive and discriminatory system imposed on them.

One well-documented example of this reality is the presence of Palestinian workers in settlements. In 2017, the International Labor Organization (ILO) noted that the number of Palestinians working in Israel and in settlements was at an all-time high.26 Although Palestinians faced difficult labor conditions in these areas, including wages lower than their Israeli counterparts, the ILO found that “the stagnating labor market in the West Bank pushes Palestinians to take up work wherever it is to be found.”27 Notably, while Israeli and international businesses often attempt to deflect criticisms related to their unlawful presence in settlements by citing their employment of Palestinians, a 2011 study found that 82 percent of Palestinian wage workers “have the desire and willingness to leave their work in the settlements if a suitable alternative is available.”28

The situation of Palestinian workers is not unique; Palestinians throughout the occupied Palestinian territory face a range of significant constraints and difficult considerations in leading their daily lives due to Israel’s occupation.

Land and Planning in East Jerusalem

As previously noted, immediately following the occupation in 1967, Israel expanded the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem with the goal of including undeveloped Palestinian land while excluding areas with large Palestinian populations, such as Abu Dis and al-Ram.29 Israel continued to entrench its annexation of the city as the occupation persisted, including through the unlawful confiscation of land for settlement use and the implementation of a discriminatory permit regime. It is estimated that more than one-third of the land added to Jerusalem through the expanded boundary has been expropriated by Israel, mainly from private Palestinian owners, and used for residential settlements. In Palestinian neighborhoods, Israeli planning authorities have not put forward outline plans for over ten years, thereby precluding authorized development.30 According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the occupied Palestinian territory, only 13 percent of land in East Jerusalem – much of which is already developed – is zoned for Palestinian construction.31 Palestinians are thus forced to build “illegally” in order to meet their basic needs, putting them at risk
for displacement. It is estimated that at least one-third of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem lack a permit, while inadequate infrastructure leads to the deficient provision of water and sewage in Palestinian neighborhoods.  

In addition, Israel has taken various steps to isolate Jerusalem from the remainder of the West Bank. Israel has constructed twelve settlements “to create a physical barrier between the city and the rest of the West Bank and to manufacture a sovereign claim over East Jerusalem.” As these settlements and their related infrastructure expanded, Jerusalem became further isolated from the rest of the West Bank through Israel’s construction of the annexation wall. Working in concert with these policies of isolation and de-development of Palestinian neighborhoods is the ID system imposed on Palestinians since 1967. This includes a revocable status of “permanent residents” for Palestinians holding Jerusalem identity cards, for which Israel requires that Jerusalem ID-holders maintain their “center of life” in the city, while it simultaneously works to ensure that doing so is as difficult as possible.

These and other Israeli policies not only serve Israel’s territorial and demographic objectives, but also have had a severe impact on the Palestinian economy in East Jerusalem. UN Habitat has noted the impact of Israel’s planning regime on Palestinian development

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Map of Atarot, the Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry website, online at economy.gov.il/English/Industry/DevelopmentZoneIndustryPromotion/ZoneIndustryInfo/Pages/Atarot.aspx (accessed 17 October 2019). The Palestinian areas next to and/or on where Atarot settlement was established include: al-Ram and Dahiyat al-Barid to the east; Bayt Hanina to the south; and Bir Nabala to the west. The area to the north is Qalandiya, with the settlement extending narrowly to the Qalandiya checkpoint.
in East Jerusalem, including: “a lack of allocated land for the construction of public facilities as well as for economic development, including commercial and industrial lands. Currently, there are no plans to develop industrial zones, or lands available for institutions and public buildings.”34 This lack of planning comes in contrast to Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, including Atarot, as well as West Jerusalem, which saw an area of 1.73 square kilometers of industrial construction between 1980 and 2007.35 Meanwhile, since Israel began construction on the wall in the early 2000s, it has cost “over one billion dollars in direct losses to Palestinian residents in Jerusalem” and “its adverse impact in terms of lost opportunities endures at the rate of $200 million per year.”36

**Land and Development in the West Bank Excluding East Jerusalem**

In the remainder of the West Bank, Palestinians face similar limited options and opportunities due to Israel’s administration and fragmentation of the territory. Under the Oslo accords, the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, was divided into Areas A, B, and C. Area A constitutes approximately 18 percent of the West Bank and, as per the Oslo accords, is under full Palestinian civil and security control. In practice, the Israeli military regularly conducts raids and other operations into Area A. Area B is 22 percent of the land area and was delineated as being under Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control. However, according to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Area B has been under full Israeli control since September 2000.37 Although Areas A and B include major Palestinian cities and population centers, the areas are carved out of the occupied Palestinian territory in a non-contiguous manner, with Area C, 60 percent of the West Bank, effectively enveloping the areas and turning them into enclaves.

As a result, the value of developing non-contiguous land in Areas A and B is low, with these areas more broadly “not intended to accommodate long-term demographic growth and related economic and social infrastructure development.”38 Similarly, although Area C is rich in natural resources and should be central to the Palestinian economy, Israel’s full control over it has instead meant that the Israeli settler and national economy profit. According to UN OCHA, 70 percent of Area C is “off-limits for Palestinian use and development,” 29 percent is heavily restricted, and only 1 percent is planned for Palestinian development.39 The World Bank has also noted: “The continuous growth in the size of land allocated for settlement activity in Area C has significantly reduced land available for use by the Palestinian private sector.”40 According to a 2011 study, these restrictions were also broadly considered “the main push factors behind Palestinian investment in Israel,” triggering greater private Palestinian investment in Israel than in the West Bank.41

**Palestinian Businesses in Atarot**

Within this context of fragmentation, movement restrictions, and an inability to use or access land for Palestinians, Israeli industrial, residential, and touristic settlements are facilitated and supported by Israel and directly benefit from the policies that target
Palestinians. Yet the Israeli media and others often put forth Atarot as a model of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coexistence. This not only ignores Israel’s stated plans for the area, which seek to transfer more settlers via a residential settlement, in contravention of international law, but also its expressed aim to bolster the presence of Jewish workers. It also disregards the policies that drive some Palestinian business owners and workers to either locate or find work there, and how such decisions may be viewed by Palestinians at large.

Coercion and Isolation
In interviews, Palestinian business owners in Atarot underscored that Israeli policies throughout the West Bank, including those described above, were central to their decisions to locate in the settlement. This choice was primarily driven by an absence of available and appropriately zoned land in Jerusalem. One business owner stated that his business was first established in 1971 in Bayt Hanina; however, he decided to move to Atarot in 1994, as there was no land appropriate for expansion in the area. Another owner faced a similar dilemma when seeking to expand, stating, “I did not have other options.” In addition to the issue of land, an individual that operated a carpentry business stated that he had to locate in an industrial area due to the noise that his machines made and the electricity infrastructure that they require.

Most business owners interviewed did not view moving into other parts of the West Bank as viable. Individuals underscored that crossing checkpoints on a daily basis would be a major burden on their business and operational costs. Such costs are significant: one 2011 study found that due to barriers to movement and higher land, water, and electricity prices for Palestinian manufacturers, production in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) was “more expensive by 30 to 40 percent than production in neighboring countries.” Palestinians in Atarot also highlighted the importance of maintaining their Jerusalem IDs; if their business moved, they anticipated that they would also eventually move to areas beyond the annexation wall to alleviate the burden of crossing checkpoints. If the Israeli government determined that Jerusalem was no longer their “center of life,” their Jerusalem residency could be revoked. With these considerations in mind, Palestinians with East Jerusalem IDs are placed in a situation where they often choose to operate in a “hostile environment” in Jerusalem, rather than one with high operating costs and other obstacles in Palestinian-administered areas.

Even when Palestinians are coerced into relocating to settlements, they remain outsiders. While Israelis are induced to relocate to settlements, the Palestinian business owners interviewed believed that they did not receive the same benefits as Jewish-owned companies operating there. One individual stated, “I think they pay less taxes, but I don’t have the evidence. I asked an Israeli company for how much they paid, but they would not give it to me.” Another shared complaint among Palestinian business owners in Atarot was what they perceived as disproportionate targeting by the municipality and other government authorities, including: denial of extra permits for West Bank employees, difficulties obtaining construction licenses and purchasing or renting additional space, and fines related to parking and other penalties. One business
owner stated that he bought two dunums (approximately one-half acre) of land in 2010 and, at the time of the interview in 2017, still had not received a permit to build on it:

They keep returning the plans; they review it and send it back. They should just give us all of their comments at once. The last time, they said that the plan was good, but the description of the project needed work; they highlighted supposed grammar mistakes.\textsuperscript{51}

A 2012 report by the EU Parliament’s policy department appears to reinforce such grievances, noting, “In the private sector, there are no formal differences between Arab and Israeli economic activities. Yet, there is discrimination in the management of development projects in the area, informal \textit{pratiques} and taxation.”\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Drawing Lines}
While the status of Atarot as a settlement under international law is clear, other distinctions on the ground are blurred due to Israel’s administration of the occupied Palestinian territory and the broader context of the colonization of Palestine. Israeli settlements are fully integrated into Israel’s national economic, political, and legal system, and Israeli politicians are open in their aim of territorial annexation. At the same time, land appropriation and the displacement of Palestinians extends beyond the occupied Palestinian territory, remaining a present reality for Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. Indeed, Palestinian business owners were keenly cognizant of the overarching context of colonization throughout Palestine, underscoring their view of a fabricated divide between 1948 and 1967 territory. One individual interviewed stated, “Atarot is an occupied area and not a settlement; in my opinion everything is occupied.”\textsuperscript{53} Another affirmed, “In my opinion, Tel Aviv is a settlement.”\textsuperscript{54}

Interviewees also discussed what their presence in Atarot denoted and considered the presence of Palestinian businesses an important counter to Israel’s administration of the territory. One individual stated:

If a Palestinian is in an industrial settlement, the Palestinian Authority should encourage it. The Israelis go to industrial settlements to take advantage of Palestinian workers. If a Palestinian is able to buy land, the PA should . . . encourage other Palestinians to go there. This is how we are going to liberate the land.\textsuperscript{55}

The situation imposed on Palestinians in East Jerusalem due to Israel’s illegal annexation of the city and the resultant presence of Palestinian businesses operating in Atarot had reportedly led the Palestinian Authority (PA) to exclude Atarot from its boycott of settlement goods, allowing Palestinian products made there to enter into the West Bank.\textsuperscript{56} Palestinian business owners interviewed confirmed this as an unofficial policy of the PA. The owners of a printing press further noted their work with international organizations, stating, “They don’t look at us as though we are in a settlement, they look
at us as Palestinians.” Even with such implicit recognition, certain business endeavors are nonetheless viewed as pushing the boundary between that which is unavoidable and normalization. This has been exemplified in the development of a new mall in Atarot.

*Rami Levy Mall*

In 2016, Israeli businessman Rami Levy announced the opening of a new mall in the Atarot area. Levy holds a chain of stores located in settlements and across the Green Line. The stores are often touted as a model of coexistence by Israeli and international media, often citing the Palestinian shoppers and workers there, while ignoring the broader context of Israeli policies on the Palestinian economy. The Rami Levy Mall in Atarot was similarly hyped by Israeli media as the “first Israeli-Palestinian mall,” which would include Palestinian-owned stores and brands.

Not all reports on the project were positive, however. The impact of the mall was felt almost immediately after construction started: Palestinian human rights organization al-Haq documented an increase in harassment by the Israeli municipality of Palestinians living and working in the area. Further, shortly after it was reported that Palestinian stores may open there, the head of the Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection (PSCP), Salah Haniyeh, called for a potential boycott against these Palestinian businesses. Although Haniyeh reportedly stated that the consumer protection group boycotts all goods and services from settlements, it appeared as though a more stark line had been crossed between well-known Palestinian businesses located in Atarot and joint “normalizing” endeavors, like the mall. According to Rami Levy, following the media attention, some Palestinian businesses pulled out of the venture. However, when the mall opened in January 2019, Levy claimed that 35 percent of the stores there belonged to Palestinians.

While Israeli media continued to bill the project as a model of coexistence that provides a needed service for Palestinians, calls for boycotts by Palestinians also grew. Fatah, for example, declared that buying or renting stores, or shopping there amounted to “national treason.” In its continuing campaign against the mall, the PSCP also noted that its presence contributed to the expansion of the settlement enterprise in Jerusalem at the expense of the land and economy of Jerusalem.

Indeed, marketed as a “discount supermarket, offering direct sales to consumers at inexpensive prices,” the store’s location is ripe for catering to Palestinian residents of Bayt Hanina and other areas of East Jerusalem. Rami Levy noted the strategic placement of the mall stating, “230,000 Arab residents with blue [Jerusalem] identity cards live around the project, in addition to the Jewish communities. There is no shopping center around there that can serve them.”66 As asserted by the organization WhoProfits, the lack of shopping alternatives is a direct result of Israeli policies that have made Palestinians “captive clients.” The organization highlighted that Rami Levy benefits from a context where Israeli authorities prevent “Palestinian businesses from competing with Israelis . . . A flourishing market in Bir Nabala was destroyed by Israel’s wall in the West Bank. And venturing into West Jerusalem is not an option for Palestinians, most of whom live below the poverty line.”

*Jerusalem Quarterly 80 [49]*
will inevitably have difficulty competing with Rami Levy. One business owner with a presence in Atarot, but no connection to the new mall, stated that a boycott of Rami Levy would be reasonable, because the store “will be ruining the businesses in Bayt Hanina.” Another stated that the chain was “coming to wreck the market [suq] of Bayt Hanina.”

**Business and Human Rights under International Law**

Although the international community, via international law and justice mechanisms, may not adequately deal with the complexities created by Israel’s prolonged occupation and colonization of Palestine, organizations and activists continue to advocate for accountability according to such frameworks. Since the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in 2011, both states and businesses have increasingly recognized their respective obligation to protect and respect human rights. In conflict-affected areas, states and businesses are also expected to respect international humanitarian law, as well as other applicable legal frameworks. Accordingly, international and local organizations and activists have steadily worked to ensure that the occupied Palestinian territory, and more specifically the businesses that operate in Israeli settlements, is on the international business and human rights agenda. This has ranged from the publication of reports that document alleged complicity of international businesses in Israel’s settlement enterprise to bringing court cases against such companies abroad. As a result, there has been an increased awareness of the role of business in Israel’s violations of international law, which has included measures taken by some companies to ensure that their operations and business relationships do not adversely impact human rights, including by withdrawing their presence from settlements.

There have also been positive actions by states. In March 2016, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 31/36 calling for the establishment of a database of all businesses engaged in specified activities linked to Israeli settlements. Later that year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2334, calling on states to “distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967.” State action under Resolution 2334 has been sparse, while the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the body charged with establishing the database, has been slow to fulfill its mandate. Although an initial report was issued in early 2018, human rights organizations continue to call for the publication of the names of companies with a presence in or activities linked to settlements. In addition to these and other multilateral initiatives, a recent bill proposed in Ireland’s upper house of parliament seeks to ban the import or sale of settlement goods.

An important question arises as to where Palestinian businesses operating in settlements fit in this. While the OHCHR database report does not specifically address the situation of Palestinian businesses, it does acknowledge the presence of Palestinian workers in settlements and the “depressed Palestinian economy” due to Israel’s land and resource appropriation policies, which has had “a direct effect on the job market.”

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Further, the Irish bill that seeks to ban settlement goods defines such products as “goods produced in whole or in part within a relevant occupied territory by an illegal settler.” This would presumably exclude goods produced by Palestinian businesses in settlements, as Palestinians are legally in the territory as the protected population.

While businesses should respect human rights and the principles laid out in the UNGPs, the coercive environment created by Israel must be deconstructed. Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory cannot be compared to Israeli settlers or foreign nationals operating therein; this would not only ignore their protected status, but also the illegal situation created by Israel’s prolonged occupation and annexation of Palestinian territory. Israel has incentivized Israeli civilians as well as Israeli and foreign businesses to relocate to unlawfully confiscated land in the occupied Palestinian territory. In doing so, Israel has not only violated international law, but has highlighted the very reason why the transfer of the civilian population of the occupying power is prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention. As noted in the commentary of the convention, the prohibition on unlawful transfer was intended to

prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.

Although the aforementioned commentary was written nearly ten years prior to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, its forewarning has neither deterred Israel from its settlement enterprise nor spurred third states to take action to hold Israel to account. Instead, Palestinians are forced to operate in this unlawful environment and find ways to meet their basic needs – this is demonstrated in certain Palestinian businesses that operate in Atarot.

**Conclusion**

Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory has increasingly been deemed illegal by scholars and has created a “coercive environment” leading to the unlawful transfer of Palestinians within and outside of the occupied Palestinian territory and of Israeli settlers into this area. Israel has both directly and indirectly forced Palestinians to make choices in regard to their residence, work, and other aspects of life within the manipulative context it has created. This is particularly palpable in East Jerusalem, where Palestinians are isolated in an annexed city, have identity cards and accompanying residency status that are vulnerable to revocation, and face a range of policies that target them. The resulting situation, including the presence of certain Palestinian businesses in Atarot, can be described as the “tension between resisting colonial practices and finding ways of survival and sustenance within existing colonial realities.”
At the same time, Palestinians also draw lines within this spectrum of “resisting and existing” within colonization. While the PA reportedly allows Palestinian goods produced in Atarot to enter into the West Bank due to the situation faced by Palestinians in Jerusalem, and therefore excludes such goods from its broader boycott of settlements, Palestinian political groups more recently called for a boycott of the Rami Levy mall in Atarot and the Palestinian businesses therein. These positions not only highlight the complexity of the situation imposed on Palestinians due to Israel’s occupation, but also the manner in which Palestinians in Jerusalem assess their choices within Israel’s broader colonization of Palestine and the limitations in international frameworks to incorporate such realities.

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Endnotes
2 Both entrances, and highway 45 itself, are inaccessible to West Bank ID holders who do not have permits. Regarding restrictions on Palestinian use of highway 45, see Apartheid Roads: Promoting Settlements, Punishing Palestinians (Jerusalem: Ma’an Development Center, December 2008), 15.
3 UN Habitat, Right to Develop: Planning Palestinian Communities in East Jerusalem (2015), Executive Summary, online at new.unhabitat.org/right-to-develop-planning-palestinian-communities-in-east-jerusalem, approximately five interviews were conducted with current owners, and one interview was conducted with an individual who previously had a business in Atarot. Three other individuals with businesses in Atarot either declined or did not respond to requests.
4 The lands were purchased by Hachsharat Hayishuv, “a company that acquired land in Palestine and prepared it for Jewish settlement.” See “Atarot,” Eretz Israel Museum Tel-Aviv website, 2012, online at www.eretzmuseum.org.il/e/236/ (accessed 23 November 2018).
7 Efrat Cohen-Bar, Trapped by Planning: Israeli Policy, Planning, and Development in the Palestinian Neighborhoods of East Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Bimkom – Planners...


16 Atarot-Jerusalem website.


18 Atarot-Jerusalem website.

19 Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees and Norwegian People’s Aid, Dangerous Liaisons II: Norwegian Ties to the Israeli Occupation (Oslo: Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees and Norwegian People’s Aid, June 2016); “Incentives and Grants to Encourage Business,” Jerusalem Development Authority, online at www.jda.gov.il/template/default_e.aspx?CID=22&PId=131 (accessed 29 September 2019).


22 Houk, “Atarot.”

23 Raoul Wootliff and Sue Surkes, “14,000 Housing Units Planned for Jerusalem, 6,000 of Them over the Green Line,” Times of Israel, 7 December 2017, online at www.timesofisrael.com/14000-housing-units-planned-for-jerusalem-6000-over-green-line/ (accessed 10 September 2019).


25 See, for example, UN Habitat, Right to Develop, 1; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring Annexation, Isolation, and Disintegration, (2013), 18.


27 “Situation of Workers,” 5.


32 According to OCHA, construction without permits places over ninety thousand Palestinians at risk of displacement. UN OCHA, *East Jerusalem*. Meanwhile, according to ACRI: “The problem of substandard water and sewage connections was created due to the ongoing failure to ensure the proper planning of the Palestinian neighborhoods and to enable development, expansion, and infrastructures consistent with the growth in population.” ACRI, *East Jerusalem*.


34 UN Habitat, *Right to Development*, 16.

35 UN Habitat, *Right to Development*, 16.


38 World Bank, *The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank* (Washington: World Bank, October 2008), v, online at reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1F6B5FA222398DB3492574EC000A88B5-Full_Report.pdf (accessed 16 September 2019). The report continues: “Access to Area B from the main centers of economic activity (generally Area A) is often interrupted by Area C and consequently at the risk of closure or delays, making a simple journey uncertain and time-consuming. In practice therefore, accessing Area B land, even in close range of the town, can be a long journey. Its value for developing commercial and housing activities is that much lower. It should be noted that this disadvantage also applies to discontinuous enclaves of Area A land as well.” World Bank, *Economic Effects*, 23.


42 During a tour of Atarot mall, U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman stated earlier this year, “Israelis and Palestinians working, shopping and doing business together – a simple path to peace.” David M. Friedman, Twitter post, 10 April 2019, 8:24 am, online at twitter.com/usambisrael/status/1115999074493378560 (accessed 16 September 2019). A similar discourse is used for other industrial zones. See, for example: Human Rights Watch, *Occupation, Inc.*, 9–10. online at www.hrw.org/node/285045/%29 (accessed 16 September 2019).

43 See note 19.

44 Author interview with P., 23 January 2017, Atarot. The names of individuals interviewed have been withheld due to the sensitive nature of the issue. Instead, an initial has been assigned to each individual.

45 Author interview with F., 23 January 2017, Atarot.

46 Author interview with H., 23 January 2017, Atarot.

47 Hass, “Study.”

48 UNCTAD has noted the “hostile environment for Palestinian Jerusalemites and their economy, in which Israeli authorities are oriented principally towards serving the interests of a settler population in their midst and Palestinian authorities
are effectively incapable of intervening in East Jerusalem and managing or otherwise sustaining the economy.” UNCTAD, *Palestinian Economy*, 18.

49 Author interview with S., 2 March 2017.


51 Author interview with S., 2 March 2017.


54 Author interview with C., 23 January 2017.

55 Author interview with S., 2 March 2017.


57 Author interview with G., 23 January 2017.


68 Author interview with M., 22 July 2017.

69 Author interview with S., 2 March 2017.

71 UN Security Council Resolution 2334, adopted on 23 December 2016, para. 5.
72 See the periodic reports of UN Special Coordinator Nickolay Mladenov.
75 UN OHCHR, *Database*, paras. 52–53.
76 “Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill 2018,” 3–4 (para. 2).
Nada embroiders her life away. She embroiders her books, her dresses, her pillows, her slippers, her couches, her towels, her key holders, her picture frames, her curtains. She embroiders her hopes, her daydreams, her nightmares, her fears. She embroiders to reflect, she embroiders to remember. She embroiders to unravel the burdens of a present suspended by fantasies, overdue: she weaves the past into the present, the past into the future.

It is my third long visit to Nada, and by now, I know that her tears do not run dry. Perhaps my own presence confronts her as a ghostly visitation, as a haunting. Perhaps my own curiosity about a past that, above all, refuses to end, paints me as a revenant. As a distorted fragment of Palestine. As a shard of her wilted hopes. Nada tells me not to worry. She tells me that she always cries – when embroidering, when speaking of Palestine, when thinking about anything outside of the daily logistics of coping in exile. So I continue pursuing unfinished endings, I continue asking about unfulfilled tomorrows. I ask: What if? What if you could go back in time? What would you bring along into exile? What were your parents like? What were your neighborhoods like? What about the corners of your home? Your heart?

A renewed stream of memories comes urgently rushing down Nada’s face. She grabs my wrist, only to guide me through a maze of fabrics and needles and measuring tapes and tablecloths and tapestries and photographs and carpets, stacked, one atop the other, in ever-expanding piles that find solace on the borders of her narrow hallways. I hop in between, landing on shrinking islands of cracked tiles. We arrive to the kitchen, where embroidery threads wait on the dinner table, on the

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dish drying rack, on the windowsill, on the handles of her mini fridge. They linger between coats of dust, along dried trails of rust. Startling me out of my reverie, the fourth drawer creaks in protest of Nada’s enthusiastic pull. She rummages through tangled clusters of orange, of yellow, of blue, of black, of red, and of green threads, carefully extracting an overflowing letter-sized envelope. Her very own archive of longings, suffocated by decades of mistakenly approximated distance.

Nada grips on the corners of her envelope as we settle back down in the living room. Inside was a letter, a letter she received in the spring of 1966, almost a year before her dispossession. It was a letter from Sa’id, sent before his wedding. His wedding to someone else.

Nada carefully pulls the letter out, and while its contents remain beyond my ethnographic sense of entitlement, I am struck by the intricate extent to which she had embroidered the corners of this tired paper. She had woven her threads – her Palestine in and through their love story, their longings, their dissonant realities. With a mere needle, she had interwoven a persistent paradise with the heartbreak of the present. “Sa’id,” Nada tells me, “is Palestine.” And Palestine is Sa’id.

For those in exile, Nada drives me to wonder, what is Palestine other than love stories between the wrong people, set in the wrong places? Other than dreaming of people one has never met, other than yearning for homes one has never seen? And in what ways can we collect and understand and measure the folds of these refracted experiences of disaster?

Nada, her needles, her threads, and her heartbreak – unaligned with the ravages of a national tragedy – illuminate the material channels of exile through which Palestinians carry their personal relics of home. Just as Nada embroiders her fantasies into the pores of weathered paper, others place expired passports and rusting housekeys in picture frames, or polish the traces of home in a faded teacup. They entangle their belongings with longings for a lost homeland, as metonymic fragments of home and of the self, as vessels of identification and belonging.

But these objects, too, are at work. “Heavy with memory,” they ensnare, they enchant, they glitter, they haunt. They make claims as they tell their stories, as they expose their lifetimes, as they unravel their biographies. They reconstruct the (im)materialities of the homes and dreams that were, involuntarily, left behind. Generations of Palestinians, in this context, hold on to the residues of a universe that is no longer; they invest themselves and their stories in the enduring artifacts of a “lost paradise.”

This article sets out to position these acts of investment and enchantment as comprising a practice of remembering that cannot be understood outside an attention to the material conditions of everyday exile. Just as Nada materializes her memories of Sa’id, of Jenin, and of Palestine by embroidering her love letter, other Palestinians exalt the fragments of an idealized past against the material backdrop of an unhomely present. Drawing on several ethnographic encounters in different corners of Amman, Jordan, I ask: What could the objects of home tell us about lost worlds, about how they are reconstructed in everyday domestic spaces of exile? How do these personal belongings organize – and are, at the same time, organized in – everyday practices
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of remembering? What could the embodied practices of embroidering, collecting, keeping, arranging, and decorating tell us about how the shadows of catastrophe are lived, furnished, negotiated, constructed, embellished, navigated, and expanded across generations?

By focusing not on what is remembered but on the relationship between people and (the memories of) their things, I seek to afford a closer examination to the unrehearsed practices of recollection that characterize the daily logistics of coping at (and away from) home.5 I seek, in other words, to foreground the everyday, the routinized, the unexceptional – the seemingly marginal stories that Palestinians may choose to tell. Memory, in this line of questioning, does not stand in for pre-packaged testimony. It does not represent an extractable story; it is not neatly stored, nor readily retrievable to buttress (counter-)narratives of history. Neither is it easily narrated, nor necessarily chronological, nor always coherent, nor ever structured. It is, rather, as a practice: a practice of materially enfolding the past within the shrinking coordinates of the present.

What follows is an effort to examine the methodological implications of this framework vis-à-vis future directions in Palestinian oral history initiatives. Because many such projects endeavor to historically uncover the events of 1936–39, 1948, and 1967 despite – and perhaps in order to redefine – archival absences, they tend to nurture a commitment to storing and authorizing oral accounts as historical documents. But how might it be possible to do so, I ask, without privileging structured narrative as the foremost vehicle for mnemonic expression, without overlooking the modes and practices of remembering that adhere neither to testimonial genres of telling nor to the plotlines of event-centered histories? How might such initiatives record, collect, and archive the unspoken practices of memory that we might otherwise track through an attention to Nada’s needles and threads, to her embroidered letter, and to the geographical expanse of her heartbreak?

Oral history’s approach to “history from below” has had monumental implications for the resonance of Palestinian voices in both intellectual and public discourse.6 Here I endeavor to expand its reach by suggesting the methodological importance of including in Palestinian oral history projects an ethnographic engagement with the everyday – the very site in which dreams, memories, aspirations, and futurities of home are cultivated (and in some cases, perhaps, abandoned). In so doing, I take up the call for a Palestinian historiography that moves beyond essentialized, structured, and authoritative narratives of indigeneity and displacement.7 My goal, as such, is to map the continuities, the discontinuities, and the detours of time and space upon which residues of the past resurface, both regularly and abruptly. It is to point toward the mundane eternities of exile: to Sa‘id, to the unfulfilled, to the unremarkable, to the uneventful. It is to measure the ways in which Nada’s Palestine can be found not in grand eulogies of the nation but embroidered in the corners of her own love letter.
Carrying the Relics of Home

“If we agree . . . that every person’s world consists of several worlds” – *worlds full of things*, I add – then “the Nakba meant the destruction in a single blow of all the worlds in which Palestinians had lived,” write Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa’di.8 Thus for many generations of displaced Palestinians, the distance between 1948 and everyday exile is furnished with the remembered belongings of the lost home. Doorbells, vases, curtains, books, forks, plates, carpets, blankets, dresses, and photographs crowd everyday currents of longing; they orchestrate plots for daydreams, they color overwhelming fantasies of return. They offer clues to a past that persists, codes to a past that haunts. They so closely dictate the everyday “vitiations of memory” that they begin to haunt those who inherit Palestine to a similar degree from which they consume their original owners.9 “Over time,” writes Suha Shakkour, “the scents of lemon and orange trees, and the shade of olive trees, become so repeatedly experienced in storytelling that they haunt the listener, who has never experienced them almost as much as they haunt the teller.” As a result, “the individual houses, their stones, their secret hiding places come to be seen as unique and [as] worthy of preservation” as the stories of catastrophe.10

The objects that, perhaps serendipitously, did follow their owners into the labyrinths of forced displacement come to hold special valence. As exile is prolonged and Palestine – as it was, as it is now imagined, as it is transmitted across generations – becomes increasingly out of reach, these objects continue to “grow” considerably in importance, over time and across generations.11 They become the vessels of transgenerational transmission, the building blocks of ever-expanding shadows, the glittering residues of a universe that is no longer.12 Ever cherished, nurtured, and steeped in the memories of the lost home, they become transgenerationally inalienable: they develop the “power ... to define who one is in an historical sense.”13 They become, to borrow anthropologist Annette Weiner’s terminology, the “vehicle[s] bringing past time into the present,” carrying the “force of history” while also positioning themselves as inextricable components of a group’s identity.14

For a familiar example, we might look to Palestinian housekeys, which are often mobilized from private spheres to public realms – sacralized and charted as symbols of collective loss, thereby binding networks of Palestinians in exile.15 In his study of Palestinian house keys, Khaldun Bshara cites one of his interlocutors to retell a story in which an elderly Palestinian refugee returned, sometime after 1967, to west Jerusalem for a hospital visit in ‘Ayn Karim. On the way to receive his treatment, the man prompted the taxi driver to pull aside as they approached his home, the home from which he had been displaced. The man told his sons, who were also in the taxi, that the house “was theirs,” before proceeding to knock on the door to share his story with the current Jewish residents. When a debate broke out, the Palestinian man declared: “If this is your home, and this door is yours, then show me the key.” This retort was an incontrovertible point of defense for the Palestinian man, for he was certain “that the new family will not be able to show the key, because he [had] kept it with him since he left more than twenty years [prior].”16
Here, we can see how the Palestinian man employs his house key, by mere virtue of its (transgenerational) **inalienability**, as a means by which to identify himself (and his sons) as the rightful owner(s) of the home. “A person can be bound up with an external ‘thing’ in some constitutive sense,” writes legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin.17 To lose these things is to “lose this claim to the past,” and, by extension, “to lose part of who one is in the present.”18 It is for this reason, argues Bshara, that thousands of Palestinians in exile hold on to their old keys, even if they do not know whether their doors or homes or neighborhoods survived the Nakba.

In the lines that follow, I explore this idea of feverishly investing oneself in the inalienable relics of the lost home. I position this practice of material investment as one that can illuminate the everyday, unspoken practices of remembering for Palestinians in exile. And it is precisely because Palestinian claims to return cannot be disentangled from the retrieval of specific sites – namely, former homes – that we must understand exile within the perimeters of the material worlds that were both left behind and carried forward.

**Exile: The Inalienable and the Uncanny**

Returning to Amman: I sit in Fadia’s study, cozy with an elaborate Persian rug and towering shelves of books on the secrets of running a successful business. We sit between sage in two teacups, between two windows, overlooking rows of unruly shrubs and hills peppered with solemn olive trees. We sit in Amman, 60 kilometers away from Jericho, 72 away from Jerusalem, 113 away from Haifa, and we talk about almost-futures: about the finality of a weekend trip to Beirut in June 1967, when Fadia would forever be separated from her family, from her Ramallah.

After two decades of being displaced from Ramallah to the quiet suburbs of a North American city, Fadia had been keen on moving to Amman. “It is closer to Palestine,” she tells me. “To its mountains, to its trees, to its air,” she continues. “Here, I feel like I can breathe. If we were ever to pack up and move again, I tell my husband, it would be to Cyprus. To Malta. Not to Europe, not to North America.” Fadia tells me that the mountains and trees and air of Amman lead her anxiously to Palestine. “As long as I am forced to be away from Ramallah,” Fadia assures me, “I will keep trying to find the closest version possible.”

With this, Fadia guides us toward the uncanny, what Sigmund Freud described as “that . . . which leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar.”19 For Fadia, the uncanny creeps into the alleyways of Amman and illuminates its sunsets, it breathes into its hills and blooms in its valleys. It promises Fadia to find Palestine, though refracted in physical space, though “defamiliarized, derealized, as if in a dream.”20

Salma, too, tells me about the uncanny, about the need to remedy its deceit. When I ask her about her rose-colored marble floor tiles, which she had imported to Amman from Nazareth in the late 1970s, she tells me that “Palestine is color.” And as we inspect every corner of her house, as we look through her books and artworks and Palestine-
inspired mementoes collected from her extensive travels across the globe, Salma does not speak about the tragedy of a universe sewn together by fantasies of Jaffa’s oranges and Jerusalem’s moonrises, nor does she detail the events of her dispossession in 1967. Nor does she readily share any of her personal belongings or anecdotes or experiences. She reroutes my attention, time and again instead, to her floor tiles, to her Palestine, to the fact that she wanted the house that she built in Amman to be colorful. Salma shows me another mode, another practice, another form of remembering: her construction of a house from the fragments of the familiar Palestinian landscape.

Because Jordan borders Palestine, because they share landscapes and sunsets, the materiality of Palestinian exile in Jordan is marked by unsettling approximations. The insistence of the familiar to present itself as uncanny – or, to borrow from Freud more literally, as unhomely – brings Palestine into sharp relief, and exile becomes all that Palestine is not. For Fadia and Salma, it becomes a terrifyingly displaced version of home, void of a sea, of sunsets, of orange groves and jasmines. Surely, a “fundamental incommensurability [exists] between what was taken and what might be given back.” The substitute, argues Stuart Kirsch, “is always inferior to the original, perpetuating the sense of loss.” And it is this sense of loss that concocts a special urgency for Palestinians to entangle the material fragments of an idealized past with the unhomely eternities of the present; indeed, it compels them to embroider, to plant, and to tile their memories of home.

To this point, we may also return to the words of Radin, who suggests that “one’s expectations crystallize around certain ‘things,’ the loss of which causes more disruption and disorientation than does a simple decrease in aggregate wealth.” As an example, “if someone returns home to find her sofa disappeared, that is more disorienting than to discover that her house has decreased in market value by five percent,” writes Radin. “If, by magic, her white sofa were instantly replaced by a blue one of equal market value, it would . . . still cause some disruption in her life.” With this example of the white/blue sofa in mind – presumably derived from a geographic context distant to our own – we may revisit Salma’s colors, to think through her insistence on importing rose-colored marble to construct a house in exile. This insistence, we could argue, entails nothing less than a refusal, enabled by her wealth and class position, to accept the material conditions of estrangement. It is also a refusal to let her expectations “crystallize” around other objects, around the uncanny objects of exile.

The Personal Museums of Everyday Exile

I find Tara between plateaus of paper, between heaps of half-finished thoughts, between barracks of boxed files. Even before I arrived at her doorstep, her stories were already sorted in tentative categories, her photographs were already spilling out of their albums, and her documents were already promised a departure from their vacuum-sealed container. Together, they crowded the shrinking surface of her elaborately carved coffee table.
Tara tells me of her family tree project, for which she has travelled to Palestine three times over the past two years. She retraces the jittery steps of her journeys, with the dizzying romanticism of exilic loss and longing: she paints the sunsets of Nablus, the shorelines of Haifa, the skies of Jaffa, and the valleys of Ramallah. “It was my life’s dream to be able to return, to ask my questions,” she explained. Tara was born in Jordan, and for thirty years, she lived between Montreal and Amman. Eventually, she received a Canadian passport that allows her to see Palestine for a few days at a time.

Tara reconnected with her family members who remained in Palestine and were willing to help her decipher the mystery of her mother’s family, who had, in her words, “gone extinct.” In her search, Tara followed the branches of her family trees, collected documents, photographs, books, jewelry, and stories, eventually landing on what she tells me is the most valuable item she could ever own: her great grandmother’s silver purse. Today, it hangs in her bedroom in a picture frame, juxtaposed with a photograph of her great grandmother.

Like Tara, Amjad longed to own a few objects that knew his grandfather’s “scent.” Born in Amman, and also having lived alongside an idea of Palestine that was ever-elusive yet ever-present, he embarked upon a journey to Nablus to find his late grandmother’s attic. There, he found a suitcase, coated with dust and dirt, inhabited by mice and cockroaches. He carefully opened it much to the “disgust” of his aunt, who had been living on the property at the time. “I found, inside . . . you wouldn’t believe,” he tells me, “a Palestinian passport issued by the British Mandate, property deeds for land in Jaffa, and checkbooks from the Jaffa branch of the Arab Bank.” Nonetheless, he lamented, his aunt fixated on the filth of the suitcase. But Amjad was captured. Passport, property deeds, checks: he had found magic, glitter, gold-plated breadcrumbs leading him back to Jaffa. “These documents,” Amjad faced his aunt, “guarantee your rights against dispossession.” His aunt retorted with indifference, while walking away: “It’s all gone. Otherwise, wouldn’t we be in Jaffa instead of here?”

This question continues to tighten its hold on Amjad. “So long as the past perseveres,” he shares with me, “we, Palestinians, are guaranteed to lose everything.” So long as the Nakba is ongoing, Amjad will continue to confront a reality riddled with the presence of absence; he will continue to retrace the trajectories of expired paper, of passports and property deeds and checkbooks that belong to institutions and places and people and homes that no longer remain.

It is no surprise that this Palestinian “archive fever” has persisted seven decades into exile, for the loss engendered by the events of 1948 is “not a moment, but a process that continues.” The threat of losing it all again – of “going extinct,” in Tara’s words – has prompted many Palestinians to collect family albums, street signs, cooking utensils, land records, and textbooks. They frame, display, and exalt the items that had once constituted an inventory of everyday existence in Palestine. For generations of Palestinians who have lived in the shadows of the Nakba, “the history of the past . . . is concentrated in an object that, in its material substance, defies destruction.”

Lana, another displaced Palestinian living in Amman, tells me that she transformed her mother-in-law’s embroidered thobes into upholstery for the chairs that occupy the
foyer of her apartment. “The thobes simply cannot remain in my closet. They must be placed at the forefront, for all to see.” Upholstered, framed, burdened with the responsibility to never disappear. This fossilization of everyday objects also points to a Palestinian desire to counter a historical narrative that is so profoundly shaped by material loss. Revisiting Weiner’s framework of inalienable possessions, we can see that the practice of nurturing the objects of home “adds to the value of [a Palestinian] past,” thereby rendering “the past a powerful resource for the present and for the future.”

In this way, the task has turned into a “national duty” of sorts, a duty to compensate for the lack of institutional infrastructure by creating personal museums where official ones have not yet been expansively established.

It must be noted that this responsibility to undertake a “national duty” in one’s home is a formula with deep historical roots. In *Men of Capital*, historian Sherene Seikaly details the fraught social landscape of Mandate Palestine, which featured at its pinnacle the figure of the “social man,” who was scientific, rational, and deeply invested in private property and individual freedom, and his mate, the scientific housewife, who was hardworking, fashionable yet frugal, and committed to the “minute” management of her domestic space. Seikaly’s subjects – the Palestinian social man and woman of thrift – cemented the boundaries of social distinction while simultaneously imagining themselves as the collaborative forerunners of a *nahda*, an Arab awakening. They posited their new, localized understandings of economy as the “prognosis for wakefulness.” And key to this narrative was their invoking of an “eternal heritage.” They positioned “the grandiosity of [the Arab] past . . . [as] reducible to one transhistorical essence, a ‘commercial disposition’ that was ready to be lit once again.”

In this narrative, the inner workings of a broader Arab economy were conceptualized as parallel to those of a precisely measured, managed, and surveyed domestic space. Thus, a homemaker’s ability to manage her home as a “realm of authority” enabled her family’s full participation in national life. If we follow Seikaly’s powerful assertion that these “figures, norms, territories, understandings of politics, and narratives . . . continue to haunt the present,” and that indeed, they “continue to inform the Palestinian social, however dispersed it may be,” then we are presented with an opening to explore the gendered and classed dynamics that inform the contemporary social distinctions that undergird the practices of collecting Palestine in exile. Indeed, we must ask: Who is able to wakefully rescue the “eternal heritage” of Palestine, the material culture that was scattered by the Nakba? Who is successfully able to establish a distinctly Palestinian “realm of authority” at home in exile?

For one, we can detect how the practice of memory unfolds within differently situated material ecologies. While Nada embroiders the corners of her own letter, Salma possesses a seemingly weightless ability to import, curate, and re-frame the inalienable landscape of home, and Fadia moves from a North American suburb to build a life in Amman. In the same vein, the socioeconomic factors that afford Tara and Amjad the ability to visit Palestine and to personally track down their own objects of home are not evenly experienced. As a result, certain subjects are endowed with the capacity to determine the contours, rules, and regulations of authentic self-recognition. And if we
afford attention to their everyday material worlds, we can trace the historically rooted social distinctions that both enable and delimit everyday practices of remembering.

Narrating the Contours of Catastrophe

For many Palestinians, the Nakba is experienced as fragmented and incoherent. It is at once the site of death and that of identification. It places loss as the “point of reference for other events, past and future,” rendering impossible an orderly sequence of time. Above all, it casts a shadow. It weighs the present with a ghostly past that insists on returning – tangentially, randomly, spontaneously – like “an ache, an ache from a sickness [Palestinians] didn’t know [they] had.”

But these aches, these ghostly visitations, are not limited to the experiences of those who directly witnessed the events of 1948. As long as Palestinians are still denied the right to return to their homes, the Nakba will persist, the past will have not yet passed, and exile will remain an inherited state. Thus the contours of catastrophe, with its temporality of “tragic cumulativity,” continue to invade the present for first-, second-, third-, and fourth-generation Palestinians, who, like Nada, Fadia, Salma, Tara, Amjad, and Lana, wait – hesitantly, patiently, and wholeheartedly in exile – to return to themselves: to unfulfilled love stories, to suspended sunrises, to entangled embroidery threads, to a past that persists despite all that may indicate otherwise.

The tyranny of this amorphous waiting constitutes a transgenerational experience that is spoken neither of nor about but around. Silence enshrouds the cruelty of transmitting a “wounded identification,” it cleans up the incoherence of persisting exile. As a result, memories of Palestine are storied not along the lines of disaster, but rather in fractured and anecdotal forms of unrehearsed everyday reminiscence that, like an ache, are “supple, associative, and more deeply concerned with commenting on the present than memorializing the past.” Thus what may be perceived as a gap or an incoherence in oral testimony should not be measured against the extent of narrative availability; it should, instead, stand in as a signifier of fracture, of a persistent Nakba, “of something that is still present.”

Increasing attention to the injustices of the Nakba have mandated, however, that intensely personal memories, often disjointed and disconnected, be molded into structured narratives of devastation that might incite political action. Testimonies of Palestinian life before 1948 and of expulsion are positioned as poignant materials for political advocacy and as evidence that authorizes claims of past and present injustice. This shift, with its requirements to remember the past accurately, chronologically, and in narrative forms, has foregrounded literary testimony as the normative genre of memory narration, thereby marginalizing and dismissing partial, fragmented, and scattered recollections in favor of event-centered accounts of expulsion and of violence.

Thus we must pause and ask: What happens to Nada, to her embroidered letter, and to Sa’id, when all that counts as worthy of remembering is that which is collectively considered to be sufficiently eventful, sufficiently political? What happens to Salma
and her tiles, to Tara and her family tree, to Amjad and his expired passports? And how can we begin to narrate, from a distance, catastrophes that have not yet been concluded?

The “Peculiar Violence of Memory-Work”: Historiographies of Silence

The perimeters of historical production, formally defined by the mobilization of archival and documentary evidence, have been exceptionally out of reach for those producing scholarship on Palestine and the Palestinians. The absence of official state archives, coupled with the loss or geographical dispersal of personal archives, renders a resort to creative sources the sole avenue by which the contours of a Palestinian past can be reconstructed. In this context, oral history has gravitated to the center of Palestinian historiography. Interviews and testimonies of Palestinian life before and around catastrophe are being conducted, recorded, collected, and archived – with a feverish urgency and in every corner of exile – as “historical document[s].”

The promise of Palestinian oral history is fueled by an understanding of memory as that which “propels” history, as the source that might allow us to inquire into the “accurate, empirical facts about what happened.” Here, memories are not opposed to written history; rather, they supplement, enhance, and in some cases, overturn and correct the written record. As such, witness testimonies of the Nakba are employed, with urgency, to construct a counter-history, to intercept the erasure of Palestinians from the Zionist unfolding of history. But to accomplish this task – to effectively speak back against such immense archival gaps – individuals must recount the Nakba chronologically and with accuracy, in forms of coherent narrative.

This idea, however, that “history is to a collectivity as remembrance is to an individual” is not one that can stand without difficulty. In his seminal work Silencing the Past, Michel-Rolph Trouillot troubles the interchangeability of history and memory, especially in a framework of impartial retrieval. On the level of the individual, this is because the contents of our mnemonic “cabinets,” he argues, are “neither fixed nor accessible at will.” Memories do not reveal themselves to us evenly, routinely, chronologically, or in coherent narrative forms – if ever at all.

Can we thus, Trouillot asks, confidently exclude from history all events not sufficiently remembered, not clearly revealed, and not yet assigned with importance? When this question is scaled up to a collectivity, further problems emerge: How can we determine where to start history, which memories to erase, and whose to exalt? Carrying the weight of methodological individualism, this storage model of memory-history “assumes not only the past to be remembered but the collective subject that does the remembering.” It abandons imperative issues of how and why collectivities decide which events to include or to exclude in processes of storying the past, and it eclipses how and why individual memories may have adjusted to each other. It separates, that is, the production of memory from the conditions of the present, and from the social
and material conditions that determine the perimeters of collective engagements with time and the past. In so doing, it uncritically accepts what counts to a collectivity as sufficiently eventful and, therefore, worth narrating, thereby excluding and overlooking the alternative modalities of remembering that otherwise exist on the margins of canonical historiography.

We must ask, then, of the scholarship that collects and draws upon Palestinian oral testimony: In the effort to remedy archival gaps through the treatment of memory as history, how might one avert the risk of mirroring the tenets of positivist history, where the webs of power informing the process of historical production are overlooked, where the event punctuates the flow of narrative, where a “truth regime” reigns, where past and present are sharply separated?48

Ann Laura Stoler and Karen Strassler argue that even those who critically study the colonial tend to unwittingly posit memory as a repository of subaltern truths, as the raw matter of counter-history. This tendency, they suggest, is undergirded by the conviction that subaltern memories contain “trenchant political critiques” that are “housed as discrete stories awaiting an audience,” “poised to be tapped” and uncovered.49 Therein lies the “peculiar violence of memory work,” as Penelope Papailias calls it, where researchers expect memory to unfold as pre-packaged historical testimony, “as spontaneous and as spirited as an oft-repeated folktale or folk song.”50 Indeed, it is the organized search for these “camouflaged” circuits, the insistence on the “romance of resistance,” and the fixation on the heroics of their extraction and recognition, that assumes the hyper-production of memory and the prevalence of structured modalities of telling.51

Here, it is important to qualify that a focus on the subaltern figures of Palestinian history (the fellah, the camp dweller, the woman) does not necessarily lead us to recover the voices of the unheard, nor does it necessarily enable the formation of an alternative historiographical model. Though such approaches are importantly committed to politically and historiographically remedying an uneven record, they must actively avert the risk of privileging the memories that most successfully and coherently narrate the unheard version of “what actually happened.” And to do so, they must actively avoid compressing memories, as well as their narrative (and) form, to fit a single iteration of loss – a single iteration that can, all the same, produce powerful material for political advocacy.

While Nada’s letter, Salma’s tiles, Tara’s family tree, Amjad’s suitcase, and Lana’s chairs do not revolve around “what happened” – around adversaries or heroes, compelling plots or violent struggles – they can tell us about the “enduring sentiments” of Palestine, and about how the material “textures of the past” that make their way into the lived spaces of the present, surfacing abruptly, often in unrehearsed, unspoken moments.52 In this way, they poignantly redirect us to the “sensibilities that cast a much longer shadow over people’s lives and what they choose to remember and tell about them.”53
Conclusions: Future Directions in Oral History Archives

As we envision, construct, and grapple with the complexities of a Palestinian archive, we must recognize the monumental importance of the work that many oral history projects have done to amplify the resonance of Palestinian voices in both scholarship and popular outlets. We must recognize that the recorded testimonies of uprooting, of expulsion, and of displacement remain central to achieving justice for Palestinians, in that they make it clear – against all archival silences – what actually happened in 1948.

But still, we must confront some methodological difficulties. Namely, we must ask: How might we navigate our commitment to historiographically reconstructing Palestinian voices without fixating on a search for the “essential historicity” of Palestinian memory? Haunted by Nada, by her needles, by her threads, and by the risk of dismissing her longings, I wish to conclude by calling for an alternative to structured memory-work, one that allows us to mark out “a space for the unrehearsed recollections of those who are convinced that their tellings are not what makes up real history at all.” For this, I argue that we must foreground the everyday. We must record and collect the practices of remembering that adhere neither to testimonial genres of telling nor to the plotlines of event-centered histories: we must portray the refracted personal catastrophes of the Nakba, appearing in the form of Nada’s letter, Salma’s tiles, Amjad’s passports, Tara’s family trees, and Lana’s chairs. And we must also grapple with the shadows of the Nakba, with the classed and gendered dynamics of exile, as we explore how the past resurfaces – most often in mundane and unremarkable ways and in everyday spaces.

An essential component of this task involves moving beyond a view of memory as a retrievable resource that contains, in its essence, a truth about the past. Instead, I have proposed approaching memory ethnographically: as an ever-changing practice, a practice in which fragments of an idealized past are woven into the times and spaces of an unhomely present. Such an approach will only allow us to enhance the existing methodologies of oral history archives, to move beyond paradigms of event-centered histories, beyond essentialized narratives of indigeneity, and towards an attention to the material textures of Palestinian exile – to the stories, to the daydreams, to the realities, and to the futures that Palestinians may wish to tell.

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Endnotes

1 All my interlocutors are anonymized via pseudonyms in this article.


5 Here, I also follow the lead of Ann Stoler and Karen Strassler, who advocate the study of memory as an “interpretative labor,” a labor in which the scholar must focus not only on what is remembered, but also how something is remembered. Memory, for Stoler and Strassler, is an “ongoing and uneven production process,” where “idioms of the past are reworked with a differently inflected but equally active voice in the present.” See Ann Laura Stoler and Karen Strassler, “Castings for the Colonial: Memory Work in ‘New Order’ Java,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42, no. 1 (2000): 9.


19 Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’,” in *Collected Papers*, ed. Ernest Jones, trans. Alix Strachey, vol. 4 (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1934), 389. For Freud, the definition of “uncanny” as the “unfamiliar” is incomplete. Freud states that the “uncanny,” which can be literally translated into the “unhomely,” contains a double meaning, one that oscillates between “that which is familiar and congenial” and “that which is concealed and kept out of sight.” Anthony Vidler (see note 28, p. 23) notes that for Freud’s purposes, the multiple significations of the German word *unheimlich* (uncanny, unhomely) were promising; they “served at once to clarify the operations of the uncanny as a systematic principle as well as to situate its domain in the domestic and the homely. . . . To this end, Freud deliberately approached the definition of the *unheimlich* by way of that of its apparent opposite, *heimlich*, thereby exposing the disturbing affiliation between the two and constituting the one as a direct outgrowth of the other.”


Whereas most of these objects might have once constituted an inventory of mundane everyday items, their survival into exile assigns them special importance. The murky inclusion of government documents (such as property deeds and passports) into this list is one that must be further explored in the Palestinian context, given that the establishment of the document-issuing state itself is still awaiting a future moment. For a noteworthy analysis of the agency of “make believe” government documents through an Actor Network Theory lens, see Navaro-Yashin, “Make-Believe Papers.”


Seikaly, Men of Capital, 6 (“minutely”), 62 (“realm of authority”).

Seikaly, Men of Capital, 172 (“haunt the present”), 52 (“however dispersed”).


A similar line of questioning has been convincingly initiated by scholars – notably Rosemary Sayigh – who have attended to the silencing of women’s narratives in their treatment of Palestinian popular memory and historiography. They argue that women’s personal recollections are often silenced because they may complicate nationalist histories. This line of argument is congruent with my insistence on the urgency of attending to the everyday experiences of exile. See: Rosemary Sayigh, “Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History,” Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 2 (1998): 42–58; Frances Hasso, “Modernity and Gender in Arab Accounts of the 1948 and 1967 Defeats,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 4 (2000): 491–510; and Isabelle Humphries and Laleh Khalili, “Gender of Nakba Memory” in Nakba, ed. Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 207–28.


44 Slyomovics, “Rape of Qula,” 32.


47 Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 16.


50 Papailias, “Writing Home,” 410, 413.


55 Papailias, “Writing Home in the Archive,” 413.

The first time I met Kamal Boullata was in 1979. We sat for long hours talking in his small two-room apartment on Dupont Circle in Washington, DC. I looked at his round face with dimpled cheeks and thick curly hair and knew that he was listening to me and feeling with me. My pain as I described daily life under occupation was his pain. He had an exceptional capacity to empathize, to put himself in my place and imagine how it would feel if he went through the difficulties of living under those conditions. It was a meeting that left a strong impression on me. We became friends ever since.

That initial visit with Kamal had a lasting effect on my life. At the end of it he said to me: “Why don’t you write down what you told me? Just write it as you said it. People here don’t know what you go through. Even I did not and I try to keep up. Think about it.” I did and eventually turned the lengthy letters I sent him after my return and in which I described daily life in Palestine under occupation into my first book, *The Third Way: A Journal of Life in the West Bank.*

My visit also coincided with the launch in New York of a book Kamal coedited, *The World of Rashid Hussein.* He invited me to the event, my first experience with
a launching of a new book and my first meeting with Edward Said, one of the contributors to the anthology. Kamal was not only ecstatic because the book – celebrating the life of his poet friend who had died tragically in New York – was finally getting launched, but also because he had just met in Paris the woman who would become his life partner, Lily Farhoud. Throughout the train journey from Washington to New York, Kamal did not stop singing the praises of Lily. I couldn’t wait to meet her.

A first meeting was followed by many others over the years. I would stay with Kamal and Lily in their small apartment and observe how generous they both were with their time. I remember how much time Kamal spent with the child of an American friend who stopped by for a visit unannounced. He had been complaining what little time he had to finish work he was engaged with, yet he left everything he was doing to give all his attention to the child and encourage him to draw. That love of children and appreciation of their art comes across in his 1990 book on the drawings of Palestinian children, *Faithful Witness: Palestinian Children Recreate Their World.*

Kamal never lost the child in him, even as he became a leading artist and writer. He was as adept with the pen as he was with the painting brush. He spent his whole life developing both means of expression and he made great strides in producing a body of visual art as well as of analytical writing about art. In his seminal article “To Measure Jerusalem: Explorations of the Square,” he wrote that “visual expression is a language that is separate from that of verbal expression. One cannot give voice to the other, nor can one be a substitute for the other. Painting proceeds from painting just as much as writing proceeds from reading.”

I continued to visit Kamal in the various countries where he and Lily lived. I always looked forward to my visits with him. They helped me keep abreast with what he was working on and what he was thinking. In Menton in the south of France, where they resided for a number of years, he continued to explore the “link between a central motif in the icons of [his] childhood and the octagonal star from which radiated those mesmerizing arabesques evolved in Islamic art.”

So often Kamal would dazzle me with his great output in both writing and painting. He seemed to find joy in both. “An inner joy mounts,” he wrote, “when advancing and receding properties of geometric colored shapes begin to act like the ebb and flow of a musical piece taking visual body. The sound of the brush thumping on the stretched canvas like a muffled drum echoes the shaping of geometric space.” Out of that joy emerged a series of paintings which he called “Surrat al-Ard” (the Navel of the Earth), a term used...
in medieval sources to refer to Jerusalem’s central rock. One of these, inspired by the Mediterranean Sea, is called “Mare Nostrum” (Our Sea). The painting has the freshness and clarity of glass. Kamal describes how he deemed the painting to be completed:

> Once I begin to sense that I could almost plunge through the painting’s surface as in a pool or a mirror, I realize that the work is finished. Days or weeks later, when I look back with surprise at what had actually been accomplished before my eyes. I cannot help but wonder what images that particular surface reflects from my memory. 

This he would explore in his analytical articles about painting.

Kamal always set high standards for himself, whether in what he wrote or what he painted, and he expected the same of others. He did not have an ounce of pretension and was intolerant of mediocrity. He was a patriot and spent a lot of his energy and time volunteering his services to the Palestinian cause, but decried narrow nationalism and never exhibited it. As a mentor, he was generous with his time for those in whom he detected promise. His 2012 book, *Between Exits: Paintings by Hani Zurob*, traces the artistic trajectory of a Palestinian artist from Gaza whose work Kamal valued. The book was instrumental in introducing this talented artist to the world.

In “To Measure Jerusalem,” Kamal quotes Albert Camus:

> I know with certainty that a man’s work is nothing but the long journey to recover through the detours of art, the two or three simple and great images which first gained access to his heart.

To Kamal, these were the circle and the square, with the earth often symbolized by the square and the circle representing the heavenly sphere. Throughout his life he seemed to be trying to square the circle of the various influences on his life, whether Christian and Islamic cultures or Jerusalem and the rest of the world.

In one of Kamal’s visits to Jerusalem, which would turn out to be his last, we managed to take a walk in the lovely hills around Ramallah – I always looked forward to the hours of strolling and talking with Kamal whenever we got together, long walks from which I always returned enriched and inspired. But he had been uneasy and on edge. From what he told me, I could tell that he wasn’t comfortable in his native city of Jerusalem. Could he have lived there if the bureaucratic obstacles were removed and it was possible to move to Palestine? I wonder.

For most of his life Kamal seemed to be always looking for a center, for a quiet place where he could work in peace. He didn’t find it in America; after he and Lily moved from there, he never wanted to go back. Nor did he find it in the south of France, although he cherished the landscape and the Mediterranean Sea. It was in Berlin, the cosmopolitan city where many other artists found refuge, that he ultimately found a home. Penny and I visited him and Lily several times there, but always in grey winter or cold early spring. Kamal urged me to come when the trees have sprouted young
leaves and the colors are enchanting. We both looked forward to taking a long walk in the Tiergarten park and enjoying the myriad colors and beauty there. It was never to be. On 6 August 2019, Kamal died and I was overcome by grief for losing a special friend impossible to replace.

Now it is only possible to walk with Kamal through my memories.

— September 2019

*Raja Shehadeh’s latest book is Going Home: A Walk through Fifty Years of Occupation (London: Profile Books, 2019).*

**Endnotes**

Palestine at the Centennial Fair of 1876
Linda K. Jacobs

On 10 May 1876, U.S. president Ulysses S. Grant opened the Centennial Fair in Philadelphia’s Fairmount Park. The fair, to which some ten million tickets were sold over its six-month run, is often described as the first world’s fair in the United States.¹ Other fairs had been held earlier, but this was the first to give such prominence to products from other countries. Hard on its heels, a nearly unbroken series of fairs opened in various cities across the United States, some local and some with national reach, with Syrian Arabs participating in almost every one of them. Most of the fairs exploited the Orientalist fad that was sweeping the country, selling Middle Eastern goods and replicating mosques, Cairene streets, and Turkish cafés, culminating in the full-scale replica of the Old City of Jerusalem at the 1904 St. Louis fair. Middle Easterners performed in costume as camel drivers, shaykhs, belly dancers, or Bedouins, many taking on multiple roles. Merchants, too, were expected to wear “native dress,” and they themselves believed this helped sell their wares. The Centennial Fair led the way, being the first in the United States to invite “native” merchants to show Holy Land goods, not only introducing these goods to an American public already in thrall to the “mystic East” and the Holy Land, but also introducing Palestine merchants to a large and hitherto unexploited market, enabling the global expansion of trade in these goods.

The Ottoman government responded positively, but quite late, to an invitation to participate in the Centennial Fair. A committee headed by Aristarchi Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in Washington, was set up in the United States to manage arrangements on the American side,
assisted by the first and second secretaries, Xenophon Baltazzi and Ahmed Rustem (along with the acting consul in New York City, Edward Sherer). Ultimately, the Ottoman section opened two months after the fair’s inauguration in May. The fair’s governing body, the United States Centennial Commission, had allocated only three thousand square feet of space to “Turkey” in the main exhibition building, half the space given to Egypt. An astonishing fifteen hundred exhibitors – both provincial governments and private individuals or companies – showed a broad range of products from all over the Ottoman Empire, from sea salt to silks, saddles to soap. The largest number of goods were textiles, followed by agricultural and food products, and leather goods. Two stuffed Angora goats were on display in a glass box, and exhibitors submitted portfolios of photographs and treatises on the medical and natural sciences.

Only four exhibitors from Palestine – all from Jerusalem – were listed in the official catalogue of the Ottoman section of the main exhibition building, although newspaper accounts mention articles of olive wood inlaid with mother-of-pearl (including “a model representing the inside of a mosque at Jerusalem”) that may have come from Bethlehem. Of the four, the largest was Vester and Company, owned by Ferdinand Vester, a German cabinet-maker who had gone to Jerusalem in 1853 to join the Swiss-German Mission. The other exhibits from Jerusalem in the Ottoman installation in

Figure 1. “Bird’s eye view of the Centennial Fair.” Courtesy of the Free Library of Philadelphia.
Figures 2a and 2b. Scenes in the Turkish Café and Bazaar.

Figure 3. Smoking parlor in the Turkish Café. Author’s collection.

Source for Figures 2 and 3: Frank Leslie’s *Historical Register of the United States: Centennial Exposition, 1876*, ed. Frank Norton (New York: Frank Leslie, 1877); author’s collection.
the main building were tiny in comparison to Vester’s: the government of Jerusalem showed a single “earthen[ware] cup”; one Cherkis Berke sent mother-of-pearl lockets; and an enigmatic entrant, “Ith,” displayed a ceramic cup and saucer. Ana Sebat (said to be from Jerusalem but most probably from Bethlehem) created a mother-of-pearl mosaic of the “Tomb and Sepulchre of Christ,” which was displayed in the women’s building. No other exhibitors from Palestine are listed.9

The Bazaars

The main exhibition building was one of five major buildings dominating the fair, but many other impressive structures – both government-built and those erected by businesses – were placed about the grounds. Dozens of smaller buildings went up wherever there was an empty space, offering entertainment, food, and goods for sale.10 Although their locations and designs had to be approved by the Centennial Commission, there was little logic to their placement and no uniformity of design, so they added visual variety to what might have been a staid, albeit grand, exposition. After initial approval, these small installations were generally ignored by the authorities (unless they transgressed some rule or did not pay rent on time). They did not appear in official depictions of the fair and were not eligible for awards.

The Ottoman government was assigned an additional 4,200-square-foot plot of land in the southwestern section of the exposition grounds between Fountain Avenue and Avenue of the Republic to build a Turkish café and bazaar. George H. Boker, the U.S. ambassador in Constantinople, had told the Centennial Commission that it would be “a small, one-story building, and it is very pretty and characteristic, being an exact copy of one of the Sultan’s kiosks.”11 Designed by Pierre Montani (the architect of several previous fair installations), the building was fifty feet square, with a kitchen protruding at the back. Its octagonal roof topped with a small dome and a standard bearing the star and crescent gave it its “Oriental” appearance. Echoing the roof’s shape, the café served Turkish sweets and coffee along with Cypriot and Samos wines, and the smoking parlor offered men narghiles and chibouks filled with Turkish tobacco.12 Opening out from the café onto the surrounding porch, four bazaars sold antiques, gold and silk embroideries, carpets, and “different Brousse, Damas, and Syria Stuff[s].”13

The romantic lens through which the Turkish Café and Bazaar were first seen gave way to malicious innuendoes. A strange spate of thefts occurred at the bazaar near the close of the fair; all the thieves were apparently well-heeled Americans and all were acquitted. The papers accused the merchants of having concocted the thefts in order to extort money from the Americans.14 Other stories claimed that the merchants were not Turks, but Greeks, implying that the public was being fooled; the items they sold were fake; and the prices they charged were outrageously inflated. The director-general himself got involved and wrote to Baltazzi, asking him to stop unauthorized vendors from selling in the bazaar, and to Aristarchi, advising him that the café was behind in its rent payments.15 These difficulties may have signaled a failing enterprise or may
have simply represented the conflicting attitudes of Americans toward “the East”: fascination on the one hand and contempt on the other.

Just north of the Turkish Café, on the same side of Fountain Avenue, were the Jerusalem and Bethlehem Bazaars – two wooden booths “designed for the sale of olive wood” and given the catalogue numbers of 53½ and 58½, respectively.16 Too small to appear on maps or photographs, several eyewitness accounts attest to their existence.

The Jerusalem Bazaar
The Jerusalem Bazaar went up first (as indicated by its smaller catalogue number and several newspaper accounts), opening on 18 May. Measuring a mere fourteen by eight feet, it was gaily painted in shades of green, yellow, blue, and gold, and sold only goods carved from olive wood: “crucifixes, rosaries, card and cigar cases, match-boxes and gew-gaws . . . all made, [said] the Syrians, of wood from those spots in the Holy Land which are so dear to Christians.”17 Bayard Taylor, the famous travel writer, visited the booth and attested to the genuine quality of the objects, in contrast to the “cheap jewelry manufactured in Paris” for sale in the Tunisian Bazaar.18 “As honey-bees cluster upon rhododendrons so do Exhibition visitors flock about the Syrian bazaar, trying to read the placards and labels displaying Turkish characters descriptive of the wares offered for sale by five natives of Jerusalem rigged in full Syrian costume.”19

The five managers of the Jerusalem Bazaar were four brothers in their twenties – Nachly (28), Abraham (22), John (25), and Jacob Abdélour Kurt (25) – and David Nassar Jamal (age 26), all of whom had traveled from Jerusalem by way of Germany, boarded the SS Pennsylvania in Liverpool and landed in Philadelphia on 3 April.20 They came to the attention of reporters, not least because they were dressed in the “peculiar costume of their country.” Jamal, a guide for English and American tourists in the Holy Land, was assumed to be the boss, because he spoke English and apparently did “nothing but smoke a short wooden pipe and act as a cicerone to the curious gazers standing around” while the other men worked.21 It may be that the Kurts brought Jamal along because of his knowledge of English, or perhaps he really was the boss, as the reporter assumed. When asked whether they were Christians or Muslims, Jamal exclaimed, “Christians! We are Orthodox, every one of us!”22 It is also not clear who owned the booth and goods (they may have even been in Vester’s employ), but the name ascribed to it by several reporters – Nachly & Bros., Jerusalem – seems to indicate the brothers worked for themselves. Skilled carpenters, these men may also have carved the objects they sold.

Four months after arriving in the United States, all but Jacob filed papers declaring their intention to become citizens. Nachly and Abraham signed with their mark, John in Arabic, and Jamal in English.23 After the fair closed, however, all except Nachly returned to Jerusalem. Jamal sold “Oriental curios” in Jerusalem and England and served as dragoman for many eminent Holy Land tourists. He and his partner, Demetrius Domian, boldly advertised their services on the Jaffa Gate, directly under the advertisement for Cook’s.24 Nachly became a carpenter in Boston; he was naturalized in 1883, so that he could obtain a passport and return home temporarily. When he went back to the United
States, he settled in New York and resumed work as a carpenter. After a second trip to Jerusalem in 1892, we lose track of him; nothing more is known about him (or his brothers), not even whether he died in Jerusalem or in the United States.25

The Bethlehem Bazaar
The origins of the Bethlehem Bazaar are more obscure, but we do know it appeared after the Jerusalem Bazaar, springing up, according to one press account, “to sell gew-gaws in opposition to the natives of Jerusalem who have a bazaar close by.”26 It is rarely mentioned in newspaper accounts, perhaps because of its late start or because it was seen as part of the Jerusalem Bazaar (some accounts say the two booths were adjoining), yet several articles testify to its existence. James McCabe described two booths in which “some enterprising Syrian merchants offer for sale articles of olive wood and mother-of-pearl from Jerusalem, Bethlehem and other parts of the Holy Land.”27 Another reported: “Hard by [the Turkish Café] there are two booths, one offering for sale a variety of olive wood articles from Bethlehem, and the other rosaries, trinkets and other keepsakes from Jerusalem.”28

The Bethlehem Bazaar’s probable owners, Michel and Beshara Dabdoub, scions of an important Bethlehem Catholic mercantile family,29 had arrived in Philadelphia
armed with an approval from the Ottoman authorities and goods to sell, and had already paid customs duty in Philadelphia. For some reason, however, fair authorities withheld permission to build. In mid-April, the Dabdoubs asked Aristarchi to intercede so that they could sell their “articles fantasies” at the fair. They probably meant objects made of mother-of-pearl, on which the Dabdoub family’s mercantile success rested, or a mixture of mother-of-pearl and olive wood. They must have finally received permission because, as noted, a booth was being built “in opposition to” the Jerusalem booth at the end of May. By that time, though, the Jerusalem Bazaar had garnered all the attention and was already doing a brisk business.

To complicate things further, a second group from Bethlehem – the brothers Zacariah, Michael, and Habib Banayotte/Panayotti – were also in Philadelphia and also waiting for permission to build. They had left Palestine in March with more than sixty dozen small objects (brooches, studs, rosaries, crosses, and so forth) worked in mother-of-pearl, olive wood, and seeds, as well as dozens of larger objects (tableaux and large medallions in mother-of-pearl, large olivewood crosses, and sets of Turkish coffee cups). They cleared customs in Philadelphia in April and in early June, a month after the fair opened and after the Bethlehem booth was already under construction, they were still awaiting permission. First Secretary Baltazzi, who with Rustem had moved to Philadelphia to oversee the Ottoman installations, urged the commission to allow the Banayottes to proceed. “It is desirable,” he wrote, “to have the space assigned near the Turkish Coffee House and as near to the Jerusalem Bazaar as possible.” The director-general granted permission on 5 June, subject to submission and approval of the plans, along with the proviso that 15 percent of all receipts be paid to the commission. Where or whether they did build is unknown. Did they join forces with the Dabdoubs in the Bethlehem Bazaar or build something separate? One article describes the building of a booth in July: “Near the Jerusalem Bazaar has just been erected and opened, the ‘Bethlehem Judea Bazaar,’ where articles of pearl and olive wood are for sale by Bethlemites [sic] in Palestine costume.” This is the only evidence suggesting that the Panayottis built their own booth. Thus, two (or perhaps three, if the Mikels were also at the fair; see note 20) Bethlehem families were present at the fair, one or all of whom ran the Bethlehem Bazaar(s) and may have supplied the mother-of-pearl goods on display in the main building, but none of whose names appear in the official catalogue, contemporary news accounts, or elsewhere.

The only extant photograph of the Palestine presence at the fair shows a single booth attached to the exterior of (and perhaps sublet from) the Brazilian Café. Neither the booth nor the café is mentioned in any document or shown on any map, so we do not know where it was located. The stall has a striped awning emblazoned with the combined rubric “Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Palestine,” which may indicate that the Jerusalem and Bethlehem Bazaars merged at some point during the fair and moved to a different (perhaps cheaper) location. Their goods certainly overlapped and would not have been difficult to incorporate into one display. Or perhaps the Panayotti brothers hurriedly attached their stall to an already-existing building in a desperate attempt to catch up to their competitors: the three blurry figures may be the three brothers. Or
it may have been one of the unauthorized installations springing up on the grounds, competing with the two legitimate booths by selling fake goods from “the Orient.”

An account written a year after the fair closed recalls that the Jerusalem Bazaar, along with the Tunisian Café and Algerian Bazaar, was so profitable that unauthorized imitations sprang up around the fairgrounds:

The above establishments opened with the Centennial, and did a prosperous business immediately. This prosperity was noted by inventive Americanized subjects, who began to open rival bazaars. These innovations gradually and steadily increased, until at the close they were located in all the most prominent places on the grounds, and trinkets from “the Orient” were made by the bushel in West Philadelphia and “down East.” The uninitiated came, and were easily persuaded to exchange their money for these imitations. As the number of visitors increased, soda-water stands were metamorphosed [sic] into genuine Jerusalem – so the proprietors said – bazaars, and many of the attendants, who said they were born in Turkey, had the rich brogue of the Emerald Island. They continued to come, and were at the close pronounced nuisances and abominations by all.36
Figure 6. “Fancy Articles - Turkey” in the Ottoman section, main exhibition building (official photograph no. 1858). Courtesy of the Free Library of Philadelphia.

Figures 7a and 7b. The hand-carved olivewood cover and frontispiece of Ferdinand Vester’s Flowers of the Holy Land. Author’s collection.
Non-Palestinian Participants

The Jerusalem and Bethlehem Bazaars also saw competition from legitimate merchants among the Ottoman exhibitioners who traded on the allure of the Holy Land. It has been said that H. H. Jessup, the Presbyterian missionary in Beirut, sent Christians from the Koura to the fair: “For six months they supervised the Turkish exhibits in the Main Hall, worked in the Turkish Pavilion and Café, and sold olive-wood artifacts from the Holy Land at the ‘Bethlehem and Palestine’ booth.” However, we know the name of only one person who claimed to be among them: Khalil Sallom, who became an agent for the travel company Thomas Cook and Son when he returned to Philadelphia later in the century. If there were others, they remain unidentified.

Cook’s travel company had begun to organize tours to Palestine in 1869, and Jaffa and Jerusalem were its main staging posts. The company erected an impressive ticket office at the fair with an array of white tents set up behind the building (the same tents as those used on the Holy Land tours), which Cook called “Palestine and Jerusalem Camp.” In addition to advertising tours and selling tickets, there was a display of “ornamental articles manufactured in Palestine” that were probably for sale. Dragoman Rolla Floyd, who later became Cook’s competitor and implacable enemy, came from Jaffa to work in the building and lend a note of authenticity and authority to the sales pitch. He was to guide a special Cook’s tour of the Holy Land due to leave Philadelphia on the day the fair closed.

It may have been Thomas Cook who encouraged Vester to participate in the fair. Cook knew Vester and later sold his products in England. Although there is no evidence that Vester himself was present at the fair, his company showed a large number of olivewood products, divided by the fair authorities into three categories: home goods (from tables and shelves to napkin rings and candlesticks); personal items (cuff buttons, book and album covers, cases and boxes of various kinds, toys, and rosaries); and library furnishings (desks, inkstands, penholders, paperweights). The company won two commendations “as a fine display of fancy goods in olive wood in a great variety of forms,” distinguished by their “superior workmanship and finish.” In the only photograph of the Turkish section in the main building, dozens of Vester’s olivewood rosaries sit on trays, spill out of boxes, and hang from the display case of Antoine Bedros’s tobacco company, alongside olive oil soap and perfumes, while a splendid array of Turkish rugs delineate and decorate the back and side walls of this portion of the exhibit.

In the United States section of the main building, meanwhile, a Philadelphia merchant, Paul Weintraub, showed “fancy articles of olive wood from Jerusalem.” Weintraub, “late Guide and resident of Jerusalem,” had travelled to Philadelphia a few years before the fair with the clear intention of staying (he brought his wife and children) and must have already been in business when he applied for a spot in the American section. After the fair, he continued to sell olivewood items (“direct from the Holy Land . . . at reasonable prices”) and fancy goods from his store on South Tenth Street until his death in 1882.
Palestine merchants attended subsequent fairs, but never in great numbers. Vester went on to show goods at the Louisville fair in 1885, the Chicago fair of 1893, from which he took home a medal, and the Atlanta fair of 1895. The Dabdoubs participated in the Louisville and Chicago fairs, and the St. Louis fair of 1904. Also at the Louisville fair was someone called Selah Mousour (perhaps Mansur?) who sold Jerusalem relics and Oriental goods. A press account described him as a “soft-spoken individual . . . all over the building, with his Jerusalem curiosities, his ‘charms of the Turkish ladies,’ his amulets, his sandal wood ornaments and ottar-of-roses scent bottles, all of which he is invariably ‘selling to-day at half price.’” The Panayottis attended the Chicago fair and, when it closed, carried their goods around the country, advertising “olive wood, Turkish rugs, jewelry, [and] perfumes” as they went. Although Jacob Norris mentions the participation of the Handal brothers in the 1853 New York Exposition, nothing and no one in the official catalogue can be construed as coming from Palestine. Solomon Handal did go to the Chicago fair and settled in New York after it closed.

The 1904 St. Louis fair, with its thirteen-acre full-scale replica of selected parts of the Old City of Jerusalem was the most spectacular exploitation of America’s hunger for knowledge of and goods from the “Holy Land.” Although all the shareholders and managers of the Jerusalem Exhibit Company were Americans, more than “five hundred natives of Jerusalem – Jews, Moslems, Christians – are conducting the trades they were accustomed to carry on in Palestine.” Living inside the ersatz city, they acted as guides, merchants, craftsmen, and entertainers, all clad in “native dress.” How many were really Jerusalemites is impossible to say: most of the “natives” at the fair whose names we know were Syrian Christians, some perhaps from Jerusalem, but many more from Mount Lebanon and others coming from their homes in the United States. Rehav Rubin cites a doubling of the value of goods exported from Jaffa in 1903 and 1904, however, indicating that many goods from Palestine were being sent to the fair. But if prior fairs are any indication, these goods were being sold by Syrians, not Jerusalemites. The Jerusalem Exhibit Company was plagued by problems and ended in bankruptcy, leaving many of those who had been brought from the Middle East in precarious circumstances.

Adele Younis, describing the successes of the Arab presence at the Centennial Fair, averred that “Syrian entrepreneurs discovered new markets in America, for the fair developed new tastes and increased the demand for new products.” Jacob Norris, however, cautions that although the fair may have been a springboard for Bethlehem mother-of-pearl merchants in America, its “influence should not be overstated.” Still, the Jerusalem Bazaar’s frequent mentions in the press, its imitators, the three Bethlehem merchant families who were at the fair, the fake “Holy Land goods” that began to be produced, and the fact that Palestine goods and merchants continued to be seen at later fairs all point to their success and testify to the attraction that Holy Land goods held for the American public.
In fact, Holy Land goods became and remained a staple for Syrian peddlers and Syrian suppliers in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most common were olivewood items, including rosaries, crosses, cigarette cases, and the like – exactly those items that were shown and sold at the Centennial Fair – which were light and easy to pack, lending themselves to door-to-door sales. They appealed to Christian Americans in all parts of the country and were especially popular in Catholic enclaves. The fact that Syrian peddlers often claimed (or were assumed) to be from the Holy Land added authenticity to their sales pitch.58 As for those actually born in Palestine, very few immigrated. Of the approximately fifteen thousand Arab immigrants in the 1900 federal census, fewer than two dozen gave their birthplace as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, or Palestine.59 The 1908–9 Syrian Business Directory lists only three businessmen from Bethlehem and four from Jerusalem (among more than three thousand names).60

The Dabdoubs and Handals, two Bethlehem families that immigrated to the United States in the nineteenth century, turned the manufacture and importation of Holy Land goods into a big business.61 Family members constantly traveled back and forth to
Bethlehem, supervising their factories, organizing the shipment of goods, and expanding their markets in North and South America. Maronite merchants from Mount Lebanon did the same. They bought Holy Land goods from Palestine suppliers until they began to manufacture their own. All of these merchants, whether from Palestine or Mount Lebanon, soon broadened their reach, either becoming manufacturers of a broad range of religious goods or becoming large importers-exporters and wholesalers of general dry goods. Thus, the Centennial Fair, as difficult as it may have been for the Palestine merchants, did provide the first venue for the display of Holy Land goods by “natives,” laying a foundation for their success in the global trading economy.


Endnotes
1 Its official name was the International Exhibition of Arts, Manufactures, and Products of the Soil and Mine.
2 Correspondence between A. T. Goshorn, director-general of the Centennial Commission, and the members of the Ottoman committee, City of Philadelphia, Department of Records, City Archives, United States Centennial Commission, Centennial Exhibition of 1876 Records, Record Groups 230 and 231 (hereinafter Philadelphia City Archives), online at hdl.library.upenn.edu/1017/d/pacscl/PCA_PCRGroups230and231 (accessed 5 October 2019). A not-quite-complete set of the photographs commissioned for the fair are held at the Free Library of Philadelphia, online at libwww.freelibrary.org/digital//collection/centennial-exhibition (accessed 5 October 2019).
3 The delayed opening can be blamed on their late start and the complexity of the arrangements (gathering goods from all over the empire, arranging for shipping them five thousand miles, dealing in a foreign language). In a letter to Aristarchi dated 15 June 1876, Goshorn explains that he was unable to assign an Ottoman to the committees of judges “owing to the uncertainty until quite recently as to the final participation of your country and the absence of information as to the extent of your participation in the Exhibition.” In fact, two men suggested by Aristarchi did become judges. Philadelphia City Archives.
4 This number included all aisles and walkways, so the display space was actually smaller. They had originally been promised a larger space but were downgraded before the fair opened. Aristarchi protested, but to no avail. Again, their late start may have been the reason their space was reduced, or the decision may have been a symptom of the generalized contempt in which the Ottoman Empire was held by the American officials, as evidenced as well by the dearth of official photographs, tiny number and low status of the awards, and neglect or rebuffs by the Centennial Commission to several of Aristarchi’s requests.
5 The number of exhibitors was surpassed only by the United States and Great Britain. The government of Damascus, for example, exhibited “wheat, maize, barley, white sorghum, etc.,” while Mme. Kamile of Tripoli, Syria, showed “embroidered napkins.” United States Centennial Commission 1876, Official Catalogue, Complete in One Volume (Philadelphia: John R. Nagle, 1876) (hereinafter Official Catalogue). In contrast to this vast array of goods shown by both governmental and
private institutions, all objects in the Egyptian and Tunis sections were said to be provided by their respective governments.

6 Pascal Sébah of Constantinople and the Kova Brothers of Beirut contributed the photographs. Although not listed in the Official Catalogue, the Kova Brothers won a commendation for their photographs of “Arabic Costumes of Syria.” The judges found it “an extremely interesting collection.” Philadelphia City Archives.

7 “The Great Show,” Intelligencer-Journal (Lancaster, PA), 1 August 1876, 2. The complete absence of Bethlehem merchants in the Official Catalogue seems to contradict Jacob Norris’ epigram taken from Malouf: “The first to enter North America, in search of trade, were the traders of Bethlehem; they carried their wooden, pearl-embellished handcrafts to the Philadelphia exhibition of 1876. They returned to their country with an abundance of wealth, and prompted others to follow in their footsteps.” Jacob Norris, “Exporting the Holy Land: Artisans and Merchant’s Migrants in Ottoman Bethlehem,” Mashriq & Mahjar 1, no. 2 (2013): 14. Perhaps Malouf was referring only to the Bethlehem Bazaar(s).

8 Vester played a key role in the building of the first Lutheran church in Jerusalem, and the house he built for himself, one of the first outside the walls, later became the American consulate. Bertha Spafford Vester, Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1950), 84.

9 The government of Syria brought Dead Sea salt, which must have come from Palestine.

10 The distinction between the “high” – the educational and informative – and the “low” – the money-making – would be increasingly marked at subsequent fairs. Their comingling on the grounds of the Centennial eventually gave way to a physical separation that reached its apogee at the Chicago fair of 1893, at which the Midway Plaisance lay completely outside the confines of the so-called White City, becoming its own attraction and earning all the money; many visitors never bothered to see the actual fair. “The Midway” became a byword for fun (the Ferris Wheel made its first appearance there), and it served as a model for the amusement parks and carnivals – eschewing any higher purpose other than entertainment and profit – that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and continue to be built to this day.

11 Boker to Goshorn, datelined “Constantinople, March 17, 1875.” Philadelphia City Archives.

12 The café was in the charge of Pierre Barthélemy and Victorine Vallauri, both of Constantinople. The Vallauri family were well-known confectioners. James McCabe wrote: “Pipes are here in abundance, and you may enjoy the happiest of smokes for a mere pittance.” James D. McCabe, The Illustrated History of the Centennial Exhibition (Philadelphia: National Publishing, 1876), 616. The coffee was said to be “as clear as amber, as black as ebony, as fragrant as the perfumes from ‘Araby the blest,’ and strong enough to satisfy a man of average nerves for the remainder of the day.” “Coffee Az-Iz Coffee: Opening of the Turkish Cafe,” Times (Philadelphia), 7 June 1876, 4.

13 Philadelphia City Archives. The proprietors of the bazaar were G. Ludovic and P. Barthélemy, Constantinople merchants. The firm of “Ludovic and Vallauri” (perhaps Victorine’s husband, Edouard), showed many goods in the Ottoman section of the main building. After the fair, the remaining goods from the Turkish Bazaar were auctioned off. Advertisement, Boston Globe, 22 December 1876, 3. The Turkish Bazaar may have been staffed by Syrians from the Koura (see below and notes 38 and 39).

14 “Are the American People Thieves?” Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 October 1876, 4.

15 Goshorn to Aristarchi, dated 6 August and 14 August 1876, Philadelphia City Archives.

16 Official Catalogue, Part III, 122, 124. The “½” implies they were late additions to the catalogue.


18 “The Genuine and the Bogus,” Press (Everett, PA), 5 September 1876, 3. Although the men in the Turkish Café spoke only Greek, according to Taylor, those in the Jerusalem Bazaar answered “with alacrity” when he spoke to them in Arabic, implying that the former were fooling the public, while the latter were the genuine article.

19 “The Palestine Bazaar,” Times (Philadelphia), 24 May 1876, 2. This was before the Bethlehem Bazaar was open and shows that the Jerusalem Bazaar was already successful.

20 A member of the Bethlehem Mikel family was also on board; he may have been going
to the fair to sell mother-of-pearl goods, but nothing more is heard of him.

21 “Among the Turks,” *Times* (Philadelphia), 19 April 1876, 1. Jamal claimed that the “little grass plot” on which the booth was being built was acquired for them by the good offices of Richard Smith, a partner in one of the oldest type foundries in the United States, whom Jamal had guided in Palestine.


23 Signing with a cross (as the Christian immigrants often did) usually indicated illiteracy in both Arabic and English, but we know from later documents that Nachly was literate in Arabic; perhaps it did not make sense to him to sign his intention papers in a script no one could read. One note says that “Ten of the Turks, belonging to the Turkish bazaar at the Centennial, filed their petitions.” *Reading Times* (Reading, PA), 11 August 1876, 2. Who these ten might have been is not known.

24 Five stereoscopic photos of David Jamal c. 1900 can be found online at calisphere.org/item/ark:/13030/kt2870283q/ (accessed 4 September 2019).

25 A family of “Kourts” emigrated from Jerusalem to the United States around 1910, but whether they were related to the earlier visitors is not known.


27 McCabe, *Illustrated History*, 617.


29 Norris, “Exporting the Holy Land.”

30 Philadelphia City Archives.


32 Philadelphia City Archives. Those who brought goods intended for sale were required to pay customs duty on entry, while duty was waived for all exhibitors, as long as they took their goods home with them. If they sold them after the fair closed, customs duty officers were on hand to assess what they owed. Most of the items in the Middle Eastern displays went on sale after the fair, usually in other cities to evade the customs officers, or were given to American museums; no one wanted to pay for return shipping.

33 Letter datelined, “Philadelphia, June 1, 1876.” Philadelphia City Archives.

34 “From Our Correspondents: The Centennial City,” *Monmouth Democrat* (Monmouth, NJ), 20 July 1876, 3.

35 Land allocations by the Commission may indicate there were three booths: the “Jerusalem, Palestine Bazaar” was allocated .012 acres (about 525 square feet) and the “Jerusalem Bazaar” .002 acres (about 87 square feet); the former may have been the combined Jerusalem/Bethlehem Bazaars, the latter, the Panayotti Bazaar.


37 See online at ww1.antiochian.org/node/21323 (accessed 1 September 2019).

38 See online at ww1.antiochian.org/node/21323 (accessed 1 September 2019). The source for this story was Sallom’s granddaughter.

39 *Official Catalogue*, Part III, 131. Since only a year later, Cook was selling Vester’s olivewood items in London (see note 42), it seems likely that the items on display at Cook’s were Vester’s and that they were indeed for sale.

40 Floyd was one of the few remaining members of an American millenarian colony that had settled in Jaffa earlier in the century. He worked for Cook for seven years before going out on his own. Rolla Floyd, *Letters from Palestine: 1868–1912*, ed. Helen Palmer Parsons (n.p., 1981).


Turkey took home only eighty-six awards out of a total of thirteen thousand, and they were all “diplomas,” rather than medals. Nevertheless, the winners proudly advertised these honors.


Although Weintraub and his wife may have been Jewish, the children were baptized and raised as Episcopalians in Philadelphia.

Advertisement, Delaware County Daily Times (Chester, PA), 29 December 1877, 3.


Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 28 August 1894, 8.


“Jerusalem at the World’s Fair,” Pulaski County Democrat (Waynesville, MO), 17 June 1904, 1. Some estimated there were a thousand “natives” from Jerusalem.

The train bringing the dromedaries will also carry a troupe of fifty natives, who are to be part of the exhibit in the reproduced Holy City. “Ship Camels for Jerusalem Exhibit,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 21 March 1904, 4.


Three separate fires destroyed parts of the exhibition. The company repeatedly petitioned the fair administration to allow them to be open on Sundays to increase ticket sales for attractions within the “city,” but was rebuffed. Charging extra admissions turned out to be a mistake that was only remedied in September, when they made the attractions free, but by then it was too late. Their frequent advertisements in the local newspapers show increasing desperation as the season wore on. The company was sued by merchants, suppliers, and employees (both “native” and American) and went into receivership in August. Trying to recoup their losses, the company sued the fair management for failure to live up to its agreements, but lost the case. At the close of the fair, the company auctioned off everything in its possession, including the stock of its “Antique Museum” as well as the materials from which the booths were constructed, but ended up bankrupt. Their creditors received pennies on the dollar.

Younis conflated the Ottoman installation with the Tunis and Egyptian displays, and Eric Davis did not distinguish between the installations in the main building with those outside (Davis, in fact, placed the Turkish Café in the main building), leading both to misinterpret the Ottoman presence. They do not mention Palestine. Adele L. Younis, The Coming of the Arabic-Speaking People to the United States (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1995), 142–49. Eric Davis, “Representations of the Middle East at American World Fairs, 1876–1904,” in The United States and the Middle East: Cultural Encounters, ed. Abbas Amanat and Magnus T. Berhardsson (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2002), 342–85.


Of course, their numbers could be hidden in misattributions: one immigrant from Nazareth was said to be born in Greece. A cursory look at the census data also shows that fewer than 200 Jews from Palestine had immigrated by 1900.


The Dabdoub family settled in the United States in 1885 after the Louisville fair, first in New Jersey and then in New York City as dealers of religious goods. Michel Dabdoub died on his way to Palestine in 1898, when the SS Bourgogne sank near Nova Scotia. Solomon Handal immigrated in 1893 for the Chicago fair and was soon joined by other family members. They too settled in New York.
From “Rag-and-Tatter Town” to Booming-and-Bustling City: Remembering Mildred White and Ramallah

Mildred White with commentary by Donn Hutchison

Figure 1. Mildred E. White served as teacher at Friends Girls School between 1922–1927, she worked for a short period at Friends Boys School. Between 1949–1954 she served as the principal of Friends Girls School. Friendly Flashes, January 1948.

The shoppers here are the poorest of the poor – those who have brought nothing tangible out of their past and for whom the future seems to promise nothing.

– Mildred White

Donn Hutchison:

Thus opens chapter twenty-six of Ramallah Teacher: The Life of Mildred White, written by her niece, Lois Harned Jordan.1 Mildred White was a legend in the Audi-Mansur family that I married into. She had taught my mother-in-law, Ellen Audi Mansur; had been principal when my wife and her four sisters were students at the Friends School; and she and I became friends over the six months I lived in Richmond, Indiana, where Mildred was living in a Quaker retirement home.

The Ramallah I first came to know seventeen years after the Nakba was much different from the rag-and-tatter town of which Mildred writes in 1948. There were no longer refugees living in tents or shacks

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fashioned out of loose stones and hammered-out tin and covered with sacking. The Friends Meeting House no longer housed refugee families, nor were the Friends Girls School grounds dotted with tents or the classrooms shared by families who had fled their homes. There were no longer tent-restaurants in the Old City, though there was still one tiny shop that made sandals and buckets out of used tires, and one could, and can still, buy used clothing and shoes from street vendors in the hisba (vegetable market).

Those refugee families, who carried little with them other than the iron keys to their homes, brought with them their ingenuity, their creativity, their belief in the value of education, and their strength to endure. They put down tentative roots that eventually grew into sturdy trees. At first, they lived in one-room dwellings, then apartments, some even eventually built villas and apartment buildings. The Ramallah of 2019 is vastly different from the Ramallah of 1948, as these refugees blended into the town and contributed to its prosperity. The rag-and-tatter town of which Mildred White wrote is only a memory in the minds of those who remember the tales of those days of 1948. The Ramallah of today is a booming-and-bustling city.

When I first came to Ramallah, the tallest building was three stories high and the majority were only one; there were three cinemas where one could go in the evenings to see the latest Western films as well as Egyptian movies featuring such stars as Fatin Hamama and Omar Sharif. (Today, those cinema houses are gone and have been replaced by shopping centers.) Few people had a television or a car; there were no fast food restaurants; shepherds still drove flocks of sheep down the street to graze in empty lots, and Abu ‘Abed delivered kerosene in the winter from a wagon pulled by a mule!

When I first came to Ramallah, Share‘ al-Irsal, known as “Radio Road,” was tree-lined and lovely old stone houses flanked both sides. It was the street where young engaged couples – not holding hands – strolled under the stars. It was Ramallah’s version of a lovers’ lane. Today, only one old stone house with its red tile roof remains. The trees are gone, the houses too. Today, it is a bustling commercial center with high-rises, shopping centers, malls, Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Popeye’s. The sidewalks are crowded; the streets are congested with taxis, vans, and private cars. Pedestrians weave among the vehicles and, concentrating on their cell phones, rarely see the people whom they pass.

This booming-and-bustling city is home for the international representative offices of twenty-one countries, numerous banks and their branches, thirty-two hotels and ninety-three restaurants, and shops too numerous to count, selling any item one might want. Merchants concentrate on making their shop windows attractive and inviting. There seems to have been a literal invasion of mannequins dressed in the latest fashions to entice a buyer to stop, to look, to buy. Shop windows are made decorative with the addition of old sewing machines and metal toys used as backdrops for the items on display. There is a conscious attempt to be creative, to appeal to the senses as one markets one’s goods.

The town of Ramallah was and is centered around the manara (literally, lighthouse). Six roads, like the spokes of a wheel, radiate out from that hub for a block or two. Today, Ramallah extends for miles beyond that hub. There is the road to al-Tira,
which used to be practically empty except for a few houses and the UNRWA Women’s Teachers Training College at the top of the hill. Today, it is a crowded thoroughfare with one restaurant or coffeehouse following another in a seeming endless line. Each one attempts to attract patrons to its outside café, to its beautiful garden, or by its tempting interior. There are lovely residential neighborhoods just beyond the complex of restaurants and coffeehouses: the cluster of individual homes in the Birzeit faculty housing neighborhood, the beautiful apartment buildings that comprise yet another neighborhood – everywhere one looks there are buildings. And silently observing it all is the giant stone statue of Nelson Mandela, a gift from the people of South Africa.

Mildred White, if she were to walk the streets of Ramallah today, would be lost. It is no longer that small town of 1948 Palestine. Perhaps she would recognize the five one-story shops a block up from the manara, as they still wear their Mandate-era red tile roofs. She might also recognize the street that goes to the left of Saleh Khalaf’s store down its narrow brick road toward the old city of Ramallah. The nine shops on the right are much as they would have been during Mildred’s time. They are only one story high; their flat roofs identify them as pre-Mandate. From some of these roofs, straggly plants grow out of the ancient mortar; two of the shops are without doors, the grill work above the doorways are rusted, and the interiors are gutted.

From Lois Harned Jordan’s *Ramallah Teacher:*

Mildred arrived in Ramallah on a “temporary appointment” to the [Friends] Mission. She was immediately involved in the administration of the Friends Girls School, care of the Ramallah Meeting, and work among the refugees. The members of the meeting asked Mildred to give Sunday morning messages, in the absence of Willard and Christina Jones who were in America for a short furlough. She worked with Na’meh Shahla to oversee Sunday School activities for ninety children. The teachers were seven girls from Friends families. They had interest and enthusiasm, but little experience, so needed a good bit of guidance.

Teaching, administration, and serving the meeting were familiar tasks to Mildred. But new were the tasks that had come to the Mission as a result of thousands of refugees living in and around Ramallah and nearby al-Bireh. Through letters and news media, Mildred had kept up with events in Palestine during her two years’ absence, but nothing had adequately prepared her for the scope of the problem. The Mission staff, besides carrying on the programs of the schools, gave as much time and resources as they could spare to alleviate some of the suffering that surrounded them. New tasks were added to the familiar ones.

When vacation time arrived in December, Mildred retreated to one of her favorite places – sunny Jericho. Besides resting, enjoying the sunshine, and eating oranges, she used some quiet hours to catch up on correspondence. In January 1950, as she sat at the little table that held her portable typewriter, she considered how best to describe the lives
of refugee families to Friends in America. As she began to type, the story of “Rag-and-Tatter Town” unfolded. When Friends opened their January 1950 issue of the American Friend they found that story.

**Mildred White, “Rag-and-Tatter Town,” American Friend (January 1950):**

There’s a high road and a low road in Ramallah. On the high road cars speed along and trucks and buses rumble by. The high road runs through the best shopping district of the town. The modern motion picture house fronts the high road. This smooth pavement is flanked with smart shops in whose glass windows displays of merchandise of varied kinds invite the passerby who has money to spend.

And the low road? Well, the low road is a stony, dusty path between two straggling rows of crazy shacks which form the shopping districts for the poor refugee population of our little city. This district may well be called “Rag-and-Tatter Town.”
Remembering Mildred White and Ramallah | Mildred White and Donn Hutchison

The “Town” sprawls the length of a bare and dusty field lying below the high road. Wretched as it is, it is all alive with activity. People in faded rags and patches come and go, to buy and sell. Articles which would be shunned anywhere else are put on sale here at the cheapest prices. Here are the culls of fruits and vegetables, and shop-worn articles of merchandise discarded from the better stores along the high road. Here are the cheapest of candies, sticky and fly-blown, for the delight of the children of the poor. Here you can see how men who have lost everything they possessed struggle with their bare hands to defend their families against hunger, nakedness, and the merciless winter sky. Because of what you see here, many families who a year ago had no shelter now pay rent for a room where all may sleep huddled together on the floor, protected from the weather. Some who a year ago had only the Red Cross rations between them and starvation now supplement their diet with vegetables and fruits. Soap has appeared in many a tent and shack and rented room where a year ago it was entirely absent.

So here is Rag-and-Tatter Town, a huddle of shops made out of next-to-nothing and costing no rent. Over here is a string of vegetable shops. Each has four wooden uprights at the corners of its enclosure and a roof of old gunny sacks sewed together with scraps of string. The sacking is weathered and has been whipped by the wind into fantastic rags and tatters, resembling the garments of Rip Van Winkle. The floors of these shops are solid earth swept daily with homemade brooms of wild thorn. The doors and windows are thin air. Displayed in these shops are small heaps of eggplant, string beans, tomatoes, peppers, okra, and garlic. Flies swarm over heaps of grapes not fresh enough to be offered for sale in the better shops. Sacks of beans, lentils, and smutty charcoal slump in the corners. The scales stand on empty goods boxes. The sellers lookup alertly as you pass. “Come in and buy,” they plead eagerly. “Good vegetables, cheap, almost given away!”

Over there is a melon shop. The owner has constructed from loose stones a wall around his small enclosure and safeguarded the rear with a tangle of rusty barbed wire salvaged from a junk heap. A few steps down the street is an old-clothes shop. Shabby coats and trousers and soiled dresses, limp and dejected, swing from ropes strung around the tiny enclosure. Worn shoes of odd sizes are set out in rows or piled in heaps waiting for buyers. Here is a tinner, sitting beside a pile of empty food tins, purchased for a song from the Red Cross. His calloused hands are busy shaping from the tin stout dustpans, funnels, candleholders, oil cans, and other clumsy utensils for sale. The finished articles dangle on strings from the roof of the shop.

At the end of the “street” is a heap of clay pots and water jars. The donkey who brought them here from a native pottery has dropped down beside them, saddle and all, to rest. The roof of this “shop” is the open sky. It has no walls at all. The proprietor, being unable to lock up at closing time, is
obliged to spend his nights as well as his days among his jars. He is busy crying his wares and sending out three or four ragged boys to carry the jars, a few at a time, to peddle from door to door. Turn and walk back on the other side of the street.

Bless my soul, what’s this? It is actually a restaurant!

In a squat hut made of oil tins pounded flat and nailed edge to edge over a skeleton of scrap lumber, where the close air resembles that of an oven in full blast, a dingy apron whisks about and a voice says cordially, “Come in and dine on good home-cooked food.” Three or four small tables, guiltless of tablecloths, stand on one side of the room and several men are eating a meal there. The other side is occupied by the kitchen and the dishwashing operations. Here food can be had at rock-bottom prices. No expensive sign is needed to advertise the place. A glass jar of cheese in brine and another of pickled turnips stand on a shelf behind the tiny front window to give evidence of the stock in trade.

That hammering sound comes from a small open shoe shop. The shoemaker cuts and hammers and stitches. The inner soles of the shoes are pasteboard salvaged from old boxes. A man must save here and there. A couple of grimy little apprentices are cutting out sandals from an old inner tube. Strings of men’s heavy shoes, women’s heelless house slippers, and children’s sandals swing from the roof.

And so we move down the street. The shoppers here are the poorest of the poor – those who have brought nothing tangible out of their past and for whom the future seems to promise nothing – people who, only by the merciful intervention of the Red Cross have from day to day a hold on life. Pallid women are buying wilted vegetables, matches, and remnants of material. Some are carrying small measures of kerosene in bottles salvaged from trash heaps. Here is a mother holding a child by the hand. Both are shabby and ill-fed, but she is smiling at his happy face as he holds up a half-piaster to a shopkeeper and receives a few candies in a cone of soiled newspaper. And here at last, of all things – a coffeehouse of gunny sacking! A dozen coffee stools are ranged in a cheerful circle on the earthen floor. Across the front of the shop is a row of stunted plants growing bravely in tin cans. The bit of green is a reminder of the village coffee houses that stood near the dear lost homes, far away, where the flowering vines shaded the rustic arbors of bamboo, and where the coffee stools in the gardens were flanked by beds of blooming marigolds and bright cockscomb. Here in a corner is a great hospitable water jar offering comfort free for thirsty lips. There is the coffee pot on the glowing charcoal brazier. The wavering light from a hanging lantern falls softly on the circle of men sitting relaxed and genial, enjoying the simple comforts and cheer of the place. Here a man may rest after the toil of the day. Here he is welcome in spite of shabby clothes and a flat purse. Here, for the price of a piaster, he may feel himself
a man among men for a few hours. The cups are handed round. The aroma of hot coffee is on the air. To the Arab it is the very breath of comfort and cheer and sociability. Talk goes round the circle, and tales familiar and well loved. Often the talk turns sadly on the losses they suffered in the war days when the world was suddenly turned upside down, crushing out their old life and familiar daily round forever. There is ease for the heartaches in each other’s presence and sympathy.

As the hour grows late, they rise one by one and disappear in the darkness toward their home. Homes? Home to one now means a crowded tent in a vacant lot. To another it means a shack with walls of loose stone and a roof of sacks and brush. To yet another it means a basement room somewhere, or a deserted cow shed. A man coming “home” late stumbles over the sleeping bodies of his wife and children, as they lie crowded together on the floor. Often the families of brothers or cousins must share the same cramped space. He gropes his way to his own place on a pallet or folded Red Cross blanket, and lies down to rest. Another day is over, thank God for that, he says to himself with a gusty sigh. But what of tomorrow, and the next tomorrow, and the next, for these sleeping ones, dependent upon him? Somewhere, somehow, God knows. The weary refugee takes off his shoes and thrusts them under his head for a pillow, and relaxes at last in sleep.

The last light winks out in the coffee-house. Only the stamping feet of the fly-bitten donkeys break the stillness. The long day is over in Rag-and-Tatter Town.

Donn Hutchison is an American-Palestinian who has lived in Ramallah for over fifty years. For forty-four of those years he was a teacher at the Friends Schools. He is the author of several books of historical fiction telling the Palestinian story and two devotionals based on lines from the Qur’an, Sufism, and the poetry of Hafiz and Rumi.

Endnotes


2 Jordan, *Ramallah Teacher*, chapter 26, 204-08.

3 The Reverend A. Willard Jones was head of the Friends Boys School, where his wife Christina Henry Jones taught history and English.

EXHIBITION REVIEW

Traces of the Nakba
Review by Penny Johnson and Raja Shehadeh


“Properties,” Manofim, the Jerusalem Contemporary Art Festival, 4 October 2018–12 December 2018.


“Whirlwind”: Herzliya

The room in the Herzliya Museum hosting Gaston Zvi Ickowicz’s 2019 exhibit “Whirlwind” is darkened; his black and white photos in their stark black frames are grainy, blurred, eerie; the color prints faded, almost archival. What are we seeing? Ickowicz explains that his photos emerged from fire: after incendiary kites and balloons launched over the “border” between Gaza and southern Israel during Gaza’s massive Great Marches of Return burned away vegetation, the ruins of three Palestinian villages – Simsim, Najd, and al-Mansura – suddenly became visible. The Palestinian inhabitants of these villages were forced to flee in 1948; most became refugees in Gaza and a substantial number of their descendants still live in Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp, one of the most densely populated places on earth. It is more than likely that some of the young men and women who participate in the March of Return are third- or fourth-generation refugees from these villages that are so close that the kites land there, so far that none of their inhabitants can return.

Simsim is noted in both Crusader (as Semsem) and early Ottoman records and contained traces of a Roman cemetery as well as Byzantine remains. Its Palestinian inhabitants – numbering around 1,400 – were driven out by the Negev Brigade in two days in May 1948. Some tried to return but Israeli soldiers also returned throughout May and June to blow up granaries and crops and houses, killing about twenty people. Photographer James Morris, in his book *Time and Remains of Palestine*, includes an evocative image of Simsim, taken several years before Ickowicz began his project.1 All that can
be seen is a scattering of rocks rippling through a green field; the uneven ground undulates as if pregnant with remnants of a life buried underneath. These small markers of habitation, Morris notes, are at the center of an Israeli nature reserve, Kurkar Gevar’am, not an uncommon fate for Palestinian villages destroyed in the Nakba.

Ickowicz’s lens, as he photographs these sites between March and October 2018, captures both the materiality and ghostliness of the now exposed ruins: stones on scorched earth, traces of the Nakba. The past, his images tell us, is both present and hidden. Ickowicz abandoned high-tech equipment to use an old camera and expired filmstock from the 1960s to produce the grainy blur through which we strive to see the past. “What happens,” he says, when we look at the past from today’s photographs?”

One thing that happens is that we must pause and reflect to interpret what we see. A white whirlwind of dust blows through the rubble of homes and habitats. “The wind cannot be controlled,” Ickowicz tells us, “and I also don’t want to control everything.” In his video “Kites,” he uses a small drone that is at the mercy of the wind as it flies over the three villages. The Nakba is both exposed and concealed, the past is in the path of a whirlwind.

And, Ickowicz tells us, some viewers of the exhibit do not want to know more. He has had many conversations and says, “Young people don’t even know there was a Nakba.” And others don’t want to know: one woman told him, “I don’t want to speak of history. I came to see the pictures.”

It is telling as well that this is the first exhibit in the museum where titles were in
Arabic as well as Hebrew and English – another long absence, one that speaks of the normality of exclusion. But it is also striking that in this year when commemorations of the Nakba have been banned by the Israeli government, a nation-state bill that allots the state to the Jewish people has been passed, and a cultural loyalty bill is being debated, Ickowicz’s exhibit is not the only one addressing the Nakba, or at the very least what one reporter called “the wound of 1948.” Are artists – and the broader cultural field – bringing back banned histories? Can they offer some hope for countering today’s politics of exclusion, which forbid, it seems, even memory? Is there, in other words, a return of the repressed through the work of artists?

We have no claim to close familiarity with the Israeli art scene. Leaving our city of Ramallah, through all-too-visible checkpoints and with the multiple hidden boundaries that increasingly separate Israelis and Palestinians, is at best a hassle and at worst a nightmare. That our friend and very experienced taxi driver Hani had trouble finding the Herzliya Museum is as indicative as the absent Arabic titles. Yet something seemed to be happening in culture across the Green Line in this most dismal of times for the future not only of occupied Palestine but perhaps of Israel as well. Visiting three other exhibits, in Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv, we came in a way as newcomers, but with a will to look with both hope and skepticism as carefully as we could.

“1948”: Haifa

On Ben Gurion Street in Haifa’s Germany Colony, banners flutter in the wind. Emblazoned on them is simply a date: 1948. The Haifa City Museum – an official municipal museum – was showing a major exhibit that offered us both hope and contradiction. The exhibit ran for over six months in the museum, located in two old houses, one a late nineteenth century German Templar building and the other a former school.

The first floor assembled works from the generation of 1948, including cartoons from Hebrew newspapers, sketches and portraits of heroic (and sometimes humorous) soldiers of the Haganah and of the mourning of Jewish families who lost loved ones even amid triumph. The only Arab artist on the first floor was Abed Abdi, who was born in 1942 in Haifa but was forced out with his family to Lebanon in 1948, returning when he was ten years old under a limited family reunification scheme. His oil painting on exhibit, Refugees (1957), is a poignant, indeed chilling, portrait of Palestinian women and children looking at two men and a child lying dead in the foreground. Much of Abdi’s work accompanied articles in al-Ittihad, the Arabic-language Israeli Communist newspaper of that era, and were pioneering in depicting the Nakba and its multiple tragedies. In his essay in the exhibit’s catalogue, Dr. Housni Alkhateeb Shehada notes that many of Abdi’s works accompanied a series of newspaper articles by Salman Natur. The title of the series was, tellingly, “We Have Not Forgotten.”

However, the Haifa City Museum’s curators did not, or could not, look to where most of the work of Palestinian artists of Abed Abdi’s generation was produced: in the refugee camps and cities of exile in the Arab world. The Palestinian artists emerging
from the refugee camps in the 1950s have instead been described by figures like artist-scholar Kamal Boullata. For example, Ibrahim Ghannam, confined to a wheelchair by polio in Tal al-Za‘tar refugee camp after his village of Yajur was destroyed and he was forced into exile at the age of seventeen, painted “a splendid narrative of life in Yajur.” Boullata continues:

Living on a rationed subsistence of canned foods, in a cubicle overlooking open sewers, Ghannam painted golden fields of harvest, thriving orange groves, and jubilant peasants at work. Painted with the meticulous precision of an Islamic miniaturist, all details within his frame claimed equal attention. Through his naive vision, Ghannam laboriously preserved for a generation born in the camp the legends of one of the villages demolished after the Palestinian exodus.²

When we walked up to the second floor – where the work of Israeli and Palestinian artists of the second and mainly post-1948 generation is displayed – the golden fields were long gone. In We Are All Tourists: Digital Prints, Jafra Abu Zoulouf (born in 1987, Daliyat al-Karmil) offers intriguing images of dislocation in her digital prints of miniaturized olive trees, their roots exposed. The artist purchased the trees from Ikea: a critique of commercialization accompanies the sense of alienation. Samah Shehadi (born in Shi‘b village in 1987) entitled her haunting charcoal- and pencil-on-paper drawing of a refugee couple (her parents), squatting in empty

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Figure 2. Olive Grove, digital print, Jafra Abu Zoulouf, 2015. Photo by authors, 2019.

Figure 3. Tayara Haramiyi, hologram print, Ashraf Fawakhry, 2015. Photo by authors, 2019.
space, waiting and gazing into a distant horizon: Nowhere. In Ashraf Fawakhry’s (born in al-Mazra’a village, 1974) Tayara Haramiyi, brightly colored shapes of fighter and bomber airplanes surround a donkey. A circle in graphite and ink on plywood – bristling with barbed wire – by Israeli artist Amir Tomashov (born in Afula, 1978) is titled Exposed Landscape No. 28. Other works by Israeli artists were more anodyne, however, such as Ido Back’s (born in Haifa, 1988) bustling city scene of Haifa and its cheerful Arab and Jewish inhabitants.

The uneasy contradictions we felt in the exhibit were not only in its visual presentation, but also reflected in the statements by the co-curators of the exhibit. Maged Khamra expressed his doubts:

From a higher perspective, as co-curator of the exhibition “1948,” I would like to discuss the dilemma facing us in our attempt to present, in one museum space, conflicts and confrontations between identities and memories using historical materials and artworks. This approach may create a false sense of reconciliation between the poles presented in the show, resulting from a curatorial gesture that seeks to balance – consciously or not – between the winning and losing side. The exhibition creates an illusory space.

Co-curator Inbar Dror Lax, on the other hand, valorized the exhibit’s balance: “The exhibition 1948 seeks to avoid reducing the 1948 war to one meta-narrative or the other, enabling the City Museum to be an entity that is multi-cultural and multi-generational, containing multiple narratives.” While it is hard to contest that “the dramatic change undergone by Haifan society in the 1948 war can still be felt in the city’s urban spaces, its buildings, residents and cultural-historical climate,” Dror Lax falls back on the weary paradigm that the exhibit creates a “human mosaic that presents the various aspects of one fateful moment.” This sits oddly with the acknowledgement in the foreword that “by 21 April 1948 about half of [Haifa’s] Arab residents had left. As the battles raged on, almost all of those remaining left as well.”

As we wandered through the exhibit for a second time, the artworks of third-generation Palestinian artists spoke to us most directly. In Nardeen Srouji’s (born in Nazareth, 1980) Buqjah 1 (Bundle 1), the protruding shapes of objects inside a pristine white ceramic bundle remind us of the few possessions Palestinian refugees took into exile in 1948. We stood for quite a while in front of Manal Mahamid’s layered tower of concrete, entitled The Year 1948, guessing at what we could barely see – houses and perhaps their inhabitants buried under an inflexible medium central to Israel’s relentless building over Palestinian ruins. Mahamid (born in Mu’awiya, 1976) told us that she has not exhibited in institutional Israeli spaces for a number of years: this work is on loan from a gallery in Umm al-Fahm.

In a disturbing self-portrait, Michael Halak (born in Fassuta, 1975) paints himself in a highly realistic style in the uniform and helmet of an Israeli army recruit. The world of these works is at a great distance from any social “mosaic”; instead, we
find alienation and exclusion or, in pieces less inflected with a sense of crisis and contradiction, recoveries of the Palestinian past, such as Fatma Shanan’s (born in Julis, 1986) video *Carpets on a Roof*, where she enlisted friends and neighbors to lay out carpets – objects that are closely tied to home and family – in various patterns on a rooftop in her village.

Even in these exhibits that do address the “wound of 1948” in different ways, art is constrained by politics. In a thought-provoking work by actor Lamis Nammar, side-by-side videos show her wandering through Berlin’s Holocaust memorial and Wadi Nisnas, the Arab neighborhood in Haifa that was most devastated by war and exile. She had wanted to call it *Nakba*, but was told she could not use the word for fear of legal action. Instead she called it *Untitled by Law*.

**“Properties”: Jerusalem**

The map was in our hands. On it, six buildings in Jerusalem’s Talbiyya neighborhood are marked. Talbiyya, a name for us that stands for all that is lost in the western part of Jerusalem. Home to the loveliest residences, aptly called villas, built largely in the British Mandate period by well-off Christian and Muslim Palestinians as families moved beyond the walls of the Old City into new areas of the city. Many of the buildings still stand, their original owners scattered around the globe.

“Properties,” a winter 2018 exhibit of the annual Jerusalem Contemporary Art Festival (Manofim) offered us this map to explore “abandoned” properties in 1948 and their transformations. “Abandoned”: a warning sign of a familiar bias, suggesting that Palestinian owners abandoned their homes, rather than being forced into exile. Still, there is an encouraging claim: the exhibition, the curators write, “seeks to confront the images, facts, and unfamiliar history which many have tried to conceal.” Admirable, we thought. “High time,” said another friend accompanying us. “Far too late,” said another. It was not an easy journey for any of us through these buildings – and the art installations gracing them – for we were accompanied by the ghosts of the past.

The Jerusalem Psychoanalytic Society is situated in a welcoming stone house with a peaceful garden, the residence of Dmitri Hanna before 1948. In his installation *Stone Tape*, Nadav Assor, an Israeli artist who lives and works in the United States, placed crisscrossed cables on the floor in the entrance hall; speakers that could only be heard with a signal device offered fragments of narrative in Arabic, almost impossible to understand. We tried to listen to a reading of a letter written by the granddaughter of Dmitri Hanna to the current owners of the house, but had to put down the strange listening device – similar to those used in wiretapping – in confusion. Perhaps this frustration was the artist’s intention, but the effect of muffling the voices of Palestinians was all too familiar.

In a side room, Palestinian artist Hannan Abu Hussein, born in the village of Umm al-Fahm and living in Jerusalem, stacked mattresses and blankets that she collected from Palestinian homes and connected to spools on the floor, an evocation of the
Palestinian home before 1948. Fragments of narrative, spools of white thread holding together a memory of home.

In 1926, businessman Antonio Katan built a house in Talbiyya, where he lived with his family until they were compelled to leave for Beirut in 1948. Entering the Katan house, we stand before a series of ten videos filmed over a decade by Elham Rokni, where her father, Bijan, exiled from Iran thirty years ago, cries as he listens to the song *If One Day* by the Iranian artist Faramarz Aslani. Rokni evokes cultural loss – as well as her aging father – in a work situated in a home (and a country) that a Palestinian family was forced to flee seventy years ago.

But the work that evoked the greatest response for us was lodged in a darkened basement in the Katana villa. We had seen Jumana Emil Abboud’s twelve-minute video *A Sketch of Manners (Alfred Roch’s Last Masquerade)* in an earlier exhibit; some of those dressed as sad clowns in the video were our friends. But to see it again here, in the deep recess of the basement, this last party – before three-quarters of a million Palestinians went into exile and a society lay shattered – was even more moving. The Nakba, we thought in the dark, is truly the unconscious of the present. It bubbles up in the imagination, but upon waking to the disasters of public life around us it is not acknowledged.

As we looked through the press coverage of “Properties” (and some of the advertisements for the project), we thought that the “willed ignorance” that the curators hoped to break was still present in framing the exhibit as simply investigating “layers of history” of a Jerusalem neighborhood. But the “ghosts of the past” – and particularly their descendants – are real people with a loss that could be repaired. Properties, in other words, can be returned; Palestinians could return to live in a land where at present many cannot come even as visitors. Art and the imagination that produces the works discussed here cannot replace the political will that might heal a broken city and a fragmented land, but it can recall memory and construct possibility. Maya Attoun’s installation of a neon sign in the “Properties” exhibit remained with us: “ghost” it read, but the “g” was not lit, so we could read “host.” The words are conjoined: ghosts are our hosts to memories of the Nakba.

“Spellbound”: Samah Shihadi

Nowhere is this more true than in the work of Samah Shihadi, whose portrait of her parents in the empty space, *Nowhere*, exhibited in Haifa, continued to haunt us. When we discovered that a solo exhibit of her work was showing at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art, we hurried to see it before it closed. Here we find her parents again, in a large charcoal-on-paper work entitled *Our Home*. But there is no home, only a flat greyish-white surface, partly overgrown with grass, where her parents sit on white plastic chairs. In the distance a path winds through a few melancholy cypress trees. Her father features in another moving work, *Shades of the Past*. He sits, looking dazed, on stone ruins in the foreground, while in the background an Israeli family emerges from a car for a picnic in the surrounding forest.
Shihadi won the 2018 Haim Shiff Prize for Figurative-Realist Art, and these meticulous, delicate but powerful drawings in charcoal and pencil, with layer upon layer of shading, are almost hyper-realist in their precise attention to detail. And yet, as “Spellbound” indicates, there is another dimension – the curator opines, there is a “veil of mystery” that surrounds the works, “making it seem that she is spellbound and enchanted by the threads of forgetfulness.” But it is the intertwined threads of memory and forgetfulness that held us spellbound. In *Family in the Landscape*, the ordinary event of a family outing has a striking eeriness. The family – her family – sits in a melancholy landscape, cactus indicating a destroyed village in the background. The poses of the parents recall Manet’s *Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe*, but it is anything but a festive occasion. Indeed, there is no evidence of a picnic meal, just a child placing one stone on top of another.

While we were Nakba-obsessed, Shihadi’s powerful other thread, exploring feminism and the tensions in self and society, was also intriguing. The first work in the exhibit, *Two Women in One (Self-Portrait with a Book)*, shows Shihadi dressed like a man (in homage to Frida Kahlo), holding a copy of a book by Egyptian feminist Nawal El Saadawi. Another self-portrait has Shihadi lying flat – but suspended in air, while in a similar pose in another work she lies on a rectangular table (like those in a hospital), her canvas and paints in a corner.

One of the most powerful works in the exhibit, *Mother and Daughter*, brings together her attention to women and family and her exploration of the Nakba. In a large charcoal-on-paper drawing, a woman in Palestinian dress has reverently placed her hand on an extraordinary mulberry tree, its bare branches twisting and turning, almost filling the

Figure 4. *Family in Landscape*, charcoal on paper, Samah Shihadi, 2018. Photo by authors, 2019.
canvas. The woman is Shihadi’s mother and as Shihadi told a Haaretz reporter: “My grandmother planted the tree in the barrel in the place where her house was and it grew to a tremendous size. . . . Ever since her death, this is the place where my family gathers to remember her.” Watching her mother praying and placing her hand on the tree to gather strength from it, the drawing was born.

While Shihadi was born in Sha’b, a village southwest of Acre with its own story of partial destruction and forced exodus, her family is from Mi’ar in western Galilee, also near Acre – a village first dynamited by the British during the Great Arab Revolt and then destroyed by Israel in the summer of 1948. Returning to the exhibit for a last look, we found the artist and asked her if there was a reason that the drawings that spoke to us of the Nakba were in charcoal – which seemed to us more ephemeral – instead of her usual pencil. She explained that she had just begun to use charcoal, but added: “When things are destroyed, only ashes remain.”

This past year has been an unremittingly dismal one for any prospect of political justice. The four art exhibits we saw over that year of public oppressions and pending catastrophes displayed contradictions and tensions in their settings in official Israeli institutions. But many of the works, mostly by Palestinians from inside the Green Line, but some as well by Israeli Jewish artists, offered sparks from these ashes to stir the imagination, much as the fiery kites from Gaza allowed us to see the ruins of three villages. The Nakba is indeed the return of the repressed.


Endnotes
1 James Morris, Time and Remains of Palestine (Heidelberg: Kehrer Verlag, 2015).
Main Findings

This chapter presents the main results for key indicators of the Population and Housing Census in Jerusalem governorate, 2017, which was carried out during the period (1/12/2017–24/12/2017) on individual, household, and housing conditions.

2.1 Population Final Results

2.1.1 Population and sex structure

Final results show that the total population of Jerusalem governorate as of midnight 30/11-1/12/2017 was 435,753 persons. This number includes an estimated 20,713 persons based on the post enumeration survey, where the under-coverage rate was 15.5 percent of the total population in Jerusalem governorate. The number of actually counted population in Jerusalem governorate was 415,040 persons; including 214,861 males and 200,179 females; the sex ratio was 107.7 males per 100 females. In comparison with the 2007 census, the actually counted population in Jerusalem governorate was 350,051 persons, the percentage of increase in the population is 19.8 percent. The total population of Jerusalem governorate comprises 9.1 percent of the total population in Palestine (4,781,248 persons).

2.1.2 Population age structure

The Palestinian society in Jerusalem governorate is still a young society: the results showed that the number of persons aged 0–14 years in the governorate totaled...
141,168 or 35.9 percent of the total population in the Jerusalem governorate; those aged 15–64 years was 236,906 persons or 60.2 percent of the total population; and those aged 65 years and over totaled 15,169 persons or 3.9 percent of the total population in the governorate.

In comparison with Palestine as a whole: the number of actually counted persons aged 0–14 years in Jerusalem governorate comprises 7.8 percent of the total population in Palestine in that age group; the percentage of persons aged 15–64 years in the governorate was 8.8 percent of the total population in Palestine in that age group; and the percentage of persons aged 65 years and over comprises 10.0 percent of the total population in Palestine in that age group.

2.2 Final Results of the Basic Characteristics of Population

2.2.1 Prevalence of disability

The final results of the census in Jerusalem governorate showed that the number of Palestinians with disability totaled 2,024 persons (1,083 males and 941 females). Regarding the prevalence rate of disability by type, results showed that mobility disability is the most prevalent among other disabilities with 1,019 comprising 0.9 percent of total Palestinian population in the governorate, followed by vision disability with 682 comprising 0.6 percent. Hearing disability affects 470 persons comprising 0.4 percent, communication disability affects 464 persons comprising 0.4 percent, and finally memory and cognitive disability affects 459 persons, comprising 0.4 percent.

Figure 1. Prevalence Rate of Disabilities by Type of Disability, 2017
2.2.2 Basic characteristics of education

The Palestinian population in Jerusalem governorate aged 5 years and over attending education totaled 121,444 persons, comprising 35.4 percent of the total Palestinian population aged 5 years and over in the governorate. As for Palestinians aged (3–5 years) attending kindergarten in Jerusalem governorate, data showed that the number was 29,124 persons, comprising 68.2 percent of the total Palestinian population in that age group in the governorate.

The number of Palestinians aged 10 years and over with a bachelor’s degree or higher in Jerusalem governorate was 36,460 comprising 12.3 percent of the total Palestinian population in that age group in the governorate.

Figure 2. Percentage Distribution of Palestinian Population (10 years and over) in Jerusalem Governorate by Educational Attainment, 2017

Among the Palestinian population aged 10 years and over in Jerusalem governorate, 5,906 were illiterate, comprising 2.0 percent of the total Palestinian population aged 10 years and over in the governorate.

In comparison with previous censuses, illiteracy over the last decade has significantly decreased in Jerusalem governorate. The illiteracy rate for males has dropped from 2.3 percent in 2007 to 1.2 percent in 2017, while the illiteracy rate for females has dropped significantly from 5.6 percent in 2007 to 2.9 percent in 2017, resulting in reducing the gap between the sexes from 3.3 percent in 2007 to 1.7 percent in 2017.
2.2.3 Basic characteristics of labor

The number of unemployed Palestinians in Jerusalem governorate in the age group 15 years and over was 4,702 persons, comprising 15.0 percent of the total economically active Palestinian in that age group (3,819 males aged 15 years and over, comprising 14.5 percent of the total economically active males at the same age group in the governorate, and 883 females aged 15 years and over, comprising 17.2 percent of the total economically active females at the same age group in the governorate).

2.2.4 Basic characteristics of marriage

The number of Palestinians in Jerusalem governorate aged 14 years and over who are married was 156,120 persons, 60.0 percent of the target population. There were 77,745 males (58.4 percent) and 78,375 females (61.6 percent), while the number of other persons (divorced, widowed and separated) in Jerusalem governorate was 9,605 persons (3.7 percent) of the target population in the governorate.
2.3 Number of Private Households

According to the final results of the census, the number of private households in Jerusalem governorate was 95,234 households, and the average household size was 4.4. This average decreased during the period 2007–2017, from 5.2 in 2007. The average household size in all of Palestine was 5.1 persons: 4.8 persons in the West Bank and 5.6 persons in the Gaza Strip.

2.4 Occupied Housing Units

2.4.1 Occupied housing units by type

The findings showed that the number of occupied housing units in Jerusalem governorate was 95,234 housing units; 59,035 of occupied housing units were apartments (68.5 percent of the total number of occupied housing units); 26,037 of occupied housing units were classified as houses (30.2 percent), and 443 of occupied housing units were classified as villas (0.5 percent).
Figure 5. Percentage Distribution of Occupied Housing Units in Palestine, West Bank, and Jerusalem Governorate by Type, 2017

* Others includes occupied households classified as (independent room, tent, marginal/caravan/barracks, and other housing units).

2.4.2 Main source of drinking water

The results showed that piped water into the dwelling was the main source of drinking water in Jerusalem governorate for 22,476 households; 99.4 percent of households in Jerusalem governorate use an improved drinking water source (piped into dwelling, public tap, protected dug well/protected spring, rainwater, bottled water).

2.4.3 Durable goods

The results showed that; 43.7 percent of households in Jerusalem governorate own a private car, while 76.5 percent have (LED/ LCD/ S-D screen), 87.0 percent of households have at least one smart phone, and 19.8 percent of households have at least one tablet device.

Endnotes

1 The percentages in this chapter were calculated according to specified characteristics only, unless stated otherwise.
2 Data exclude those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israeli occupation in 1967.
3 Data exclude those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israeli occupation in 1967.
4 Data exclude those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israeli occupation in 1967.
5 Data exclude those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israeli occupation in 1967.

Please note that the total of disabilities are higher than the number of persons with at least one disability.
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