INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM STUDIES

Autumn 2019

The Suppression of the Great Revolt and the Destruction of Everyday Life in Palestine
Charles Anderson

Resistance and Survival in Central Galilee, July 1948–July 1951
Adel Manna

Building to Survive: The Politics of Cement in Mandate Palestine
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To Subvert, To Deconstruct: Agency in Qalandiya Refugee Camp
Ahmed Alaqra

Thurayya’s Wedding: A Glimpse of Ottoman Jerusalem from the Khalidi Library
Khader Salameh

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AUTUMN 2019
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The Institute of Jerusalem Studies
P.O. Box 21649, Jerusalem 9121501
Tel: 972 2 298 9108, Fax: 972 2 295 0767
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Editorial: The Everyday and the Shadow Years .................3

* The Suppression of the Great Revolt ........................................9
  and the Destruction of Everyday Life in Palestine
  
  Charles Anderson

Resistance and Survival in Central Galilee, .....................28
July 1948–July 1951

Adel Manna

* Building to Survive: .............................................................39
The Politics of Cement in Mandate Palestine

Nimrod Ben Zeev

To Subvert, To Deconstruct: ...............................................63
Agency in Qalandiya Refugee Camp

Ahmed Alaqra

Thurayya’s Wedding: ...............................................................77
A Glimpse of Ottoman Jerusalem from
the Khalidi Library

Khader Salameh

Diaries of the Fall .................................................................100

Review by Walid Habbas

Reversing Israel’s Deepening Annexation ..........................103
of Occupied East Jerusalem

International Crisis Group

* Peer reviewed article.
In the Palestinian imaginary, one is hard-pressed to find a figure more evocative of the centrality of everyday life to social reproduction, and of family relations to political sensibilities, than that of the grandmother. It is not surprising, therefore, that the news of ninety-year-old Muftiya Tlaib from the village of Bayt ‘Ur al-Fawqa defiantly rebuking U.S. president Donald Trump for calling on Israel to deny entry to her granddaughter, Rashida Tlaib, has unleashed a Twitter storm around the hashtag #MyPalestinianSitty.\(^1\) In her Palestinian thawb, standing next to a limestone house, her face wrinkled like the surrounding hillside terraces of olive trees, the momentary grandmother of us all, sitty Muftiya, reminds us that the political is much more than politics, and that the agency of ordinary Palestinians is multifaceted, pervasive, and persistent, especially when it comes to the relationship to land and the meaning of “home.”

Sitty Muftiya’s fifteen minutes of fame also reminded the Jerusalem Quarterly editors of a special issue published in 2007 (JQ 30), with an introduction titled “My Grandmother and Other Stories: Histories of Palestinians as Social Biographies” by Beshara Doumani, the guest editor of that issue and current editor of JQ. The articles were culled from three workshops on “Silenced Histories: Toward an Agenda of Research on the Social and Cultural History of the Palestinians,” organized by the Institute for Jerusalem Studies in the summer of 2006.\(^2\) The letter of invitation asked participants to write about their grandmothers or any other person from their generation in order to “expose a set of relationships normally hidden in the shadows of political history.” The idea
was that writing ordinary Palestinians into history is critical to contemporary political practice, for it is difficult to imagine how Palestinians can have agency as well as take responsibility for their own actions if their lives and memories are not central to narratives about the past.

The urge to shift the focus from the trials and tribulations of political elites to the everyday lives of “ordinary” Palestinians, including Palestinian women, is not new. It gained in momentum since the 1950s with the second wave of the Palestinian national movement which, as the pioneering work of anthropologist Rosemary Sayigh has shown, was built on the transformation of peasant refugees into freedom fighters. This populist phase opened a large space for thinking about Palestinians, not just Palestine. True, writings on the politics of the “Palestinian-Israeli conflict” still dominate bookshelves, but works that put ordinary Palestinians at the center of academic inquiry and that take seriously oral history, locally generated sources, and ethnographic work have grown rapidly, in quality and number, especially since the 1990s.

The lead articles in this issue – by Charles Anderson, Nimrod Ben Zeev, and Adel Manna – are cases in point. They were initially presented at the fifth annual workshop of New Directions in Palestinian Studies (NDPS), held at Brown University in March 2018 under the theme: “The Shadow Years: Material Histories of Everyday Life.” Organized by Alex Winder and Beshara Doumani, the workshop called for papers on Palestinian daily struggles for survival under conditions of settler colonialism, for these struggles constitute a rich archive of potential histories, hitherto obscured by the deep shadows cast by violent ruptures, such as 1917, 1948, and 1967. The goal was not to avoid the political, but to recast and contextualize moments of great trauma and violence within the larger dynamics of Palestinian society. Three other papers from the NDPS workshop were published in a special issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies in 2018 and others will appear in a forthcoming special issue of JQ.

Charles Anderson’s “The Suppression of the Great Revolt and the Destruction of Everyday Life in Palestine” makes two claims. First, that the British government waged a war against the very foundations of Palestinian daily life, employing such tactics as large-scale demolitions and movement restrictions, in order to defeat the 1936–39 rebellion. And second, that these tactics of indiscriminate collective punishment were largely adopted by the Israeli government after 1948. Although not fleshed out in the article, these findings echo the systematic dismantling of indigenous communities in the United States and elsewhere under conditions of settler colonialism. This article is nicely complemented by Ahmed Alaqa’s piece on spatial practices in Qalandiya refugee camp near Jerusalem. Also drawing on the concept of the “everyday,” Alaça argues that daily practices of space making produce new systems of meanings that allow for collective and individual forms of agency.

Nimrod Ben Zeev’s article on the social life of cement in Mandate Palestine – based on a wide range of Zionist, British, and Palestinian sources – makes a compelling argument about the fundamental importance of cement to power struggles for controlling the built environment, to contestations over the meanings of modernity, to Zionist practices of Hebrew Labor, and to the political aspirations of Palestinian
entrepreneurs. His original research on the failed pre-1948 attempt to establish a Palestinian cement company that could break the Zionist monopoly introduces a crucial line of inquiry about the racial logics of colonialism and capitalism as embodied in British legal governance in its colonies. His findings, moreover, are full of insights relevant to the current centrality of cement to the Palestinian condition whether in cement-starved Gaza or overbuilt Ramallah.

Adel Manna’s “Resistance and Survival in Central Galilee, July 1948–July 1951,” looks at a period, a region, and a social group (rural inhabitants) that lie in the darkest shadows of 1948. The question he poses is a counterintuitive one: what explains the fact that most inhabitants of the Galilee were able to stay on their land despite several massacres and at a time when so many villages in other areas of Palestine were ethnically cleansed and then destroyed? Based on oral history, personal biography, family papers, and Israeli archives, Manna tells stories of struggle and survival largely unknown to most Palestinians. It is quite striking, in fact, how little we know about the everyday lives of Palestinians in the years immediately following the Nakba, not to mention in the pre-colonial era.

In this regard, we are pleased to include in this issue of JQ a rare letter, written in 1905 by Siddiqa al-Khalidi to her son Ruhi about another son, Thurayya. The letter sheds light on one of the most important station stops in the life cycle of the everyday: marriage. Transcribed, annotated, and analyzed by Khader Salameh, the letter describes the three major components of the marriage process: the engagement, the contract, and the wedding ceremony. There is much to learn here about a leading Jerusalem family. Salameh’s biographies of the main personalities featured in the letter, culled from other sources in the Khalidi Library, provide, along with the letter itself, a rare insider’s view of the social and political dimensions of marriage strategies, and the pivotal role that women – grandmothers and mothers alike – played in material and affective relations that inform the everyday of Palestinian life.

A dozen years after Siddiqa’s letter to Ruhi, World War I and Britain’s conquest of Jerusalem and declaration of support for Zionism brought about the first major rupture in the twentieth-century history of the Palestinians. As Walid Habbas illuminates in his review of Stanley Weintraub’s The Recovery of Jerusalem, 1917: Jerusalem for Christmas, the war cast a shadow not only over the everyday lives of Palestinians, but also over the British soldiers who, in December 1917, “advanced without stopping from Gaza toward Jerusalem, with the goal of presenting the holy city to the British nation as a Christmas gift.” Habbas examines these biographic details frequently obscured by the fog of biblical framing and Orientalizing of what was essentially a strategic campaign to link British interests in the Mediterranean with those in the Indian Ocean.

Now, more than a century later, everyday life for Jerusalemites continues to become ever harder and more complicated, as Israel advances new policies to entrench its de facto annexation of most of occupied East Jerusalem. The impact of Israeli policies was elaborated upon in a report published by the International Crisis Group in June 2019, titled Reversing Israel’s Deepening Annexation of Occupied East Jerusalem.
In it, the ICG details the excision of Palestinian-inhabited areas according to Israeli plans, but also cogently argues why and, most importantly, how to reverse this process. *JQ* is pleased to publish excerpts of this timely report, especially as the next Israeli government will almost certainly seek to further Israel’s hitherto incomplete annexation of parts of the city by moving forward with its five-year plan, now in its second year.

Finally, this issue goes to press with the sad news of the passing of Kamal Boullata, the notable painter, poet, and leading art historian from Jerusalem. In addition to his groundbreaking works on the development of Palestinian art, Boullata had contributed a valuable historical article on “Daoud Zalatimo and Jerusalem Painting during the Mandate” to *JQ* 70. He also designed the distinctive *Journal of Palestine Studies* bird logo as well as several of the journal’s covers. *Jerusalem Quarterly* editors participated in his moving funeral at Jabal Sihyun, where his mortal remains arrived via airplane from Berlin. In tribute to Boullata, we are printing one of his recent works on the back cover of this issue.

Endnotes

1 See, for example, the headline of an article in *HuffPost*: “Twitter Bursts with ‘Sitty’ Love for Palestinian Grandmas after Israel Bans Rashida Tlaib.” Mary Papenfuss, “Twitter Bursts with ‘Sitty’ Love for Palestinian Grandmas after Israel Bans Rashida Tlaib,” *HuffPost*, 18 August 2019, online at www.huffpost.com/entry/rashida-tlaib-muftiyah-tlaib-israel-palestine-sitty-twitter_n_5d58c3a9e4b056fafd0d0731 (accessed 27 August 2019).


3 NDPS provides a platform for rigorous theoretical and methodological discussion of research agendas about Palestine and the Palestinians, and on the spaces of political mobilization they open and foreclose. An initiative of the Middle East Studies Program at Brown University, NDPS is dedicated to decolonizing the field of Palestinian studies and promoting its integration into larger streams of critical intellectual inquiry, especially by supporting the work of emerging scholars. For further details on the 2018 workshop, see online at palestinianstudies.org/workshops/2018 (accessed 29 August 2019).


Corrigenda:

In *Jerusalem Quarterly* 78, the review of *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940* mistakenly defines *citadinité* as “urban citizenry” (page 135, paragraph 2, line 5). The sentence should have defined *citadinité* as “urbanity.” The online version is corrected accordingly.
Announcing the 2020 round

Ibrahim Dakkak Award
for Outstanding Essay on Jerusalem

will be awarded to an outstanding essay that addresses either contemporary or historical issues relating to Jerusalem. The winning submission will receive a prize of $1,000 and will be published in the Jerusalem Quarterly.

Essays submitted for consideration should be 4,000–5,000 words long (including footnotes), should be based on original research, and must not have been previously published elsewhere. Submissions from junior and early career researchers and students will be given priority.

Please submit essays and a short bio (including current or previous affiliation with a university or research institution) via email to jq@palestine-studies.org

Images must have copyright clearance from owners and should be submitted as separate files with resolution of 600 dpi if possible.

The deadline for submissions is 31 October 2019. A committee selected by the Jerusalem Quarterly will determine the winning essay.

Call for Papers

UPSIDE DOWN, INSIDE OUT: PALESTINE FROM ABOVE
Special Issue of the Jerusalem Quarterly

Yazid Anani, Guest Editor

This special Jerusalem Quarterly issue will accompany an exhibit with a similar title next year at A. M. Qattan Foundation. The issue will explore how the technology of mapping and imaging has been used to depict the Palestinian landscape from various elevations for a variety of uses: mapping, surveillance, art, planning, .etc. Artists, academics, and writers are invited to submit articles between 2000–4000 words focusing on these and related themes. Contributions are encouraged to tackle issues such as: image representation of Palestine and its people/ geography; the notion of what is of interest and disinterest in the eye of the image maker versus what is not represented or captured and why; uses of aerial photography in railways, military points, airports, roads and other infrastructure; unpacking urban planning paradigms through images; scrutinizing the issue of transformation of the landscape, and its natural/ human causes, as well as other issues pertaining to surveillance and intelligence.

Submission deadline is 20 November 2019. Send to: jq@palestine-studies.org
Please separate images from texts when submitting.

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The Suppression of the Great Revolt and the Destruction of Everyday Life in Palestine

Charles Anderson

Over the past quarter century, the deconstruction and obstruction of everyday life in the occupied Palestinian territories has become all too familiar. Since the Oslo era (1993–2000), the checkpoint has, in many ways, come to symbolize Israel’s willful obstruction of Palestinians’ most elementary of freedoms: the ability to move from place to place.1 Going to school, tending to agricultural areas, conducting business in an adjacent town, or visiting relatives and friends – the simplest activities of modern life and society – all become subject to the time distorting effects of unpredictable lines and the routine harassment and humiliation of security checks at the network of checkpoints that grew in the 1990s. In turn, Palestinian space has been fragmented and parcelized in dizzying fashion, with islands of supposed Palestinian control (“Area A” of the West Bank) decomposed into some 227 “enclaves” by the end of the Oslo years, 88 percent of which were less than two square kilometers in size, and all surrounded or divided from each other by Israeli jurisdictions and checkpoints.2 Drawing on Heidegger’s observation that the ability to self-consciously control the use of time is one of humanity’s defining characteristics, Amal Jamal suggests that the removal or muting of that capacity in the occupied Palestinian territories – what Jamal describes as subjection to “racialized time” – has been deliberately used to diminish Palestinian life and, in effect, call Palestinians’ humanity into question.3 Similarly, Sari Hanafi has argued that Israel is committing “spaciocide,” annihilating Palestinian space through colonization, demolition and degradation of urban centers, constriction.
of zones of habitation, and territorial disaggregation and fragmentation. Within this harrowing ensemble, Palestinians live under endless and constantly changing restrictive conditions that enforce precarity and damage the social and economic bases of their collective life, while at the same time they periodically suffer from additional collective punishments, such as curfews and home demolitions, attacks by settlers, and military raids, searches, and campaigns.

The present fractured state of occupied Palestine bears more than a passing resemblance to the now distant era of the 1930s. Many of the military tactics Israel uses to control the Palestinians, and especially its fascination with collective punishment, date back to the British Mandate, and specifically to the suppression of the Palestinian insurgency from 1936–39, known as the Great Revolt. Aside from tactical repertoires for managing and repressing the Palestinians, important elements of the systems of military law which Israel has employed to rule over the Palestinian minority in the Jewish state (1948–66) and the population of the West Bank and Gaza (1967–present) also stem from the British counterinsurgency state built in the 1930s. In what follows I propose to tease out another dimension of the manifold legacy of the 1930s: that of the regularized destruction of the daily life of the colonized.

Everyday life, and its social and economic foundations, became a battleground during the Great Revolt. Recent scholarship in English has disclosed much about the collective punishments, dirty war tactics, and ambient brutality that characterized the counterinsurgency against the Great Revolt. This paper supplements our understanding of the counterinsurgency by highlighting its targeting of the everyday existence of the Palestinian population. The colonial state intruded upon all manner of daily activities, degrading Palestinians’ living conditions and turning the mundane into a site of contest and a pressure point through which to exercise power. The colonial regime converted schools and hotels into military bases, seized crops and livestock, and invaded, assaulted, and demolished homes, villages, and urban quarters. Quotidian and ritual activities like attending prayers or going to school were made contingent on docile behavior or random circumstance; even funerals were prohibited as potential “disturbances.” Villages were temporarily incarcerated and the movement of goods and persons was restricted and rendered dependent on compliance with state surveillance. The rebels were determined to build an alternative sovereignty and public realm that would incorporate the Palestinian population. To destroy that project and cow the population into submission, colonial authorities employed an array of collective punishments that targeted the body politic. The result was a sustained attack on the daily life of the colonized that operated through four registers: economic sanctions, the control of space, the loss of bodily autonomy, and movement controls. No less than its other legacies, this article contends that the 1930s counterinsurgency established a critical precedent for Israel’s subsequent approach to the Palestinians, one premised on the systematic disruption and degradation of everyday life as a means of curbing resistance and controlling the population.
Collective Punishment

When the Palestinian rebellion sprang to life in April 1936, the Mandatory power faced the greatest crisis since its founding – one from which it never fully recovered, and which largely set in motion the end of British rule over Palestine a dozen years later. The uprising was the conscious fruit of the revolutionary preacher ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his followers, and of the anticolonial currents among youth, peasants, and wider society that were galvanized into action following al-Qassam’s failed bid to make revolution in 1935. Its strength flowed from its broad popular appeal and its creative organizational and institutional impulses, which provided a durable and formidable framework.

The government’s first line of defense in 1936 was the 1931 Palestine (Defense) Order in Council, an omnibus legislation that granted broadly dictatorial powers to the Palestine administration and empowered the high commissioner to make regulations by fiat in the name of “securing the public safety and the defense of Palestine.” The Order in Council not only allowed the government to bypass the regular court system (through military courts and other measures), but also authorized state seizure or destruction of immovable properties and confiscation of goods such as fuel, food, grain, or other items, without recompense or challenge. The Order in Council was invoked even before the uprising had become an Arab general strike and over the ensuing years the corpus of “emergency” and “defense” law grew rapidly, affording new levers to exert pressure on the everyday lives of Palestine’s Arab communities.

The Jerusalem government hoped to bring the revolt to a close through a diplomatic feint (a royal commission of inquiry) or by arresting key organizers – both of which were attempted in May 1936. Instead, the civil uprising grew into an insurgency that featured dozens of attacks per day by July, the majority directed at state forces. Armed rebel formations operated in both urban centers and the countryside, receiving support from the population and (surreptitiously) from the strike’s leadership organs. Faced with insurrection, the military was eager to press a counterinsurgent campaign and, throughout 1936, repeatedly sought sanction for iron fist tactics. It deemed rural society especially deserving of assault, and began to formulate an argument conflating the rural population tout court with insurgency. Yet despite its zeal, the military faced serious challenges, not least the absence of actionable intelligence on the rebels and their whereabouts. The rebels, meanwhile, knew the country and its rural milieux, and were experts at concealing themselves, going to ground in the presence of the army and the police. The military’s answer to these conundrums was a search regime that targeted Palestinian communities indiscriminately.

The official rationale for searches was to locate insurgents, arms, and contraband. However, in its brutish fashion, the military was poorly equipped (and less interested) to determine liability for acts of rebellion, such as sniping on Jewish colonies, British patrols, or road and rail traffic, and content instead to dole out punishment to communities on the grounds of their proximity to such incidents. Searches often
resembled punitive raids: houses and businesses were smashed up, goods and foodstuffs ruined, livestock killed, and villagers humiliated, beaten, and killed on occasion. The military’s commanding officer later explained that the destructiveness of searches was compensation for the instructions to keep collective fines modest. Moreover, as the military was incapable of landing a crushing blow on the insurgency, colonial forces aimed instead to cut it off from its bases of rural support by intimidating and brutalizing villagers in areas of rebel strength.12

From the beginning, the search regime was lethal. On 25 May 1936 at Kafr Kanna in the Galilee, British forces shot and killed an Arab woman. Other villagers were slain during searches in the subdistricts of Nablus, Ramallah, Ramla, Safad, Tulkarm, and no doubt elsewhere. In the Ramallah subdistrict, troops conducting sweeps in early July repeatedly fired on villagers, killing six and injuring four.13 When they were not lethal, searches remained destructive and terrifying. At al-Tira in the Ramla subdistrict, the police and military spoilt food, wrecked doors to homes, shops, and storehouses, and beat or assaulted some seventy residents. At Kuwaykat in the Galilee, search forces gathered the village’s men and youth, took them outside the village, forced them to run and jump on command, then beat and kicked them after making them sleep outdoors.14 By the end of June 1936, the regime’s first official month in action, 148 villages had been searched, and by late July the number had risen to 215 operations.15 Complaints surfaced across the country.16 Despite turning up little in the way of arms or men, the Royal Air Force (RAF) deemed subsequent searches “very successful,” and such operations continued throughout and after the strike.17

Far from being passive, as the literature that repeats common arguments found in military sources has represented,18 the Palestine administration regularly evolved new tactics aimed at quelling the rebellion. These tactics nibbled away at the time and financial health of the colonized or interfered with their rhythms of life. Curfews were one such device. Initially imposed in Jaffa, the uprising’s first urban flashpoint, curfews became regularized at night and common by day in Arab towns and villages. At their extreme they confined affected populations to their homes for twenty-two hours a day.19 The administration quickly updated the Collective Punishments Ordinance, allowing it to saddle villages accused of offenses such as property damage or stoning cars with “punitive police posts” whose costs were born by the village. By mid-June 1936 almost thirty such posts existed; the government sometimes threatened their imposition to try to induce village mukhtars to collaborate.20

A mainstay of the government’s approach was to use financial sanctions to dissuade support for the strike and punish its participants. Since the strike was not technically illegal, the administration opted to criminalize the financial support of those who, as the high commissioner put it, endeavored to “coerce the Government of Palestine,” and to seize their assets or place them under attachment. The grounds for imposing collective fines multiplied, and, by design, no proof tying a given locality to specific unlawful activity was necessary.21 Villages resisting police and military searches were assessed fines, as were, more arbitrarily, those merely proximate to roadside attacks or ambushes.22 ‘Isa al-Sifri, a Jaffa youth activist, counted 250 fines levied in
1936. Attempting to correct for previous practice, when fines imposed after the 1929 uprising went uncollected because they were too steep, High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope instructed that fines be modest in size and collected immediately. Fines were often taken in kind, which in villages meant the seizure of valuable livestock, damaging the long-term earning capacity and savings of affected families. Nablus, which was hit with one of the largest fines (five thousand Palestine pounds), resisted payment but had part of its fine taken in goods and sundries, even including pillows, soap, and sugar. By the strike’s end 21,272 Palestine pounds in charges had been assigned, yet less than half of this sum was collected by early 1937, which may have owed in part to resistance but also indicated many communities’ economic fragility, which only sharpened under the stringent conditions of the strike.

The violence, destruction, and financial losses caused by searches and collective fines led to widespread Palestinian fear and sometimes unexpected responses. At times, rural populations – including those of Qabatiya in Jenin subdistrict and the ‘Arab al-Bawatin Bedouin encamped east of Bisan – fled ahead of searches and other operations. The Arab Higher Committee, the official coordinating body for the strike, considered incidents like these a response to the search regime and its “intimidation of women and children.” Collective fines, and fears for the honor and safety of women and children, were also a cause for temporary evacuations.

**Controlling Space**

In June 1936, the government unveiled a new set of repressive powers, several of which struck at the autonomy and liberty of individuals. They authorized district commissioners to force open shops that had closed in observance of the strike – a provision that was unworkable – and, more efficaciously, to order detention without trial for one year in internment camps. Soldiers were given powers to arrest members of the public and, more degradingly, to compel them to perform corvée labor. The latter power was part of the military’s venture to reclaim urban spaces. In some cities, rebels had created semi-autonomous zones, erecting barricades to close off neighborhoods to state penetration and strewing nails on streets to impair British and Jewish mobility and to dissuade normal traffic. Arabs protested the corvée regulation as humiliating, but it was utilized to force Arab residents to clear away these obstructions and reopen the roadways.

The June regulations also included home demolitions, to be conducted where government forces were fired upon and as an exemplary punishment when culprits could not be located. By Sifri’s count the new power was wielded in at least thirty villages, sometimes in conjunction with other punishments. At ‘Alma, outside Safad, state forces killed the village’s livestock before destroying a home that contained a seed repository. British forces destroyed homes across Palestine, from Khan Yunis in Gaza to Majd al-Kurum in the Galilee. Bedouin communities targeted with
demolitions included the Wadi al-Hawarith, the Tarabayn (Beersheba), and the Tayaha (Naqab). Displaying the Orientalist models that often informed British thinking, RAF military intelligence heartily endorsed the tactic: “It is a quick and conclusive form of punishment and one that is understood by the Arab mind. The ruins of the house or houses stand as a lasting memorial of Government punishment.”

The most extraordinary demolitions in 1936 came in June at Jaffa, where British forces razed much of the Old City to pave the way for military access roads. Sifri compared the events to an earthquake and estimated that over one thousand dwellings and ancillary buildings were destroyed, putting ten thousand people out on the street. A later researcher counted roughly 650 families whose homes were destroyed and another 1,150 families that temporarily or permanently evacuated – rendering approximately one-sixth of the Arab population of Jaffa temporarily or permanently homeless. Although the demolitions destroyed a critical rebel sanctuary, local partisans continued to battle security forces and attack Jewish settlements in the area.

While Jaffa bore the brunt of the state’s increasingly militarized response to the strike, other cities also became sites of urban warfare. Palestine’s garrison grew during the strike from two battalions to twenty-two, and the army took over schools throughout the country for use as barracks and bases, further contributing to the militarization of urban space. As one ranking officer sarcastically put it, “Educational institutions provided a good deal of the required accommodation, much to the indignation of some people. Protests poured in, and the Arabs helpfully suggested that the troops should live in the open in order to harden them, instead of starving the intellectual development of their young by usurping their schools.” Nablus was surrounded with barbed wire and the army occupied the local shari’a court and the Sports Union Club (where the local strike committee had its headquarters), mounting machine guns on the latter’s roof. The historic Jazzar mosque in ‘Akka was riddled with machine gun fire, and when the Arab Higher Committee objected, the military clarified that it had been aiming at the waqf building adjacent to the mosque, thereby underlining the disregard for local religious institutions and communal gathering places. The military wanted to lay siege to the Old City in Jerusalem, but was held off by the administration’s concerns and had to suffice with police checkpoints to effect searches and regulate foot traffic.

The Failure of Counterinsurgency in 1936

Still, the military advocated more aggressive tactics and complained that its hands were being tied by the civil administration, which, in its view, was too concerned with Arab casualties and Arab public opinion. In June 1936, the military brass began calling for martial law, by which it meant the end of any restraints placed on its operations. Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore and High Commissioner Wauchope rejected this idea, contending, in the main, that the Order in Council was adequate to the task of suppressing disorder; Wauchope also believed (not without reason) that left to their
own devices the military would, by harming innocent people in large numbers, sow “bitter feeling” and make the restoration of order more difficult.\textsuperscript{39} In the opinion of the ranking military officer, R. E. C. Pierse, however, nothing short of crushing the peasantry altogether, particularly in the central hill country, was adequate to snuff out the stubborn rebellion.\textsuperscript{40} In reality, his determination to scorge and chasten peasants \textit{en masse} was indicative of the military’s own failure, after long, hard months of combat and service, to uproot the insurgency. The resort to collective punishment as strategy betrayed the guerillas’ capacity to survive and build the uprising despite regularly being defeated on the battlefield. Short of achieving a military knockout, the state’s response was to try and disrupt rebel systems by punishments that struck indiscriminately at the public, impinging on and constraining daily life, and turning everyday locales like villages, schools, and town squares into part-time warzones.

During the first phase of the Great Revolt, colonial authorities established a template for suppressing the popular movement through collective punishments. The state used financial penalties and combined these with direct physical intimidation and violence. The former damaged people’s economic wellbeing, and in effect threatened the population with impoverishment and deprivation. The latter, along with the occupation of schools, clubs, and other public places, did injury to the everyday security people expect in their villages and urban spaces and amounted to the violation or denial of sanctuary. Home demolitions – a favorite tool and hallmark of the government’s counterinsurgency – struck at both economic livelihood and personal and collective security.\textsuperscript{41} The son of Jenin’s mayor named home demolitions, curfews, and fines – each of which tore at the fabric of everyday life and depleted communal livelihoods and resources – as “the most oppressive” government tactics employed during 1936.\textsuperscript{42} When these proved damaging but insufficient to subdue the revolt, the colonial authorities continued their search for a means to suppress the rebellion. During the revolt’s succeeding phases, tactics pioneered during the strike, such as movement controls and forced labor, would be further amplified and developed; utilized alongside new methods, such as temporary mass incarceration, the effect was devastating.

\textbf{Entering a New Phase}

During the Peel Commission interregnum in 1936–37, the rebels began new, albeit smaller, offensives against Jewish colonies, state security forces, and informants and loyalist Arabs. The government continued to levy collective fines and demolish homes, promulgated an even more despotic Order in Council, and renewed its dragnet of nationalist activists. It also widened the imposition of punitive police posts to include “areas where the inhabitants had failed to render all the assistance in their power to the police or other authority for the purpose of suppressing disturbances.” By the end of 1937, eighty punitive billets had been established, meaning that about one-tenth of Arab villages were directly under police supervision.\textsuperscript{43}
The revolt was renewed at greater intensity after the Peel Commission’s call for partition sparked widespread outrage even among Palestinians more sympathetic to the government and Palestinian rebels assassinated Lewis Andrews, the acting district commissioner—Galilee, in September 1937. The government quickly established a military court system and the military undertook punitive operations and searches that the acting high commissioner labeled “drastic in the extreme.” The government outlawed the formal organs of the national movement, and deported Arab Higher Committee members to a prison camp in the Seychelles; others fled into exile. Arrest sweeps clogged prisons and filled internment camps, targeting nationalist activists, but also preachers, shaykhs, and all manner of notables; practically all of the northern notables were interned for some duration.\

While the administration suppressed the organs of the Palestinian national movement, the military resorted to greater displays of spectacular violence. Individuals were more frequently killed during searches, which were often more destructive than they had been in 1936. In February 1938, for example, troops searching Ijzim in the Haifa subdistrict literally bashed the brains out of a man breaking the search cordon, demolished two houses and destroyed the contents of fifty to sixty others, and hauled off seven hundred to eight hundred goats and sheep as a collective fine.44 British forces took entire flocks for fines, driving villagers to hunger, and smashed sewing machines and other tools of women’s lives in an effort to pry them away from the revolt.45 Home demolitions expanded, often entailing widespread destruction of the built environment in villages. At Baqa al-Gharbiyya near Tulkarm, proximate to where several soldiers were killed in summer 1938, between 53 and 93 homes were destroyed.47 In July 1938, vengeful soldiers reportedly burned down the entire Galilee hamlet of Kawkab Abu al-Hayja.48 Sha‘b, near ‘Akka, witnessed 120 of its approximately 300 homes demolished after a lieutenant was killed by a mine outside it. Jenin, then a modest town of three thousand or so inhabitants, had between 20 and 50 percent of its housing stock destroyed — leaving behind many hungry and homeless — after its acting district commissioner was assassinated in August 1938.49 As in 1936, the destruction and brutality of searches led some villagers to pull up stakes and evacuate, both before and after visits by the military and the police.50

Jeopardizing the basic livelihoods of rural populations was, like so many of the colonial regime’s counterinsurgent methods, a double-edged sword. In spring 1937, Wauchope warned that “so large a number of landless Arabs are near the border line of starvation” that he feared this could further destabilize Palestine’s security.51 The government did little to ameliorate these dire conditions, despite a sizeable budget surplus.52 As the specter of famine reappeared in 1938 and the wheat harvest for the year failed, those whom government had brutalized or consigned to deprivation were increasingly open to the rebel call to overthrow the hated colonial state.53 From fall 1937 to fall 1938, rebel power grew, forcing the government to retreat from all but a handful of cities and fortified military bases.

As the Palestinian revolt built toward a “security landslide” by summer 1938, the government struggled to hold its ground.54 It reoccupied villages in the Galilee and the
central highlands, put the Special Night Squads – notorious units that placed irregular Jewish forces under British officers to carry out raids and extrajudicial executions – into action, and converted the Mandate judicial system into a hanging court for Arabs. None of these proved the silver bullet the colonial regime was looking for, but new tactics were soon devised that presented stark challenges to the daily existence of Arab communities in both the countryside and the towns. The first of these was regularized mass incarceration of villagers during searches.

**Mass Detention**

With the aid of Zionist intelligence, the practice of “caging a village” ultimately helped build a network of informants with knowledge of the rebel movement, thereby yielding the type of valuable intelligence that the government had long lacked. Mass detention of male populations during searches – in on-site or semipermanent cages – became commonplace and was often combined with forced labor and other forms of punishment. The scale of detentions and the broad sweep of the population they affected are one of the most dramatic and underexamined aspects of the 1930s counterinsurgency.

The practice began in the north in July 1938, prompted by consistent local resistance to new police posts and a border fence. At al-Malakiyya, a fifty-by-fifty-meter cage was set up, to which the military brought some one thousand men from the surrounding Arab villages. The men were held for several days without food, drink, or protection from the elements, save what women of their villages could bring. The same month, a combing operation in part of the Triangle targeted males between the ages of sixteen and sixty for “questioning” at Tulkarm and the nearby prison camp at Nur al-Shams. Men from ‘Illar, ‘Atil, Qufin, al-Hanana, and ‘Ar‘ara were among the first picked up. They spent days exposed in outdoor pens without food before they were joined by their compatriots from ‘Anabta, Bal‘a, Dayr al-Ghusun, Kafr Ruman, and Shuwayka. High Commissioner MacMichael (who replaced Wauchope in March) estimated that some four thousand men were temporarily detained. The duration of their incarceration is unknown, but the scale of the undertaking was unprecedented.

In subsequent rounds of mass detention, men were used as forced labor on local gun battery installations and for other purposes. Soldiers sometimes marked the bodies of detainees as if they were herd animals, painting the necks of men from certain villages so as to make their origins visually identifiable to their captors. Detention during searches was soon extended to urban populations as well. In August 1938, a twenty-four-hour curfew was imposed on Nablus, and amid ambient violence killing at least two, the entire city’s male population (boys included), numbering perhaps six thousand, were searched and processed in cage screenings at the local military base. Lydda, ‘Akka, Gaza, and Jaffa all faced such searches over the next months, with hundreds detained afterward.
The military’s increasingly close cooperation with Zionism, especially the Haganah, also impacted the new search protocol. A detention pen was established at the colony of Karkur, near the Triangle, and used as a regular depot for mass detentions. The Haganah’s chief of Arab intelligence, Ezra Danin, supplied the army with informants who were used in “identification parades” that came to accompany searches. During these exercises, informants concealed in armored cars picked out rebels and their supporters as male villagers were made to file by. Zionist intelligence and counterrevolutionary Palestinians (who mobilized in 1938 into so-called peace bands) assisted in pinpointing which detainees might be turned into informants.

The carceral search techniques generalized in the second half of 1938 created a shadow prison system, in which a large number of Palestinian males experienced confinement and forced labor, and where, as some Arab protestors noted, the formal regulations and legal apparatus governing incarceration did not apply. According to military statistics, between November 1938 and mid-April 1939, the military conducted an average of 40 to 70 searches per week and weekly detentions for interrogation sometimes ranged in the thousands, and did not dip below five hundred until March 1939. Irrespective of ties to insurgents, detainees were exploited for their labor, building roads, digging trenches, moving equipment, and performing other tasks. The British military made light of these practices: In late 1938, General Officer Commanding Robert Haining breezily described that those rounded up in searches were sent to “a Concentration Camp for a spell,” and the military claimed that suspects were “detained locally for ten days or so and given a little road work or other exercise for the good of their souls.”

The colonial state’s demand for forced labor was more insidious in the case of human shields, referred to colloquially as “minesweepers,” used to try to curb rebel assaults on the country’s transportation network. British soldiers placed Arab captives in an anterior position in a convoy or on a rail line, in a separate vehicle or strapped straight to the front of a military vehicle, so that in the case of a sniping attack or mine they would almost definitely become the first casualties. The military also used human shields on patrols in villages and during combat on some occasions, although it adamantly denied this. During the peak of the revolt, use of human shields became standard operating procedure in parts of the country and on the railroads. Men were kept on hand at military camps and bases for such use by fall 1938 in the north, and all convoys there travelled with human shields. Residents of the ‘Akka, Haifa, and Safad areas protested searches, detentions, and human shielding (comparing the latter to torture) to no avail.

To be clear, mass detentions in the form of cage searches supplemented the existing prison system and the concentration camps created since 1936. The extensive use of temporary mass incarceration might help explain the discrepancy between Arab estimates of forty to fifty thousand detained during the revolt and the radically lower government figures, such as its claim that only 3,628 persons were held (in all facilities) at the close of 1938. The Arab total approaches three-quarters of the entire rural breadwinning population of peasants and sharecroppers counted in the 1931
census, a staggering figure that compares with the (equally staggering) contemporary rate of male detentions in the occupied territories. Even if the Arab estimates are high, rural life was clearly punctuated by considerable and traumatic disruptions in many parts of the country, and many men were subjected to confinement, forced labor, and possibly torture, beatings, or other mistreatment.

**Controlling Movement**

The counterinsurgency’s second critical tactical innovation was the imposition of a regime of movement controls in late 1938. Already common in 1936, curfews were used more frequently and extensively by 1938. Residents analogized them to “imprisonment” and sometimes alleged that they caused hunger and even starvation of infants and children. By fall 1938, the British administration placed Nablus, Nazareth, Haifa, Jenin, and the Old City of Jerusalem under a standing order evening curfew, which also applied to “all roads and tracks throughout Palestine outside municipal and built up areas.” Daytime curfews severely restricting movement were used as punishments for rebel activities. The limitations on free movement altered or abridged common social practices and religious rites. Curfews interfered with or barred prayer at mosque, and funerals were sometimes prohibited or even halted while in progress for fear of triggering anti-government disorder.

The Arab public’s ability to conduct its daily affairs declined dramatically with the application of movement controls in November 1938 that threatened everyday commerce and food security writ large. Motorized traffic on any road was prohibited without a military-issued permit, the granting of which was dependent on obtaining an identification card. The identification card system was intended to improve the government’s ability to track and surveil the population, and the rebels rightly saw it as a grave development for the revolutionary project. They responded by calling a three-day general strike before the movement controls came into force and announced a ban on obtaining travel permits and identification papers. The ban on cooperating with the movement control regime was well observed but put the insurgency into a devil’s bind of damaging the public interest, which it could not afford to maintain indefinitely.

The pass law system, in effect, imposed siege warfare on the whole of the Arab public and, as the high commissioner bloodlessly observed, menaced it with “ruin and starvation.” Arab traffic ground to a halt and then shifted to non-motorized forms: donkeys, camels, horses, animal-drawn carriages and carts, and bicycles. The high commissioner derisively commented: “A change of this kind [using pack animals rather than cars] is not difficult for the Palestinian Arab; it merely means that the clock is put back twenty years.” Yet the pass laws had larger, if uneven, economic ramifications. Trade, agriculture, and industry underwent “almost complete dislocation,” shriveling beyond their already emaciated condition. Prices rose and the poor in some locations (like Haifa) were unable to afford food, while in others (like Jerusalem) the majority
had “barely enough to eat.” In the Southern District, the administration dourly judged that winter would pass “with difficulty, but without starvation.”

Boycott of the pass system caused strains in the rebel camp and one band captain described it as “nothing but a calamity to the Arabs.” Merchants engaged in price gouging and bought from Jewish peers while the public suffered shortages in vegetables and foodstuffs. The onset of the citrus season caused another problem, as the rebel ban put the whole year’s crop in jeopardy. To remedy the situation, rebel authorities proclaimed exemptions for the citrus trade, permitting individuals involved to acquire IDs and travel permits. Seizing on these frictions, the military denied permits to citrus merchants and workers until the general population submitted to the system. The rebels buckled and cancelled the boycott in mid-December, after roughly six weeks. A rush of applications for ID cards and travel permits followed.

The Arabs’ travails continued, however, as did military measures that sacrificed Arab economic activity in the name of state security. In January 1939, the military cancelled all travel documents issued to Arabs and effectively banned interurban motor transport for Arabs on the pretext that taxis had been used in offensive operations by insurgents. Most reapplications for permits were refused, with the only categorical exemption granted to citrus-related business. Merchants and landowners outside that sector were hit hard. Arab transport returned to a state similar to that under the pass laws boycott. Making matters worse, military orders in February 1939 further closed down commercial traffic as punishment for sabotage. Adding to these disruptions, the military authorities imposed “very frequent 24-hour curfews” after urban assassinations or attempts in early 1939. Meanwhile, identification papers were issued during all searches, rendering the male population more visible and more easily tracked. As of March 1939, ninety thousand identity cards had been issued to adult Arab men.

The transit boycott was probably the last great show of strength by the rebels. The dilemma posed by the pass laws was insuperable, and capitulation to them greatly advanced surveillance and penetration of Arab society while tarnishing the rebellion’s credibility. Disarray and dysfunction within the rebel movement, propelled by both internal and external pressures, only increased afterward. Meanwhile, military commanders continued to promulgate harsh orders on matters great and small, with a January 1939 directive in the north declaring that persons with hands in their pockets in public would be handled as suspects exemplifying the extreme lengths to which regulation of the population was pushed. Battered by the ever more pitiless counterinsurgency and its growing impact on livelihoods and everyday life, the Arab public was left to put its hopes, fruitlessly as it turned out, in the diplomatic process that led to roundtable talks and the White Paper of 1939.
Conclusion

In his memoirs, district commissioner—Galilee Alec Kirkbride expresses ambivalence about the idea that the Great Revolt was broken militarily. Where the battlefield continuously drew young Arab men to perish in the name of national glory, he posits that the constriction of “everyday life,” in particular the movement controls implemented in fall 1938, ultimately proved most effective in choking off rebel activity. In place of raw military might, movement restrictions brought the counterinsurgency into every Arab home, impinging on the most elementary aspects of everyday life. It was through such channels that the rebellion was, after a prolonged campaign of attrition, rendered unsustainable.

Throughout the Arab rebellion the terrain of everyday life was elemental to the contest for control of the country and its fate. As rebel partisans and sympathizers strove to reclaim Palestine’s urban and rural geography from the colonial state and to build an autonomous public arena and indigenous self-governing institutions, the government fought back by increasing the costs associated with the rebellion. It did so unabashedly, not only through punitive military raids, but through tactics that struck at the interests of the general public, eroding its liberties, violating and militarizing urban and rural space, and coercively altering its patterns of life and social practice.

The first effective vehicles for this stratagem took the form of financial penalties, curfews, and house demolitions. The last suited the military’s desire for spectacular punishment and illustrated the state’s need to control space. The contest over space led to its militarization, both as military forces literally turned schools into barracks and as they injected violence into everyday spaces in order to abolish rebel strongholds and zones. In the process, places of sanctuary diminished and where still intact, the threat of state violence remained latent. During the revolt’s second phase the colonial state’s interventions into daily life were deeper and progressively more integral to the prosecution of the counterinsurgency. The security forces hoped that greater applications of force, the infliction of larger economic losses, and more drastic damage to the built environment would break the rebel movement. Meanwhile, routines of work, school, worship, and travel periodically disrupted in 1936 were more dramatically altered by intensified curfews, new practices of mass incarceration and forced labor, and the revocation of free movement. Normalcy was abolished as the colonial state and the military took their campaign of collective punishments ever further, constricting and diminishing the life of the colonized and ruthlessly exploiting the damage they did to the substance and fabric of people’s lives. The retooled British counterinsurgency brought economic instability and physical insecurity, shaking the socioeconomic foundations of society and cracking the institutional bases of the revolutionary movement. The onslaught of collective punishments destroyed the daily life of Arab Palestinians, forcing sacrifice and suffering onto households far and wide and making the quest for freedom and self-determination ever more costly and untenable. As it remains today in the occupied Palestinian territories and elsewhere, the viability of everyday life was a bellwether in 1930s Palestine for the capacity to
develop and maintain a resilient popular movement, and without the ability to shelter it, the Great Revolt was soon in tatters.

Many seeds of the present regime in the Palestinian territories are evident in components of the 1930s counterinsurgency. To be sure, the British did not commit spacio-cide – at least not in the sense of seeking to uproot the Palestinians by reducing the livability and physical integration of their villages, towns, and cities. Yet the calibrated, intentional degradation of the built environment as a method of exercising coercion does trace back to the 1930s. Similarly, the British profoundly impacted the daily temporality, rhythms, and movement of colonized Palestinians, laying the groundwork for “racialized time.” Yet where the latter connotes the deliberate squandering of colonial subjects’ time and thereby degrading their humanity, the counterinsurgents of the Great Revolt were more concerned (with their curfews and movement controls) to restrict Palestinian liberties in order to contain an unruly population. As in other domains, Israel has continued to reengineer and supplement the tactics and tools it inherited from the 1930s. Although Israel’s borrowings are at times strikingly direct, the deeper “lesson” that its leaders and institutions have taken from that era has to do with the utility of the everyday as a sphere for intervention and site of continuous tactical development. Echoing Kirkbride’s evaluation, the targeting of everyday life, and the suffering and disorientation so entailed, has become a powerful method – and model – guiding Israel’s never-ending counterinsurgency.

Charles Anderson is assistant professor of history at Western Washington University.

Endnotes
1 Hannah Arendt called freedom of movement the most fundamental of all civil rights; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1963), 32.

8 Palestine (Defense) Order in Council, 1931, the National Archives of the UK (TNA), Colonial Office (CO) 733/239/5. Prepared after the rebellion of 1929, the Order in Council was the government’s answer to growing Palestinian resistance in the 1930s.

9 Anderson, “From Petition,” chapter 7; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 2 July 1936, secret, TNA Foreign Office (FO) 371/20034. See also Kayyali, *Palestine*, chapter 7.


12 Report by the Air Officer Commanding (AOC), 34, 45, enclosure to: AOC to Air Secretary, 15 October 1936, TNA CO 733/317/1. Such coarse methods drew on Britain’s recent experiences in India’s Northwest Frontier Province and evolving notions of fighting “small wars,” that is, war against non-state actors. See Matthew Hughes, “From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain’s Suppression of the 1936–39 Arab Revolt in Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39, no. 2 (Winter 2010), 7; and Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 19–21.

13 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 25 May 1936, #268, TNA FO 371/20033; RAF (Jeru.), 3 June 1936, monthly summary of intelligence (May), TNA FO 371/20030; ‘Isa al-Sifri, *Filastin al-‘Arabiyya bayna al-intidab wa al-sahyuniyya* [Arab Palestine between the Mandate and Zionism] (Jaffa: Maktabat Filastin al-jadida, 1937), vol. 2, 87. Memo by High Commissioner on General Officer Commanding (GOC)’s report, p. 4, enclosure to High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 28 November 1936, TNA CO 733/317/1.

14 Najib, 5 June 1936, Central Zionist Archive (CZA) S/25-3875; Arab Bureau information, 10 June 1936, CZA S/25-22231; Sifri, *Filastin al-‘Arabiyya*, vol. 2, 86. During the first month of searches the Arab Higher Committee cited similar abuses in the villages of al-Dhib, Kafr Misr, Nabi Samwil, Bayt Ikas, al-Tayyiba, Qaqum, and Dhinnaba. Arab Higher Committee to High Commissioner and League of Nations, 20 June 1936, TNA FO 371/20023.

15 RAF (Jeru.), 1 July 1936, 31 July 1936, weekly summaries of intelligence, TNA FO 371/20030. Conflicting tallies indicate that some villages were likely searched more than once.


17 Compare RAF (Jeru.), 7 August 1936, weekly summary of intelligence, and Gen Staff (WO), Palestine summary #2 (through 6 October 1936), TNA FO 371/20030.


20 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 4 May 1936, #181, TNA CO 733/310/1; Official communiqué 37/36, 5 May 1936, Israel State Archive (ISA) (2) 566-6m; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 17 June 1936, #385, TNA CO 733/310/3; Arab Bureau information, 17 June 1936, CZA S/25-22231.
21 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 7 June 1936, #335, 10 June 1936, #348, and Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner, 11 June 1936, #255, TNA CO 733/311/3.


24 Report of the Palestine Royal Commission [the Peel Commission], Cmd 5479 (London: HMSO, 1937), 194; Chief Secretary to District Commissioners, 25 July 1936, Haganah Archive (HA) 8/40.

25 Report to the League of Nations, 1936, 10.


27 Peel Commission report, 194.


29 Arab Higher Committee to High Commissioner and League of Nations, 20 June 1936, TNA FO 371/20023; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, Fi khidam al-nidal: mudhakkirat Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), 72–73. The use of this power did not stop military officers from concluding that forced labor was not readily enough employed. See H. J. Simson, British Rule in Palestine and the Arab Rebellion of 1936–1937 (Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1937), 241.

30 Report, 1 July 1936, HA 8/39.

31 Report to the League of Nations, 1936, 10; Arab Higher Committee to High Commissioner and League of Nations, 20 June 1936, TNA FO 371/20023; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, Fi khidam al-nidal: mudhakkirat Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), 72–73. The use of this power did not stop military officers from concluding that forced labor was not readily enough employed. See H. J. Simson, British Rule in Palestine and the Arab Rebellion of 1936–1937 (Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1937), 241.

32 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 7 June 1936, #335, TNA CO 733/311/3; Sifri, Filastin al-'Arabiyya, vol. 2, 89–91; HC to Colonial Undersecretary (Parkinson), 16 October 1936, TNA CO 733/316/11; RAF (Jeru.), 4 September 1936, weekly summary of intelligence, TNA FO 371/20030.


37 Arab Bureau information, 10 June 1936, CZA S/25-2231; Zu‘aytir, Yawmiyat, 123; Colonial Undersecretary (Williams) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 17 August 1936, covering letter to an Arab Women’s Committee petition, TNA FO 371/20023; Arab Higher Committee to High Commissioner and League of Nations, 20 June 1936, and covering memo by the Foreign Office, n.d., TNA FO 371/20023; Memorandum by Chief Secretary on AOC’s report, n.d., enclosure to High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 13 November 1936, TNA CO 733/317/1; Abu Gharbiyya, Fi khidam al-nidal, 72.

38 Report by the General Officer Commanding (n.d.), part I (n.p.), enclosure to: General Officer Commanding to Undersecretary of War, 30.10.36, TNA CO 733/317/1. See also Simson, British Rule, chapters 12–19.

39 Report by the AOC, 45–46, TNA CO 733/317/1; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 2 June 1936, #320, Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner, 3 June 1936, #242, TNA CO 733/311/3; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 22 August 1936, CP 225 (36), TNA CAB/24/263/55. Quote from the last. Part of what was deduced in London about the demand for martial law was that it meant the wholesale destruction of villages: Minutes, J. C. Sterndale Bennett to L. Oliphant, 14 August 1936, TNA FO 371/20023.

40 Memo by the AOC, 20 August 1936, CP 225 (36), TNA CAB/24/263/55. AOC Pierse argued that “since the ultimate vote for peace or war lies now with the fellaheen, their subjection must be the primary object.” Pierse was replaced as commanding officer by GOC J. G. Dill in September.

41 Defending the use of home demolitions for exemplary purposes, the High Commissioner plainly argued in June that because the rebel
bands were so difficult to pursue, the only means left at government disposal to try to stem the further deterioration of state control was to take action against communities aiding rebels, or from which they originated. High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 10 June 1936, #348, TNA CO 733/311/3.

42 Abboushi, “Road to Rebellion,” 36.

43 Anderson, “From Petition,” chapter 8; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 27 March 1937, CP 109 (37), TNA FO 371/20805; Report to the League of Nations, 1937, 11–12, 14.

44 Anderson, “From Petition,” 858–60; Extract of Cabinet conclusions, 29 September 1937, TNA CO 733/332/11; Officer Administering the Government (Battershill) to Shuckburgh (CO), 21 November 1937, CP 286 (37), TNA CO 733/332/12; A. S. Kirkbride, A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East (London: John Murray, 1956), 100.


46 Norris, “Repression and Rebellion,” 33–34; Bishop to Archbishop of Canterbury, 26 February 1938, MECA, JEM 61-3. Adding insult to injury, villagers were sometimes offered the option of buying livestock back from the state if they could afford to do so.

47 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 19 July 1938, #358 and 20 July 1938, #365, TNA CO 733/366/4; Report to the League of Nations, 1938, 12; Zu’aytir, Yawmiyat, 415–18.


49 Cannon Charles Bridgeman to Bishop, 29 August 1938, MECA, JEM 61-3; Anderson, “From Petition,” 1073–75.


51 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 27 April 1937, enclosure to CP 127 (37), TNA CO 733/332/11.


53 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 5 September 1938, TNA CO 733/368/9; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 17 September 1938, TNA CO 733/366/4; Conversation with M.Q. in Nablus, 3 June 1938, and Political information on Arab activities: survey, 6 July 1938, 17, 20, CZA S/25-22191.

54 X (Tegart) to Lytton, 22 April 1939, MECA, Tegart papers 4-4.

55 Tegart, memo: “Present Situation,” 3 May 1938, and Tegart, no heading, 10 May 1938, MECA, Tegart papers 2-3; Matthew Hughes, “Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish Collaboration and the Special Night Squads in Palestine during the Arab Revolt, 1938–39,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 4 (2015): 590–610; Zu’aytir, Yawmiyat, 412. Regarding the courts, for example, three Arabs from Kaf Qasim were executed for property crimes (the arson of a Jewish flour mill) and four others were sentenced to death for attempted arson in July 1938.


57 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 5 September 1938, with enclosure, Arab Women’s Committee to High Commissioner, 25 July 1938, TNA CO 733/368/9; RAF (Jeru.), 10 August 1938, resume of operations (July), TNA Air 5/1248; Zu’aytir, Yawmiyat, 415–18.


59 Zu’aytir, Yawmiyat, 431, 509; RAF (Jeru.), 17 September 1938, resume of operations (August), TNA Air 5/1248; Isbir Munayyir, al-Lidd fi ’adhay al-intidab wa-l-ihtilal (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997), 27; Narrative dispatch #11, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 3 December 1938, 73–75, TNA CO 935/21.
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60 The Suppression of the Great Revolt | Charles Anderson

HMS Repulse, reports of proceedings, 26 July 1938 and 27 August 1938, TNA CO 733/366/4; Zu’aytir, Yawmiyat, 456–57.


62 See weekly reports from the General Officer Commanding or GHQ in Palestine to the War Office at TNA CO 733/379/3 and FO 371/23243.

GHQ, extract from D.O. no. G.S.I. 27/1, 25 November 1938, TNA CO 733/379/3; GOC Haining, “Hostile Propaganda in Palestine,” 1 December 1938, 8–9, TNA FO 371/21869; ‘Abdullah al-Jazzar (mufti of ‘Akka), et al. to Secretary of the League of Nations, 22 September 1938, enclosure to High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 4 November 1938, TNA CO 733/368/10. One Jewish Agency report notes that 50-60 people were taken from “each village” for forced labor (Information on Arab activity, 17 November 1938, CZA S/25-22191).


66 Subhi Yasin, al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-kubra (Cairo: Dar al-huna li-l-tab’a, 1959), 36; Darwaza, Hawla al-harakha, 201; Abu Gharbiyya, Fi khidam al-nidal, 117; Report to the League of Nations, 1938, 115. The administration claimed that only 2,463 Arabs were detained under the Defense Regulations during 1938 (Report to the League of Nations, 1938, 114). This number rose to 5,679 in 1939 (Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, appendix IV, 847).

67 Census of Palestine 1931, prepared by E. Mills (Jerusalem: Government of Palestine, 1933), vol. 1, 289–90. Census figures cited here (67,175) do not include rural laborers who were heads of households (totaling 26,495). Recent estimates suggest that up to 40 percent of Palestinian males in the occupied territories have been detained since 1967. Rashid Khalidi, “Israel: A Carceral State,” Journal of Palestine Studies 43, no. 4 (Summer 2014), 5–6.


69 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 9 September 1938, #557, TNA CO 733/366/4. Exemption from the permit system was made for the Jewish areas of Tel Aviv and its adjacent citrus plain (the Sharon): “Report on Military Control in Palestine,” 34, TNA WO 191/89.

70 Announcement of Southern military commander, 16 November 1938, in Watha’iq al-harakha, 515.

71 Al-Jazzar et al. to League of Nations, 22 September 1938; Abdallah Mukhless et al. to Colonial Secretary, 21 October 1938, enclosure to High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 23 November 1938, TNA CO 733/368/10; Letter from Safad, 19 July 1938, in Watha’iq al-harakha, 484–85; Haifa diary 1938–39, 27 February 1939, Bodleian Library, Oxford (BLO), Scrivenor papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 377.

73 Narrative dispatch #11, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 3 December 1938, 76, TNA CO 935/21.

74 Narrative dispatch #12, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 29 December 1938, 83, TNA CO 935/21; Reports from District Commissioners for November (1938), TNA CO 733/372/18.

75 Abu ‘Adnan to Abu Mansur, 17 November 1938, Sanur cache, CZA S/25-22591 (quote); Narrative dispatch #12, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 29 December 1938, 81, 90, TNA CO 935/21; Zu‘aytir, Yawmiyat, 539; District Commissioner-Southern to Chief Secretary, 4 January 1939, report for December, 2, TNA CO 733/372/18.

76 Narrative dispatch #1, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 27 February 1939, 7, 12, and Narrative dispatch #2, 24 March 1939, 18–19, TNA CO 935/22.

77 Narrative dispatch #1, High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 27 February 1939, 7, TNA CO 935/22.


80 General Bernard Montgomery (later of World War II fame) privately explained this order as a means to excuse shooting or killing persons “acting suspiciously.” Haifa diary 1937–38, June 1939 (record of prior conversation w/ Montgomery), BLO, Scrivenor papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 377.


82 Kirkbride, Crackle, 106.
In November 1947, the population of the Galilee was approximately 241,000. The vast majority were Palestinian Arabs— with the number of Arab Muslims estimated about 169,000, Arab Christians about 29,000, and Druze about 10,700—and the Jewish population about 31,790. At the end of the 1948 war, only an estimated 100,000 Palestinians, in just 70 out of 220 Arab localities, remained in the Galilee, having survived the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. In no other part of Palestine occupied by Israel in 1948 was so significant a portion of Palestinians (almost half) spared the experience of expulsion and exile.

Geography as well as communal affiliation was a significant element in determining who remained in the Galilee. Druze villages remained in place and no harm was inflicted on the members of this community. As for the Christian communities in northern Palestine, it is safe to say that Israel’s sensitivity toward the West and the various Christian denominations there produced a more benign policy toward them. (This was particularly true in Nazareth, a holy city for the Christian world.) As a result, most of those living in Christian localities in the Galilee were able to stay put in this part of the homeland—although there are exceptional cases, such as Iqrít and Kafr Bir‘im, whose inhabitants were forced to evacuate their villages and were not allowed to return home. Muslims in the Galilee suffered from the harshest policies of ethnic cleansing. Only about one-third of the pre-1948 Muslim population survived in the Galilee; the remaining two-thirds became refugees, the majority in Lebanon and Syria.
In August 1948, Constantine Zurayk (1909–2000) published his seminal book *Ma‘na al-nakba* (The Meaning of the Catastrophe).\(^4\) Arab elites in Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo read the macro picture of the catastrophe. But the Nakba held a different meaning in the eyes and minds of local leaders and inhabitants from the Galilee than it did for Zurayk and national elites. Far away from the Arab capitals, these Palestinians experienced the repercussions of the catastrophe on their kith and kin. To cope, survivors in this part of Palestine decided to cling to their homeland and face their conquerors barehanded. Knowing the limits of their power, they focused on decoding the Israeli policies at this stage of the war in the Galilee.

The challenges of resistance and survival facing the people living in rural Galilee were rarely noticed even by the urban Palestinian leadership in Jerusalem, and the resilience of many Palestinian families in the Galilee is a fascinating story still largely absent from the Nakba narrative. This essay proposes to shed light on the daily experiences of Palestinians during the later stage of the Nakba in northern Palestine. The microhistories of Majd al-Kurum and its adjacent villages during the later phase of the 1948 war and after have much to teach us about the meaning of the Nakba in the daily experiences of refugees and non-refugees in the Galilee. I rely heavily on the broader research undertaken for my recent book *Nakba and Survival* to delve into the realities of the people of Majd al-Kurum before and immediately after its surrender to the Israeli Army on 30 October 1948.\(^5\) In writing *Nakba and Survival*, I interviewed dozens of eyewitnesses from Majd al-Kurum and neighboring localities. These oral testimonies are a valuable source for understanding the people’s experiences, hopes, and fears during this critical period, as are the diaries of Abu Jamil – one of the few educated elders of Majd al-Kurum village – to which I was granted access by his family and which span a period of more than forty years, before and after the Nakba.\(^6\) And as we shall see, the predicament of the Palestinian survivors continued long after the fall of the Galilee.\(^7\)

**Microhistory versus Macro Narratives**

The Zionist project of immigration from Europe into Palestine and settling on its land is not much different from other settler-colonial ventures in the Americas, Australia, South Africa, and elsewhere.\(^8\) However, a few differences and specific aspects of Zionist settler-colonialism are crucial for understanding Israel’s history: First, the relatively late timing of the Zionist project prevented elimination of the indigenous Palestinians by massive massacres and genocide. Second, Zionists’ establishment of a national movement for the Jewish people *before* immigration to Palestine distinguishes it from other settler-colonies. Finally, the exclusivist nature of Zionism as a project only for Jews largely determined its hostile relations with the indigenous Arabs of Palestine.\(^9\)

While the location and timing of the Zionist settler-colonial project hindered the option of genocide or mass killing of the Palestinians, neither was integration an
option from the Zionist point of view. The growing resistance of the Palestinians to the British Mandate in the late 1930s raised a red flag among the colonizers of Palestine; it was during this period (in 1937) that a “transfer committee” was established with the knowledge and support of David Ben-Gurion. Addressing the question of how to rid the land of the indigenous Palestinians became an urgent task. Uprooting the Palestinians from the future Jewish state was transformed from the “present absent” question into the spoken common good of the Zionist settler colonials. Thus, the plans for transfer or ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians by Israel were set ten years before the Nakba of 1948.

Much of the historical debate on the Nakba continues to revolve around the question of whether or not Plan Dalet, drawn up in March 1948, is the key for understanding the Israeli policy of ethnic cleansing. Walid Khalidi, Ilan Pappe, and others on the Palestinian side convincingly argue that Israel had a master plan for expulsion, which was implemented during the war. On the Zionist side, Benny Morris and others deny any plans for expulsion of the Palestinians and claim that “the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem” was an outcome of the war. Sticking to the old questions and the positivist methodologies helps obscure much of the complexity and richness of what happened on the ground. Particularly absent from these macro accounts is the agency of the people of Palestine in their own history.

The Zionist narrative of 1948 war relies heavily on Israeli military archives, memoirs of the victors, and official British sources. On the Arab side, archives are absent and the Palestinians left fewer written testimonies. However, some Palestinian communities who survived in parts of the homeland cherish microhistory and are happy to share their story. Putting together oral testimonies of eyewitnesses, local diaries, the contemporary press, and other written sources enables us to give voice to those who were long silenced. The voice of marginalized survivors in the Galilee, for example, adds fresh knowledge and new insights absent from the national narratives of the urban elites.

The case study of the Nakba in the Galilee raises important questions. If the ethnic cleansing policies of Plan Dalet were implemented in this part of Palestine, how did so many escape expulsion and uprooting? Did Israel have a different policy toward Palestinians in the Galilee? If so, why? If not, what role did the inhabitants of the Galilee play in determining their lot as survivors of ethnic cleansing? Was collaboration the name of the game or were different methods of indirect and peaceful resistance to expulsion more significant? The answers to such questions could produce a new chapter about the daily experiences of Palestinians during the later stage of the Nakba in fall 1948 and beyond.

The distinct experience of Palestinians in the Galilee at the end of 1948 sheds new light on the deterministic approaches and humanizes the behavior of the survivors. The eastern Galilee, including the districts of Safad and Tiberias, was occupied in spring 1948 and very few Palestinian localities survived. The ethnic cleansing in the abovementioned areas as well as in the Bisan district was almost complete. The same is true when the seashore area from the city of ‘Akka up to the Lebanese border is
our concern. The bulk of the about one hundred thousand Palestinian survivors north of Haifa were found in the lower Galilee and mid-upper part of it. This geographical differentiation is highly important and is telling about the complexity of the Nakba experiences even in the northern part of Palestine.

Unlike Safad, Tiberias, and Bisan, the city of Nazareth survived the Nakba after its fall in July 1948 and ended up hosting thousands of refugees from neighboring villages and cities. The peaceful surrender of this holy city and the survival of most villages in its district are in many ways unique. However, Israeli policy changed dramatically three months later, during Operation Hiram. Ben-Gurion had promised his cabinet members on 26 September 1948 that “the Galilee will be empty of Arabs” after its occupation was complete. However, most of his cabinet members refused to give the prime minister a green light to renew the war against the Egyptian army in the south and to occupy the Upper Galilee in the north. Ben-Gurion’s plans were delayed until the end of October, at which point the Israeli army used terror and brutality on the frightened civilians, many of whom chose to leave their homes for a time under the onslaught. However, they returned quickly to their localities and wrote an important chapter about Palestinian survival in the homeland.

The people of the Galilee were not partners to the rivalry between the Husaynis, the king of Jordan, and the Egyptians. Far from Jerusalem and Gaza, the centers of national political activity, the Palestinians in northern Palestine were leaderless on the national stage. This vacuum was filled by tribal, communal, and other local leaderships that took initiatives to survive under Israeli control. Druze, Bedouin, and other tribal leaders (the Zu’bi clan in villages east of ‘Afula, for example) initiated mutually beneficial relationships with the victors. The communists in Nazareth and Haifa, led by Tawfiq Tubi, Emil Habibi, and Fu’ad Nassar, became survivors and collaborators with Israel of a unique kind in the fall of 1948, supporting annexation of the Galilee to Israel and initiating the integration of their National Liberation League (‘Usubat al-Taharrur al-Watani) into the Israeli Communist Party (Maki). The people of Majd al-Kurum would later turn to other survivors in the Galilee – such as the people of Nazareth, their Druze neighbors, and the communists – to learn lessons and methods of peaceful resistance. First, though, they had to survive themselves.

Surviving Operation Hiram against All Odds

After declaring the second truce on 19 July 1948, a pocket of about sixty Arab villages in the middle and upper Galilee was left outside Israel’s control. The so-called Galilee pocket stretched from the village of ‘Ilabun in the southeast to Majd al-Kurum in the west. This pocket was besieged by Israeli forces from three sides, maintaining open and direct access to Lebanon only in the north. The fall of this region to the Israeli army was only a matter of time. Unlike the Jordanian and the Egyptian armies in the south, the Lebanese and Syrian armies played no serious role in defending the Galilee against the Israeli army after July 1948. Meanwhile, the Palestinians who lived in the
“pocket” area enjoyed a state of autonomy led by elders of the villages in cooperation with officers of the Jaysh al-Inqadh.22

The village of Majd al-Kurum, located eighteen kilometers east of ‘Akka, on the main road to Safad, became an active frontline in the 1948 war from mid-July until the end of October. The Israeli forces transformed the occupied village of al-Birwa into a military base from which they launched several attacks on the western outskirts of Majd al-Kurum. The people of this village were supported by volunteers from the neighboring villages as well as soldiers from Jaysh al-Inqadh. Some volunteers were Palestinians from the Galilee and elsewhere, and others came from as far as Iraq. Cooperation between local Palestinians and Arab volunteers enabled administration of a normal life during the hundred days of the second truce period (19 July–29 October 1948).23

During the three months of the second truce, Palestinians in the Galilee experienced daily life in different ways. Nazareth was the only Arab city to survive the war under Israeli occupation and its inhabitants were managing their way back toward a kind of normal life.24 The municipality and other communal institutions collaborated with Israeli authorities in administering daily life for the local population. The news from Nazareth about a “return to normality” bred hopes of a similar future elsewhere in the Galilee. However, the realities in ‘Akka and the western Galilee were more disturbing. Arab villages along the coastal area of the western Galilee up to the Lebanese border were uprooted and their inhabitants joined the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees.25

When Israel launched Operation Hiram to conclude the occupation of the upper Galilee, the Israeli army made special effort to uproot the remaining villagers. Despite these efforts, only about half of the population left home, while the other half survived in situ. The survival of about half the Palestinian population in upper Galilee, given the brutally harsh policy that included fourteen massacres in this tiny region within a week, is remarkable.26 In no other case during the 1948 war was the desire of the commander (Ben-Gurion) to seize the land vacant of its people made more explicit than in the upper Galilee. From where, then, did the people find the strength to resist the renewed efforts toward ethnic cleansing? How did the inhabitants of this area calculate their steps? Is there a lesson to be learned from the experiences of these indigenous people who found creative methods to resist expulsion and remain in the Galilee?

The Power of Weakness

Six villages along the main road between ‘Akka and Safad control the border line between the upper and lower Galilee. Majd al-Kurum, on the western side of the Shaghur valley, dominates the hills overlooking the sea, while al-Rama on the eastern side controls a strategic intersection between lower and upper Galilee. In the middle, between al-Rama and Majd al-Kurum, four villages – Bi‘na, Dayr al-Asad, Nahf, and Sajur – constituted a strong chain of Palestinian presence. Until 1948, there were no
Zionist settlements in the area. In Operation Hiram, the Israeli army made special efforts to uproot the indigenous inhabitants of this part of the Galilee. However, all six villages stayed put and most of their inhabitants remained, withstanding massacres, intimidation, and expulsion operations. Though Ben-Gurion had promised his cabinet members the conquest of the Galilee empty of its indigenous Arab population, the experiences of the leadership of Nazareth, the Druze, and the communists encouraged the people of upper Galilee to stick to their homes and not to leave easily. At this stage of the war, they had no illusions that their leave would be temporary.

The contradicting “messages” of the Israeli army on the one hand, and the local leadership on the other, further complicated the situation. The volunteers of Jaysh al-Inqadh came to evacuate the village of Majd al-Kurum on the evening of 29 October 1948. They informed the villagers of evacuation orders to Lebanon and urged them to stay put. The Iraqi officer was very clear in spelling out his advice: If you have friends among the Jews or the Druze, contact them tonight and try to reach an agreement of surrender. Unsurprisingly, the village elders followed the advice of the Iraqi officer. Three went to the Druze village of Yarka and, through the mediation of the elders of the Ma’di family, they reached a surrender agreement with the Jewish soldiers in al-Birwa. (Members of the Ma’di family from Yarka were mentioned as mediators of similar surrender agreements in several other villages as well.)

The next morning (30 October) a few notables of the village and a few children met with Israeli soldiers several miles west of Majd al-Kurum and led them peacefully into the spring courtyard. That afternoon, a unit of Israel’s Golani Brigade approached the village from the east. When the Golani Brigade soldiers started shelling the center of the village, they encountered fire from the Israeli unit that had accepted its surrender. After realizing that it was friendly fire, the exchange quickly ended. The elders of Majd al-Kurum realized that by acting quickly they had spared their village a massacre similar to the one the Golani perpetrated in ‘Ilabun that same day. However, the events of 30 October did not serve as the final word of the Israeli army. The massacre planned for that day was delayed but not cancelled, taking place a week later.

In the massacres that took place in these villages, Israeli soldiers entered each village and ordered all men to convene in a courtyard in the village center. Then, an officer gave orders to shoot three or four young men to terrify the locals. Next, inhabitants were ordered to leave within half an hour. The soldiers watched the villagers start their march into exile before moving to the next village. The consistent pattern of the soldiers’ behavior is the best indication that they followed orders from above. The case of al-Rama, on the eastern side of the Shaghur valley, supports the theory of orders from above. The inhabitants (a mix of Christians and Druze) were convened by the soldiers, but no massacre occurred. The soldiers allowed the Druze of the village to stay in their homes because the Druze community’s leaders had reached agreements with the Israeli leadership. As for the Christians, they were ordered to depart immediately for Lebanon. The families spent two days climbing the steep mountain north of the village, in the direction of Lebanon.
and contacted community notables in Yarka. The expulsion orders were overturned and the Christians of al-Rama went back to their homes.

In Majd al-Kurum, the massacre began on 5 November 1948, the pretext for this war crime being that not all weapons had been delivered to the Israeli army according to the previous week’s agreement. The elders of the village denied the charge and witnessed helplessly the execution of five young men within a few hours. A larger massacre was averted when a security officer named Haim Urbach from Nahariya arrived. Urbach had mediated the village’s surrender agreement at the end of October, along with the Druze notables from Yarka. The exact circumstances of Urbach’s arrival are not known, though eyewitness accounts seem to indicate that he was contacted by the villagers of Majd al-Kurum.33

News of the massacre in Majd al-Kurum reached the United Nations (UN) observers who visited the village on 9 November. The Israeli army representative who accompanied the UN observers on a tour dismissed the massacre as rumors spread by the villagers. The villagers exhumed the fresh graves to let the UN observers see with their own eyes the victims’ wounds. According to locals’ testimony, the UN team took photographs of the victims’ wounds.34 This incident proves the courage that many Palestinians showed in this period, not only in remaining in their homes and villages, but in challenging the representative of the Israeli military and his untruths, even going so far as digging up their recently deceased relatives and neighbors. Even at this late stage of the war, however, and despite the intervention of the UN, no Israeli soldier was prosecuted, let alone convicted and punished, for war crimes.

In the aftermath of the massacre, dozens of young men fled to the mountains, fearing execution. However, most of the inhabitants of Majd al-Kurum decided to remain in their homes. In mid-December 1948, the Israeli authorities began to register the inhabitants in order to prevent the return of refugees to the area. According to that census, more than 1,800 people were counted and registered, receiving registration receipts, in Majd al-Kurum. On 9 and 14 January 1949, however, before the Israeli authorities had delivered identity cards to residents of the upper Galilee and on the eve of the first elections in Israel, the Israeli army expelled 535 people from the village.35

The excuse for this delayed expulsion, according to military documents, was that those expelled were refugees who had returned illegally from Lebanon. However, documents from the High Court of Justice in 1951 negated the army’s claims.36 Dozens of those expelled in January 1949 refused to accept the fate of living in refugee camps and crossed the border, often multiple times, to return to their homes. In July 1951, on the eve of the second elections in Israel, dozens of these villagers turned to the High Court and asked for its support in putting an end to the cycle of return and expulsion. They had received Israeli identity card numbers, documented by the registration receipts they had received, and therefore, they argued, they had the right to stay and even to participate in the elections. Indeed, the court heard the arguments put forward by the army and by the people of Majd al-Kurum and decided in favor of the latter. Despite having been denied identity cards, the court accepted the registration receipts as proof of being present in the village before the “unlawful expulsion.”37
My family was one of the many that benefitted from the court decision. After experiencing life in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp in South Lebanon for two and a half years, my father decided to bring his family back home. During the years of exile, he had crossed the border a number of times and spent weeks at home in Majd al-Kurum with his mother. His mother and sisters helped hide him and gathered some money for him and his brother in the refugee camp. Ultimately, he decided to bring his family back home after the court decided in favor of the returnees. The refusal of hundreds of people from Majd al-Kurum and the neighboring villages to comply with the army’s expulsion orders is a striking example of resilience and survival against all odds.

Epilogue

July 1951 was an eventful month in the history of Israel and its neighbors. On 16 July 1951, the Lebanese prime minister Riyad al-Sulh (1894–1951) was assassinated on his way back to Beirut after a short visit to Jordan. Less than a week later, on 20 July, King ‘Abdallah, the founder of modern Jordan, was assassinated in Jerusalem. The two leaders were accused of betraying the Palestinians by conducting secret negotiations to reach peace agreements with Israel. Six decades later, very few of the villagers I interviewed mentioned these two traumatic events of macro historical value. Many more recalled Israel’s second parliamentary elections on 30 July 1951, remembering it as the first time they took part in Israeli elections for the Knesset. The elections were an opportunity for some to exchange their extended family vote for identity cards that could allow their continued presence and survival in the Galilee. Collaborators with the ruling labor (Mapai) party approached elders of families and promised citizenship for infiltrators if they vote “correctly.” Thus, dozens of people without citizenship earned the identity cards so crucial to their survival in the aftermath of the 1951 and 1955 Knesset elections.

In my parents’ memory, the importance of July 1951 is related to the family’s return to Majd al-Kurum after two and a half years of exile. Few people dared to share their memories of the Nakba with their children during the 1950s, and even later. My father was different, and in 1958 he told his ten-year-old son bits and pieces of the village ordeal during and after the Nakba. My father was proud to tell the story’s “happy ending” of return from south Lebanon, and from an early age I grasped the significance of growing up at home in Majd al-Kurum and not in a refugee camp in south Lebanon. Fulfilling the right of return was a courageous decision in light of the fact that Israeli soldiers shot dead at the borders thousands of Palestinians seeking to return surreptitiously to their homes, and I remember feeling doubly lucky while hearing, time and again, the family’s story of return by sea.

My mother was also active in telling her part of the family story. She was surprised when one day my father asked her urgently to prepare to go back to Majd al-Kurum. “Can’t you see that I am pregnant and will not be able to walk dozens of miles in the mountains like you,” she told him. “I do,” he replied, “and you are not going to walk
“at all.” Indeed, a car transported my parents and their three-and-a-half-year-old child from ‘Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp to Tyre. From that city’s tiny harbor, fishermen transported the Palestinian refugee families in their boats to Shavei Zion (Returnees of Zion) north of ‘Akka. And from there, my family found its way back home and my mother gave birth to her second child (Muhammad) at home on 14 October 1951.

Adel Manna is a Palestinian historian specializing in the history of Palestine during the Ottoman rule and the history of the Palestinians after the Nakba. His latest book Nakba and Survival was published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies in 2016 and in Hebrew by the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in 2017. Its publication in English by the University of California Press and IPS is forthcoming.

Endnotes

1 In addition to Jewish and Arab inhabitants, a few thousand Circassian Muslims and Armenian Christians lived in the Galilee, mostly in Arab localities. For further information on the Galilee’s population in 1947, see Adel Manna, Nakba and Survival [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: The Jerusalem Van leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2017), 86.

2 Some of the uprooted villagers – mainly refugees from villages such as Iqrit, Kafr Bir‘im, al-Birwa, al-Damun, al-Ghabsiyia, and other depopulated localities – were allowed to stay and were designated “present absentees” according to the Israeli legal system.

3 The same is true of the tiny communities of Circassians (in the villages of Kafr Kama and al-Rihan‘yya) and Armenians.

4 Constantine Zurayq, Ma‘na al-nakba (Beirut: Dar al-‘ilm lil-malayin, 1948). The first edition of the book was published in August 1948, and second edition in October.

5 Adel Manna, Nakba wa baqa’: hikayat Filastiniyyin dhalu fi Haifa wa al-Jalil (1948–1956) [Nakba and Survival: The Story of the Palestinians Who Remained in Haifa and the Galilee, (1948–1956)] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2016). The Hebrew edition (Nakba ve-hisardut) was published the following year by the Van Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad.

6 I am very grateful to Abu Jamil’s family, who allowed me to photocopy the two volumes of diaries. Abu Jamil, or Muhammad Haydar, was born at the beginning of the twentieth century and started writing his diaries after the birth of his elder son, Jamil, in the mid-1920s.

7 Expulsion of Palestinians from the Galilee continued on a low scale through the early 1950s. At the end of October 1956, the inhabitants of two villages (Kirad al-Baqqara and Kirad al-Ghamameh) in the Huleh Valley were uprooted and expelled to Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.


9 The exclusivist nature of Zionism became clearer in the ideology of the second wave of immigration (‘aliya), which stressed the concepts of conquest of land (kivush ha’adama) and conquest of labor (kivush ha’avuda). Ben-Gurion and other prominent leaders of Israel in 1948 were members of this group.

10 A transfer committee led by Yosef Weitz and supported by Ben-Gurion started discussing methods of expelling Arabs from the future Jewish state immediately after the Peel Commission’s report in 1937. In a new biography of Ben-Gurion, Israeli historian Tom Segev confirms Ben-Gurion’s support for transfer. See Tom Segev, Medinah be-khol mehir: sipur hayav shel David Ben-Gurion [David Ben-Gurion: A State at All Costs] (Jerusalem: Keter, 2018).


14 See the early works of Nafez Nazzal (*The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee* [Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978]) and Rosemary Sayigh (*Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, a People’s History* [London: Zed, 1979]) on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The story of the Nakba survivors in Israel was largely untold by both sides of the conflict divide. Many in the Arab world until 1967 perceived these survivors as collaborators with the Jewish state.


16 In Safad district, for example, out of seventy-four Arab localities, only four small, geographically dispersed villages survived: Jish (Christian, mostly Maronite); al-Rihantiyya (Circassian); Tuba al-Zanghariyya (Bedouin); and the tiny ‘Akbara (refugees from Qaditha). Mustafa Abbasi has published several works on the fate of the Tiberias, Nazareth, and Safad villages in Arabic, Hebrew, and English.

17 A week after the horrific exodus of Lydda and Ramla on 11–12 July 1948, the Israeli army behaved differently in Nazareth. The city’s mayor, Yusuf al-Fahum, and other notables were invited to sign a surrender agreement on 16 July, which promised the people of Nazareth peace and equality. For further reading on this topic see Manna, *Nabka wa baqa’*, 74–82.

18 The newly built Israeli air force was used to bomb Arab villages. In the tragic case of Tarshiha, ten members of one family were killed or injured. But the main purpose of the aerial bombardment was to increase fear and intimidation among the civilian Palestinians.


20 For more details on the political transformation of the communists in the second half of 1948, see chapter 3, “al-Shiyu’iyyun al-‘Arab ma bayna al-nakba wa al-istiqlal” (Arab Communists between Nakba and Independence) in Adel Manna, *Nakba and Survival* [*Nabka wa baqa’*], 145–196.


22 This volunteer army, usually translated as the Arab Salvation Army or Arab Liberation Army, was led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji from Syria. See Laila Parson, *The Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence, 1914–1948* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2016).

23 Dr. Khaled Farhat (1927–2012) had vivid memories about the daily life in Majd al-Kurum during that period. He was the secretary of the local committee which administered life in the village until late October 1948. Author interview, Orlando and Jerusalem, 2008.


25 The exception to the complete ethnic cleansing in the northern seashore area was
the village of al-Mazra’a, where a high-ranking British officer lived and administered a farm.


27 A detailed account of what happened in other villages of the Shaghur valley during Operation Hiram is narrated in Manna, Nakba wa baqa’, 97–144.

28 This account is a summary of several eyewitness testimonies (Abu Jamil, Muhammad Kan’an, and Muhammad Ziho). Later, I found documents in the Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives that fully support these testimonies and anchor them in an exact timeline of events.

29 A few eyewitnesses from the Zurayq family (from ‘Ilabun) were forced to join this force after the massacre of twelve young men and the expulsion of all inhabitants of the village.

30 The soldiers made no secret of their intentions while driving their military vehicles from ‘Ilabun to al-Rama and from there to the eastern outskirts of Majd al-Kurum.

31 This was the experience of Nahf, Bi‘na, and Dayr al-Asad. The inhabitants of these villages did not go all the way to Lebanon but rather returned to their homes after staying one or two days in the mountains.

32 According to the account of Elias Srouji, an Israeli soldier told the villagers: “Our friends, the Druze, have been with us from the beginning, and everybody else is an enemy.” Elias Srouji, “The Fall of a Galilean Village during the 1948 Palestine War: An Eyewitness Account,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 71–80, quote at 75.

33 Abu Jamil and other eyewitnesses mentioned that an Israeli officer arrived in the village on 4 November and spoke to its mukhtars about the failure to collect and deliver weapons. The officer warned that he would “arrive tomorrow to collect the arms and punish those who did not follow the surrender agreement.”

34 Zvi Rabinovitch, an intelligence officer from Haifa who operated under the alias “Khawaja Ghazal,” acknowledged that he confiscated the camera from the UN team after leaving the graveyard. Author interview, 16 May 1998, Haifa.

35 The elections were on 25 January. Palestinians in Nazareth and its district as well as inhabitants of the Western Galilee villages were invited to take part in the democratic process. However, the newly occupied Palestinians in upper Galilee were not allowed to vote.

36 For details on the High Court of Justice’s deliberations in 1951, see Manna, Nakba wa baqa’, 326–33.

37 See the language used in Salem Ahmed Kiwaan v. Minister of Defense and Others, HCJ 155/53, online at versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/kiwaan-v-minister-defense (accessed 24 June 2019). Unlike the official Zionist narrative in the 1950s, the High Court judges in Jerusalem did not shy away from terms such as “occupation” and “expulsion.”

38 The Arab residents of the lower and western Galilee were allowed to participate in the first parliamentary elections on 25 January 1949, but the survivors of Operation Hiram were not.

39 For further details about such deals during the 1951 and 1955 elections see Manna, Nakba wa baqa’, 364–70, 374–78.

40 The diaries of Abu Jamil were helpful in indicating that the return of our family from south Lebanon took place in mid-July 1951.

41 Accounts of return to the Galilee by sea are largely unknown and rarely documented.
Building to Survive: The Politics of Cement in Mandate Palestine

Nimrod Ben Zeev

“These people are really committing suicide . . . why [they] deprive us and themselves of cement baffles me.”

Emile Boutagy
26 February 1941

“If the subject of this letter (the vexed question of cement) does not come within your schedule, would you pass it on, with my apologies, to the officer who deals with the affairs of this mournful commodity.”

Ivan Lloyd-Phillips
14 December 1946

“Oh cement, oh beloved
you are always on my mind”

Islam Ayoub
“The Cement Song (Longing, Oh, Beloved),” Gaza, 2014

Portland cement, a hydraulic cement first patented in England in the early nineteenth century produced by fusing limestone and aluminosilicates, has played a crucial role in Palestinian history for almost a century. From the first sacks unloaded in Jaffa in the 1890s to those clandestinely transported into the besieged Gaza Strip through tunnels from the Egyptian border area since 2007, cement has stood at the center of two of the defining experiences of Palestinian society: modernity writ-large and the encounter with Zionism. 1 Cement, and concrete for which it is a key constituent, have had far-reaching impact on infrastructure, the built environment, and the building professions globally. 2 However, cement, in presence and absence, has also intertwined in unique ways with Palestinians’ everyday lives and political horizons: Its abundance has defined the changing landscapes
of Palestinian towns and, after 1948, refugee camps; its scarcity – the product of Israeli restrictions – has caused contemporary Gaza’s constant state of disrepair; its malleability has shaped the experiences of Palestinian construction workers in Israel and the settlements; and its solidity has wrought the separation wall.3

In this article, I focus on the period of British rule (1918–48), which I argue was the formative stage of cement’s Palestinian biography.4 During this period construction was a central component in both the Zionist and the Palestinian nation-building projects. In the process, the consumption and production of cement became indexical of the ability to construct not only modern buildings but also communities. While tracing cement consumption became one method of quantifying “the movement of construction” (Arabic: harakat al-bina’; Hebrew: tnu’at ha-binyan), its production was understood as crucial to the prospect of economic independence and liberation from colonial domination.5 As part of a broader narrative that posits construction and construction work as central pillars of the structures of inequality and domination in twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, the article illuminates cement’s role in the formation of these structures and in the strategies of struggle and survival Palestinians would deploy in their shadows. The first two sections follow the failed attempts to make cement and concrete an exclusive object of Hebrew labor through specialization and expertise, which coalesced with British racial ideologies and foreshadow the central role Palestinian men would eventually come to play in constructing the Jewish state.6 The subsequent sections examine the formation of the Nesher cement company’s monopoly over cement production, abetted by British support, and the thwarted attempts of Palestinian capitalists to establish an Arab cement company during the Mandate. These developments set the stage for Nesher’s ability to maintain its monopoly, largely unabated, well beyond 1948. The struggle over cement production also presents new questions regarding the history of corporations and race in Mandate Palestine. The paper’s final section binds together these layers. The accumulation of cement’s various significances meant that in times of scarcity, such as during World War II and in its aftermath, cement emerged as an object eliciting intense emotion, intimately connected to life itself and to the possibility of survival.

\[ \text{It Has No Other Experts} \]

The significance of construction materials is never intrinsic to physical properties alone; rather, it is derived from how they have been employed historically and from the contexts that undergird their use – what architectural critic Or Alexandrovich calls a “politics of building materials.”7 Early Zionist efforts to transition from the “traditional” construction materials of Palestine, such as gravel and limestone, to “modern” materials, in particular cement and cement bricks, were an essentially political transition linked directly to the idea of Hebrew labor (’avoda ‘Ivrit).8 Focusing on the construction of the first “modern” Hebrew neighborhood, Ahuzat Bayt, just north of Jaffa in 1909, Alexandrovich describes an emerging consensus in Zionist circles whereby Palestinian
construction workers were considered more skillful, indeed “naturally inclined,” toward construction in local materials and methods. They were imagined as having known the local stone “for generation upon generation,” making them “greatly preferable” to Jewish laborers.9 Zionist contractors and entrepreneurs viewed the construction of Ahuzat Bayt as an opportunity to introduce a new set of building materials and methods to unsettle this hierarchy of expertise. The material chosen to foster this shift by the neighborhood’s contractor, Akivah Aryeh Weiss, and his business partner, David Arber, was the concrete brick (also referred to as a “cement brick”), to be made of imported Portland cement in Arber’s new factory.10 Their goal was to ensure that Jewish hands would construct Jewish houses.11

Weiss’s and Arber’s foray into replacing local stones and local workers was unsuccessful. In Alexandrowich’s telling, it was only after World War I, with the mass production of silicate (sand lime) bricks starting in 1922, that a serious contender to stone and masonry emerged.12 However, the underlying logic of Weiss’s initiative – the suggested affinities among specific kinds of labor, materials, and race – continued to resonate strongly in Zionist circles. As the use of cement and concrete proliferated, the materials themselves were incorporated into competing visions of the land’s future. Like Hebrew labor and “building the land” (binyan ha-aretz), cement and concrete held a unique place in idealized visions of building. This is captured in Nathan Alterman’s “Morning Song” (1932), for example, where dressing the land “in a gown of concrete and cement” becomes central to performing the love of the land.13

In this climate, the idea that Jewish laborers were more adept at work in modern materials, particularly concrete and cement, took on additional weight. British racialized conceptions of the different capacities of Jews and Palestinian Arabs further bolstered this line of thought. In 1929, the British high commissioner John Chancellor weighed in on the increasingly contested matter of the unequal division of labor in Palestine, arguing that “the rivalry between the Jews and Arabs [in the matter of the division of labor and wage inequality],” was “mitigated by the fact that the two races tend to become naturally segregated in different kinds of labor.”14 Juxtaposing the “superior physique” of Arabs to the “greater intelligence” of Jews, he used concrete work, among other things, as a case in point for this contradiction-riddled racial ideology, stating that

By reason of their greater intelligence and manual skill the Jews are economically superior to the Arabs in some of the more modern forms of skilled and semi-skilled work, such as reinforced concrete, care of machinery and electrical work. [emphasis mine]

Champions of Hebrew labor seized upon these distinctions, effectively mirroring earlier frustrations with the inadequacy and disadvantages of Jewish hands working in local Palestinian stone. In place of the Palestinians’ “natural” or “traditional” affinity, Jewish labor offered expertise and specialization. The right-wing newspaper Do’ar ha-Yom reported with unconcealed glee that, following the devastation of the 1927 earthquake, Arab employers increasingly saw Hebrew construction, particularly in concrete, as
more durable. As a result, the paper stated, Arab contractors in the Jerusalem area increasingly employed Jewish laborers. Prior to the earthquake “a small number of [Jewish] professionals in concrete work had worked . . . for Arab employers.” Now, it was in concrete work in particular, “which among the Arabs has no specialists,” that Arab contractors in and around Jerusalem sought to employ Jews. Opportunities to celebrate Jewish dominance of concrete work were found even when bemoaning the hardships of the Hebrew labor struggle. In March 1929, the left-leaning Davar, identified with mainstream Labor Zionism, complained that due to Arab laborers’ low salaries, Jewish workers were entirely blocked from the Jerusalem Electric Company’s works. The article took some solace however in “a small concrete work [as part of the electric company’s projects] that employs several Jews, since it has no other experts.”

Jewish mastery of cement was frequently juxtaposed with Arab failures to do so. In 1931, Davar complained that the Jerusalem municipality hired an Arab contractor to build the city’s new refuse incinerator and slaughterhouse. The contractor was “of course employing only Arab laborers in all simple labors.” However, Davar remarked, his attempt to boycott Hebrew labor “in the professional work as well” proved unsuccessful: the quality of the incinerator’s walls, “cast” – indicating they were made of concrete – initially by Arab laborers, was so poor, that Jewish laborers were hired to rebuild them. A striking example of this trope is found in a book dedicated by the Construction Workers Union to one of the Jewish construction industry’s pioneers, Chaim Flexer, celebrating his seventieth birthday. In an undated speech before the Construction Workers Association in Jerusalem, Flexer reminisces of his days working in the city, first in stone masonry, then in concrete: “As I passed the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood, I was reminded of the Mufti – Hajj Amin al-Husayni – who invited Jewish laborers in 1934 to fix the concrete ceiling that had collapsed in his office, immediately after it was cast by Arab laborers.” The crux of Flexer’s recollection, apocryphal though it may be, is clear: that a nationalist figure of al-Husayni’s standing invited Jewish laborers to fix the shoddy workmanship of his compatriots is ultimate testimony to what the discourse of Jewish expertise rendered an almost “natural” Jewish superiority in cement and concrete work. Flexer’s memory may have already been tinged by the widespread association in Jewish Israeli culture between “Arab labor” and poor work, but it might also point us toward its origins. This neat narrative of exclusive Jewish expertise in cement and concrete and the corresponding depiction of Palestinian construction as always falling apart, fell apart readily itself. Throughout the Mandate period, Palestinian contractors and laborers carried out projects, large and small, that made extensive use of concrete and cement.

The idea that Portland cement and its products could restructure the building trade was not unique to Palestine: from the early nineteenth century, part of what made these materials appealing to capitalist and socialist visionaries alike was their potential to do just that. In both Europe and the United States, construction in concrete was supposed to facilitate a redistribution of skill within the building trades. However, rather than fostering a new class of expert laborers, it was perceived as circumventing established building crafts, permitting cheaper, “unskilled” labor to engage in the manual work of
construction, while emphasizing the skills of engineers and other technical experts. From the perspective of labor, Hebrew or otherwise, the introduction of cement and concrete as materials of expertise was fraught to begin with. Working in a “deskilling” material, most Jewish construction workers seem to have had very little actual advantage over their Palestinian peers. At the same time, despite the capacity of Palestinian contractors and workers to incorporate the new materials into their repertoire, the introduction of cement and concrete on a large scale had considerable adverse impact on Palestine’s established building crafts. As early as 1930, the Hope-Simpson report noted that Palestinian stonemasons and stone dressers were severely hurt by the expanding use of “cement, reinforced concrete and silicate brick, all manufactured by Jews.”

Cement transformed construction work in Palestine, but not in the ways the Hebrew press or Zionist entrepreneurs imagined. Its wide-scale introduction succeeded in weakening the standing of Palestinian craftbuilders. That in itself could not guarantee Zionist dominance in construction. Labor, however, was not the only area in which the ability to construct in Palestine was contested. Attention to Zionist preoccupations with material acts of building as part of a nation-building project, studied from perspectives as diverse as literature, political philosophy, and architecture, may have occluded the importance Palestinian anticolonial projects conferred upon construction, evident already during the Mandate. In the press, in their interactions with the British, and in business correspondence, Palestinians articulated visions of national futures bound together by cement. These visions came up against a considerably more substantial obstacle than Zionist claims for labor specialization, however, shaped in no small part by British policy: the Jewish monopoly over cement production.

Cementing Monopoly

The Nesher Portland Cement Company, founded in 1923 by the Russian-born industrialist and entrepreneur Michael Pollak, maintained throughout the Mandate and beyond a monopoly over cement production. The Nesher factory’s establishment was the realization of plans laid by a group named the Palestine Portland Cement Syndicate. By the time Michael Pollak became involved, the syndicate, led by several prominent British Jews, had already selected land near the town of Yajur, southeast of Haifa, for the factory and its quarries. Once conditions of the land’s purchase were agreed upon, Pollak registered the new “Portland Cement Company ‘Nesher,’ Ltd.” in London, so a viable legal entity could make the purchase. London remained the center of Nesher’s financial operations until Pollak sold his stake in the company and its London holdings were liquidated in 1945.

Nesher’s increasing profits and the company’s strengthening hold over Palestine’s cement market, beginning in the late 1920s, coincided with a steady increase in the use of cement in the land. In 1922 and 1923, cement imports into Palestine – approximating consumption in the absence of local manufacture – totaled roughly thirty thousand tons annually. By 1929, consumption was estimated at nearly sixty-two thousand tons.
Although British ideologies of racial and civilizational hierarchy contributed to the Mandate administration’s more favorable view of Jewish industrial endeavors than Arab ones, Nesher’s ability to maintain its status as a monopoly seems also to have been rooted in its management’s ability to navigate British local and imperial interests and discourses.\(^{27}\) Pollak’s efforts in the summer of 1925, immediately before beginning production, to institute duty-free admission for raw materials for exporting industries were instrumental to the company’s success. Here, the reasoning Pollak provided was entirely local: without concessions, the company risked collapse, resulting in loss of jobs.\(^{28}\) However, earlier that year, Pollak had attempted to convince the British to raise the tariff on imported cement to protect Nesher’s product using a more “imperial” argument. Unlike imported European cement, Pollak contended, Nesher’s production would rely solely on British coal, thus contributing to the Metropole. When authorities formed a committee to discuss the tariff on cement in May 1926, Pollak again justified protection not only because the firm employed “250 Jewish workers and 100 Arab workers,” but also because it provided a living for “about 200 English workers in coal mining and transport. [And] England is now in dire need of exporting coal.”\(^{29}\)

The decision to employ Palestinians in the company’s quarry, despite the protests of the advocates of Hebrew labor, was in line both with economic considerations, given the wage discrimination between Arabs and Jews, and with the ongoing prevalence of ideas regarding the suitability of certain bodies for certain forms of labor and materials. Yet Pollak’s outward reasoning also brought together political expediency and economy, demonstrating attention to British and regional sensitivities and to the struggle over cement’s identity. The employment of Arabs, he argued, was intended to prevent accusations by consumers in Palestine and beyond that Nesher’s cement was “Jewish.” Furthermore, a company registered in England should rightly employ both peoples.\(^{30}\) Whether or not Pollack’s reasoning was genuine, Norris notes that for the British, the makeup of Nesher’s workforce was a decisive factor in directing the Haifa harbor’s construction to utilize Nesher’s cement.\(^{31}\)

**Cement: To End Colonial Domination**

Despite the profound differences between a settler movement and an indigenous one, the objective of “building the land” in a material sense and as part of a national project – for so long perceived as a uniquely Zionist project and concern – was also shared by Palestinians. Palestinian capitalists, builders, and others took note of cement’s growing popularity. By the late 1920s, they began to see the material not only as an economic opportunity, but potentially an important factor in economic and national emancipation. Discussions about Palestinian access to cement, the prospects of “Arab cement,” and Nesher’s stranglehold over the local market emerged alongside increased attention to the act of building itself. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestinian press frequently covered the “movement of construction” (harakat al-bina’) in various Palestinian cities, reported on the changing costs of construction
materials and labor, featured articles about construction methods and the economics of construction, and closely followed governmental building schemes, the availability of housing, and the granting of building permits.\textsuperscript{32}

The records and correspondence of Palestine’s Chambers of Commerce and the contemporary Arabic press prove key sources for unearthing Palestinian visions of national futures. These sources further reveal the centrality of construction, and in particular of cement – a material which became identified with modernity and national liberation – to these visions. The chambers, as an increasingly important hub for the activities of Palestine’s “men of capital,”\textsuperscript{33} were often closely involved in initiatives to introduce “Arab cement” into the Palestinian market, either through regional cooperation or through local manufacture. The press, meanwhile, served as a platform for highlighting cement’s centrality, benefits, and emancipatory potential. Newspapers also placed Nesher at the center of their critiques of British protection of Jewish industry and sought to encourage alternatives. Opposition to the government’s preferential treatment of Nesher seems to have emerged forcefully toward the end of 1929. Nesher’s success after initial difficulties, the sharpening contours of conflict in the wake of the violent clashes of summer 1929, and the British decision (succumbing to Nesher’s pressures) to raise the tariff on imported cement to 850 mils per ton all likely played a role in the timing. Furthermore, the establishment of the Syrian National Cement Manufacturing Company in Damascus in early 1930 meant that there was now a self-styled Arab national alternative to Nesher, and the Syrian company’s founders specifically courted Palestinian investors through the press.\textsuperscript{34}

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on cement and concrete as decidedly “scientific” materials at the time, one of the earliest written responses to this call for Palestinian investors was a two-part article describing the benefits of cement “from the chemical perspective.”\textsuperscript{35} Its author, Majdi al-Shawa, a Gazan doctor of chemistry, specifically stated his objective was not to comment on whether Palestinians should invest in the Damascene firm, since “all were convinced of the necessity of cooperating in and assisting the national economy.” Rather, he provided readers with a history of cement’s evolution, Portland cement’s invention, the differences between natural and industrial cements, and between non-hydraulic and hydraulic cements. The article’s second installment discussed the benefits of cement in the face of structural threats, focusing on earthquakes and drawing on examples from concrete construction in Japan – no doubt a pertinent focus given the disastrous impact of the 1927 earthquake still fresh in the local memory. Despite his initial claim not to opine on investing in the Syrian factory, Shawa concluded this second part by clarifying that initiatives like the Arab cement factory were crucial for the Arab lands’ economic independence, and that its founders sought no less than to end colonial domination.

Shawa’s writing stands out among other contemporary discussions of cement in its materials science approach. However, the tone of much of the discourse, particularly among those Palestinians calling for tariff reform and the end of preference for Jewish industry, was often framed as scientific in a different fashion: it was anchored in economic calculations. In December 1929, Mir’at al-Sharq estimated that the tariff
on imported cement cost Palestine’s government fifty-two thousand pounds a year, accounting for the customs lost on imports, the losses of shipping, and of porterage income at the ports. In February 1930, the prominent Palestinian accountant Fu’ad Saba sent the acting chief secretary of the Mandate administration an evaluation of the government’s cement tariff policy in light of Nesher’s 1927 and 1928 financial reports. Saba concluded that given Nesher’s already “very fair return” in 1928 there was no justification for the 1929 tariff increase. Saba’s evaluation, of which his firm kept a copy in a folder titled “Government Neglect of Arab Industry” (ihmal al-hukuma lil-sina’al-‘Arabiyya), included calculations that demonstrated that Nesher’s “heavy protection” was not economically viable, but rather part of a pattern of neglect and preference, according to Arab and Jewish industries respectively.

The press continued to follow the progress of the Damascus factory, and to critique the tariff policy on cement throughout 1930–31. In one article, a “prominent” Haifa merchant told Filastin that the degree of Nesher’s “tyranny” could be revealed by posing different questions: instead of asking why European cement is so expensive in Palestine, the merchant suggested, one should ask how Nesher could sell its own cement in Syria at a lower price than in Palestine, despite additional transportation costs. The tariffs, in the merchant’s view, encouraged precisely this sort of behavior, since they meant that Palestinian consumers had little alternative to Nesher. To combat this, he continued, the Arab Executive and the other national bodies should demand the government force Nesher to sell its produce in Palestine at the same prices as in Syria. Failing this, the alternative was simple – the same national bodies should call for the establishment of a national cement corporation. Supporters and investors were sure to approach immediately, since cement “was a necessary material, and the profit in it was without doubt.” He added, “Palestine’s people have had their fill of meetings and statements, it is time for action.”

Perhaps here the idea of a Palestinian Arab national cement factory was born. By early 1935, reports appeared of Arab and Jewish initiatives to compete with Nesher. The coincidence of initiatives by “a group of people from Bayt Jala who had recently returned from America” to establish a cement factory in the Nablus area, and a Jewish entrepreneur who established a company named the Shimshon Cement Company in the ‘Artuf area west of Jerusalem, indicates that it was likely the economic boom of 1934–35 was motivating both. The Bayt Jala initiative seems to have dissipated quickly. Shimshon would remain in a perpetual state of commencing operations “shortly” for two decades.

For Palestinian consumers, the 1936 general strike seems to have made appeals to products’ “Arabness” particularly attractive and concerns that products were secretly benefitting Jewish investors more grave. Two articles from al-Difa’ and an advertisement for Syrian cement, all published in January 1937, demonstrate this. The first al-Difa’ article discusses the rising enthusiasm of Arab consumers for Arab goods and its impact on Nesher, whose sales were increasingly threatened by the Syrian National Cement factory in Damascus and the Chekka factory near Tripoli. In the second article, the same Chekka factory responded to rumors that the company
was owned by Jewish investors by affirming that Chekka was a pure (*sarīfa*) Arab company, its cement made by Arab hands (*maṣnu‘a bi-ayādi ‘Arabīyya*), and that among its five hundred workers and its shareholders “there is not a single Jew.” In an advertisement in *Filastin*, Chekka’s Damascene competitor used similar language, stating that the company’s cement was made “entirely by Arab hands” and of “good Arab soil,” and that all company shares were owned by Arabs. Ownership of capital, the laboring bodies involved in production, and the soil from which the cement was made all played a role in defining it as properly Arab.43

Also in early 1937, the first Palestinian Arab initiative to gain considerable momentum toward establishing a cement factory took shape. This plan likely sought to capture some of the revolt’s energy, but it was the revolt that would ultimately undo it.44 A group of prominent Palestinian capitalists, including Ahmad Hilmi Pasha of the Arab Bank and later the Arab National Bank, Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi, Fakhri al-Nashashibi, Elias Gelat, and George Khader led the initiative. Having struck a partnership with the German MIAG firm, the new company began conducting scientific surveys of suitable sites in the Nablus, Jerusalem, and Haifa areas, eventually settling on a site near ‘Artuf – where the Shimshon company had also planned its location. However, the arrest and exile of Ahmad Hilmi and others during the revolt put an end to the project, and all its documentation was lost when Fakhri al-Nashashibi was murdered in Iraq in 1941.45

**The Binds of War**

The severe economic downturn in the latter part of the revolt seems to have stymied Palestinian initiatives, while the Histadrut took advantage of these circumstances to gain a foothold in Nesher’s quarry. The quarry’s Arab workers were pushed out completely in 1938 by David Hacohen of Solel Boneh, the Histadrut’s contracting firm, who two years prior had replaced Musbah Shaqifi – the contractor who operated the quarry since its establishment.46 If British enthusiasm toward Nesher’s product was, initially at least, due in part to its employment of both Jews and Arabs, the revolt and the eruption of World War II changed British calculations dramatically. As safe shipping routes became fewer and other regions in the empire consumed their local cement production entirely, the British became dependent on Nesher.

During World War II, Palestine was transformed into Britain’s second-largest military base in the Middle East, generating unprecedented demand for materials, produce, and goods.47 Palestine’s manufacturing industry grew rapidly, mainly to satisfy British military demands, and unemployment was considerably reduced.48 At the same time, severe inflation dramatically curtailed the purchasing power of Palestine’s inhabitants. To combat this and to assure sufficient supplies for the military stationed in Palestine and beyond, authorities installed an austerity regime, with price control and rationing measures on manufactured goods and produce. This regime failed to prevent scarcity, however, in goods from foodstuffs to building materials, and cement in particular.49
The war also spurred unprecedented government construction, and Nesher became the exclusive source of cement for British military needs in Palestine. Between 1942 and 1943, it sold 80 percent of its cement to British forces, and throughout the war the government was required to approve all civilian purchases. Dependency spawned intense government cooperation and coordination with Nesher. This included instituting monthly coordination visits at the factory, setting production quotas, intervening on Nesher’s behalf with suppliers of oil and coal in order to meet quotas, and having Nesher’s representatives advise the general headquarters in Egypt. The war proved immensely profitable for Nesher, even though cement was throughout a controlled material, its price fixed and its civilian use prohibited, generating a severe housing shortage.

Many Palestinians felt that Nesher, like other large Jewish-owned firms, was profiteering, granting preference to Jewish needs, and neglecting and exploiting Palestine’s Arab population. Furthermore, the war had cut off Palestinians from neighboring countries, circumscribing the regional visions that animated earlier calls to turn to Syrian cement instead. Limited by British wartime control policies, the Arab Chambers of Commerce requested that the government either allocate some of Nesher’s product for civilian needs, drastically reduce the tariff, or allow import from neighboring countries once again.

As the war in Europe drew to a close, Nesher’s workers embarked on a lengthy strike, protesting the prices they paid while the company profited. In November 1945, after several months of negotiations and deliberations, Pollak sold the company to the shared ownership of Solel Boneh, and a coalition of industrialists and contractors organized as the Central Palestine Company for Trade and Investment. The 50–50 split between the trade union’s contracting firm and private capitalists was framed as an ideological decision. For Palestinians, it meant that what little claim Nesher ever had to having been a disinterested party was now completely gone. Under the joint ownership of Zionist workers and contractors, the newspaper al-Sha'b stated, the company had become entirely subservient to the conquest of labor and colonization.

The war’s end brought little economic respite. The housing shortage, which resulted in immense crowding and even plague, continued. The shortage itself, according to British sources, lasted until December 1947, when Nesher’s production finally began catching up with post-war reconstruction. Throughout, and despite countless appeals, the government maintained the 850 mills tariff on imports. The urgent need for construction, Nesher’s inability to produce sufficient cement to satisfy demand, and the continued sense that the company and its agents were actively granting preference to Jewish needs, led to what became known in the Arabic press as the “cement crisis” (azmat al-asmant).
“It Is Impossible for a Company to Possess Race”

Out of this crisis emerged the Arab Cement Works (ACW). According to a memorandum by the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, the cement works grew out of two competing initiatives (figure 1). The first was centered in Nablus and led by ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi, who had also been involved in the 1937 initiative. The other was headed by ‘Abd al-Hamid Shoman of the Arab Bank. Realizing that “the Nablus scheme” was progressing rapidly, Shoman threw his support (but not his finances, the memorandum states) behind Tamimi’s initiative, and the ACW was incorporated in Palestine on 22 June 1945.62 Even before official incorporation, Filastin had written of “peak enthusiasm” (hamasa’ yablugh al-dhurwa) among investors for the initiative, which received the support of both of Palestine’s Arab banks, and al-Difa’6 had reported that the project was garnering interest in Transjordan as well.63

During the first year of its operation, the company appointed a board and auditors, reached an agreement with a machinery manufacturer to supply all necessary equipment, and selected land for purchase. In purchasing machinery, the ACW initially pursued a
strategy not dissimilar to Michael Pollak’s in Nesher’s early days. It began negotiations with the British Danish FL Smidth company, due to ACW’s “initial desire to give priority to British Manufacturers.” Smidth’s supply schedule proved slow, however, prohibiting even partial fulfilment in the 26-month period ACW had set for beginning production. In a letter to the Controller of Heavy Industries (CHI), the company explained that despite their preference for British machinery, they were forced to sign an agreement with the U.S. Kennedy company. Given Palestine’s urgent need for cement, the speedy launch of operations was a priority. At this stage, all that stood in the ACW’s way appeared to be an import license for the machinery and the release of U.S. currency to fund the purchase. The company applied to the CHI for both on 31 October 1946, and began searching for a director and an office near al-Ramla. By late spring 1947, those who followed the ACW’s progress in the press had reason to be optimistic. On 28 May, Filastin reported that “after mighty efforts” the company had secured an import license for the machinery and the U.S. currency to pay for it. With this news, the value of the company’s shares rose. Sixteen years since a Palestinian national cement factory was first suggested, and after a series of unrealized initiatives over the previous decade, this “great national economic project” seemed to finally be getting off the ground.

Behind the scenes, however, it was the ground that was the problem. In December 1946, the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce reported that the ACW had purchased plots of land between ‘Innaba and Jimzu in al-Ramla district, after “experts from the Hilwan Cement Works of Egypt” examined the soil and recommended its suitability. A January 1947 letter from ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi to the High Commissioner reveals that the purchase of the lands was done “in trust” by “some members of the Board of Directors as a temporary measure.” Tamimi explained that the administrator general had responded positively to the ACW’s request to purchase the lands in its name according to the Companies Ordinances of 1929/39. Difficulties arose when the ACW applied to register them with the Registrar of Lands. Ya‘qub ‘Atalla of the Registrar of Lands had confirmed that the company was eligible to purchase the lands in accordance with the Companies Ordinances. Under the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940, however, “the transfer of any land from a Palestinian Arab to a non-Palestinian person in Area A is forbidden.” Since race was one of the “assumed qualifications” (al-quyud al-mafruda) of the regulations, it was these, not the Companies Ordinances, that prohibited the ACW from registering the lands. Regardless of the owners of the company, ‘Atalla explained, “It is impossible for a company to possess race” (la yumkin li-sharika an taktasib al-jinsiyya).

The registrar’s reasoning, upheld by the high commissioner on two separate occasions, raises multiple issues. First, it seems to run counter to the purpose of the 1940 Land Transfer Regulations. The British had presented these regulations, put into place following the publication of the 1939 White Paper in the context of the 1936–39 revolt, as a measure to protect the Palestinian population from the increasing threat of landlessness. That is, restrictions on the transfer of lands from Palestinian Arabs to “anyone other than a Palestinian Arab” – understood to mean Zionist settlers, first and foremost – was intended to ensure that “the rights and position’ of the Arab population
be duly preserved.” In certain areas (referred to as “Zone A” in the regulations, and including the area between ‘Inabba and Jimzu where the ACW had conducted surveys and where its board members had purchased lands in trust), Palestinians’ rights were accounted the strictest protections and the transfer of land therein would be prohibited “save in exceptional cases.”

The registrar had correctly anticipated that the ACW would claim that the fact that it was “100 percent Arab in Capital and in Membership,” should suffice to exclude the company from being considered “non-Arab.” When the ACW appealed, the office of the acting secretary general suggested that the company apply for consideration again through the district commissioner. Although the company’s second application is missing from the file found at the Israel State Archives, the July 1947 response from the office of the general secretary states once again that a company is “not a ‘Palestinian Arab’” within the definitions of the Land Transfer Regulations. The High Commissioner, it adds, rejected the application since he “has no power to grant permission for the transfer.”

The Mandate administration’s reasoning – that “it is impossible for a company to possess race” – further raises questions about the scope of corporate personhood and the applicability of race as a category in the Palestinian context. If the legal notion that corporations are persons, widely accepted in British law by the second decade of the twentieth century and enshrined in the 1922 Palestine Order in Council, still makes us somewhat uneasy, then the very question of whether a corporation can possess “race” can seem altogether dumbfounding. In the United States, race has been intricately linked to the legal history of corporate personhood. These links began with Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) and extend through the long history of corporations basing claims to legal rights on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution – introduced during Reconstruction, partially as a corrective to the Dred Scott decision, to ensure the citizenship rights of freed black American slaves. In the British Empire, however, such links appear to have been less pivotal, or at the very least have been less well documented and researched.

In Palestine, links between race and corporate personhood seem to have first arisen directly in relation to the Land Transfer Regulations. The regulations mention companies only in their capacity as potential mortgage holders. However, Amendment 16D to the Palestine Order in Council, put forward on 25 May 1939 to facilitate the Land Transfer Regulations, introduced the category of “bodies of persons corporate or unincorporated” as separate from the categories of Arab and Jew. This in itself hardly suffices to interpret race as the operative category here. Shira Robinson has rightfully noted the “slippery boundaries” that existed between race, culture, nation, and people in international law, within the Mandate system, and in British Mandate Palestine specifically.

Yet the Land Transfer Regulations seem to have inspired British officials to employ systematic racial thinking. In May 1940, roughly three months after the publication of the Land Transfer Regulations, the British chief secretary issued directions for the submission of land transfer applications, noting that for each “transferee and transferor
[in each application] should be included race, nationality and where habitually residing.” The inclusion of race as a category quickly spurred questions and doubts as to how British officials should classify different Palestinians racially. Within months, the director of land registration for Jerusalem and the district commissioners of Jerusalem and Haifa raised questions of whether Palestinian Druze and Palestinian Armenians should be considered Palestinian Arabs under the regulations. The chief secretary opined that “Druzes are Arabs who profess the Durzi creed. [Therefore] I think that a Palestinian Durzi is a Palestinian Arab in the sense of the . . . Land Transfer Regulations.” Regarding a potential Armenian transferee, the chief secretary decidedly stated that, “[h]e may be regarded as ordinarily resident in Palestine; but he is not an Arab. Ethnologically he belongs to the Aryan race.” The regulations seemed to have awoken the inner race-scientist in some.

By the time the problem of determining the race of corporations arose several years later, the idea that the terms Arab and Jew in the regulations were first and foremost racial categories was firmly ingrained. In a March 1945 letter seeking legal advice regarding the regulations’ application to companies, the director of land registration expressed his understanding that “the fundamental principles of the Regulations are based on race and residence and whilst a company may enjoy the latter, the former does not reside in it.” Several months later, the acting chief secretary affirmed the legal opinion of the attorney general, without mentioning race specifically. Rather, he returned to the distinctions made in Amendment 16D to the Palestine Order in Council between Arabs, Jews, and “bodies of people corporate or unincorporate [sic].” The attorney general explained that

having regard to the express reference in Article 16D to bodies corporate, it seems to me that the words “Arab” and “Jew” therein, do not include corporations. “Person” is nowhere mentioned in the article (except as “bodies of persons”) and accordingly one cannot introduce the definition of the word person, in conjunction with the word “Arab.”

This legal opinion shaped the application of the regulations for the remainder of the Mandate.

British approaches to the Land Transfer Regulations’ application to companies were not limited to legalistic argumentation regarding corporate personhood or ideas about race. There were those among the British authorities who argued that companies be excluded from the regulations to better fulfill the “spirit of the White Paper” – that is, to safeguard the fallahin in danger of becoming landless against potential Zionist attempts to subvert the regulations. In November 1945, the Land Transfer Inquiry Committee, appointed earlier that year to investigate alleged contraventions of the regulations and make recommendations regarding their implementation, issued its final report. Among other issues, the report addressed proposals to exclude Arab companies from the ruling that no company is a Palestinian Arab. The committee argued against such an exclusion, “since a nominal Arab company might in reality be controlled, either in
the present or in the future, by Jews.”⁷⁹ In the same breath it recognized that, “under the present ruling the development of legitimate Arab companies is frustrated by inability to acquire necessary land.” Accordingly, they recommended the exclusion be temporary, to be removed following “the provision of adequate safeguards.” The fate of the Arab Cement Works demonstrates that no such safeguards were ever put in place.

An article which appeared in Filastin on 28 March 1948, when war was already raging in the land, described the ACW’s annual company meeting held in Nablus the morning prior. The company, at least as a business entity, seemed to have survived the registrar’s decision. However, the article made no mention of machinery en route from America, nor of the progress of the company’s plant construction. The registrar’s decision was likely a death blow, the last in a series of events which over fifteen years stymied any Palestinian attempts to challenge Nesher’s monopoly. Whether the logic behind the registrar’s decision was that of limiting corporate personhood, as Ya’qub ‘Atalla’s original letter implied, or of upholding the spirit of the White Paper, against the specter of “nominally Arab companies” potentially “controlled by Jews,” the results were the same. The very measures designed to protect Palestinian land rights were turned against a venture that, for nearly two decades, many Palestinians saw as crucial to their ability to build their futures.⁸⁰

A Mournful Commodity

In late February 1941, Palestinian capitalist Emile Boutagy wrote heartfelt letters to five of the most powerful British officials in Palestine. All five letters dealt with the abrupt cancellation of an import license for one thousand tons of cement from Syria, obtained by two businessmen, Malas and Budayr. More striking than the details of the transaction’s cancellation, whose reversal Boutagy sought, is the language Boutagy used to write about cement. The letters offer variations on the same theme: because Nesher’s produce was entirely consumed by the war effort and importing cement from overseas was impossible, cement had become, in Boutagy’s words, “a matter of life and death,” which “would be a God send for those hungering for [it].” It was, after all, a material which “no country in the world

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Figure 2. Letter of Emile Boutagy to George As’ad Khader, 28 February 1942, Israel State Archives.
can exist without.” Boutagy’s writing was often flowery and dramatic, even when arguing for the necessity of gramophone records to lift up British troops’ morale during the war, or of original Kiwi shoe polish as opposed to “monstrous imitations.” None of Boutagy’s writing elsewhere, however, matches the existential tone of his writing about the cement shortage. In a more informal letter to George As‘ad Khader, secretary of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem (figure 2), Boutagy wrote of the British decision to cancel the import license: “These people are really committing suicide.”

Boutagy was not alone in equating the ability to build – and specifically to build in cement – and the preservation of life itself. The discourse of the “cement crisis” after World War II also was rife with portrayals of cement as a provider of jobs and shelter, as a commodity linked to “the welfare of the country,” the supply of which was part of “safeguarding the rights of the public.” An “incessant flow of appeals and grievances” led the Haifa Chamber of Commerce, for example, to write to the British chief secretary of the crisis having “detrimental bearing on the vital nourishment of building projects.” Cement, more than any other material, became synonymous with the capacity and necessity to build in order to survive.

Although the press and the chambers of commerce may be seen as stirring up emotions for the benefit of commercial interests, there is some evidence that the link between building materials and the capacity to build held similar emotional significance for others as well. In 1942, for example, Sitt Amina al-Khalidi, left an endowment (waqf) for the establishment of a new hospital in Jerusalem’s Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood. That summer, the executors of Khalidi’s will appealed to the British to approve the hospital’s location and release the necessary building materials for its construction. Progress on the location seemed to be made quickly, but Khalidi’s trustees apparently sensed that the issue of building materials might require additional pressure. Thus, in mid-November, a coordinated series of petitions with over three hundred signatories were sent from multiple locations in Palestine to the high commissioner, to pressure the government to release the materials necessary for construction. While some of the petitions requested the British to facilitate the construction of the hospital more broadly, others explicitly referred to the release of building materials. Many of the telegrams used distinctly emotional, even heartrending appeals. They described the facilitation of the hospital’s construction – that is, the release of building materials – “as a measure of reducing the tortures of which humanity is suffering,” “a contribution toward the alleviation of the sufferings of the poor,” and “a measure of service to humanity.”

The capacity to construct, reduced to access to building materials, meant the world. The multiple facets of cement’s history endowed the seemingly drab material with emotional resonance. Within the discourse of Hebrew building expertise in cement and concrete, Palestinian structures made of these materials were always ready to collapse, their disintegration inevitable and imminent. The ideal materials for building the Jewish homeland anew were imagined as somehow beyond the grasp of Palestinians. Of course, from the point of view of skill, of capacity, of initiative, they never were. Yet, the Yishuv garnered advantages elsewhere. The political and economic order that developed during the Mandate, solidifying Nesher as a monopoly, seemed to withstand
any challenge thrown its way. Time and again, British interests appeared to coalesce with those of the company. What Palestinians lacked during the Mandate then was neither expertise nor skill; rather, empire and its legal structures, not labor, ended up structuring the political economy of cement.

At the same time, these very materials became intertwined not only with visions of the national future cultivated by economic and cultural elites, but more importantly, with tangible, concrete needs. The prolonged “cement crisis” transformed cement’s absence into something that was felt by countless Palestinians every day. As the notion of crisis circulated, cement, more than any other building material, became an object of desire and longing – the key to the capacity to build and to live. It was, as Ivan Lloyd-Phillips from the Gaza district commissioner’s office described it, “a mournful commodity.”

These configurations did not suddenly cease to exist with the catastrophe of 1948. Dreams and nightmares of cement and concrete continued to haunt Palestinians well beyond the Nakba, taking different yet eerily familiar forms. Seemingly defying their own physical properties, cement and concrete traveled alongside those who were forced to leave and sat heavy on those who remained, somehow always maintaining a fleeting sense of promise, echoed in 2014, with a bitter smile, by Gazan artist Islam Ayoub: “Oh, cement, oh, beloved/you are always on my mind.”

Nimrod Ben Zeev is a PhD candidate in the department of history at the University of Pennsylvania. Research for this article was conducted with the support of the Social Sciences Research Council’s International Dissertation Research Fellowship. A version of this article was first presented at the New Directions in Palestinian Studies Workshop at Brown University, in March 2018. He would like to thank On Barak, Beshara Doumani, Basma Fahoum, Marc Flandreau, Dotan Halevy, Naama Maor, Sherene Seikaly, Heather Sharkey, Salim Tamari, Eve Troutt Powell, Alex Winder, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on various iterations of this article. He would also like to thank Ohood Mrqaten and Hamze Awawde for their help throughout, and David Ferentz, warehouse manager and self-taught archivist at the Nesher factory in Haifa, for granting access to his remarkable collection of company records.

Endnotes


Diana Jean Sandoval Martinez, “Concrete Colonialism: Architecture, Infrastructure, Urbanism and the American Colonization of the Philippines” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2017).


6 This reversal is even more remarkable when one considers that “wet jobs,” work in cement and concrete, would become those most identified with Palestinian laborers in the Israeli construction industry. Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labor Migration to Israel: Labor, Land, and Occupation (London: Routledge, 2005), 108–9, 114–15, 146–47, 170–71.


11 This went well beyond the need to supply Jewish workers with employment and the economic goals generally identified with “Hebrew labor.” Weiss employed a discourse of sanctity and impurity regarding builders’ bodies and touch in the construction process. In his memoirs he describes his home, built solely by “Hebrew hands,” and “untouched by a foreign finger” as being “constructed wholly sacred.” Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Meleṭ,” 77–79.


13 Eric Zakim, To Build and Be Built: Landscape, Literature, and the Construction of Zionist Identity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 169–175. An example of the rapidly growing importance of cement in construction in Palestine during the period is the contemporary measurement of the tons of cement used annually to gauge the growth of Jewish construction in: Ziman, Binyan, 87.

14 The National Archives (United Kingdom), Colonial Office (CO) 733/165/2, 91.

15 Do’ar ha-Yom, 28 August 1927.

16 Davar, 18 March 1929.
Davar, 18 November 1931.

Biletzki, Chaim Flexer (Tel Aviv: Hotz'at Histadrut Po'alei ha-Binyan, 1972), 124.

I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for calling my attention to the similarities between Flexer’s story about the collapsed roof in al-Husayni’s house and the contrasting narratives about the collapse of the roof of the Neve Tzedek Girls’ School in 1908. The 1908 incident, which Or Alexandrovich also recounts, placed the school building’s contractor, Jaffa-native Yosef Eliahu Chelouche, opposite an inquiry committee formed to investigate the collapse. The committee found that the collapse was a result of what they described as the negligence of Chelouche’s Palestinian Arab builders. Chelouche himself—who understood the committee as exonerating him entirely—placed the blame on the inexperienced Jewish carpenters he was forced to hire. Here too, then, structural integrity and questions of builders’ skill were politicized and racialized. It is also possible to see Flexer’s recollections as a retort of sorts to Chelouche’s: an assertion of the advances made by “Hebrew labor” in the two and a half decades which separate the narratives. Yosef Elyahu Chelouche, Parashat Hayai [Reminiscences of My Life] (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2005 [1931]), 117. Cited in Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet,” 66–68.


Forty, Concrete and Culture, chapter 8; Slaton, Reinforced Concrete.


25 Moshe Ben-Ner, Menachem Aviram, and Menachem Levi, eds., ha-Melet ve-Yotzrav: Ha-Ra’ayon u-Mimusho, 1923–2001 [Cement and its Makers: The Idea and Its Fulfillment] (Haifa: Nesher Me’aleh Yisre’elim, 2002), 19–23, 66. Nesher’s contemporary publications in Hebrew and English attempt to trace the company’s establishment directly to visions of Theodor Herzl, the Zionist ideologue often described as the “visionary of the State” (ḥoze ha-medina). Both Nesher’s Hebrew and English webpages cite a passage supposedly taken from his highly influential 1902 utopian novel, Altneuland (Old New Land). The passage cited, “[t]he plan for building a homeland for the Jewish people must take into consideration the founding of a Hebrew cement factory as well,” is, however, nowhere to be found in the novel. Indeed, even its prescriptive tone is at odds with the narratorial voice of the novel. Herzl does make positive mention of plans to establish a cement factory in Haifa in the novel (alongside a new kind of brick kiln), as one among many components of a narrative of general industrial progress and prosperity told by Joe Levy, the general director of the Department of Industry. Levy’s speech is heard by the novel’s protagonists in the form of a phonograph recording intended for posterity, played back during a Passover Seder meal. The fabrication is particularly curious given that other early twentieth-century Zionist ideologues such as Arthur Ruppin and the industrialist Nahum Wilbushevitz did in fact offer such prescriptive visions. “Introduction,” Nesher Israel Cement Enterprises, n.d., online at www.nesher.co.il/en/history-nesher/ (accessed 17 July 2019); and Theodor Herzl, Old-New Land (Altneuland), trans. Lotta Levensohn (New York: Markus Weiner Publishing and the Herzl Press, 1987 [1941]) 217–18; “To Manufacture Cement in Palestine,” American Jewish Chronicle 2, no. 4 (1 December 1916): 127.

26 B. S. Binah, Industrial Palestine: A Survey of Recent Undertakings and Future Possibilities (London: W. Speaight & Sons, 1924), 28; Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943 (Jerusalem: Government of Palestine, 1944), Table 135. It is highly likely that British building policies and preferences also contributed to the increased consumption of cement already during the first decade of the Mandate. However, the most prominent example of British construction policies’ impact during this period, Ronald Storrs’ Jerusalem stone—or white stone—regulation, meant that at least in the vicinity of Jerusalem’s Old City, a wide-scale transition towards cement and concrete was effectively prohibited. The regulation, which mandated the use of local limestone in all new construction in the area, also engendered prohibitive costs, considerably restricting who could and could not build new structures or renovate existing ones. See: Roberto Mazza, “‘The Preservation and Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City without Favour or Prejudice to Race or Creed’: The Pro-Jerusalem Society and Ronald Storrs, 1917–1926,” in Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City, ed. Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire (Leiden: Brill, 2018): 403–422; and Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007), 28–37.

27 Norris relates this British tendency to a conception of Jews as ideal “colonial middle men,” while Smith attributes it to British concepts of Jewish settlers as Europeans who were thus more “civilized” and “modern” than the Arab “natives.” Both explanations, despite different emphases, boil down to British racial and civilizational hierarchies. See: Norris, Land of Progress, 75–91; and Smith, Roots of Separatism, 7, 53.

28 Smith, Roots of Separatism, 166–68.


31 Norris, Land of Progress, 121–22.

32 See, for example: Mir’ at al-Sharg, 4 June 1930; al-Difa’, 5 November 1935; Filastin, 29 April 1937; al-Wahda, 26 January 1946; al-Ghadd, 7 June 1946; and Filastin, January 16, 1947. Two articles published in Mir’ at al-Sharg in April and May 1933 described
a housing bubble in Jerusalem, scarring Jerusalem’s Palestinian capitalists for ignoring “true economic principles” (qawa’id iqtisadiya sahiha) and misinterpreting the impact of the unfolding global financial crisis. According to the author, in their zeal to construct housing, perceived as a “safe” investment in tumultuous times, Palestinian capitalists transformed the city: “Ten years ago [one] searched by lamp and wick for a house,” in Jerusalem; now “you find hundreds of houses . . . [but] no one to rent them.” It was the responsibility of these capitalists to amend this situation by ceasing to build housing recklessly and adopting proper economic reason.

Mir’at al-Sharq, 29 April 1933; Mir’at al-Sharq, 3 May 1933.

33 Seikaly, Men of Capital.
34 Al-Yarmuk, 8 October 1929; Mir’at al-Sharq, 29 December 1929; Filastin, 23 February 1930.
35 Filastin, 8–9 April 1930. The centrality of the scientific approach is demonstrated by the sheer volume of reports on cement and concrete issued by the Technion’s Building Materials Testing Laboratory and others. Central Zionist Archives (CZA) J15\4084. See also: Slaton, Reinforced Concrete; Forty, Concrete and Culture, especially introduction, and chapter 1.
36 Mir’at al-Sharq, 29 December 1929.
37 “Re: Interview of Arab Executive on the subjects of Taxation and Protection,” 18 February 1930, Israel State Archives (ISA), ISA-NonGovernment-ArabExecutiveCommit-000678h.
38 Mir’at al-Sharq, 9 April 1930; Filastin, 30 July 1930; Filastin, 5 November 1930; Filastin, 3 December 1930; Filastin, 29 March 1931; al-Difa’, 9 September 1931.
39 Filastin, 6 October 1931. A similar claim regarding Nesher having “dumped” cement in Syria in the past, underselling local produce, was later raised in an appeal by the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce to the Department of Customs, Excise and Trade. “Imports of Cements,” 6 December 1940, ISA-NonGovernment-ArabCommrcChambJer-000zt5k.
40 Mir’at al-Sharq, 23 February 1935; Mir’at al-Sharq, 13 March 1935; al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya 1, no. 7 (1 April 1935): 25; Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1943, Table 135. Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya identifies the rise in consumption as what motivated Menn of the Shimshon initiative.
41 The factory faltered initially due to funding issues and questions potential investors posed as to the trustworthiness of its founder, Nachum Menn. Construction began multiple times, but production began only in 1955. In 1969, Nesher purchased Shimshon to become once again a production monopoly. Correspondences and Reports regarding the Cement Industry in the Land, 1926-1938, CZA S8\1062; and Ben-Ner, Aviram, and Levi, ha-Melet, 175–79.
43 Al-Difa’, 25 January 1937; Filastin, 12 January 1937. The advertisement in Filastin is mentioned in Deborah Bernstein and Badi Hasisi, “‘Buy and Promote the National Cause’: Consumption, Class Formation and Nationalism in Mandate Palestinian Society,” Nations and Nationalism 14, no. 1 (2008): 142. While outside the scope of this paper, the question of what (capital, labor, land) renders a product “appropriately national” demands further inquiry.
45 Al-Difa’, 28 April 1937; Filastin, 14 May 1937, 3; “The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” 4 December 1946, ISA-NonGovernment-ArabCommrcChambJer-000zy9l.
46 Shaqifi was notorious for the poor conditions and harsh treatment his employees received. This made the quarry the site of some of the most frequent and lengthy Arab workers’ strikes during the Mandate period. See Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 207–10; and Bernstein, “Yehudim ve-‘Aravim,” 97–101.
47 Seikaly, Men of Capital, 2.
Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, 28; Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9. This led to the emergence of what Sherene Seikaly has termed “the politics of basic needs.” Seikaly’s work on the war and its aftermath has focused on the elements of this new politics which related to food supply, agricultural produce, and emergent concepts such as the calorie and cost-of-living. See Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, chapters 3 and 4.


For some particularly interesting examples of these connections, see: Controller of Heavy Industries (Formerly Director of Public Works) (Competent Authority) March 12, 1942–April 30, 1943, Collection of David Ferentz: “Meeting on 11-3-1942 to arrange for the maximum possible output of cement from Portland Cement Co. Nesher Ltd.,” 11 March 1942; Director of Public Works to the Shell Company of Palestine, 14 March 1942; Portland Cement Co. Nesher to the Director of Public Works, 15 March 1942; Director of Public Works to the Portland Cement Co. ‘Nesher,’ 20 March 1942; Director of Public Works to Portland Cement Co. ‘Nesher,’ 26 March 1943.


Al-Sha’ab, 19 December 1946.

The Fight against the Plague, 18 August 1944 – 3 April 1946, Haifa Municipal Archive 6050 00311/22. The fight waged in Haifa against the plague was also dependent on the ability to secure cement to seal openings in structures which could potentially house rats.

Acting Commissioner for Commerce and Industry to Chief Secretary, 7 January 1948, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3.

Acting Commissioner for Commerce and Industry to Chief Secretary, 7 January 1948, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3.

Filastin, 13 December 1945; al-Sha’b, 19 December 1946; al-Difa’, 23 January 1947; Anis Nasr, Vice President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3. Several reports indicate in fact that the removal of the controls regime on 15 September 1946 had in fact lessened cement’s availability dramatically, fostering additional profiteering. District Commissioner’s Office, Gaza to Acting Chief Secretary Dalgleish, 14 December 1946 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3; Filastin, 11 December 1946; al-Sha’b, 19 December 1946.

“The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” 4 December 1946, ISA-NonGovernment-ArabCommrcChambJer-000zy9l. In late July 1944, the solicitor Anton (Antun) ‘Atalla, sent the British chief secretary a proposal on behalf of the newly formed Riad Building Company and Arab Building Company to establish a cement factory. Initially refused by the British due to inability to import the necessary machinery due to the war, ‘Atalla sent a second proposal after hostilities in Europe concluded and was granted a meeting. This time, the government was willing to permit the companies import machinery after the end of 1945. I was unable to find evidence of any further actions taken by either company. *Arab Cement Factory (1945)*, ISA-Privatecollections-ArabLawyers-001081p.


“The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” 4 December 1946.

Filastin, 28 May 1947.

“The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” 4
December 1946.

67 Abdul Raḥim Tamimi to High Commissioner, January 29 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nj2.

68 The translation of jinsiyya as “race” is not an obvious one. However, as will become evident below, the ambiguity of the Arabic term is amply clarified by how other British officials discussed the regulations. Ya’aqub ‘Atalla, Department of the Registrar of Lands to President of President of the Board of Directors, AWC, 20 January 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nj2.


70 E. Matta, on behalf of the Chief Secretary to the AWC, 9 February 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nj2.

71 E. Matta, on behalf of the Acting Chief Secretary to the District Commissioner, Lydda District, 31 July 1947, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000nj2.


74 Brenna Bhandar’s work on the Canadian, Australian and Palestinian/Israeli contexts argues for the “conjoined articulation” of private property relations and racial formations in settler colonial context. Joseph R. Slaughter’s work, meanwhile, traces the evolution of corporate personhood in international law (and indeed of the very idea of persons as subject to international law and human rights) to the safeguarding of nineteenth century imperial charter companies’ territorial and trade interests in Africa. Taken alongside one another, such works indicate that perhaps here too, as in the US instance, property served a crucial mediatory role between the categories of race and the corporation. See: Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Joseph R. Slaughter, “However Incompletely, Human,” in The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, ed. Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 272–97.

75 “Part II: Executive.” English text of the Consolidated Palestine Orders in Council, 1922–1927, Article 16D.


77 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mpdpd: Chief Secretary to Assistant District Commissioners, 30 May 1940; Jerusalem District Director of Land Registration to Chief Secretary, 24 August 1940; Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 14 September 1940; Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 5 October 1940; C.S.O. Minute Paper, 27 September 1940 and 15 October 1940. A later case saw the Director of Land Registration issue a detailed explanation of the racial and social standing of Circassian Palestinians. Responding to an inquiry from the chief secretary regarding a potential Circassian transferee, the director stated that Circassians “may be said to form part of the Arab community.” However, in terms of race he found that he was “able to discover very little regarding the origin of the Circassians . . . One theory connects them with the Goths.” He then concluded that “the Circassian communities are undoubtedly an established and accepted part of the population, but on the other hand they are racially entirely foreign to the Arabs.” Director of Land Transfer to Chief Secretary, “Land Transfer Regulations 1940. Circassians,” 18 February 1948, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mtyn.

78 ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mtyn: Director of Land Registration to Chief Secretary, March 6, 1945; C.S.O Minute Paper, 19 June 1945; Acting Chief Secretary to Director of Land Registration, June 29, 1945.


Initial reports of progress securing the land were overly optimistic. Beginning 18 November 1942, only days after the first petitions on building materials were sent, a dispute arose between Amina al-Khalidi’s heirs and those she had charged with the *waqf*. The hospital was never completed. Ahmed Samih al-Khalidi on behalf of the Trustees of Sitt Aminah Khalidi’s Hospital to H. Kendall Esq., Town Planning Adviser, 22 July 1942, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-MandateHealth-000zbow; *Waqf of Aminah bint Bader el-Khalidi* (sic), ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryMuslims-000tdej.

The work of cultural theorist Sara Ahmed is useful in understanding how an object like cement can become so emotionally charged. Ahmed defines an affective economy, as the economy-like circulation of subjects or objects and the discourses related to them which generate positive or negative emotional attachments. In other words, “a theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate . . . , but as that which is accumulated over time.” Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” *Social Text* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 117–39. While Ahmed centers her work on the affective economy of fear as an emotion which “sticks” to the racialized bodies of immigrants, others have already extended the concept to “mundane” objects. See, for example, Alev P. Kuruoğlu and Güliz Ger, “An Emotional Economy of Mundane Objects,” *Consumption Markets & Culture* 18, no. 3 (2015): 209–38.

I. Ll.-Phillips, District Commissioner’s Office, Gaza to Acting Chief Secretary Dalgleish, December 14, 1946, ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryCommerce-000m8p3.

In April 2018, heavy rain destroyed part of the wall near Shu‘fat refugee camp in Jerusalem. In videos that circulated on social media, children seized this opportunity to cross over the ruins of the destroyed wall and play football on the security road beside the fallen wall. This separation road – its function and its meanings – ceased to exist for a moment: the children managed to replace the existing meanings of the wall and the adjacent separation road, embodying daily needs and ephemeral aspirations. What constituted the wall – its meaning, history, structure, political signification, and boundaries – was transformed for a moment and for these children – not for city dwellers or other refugees, but only for them – into a playground. This transient character of the space is an

Figure 1. Qalandiya camp during U.S. president Donald Trump’s announcement on moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. Photo by Ahmad Alaqra, 2017.

To Subvert, To Deconstruct:
Agency in Qalandiya Refugee Camp
Ahmed Alaqra
essential part of the agency of deconstruction for the refugees in Qalandiya, which responds to daily life aspirations along with political questions.

The daily practices of Palestinian refugees have long been understood as a direct reaction to the influences of the political and social structures that exist in Palestinian refugee camps. The anthropological studies conducted on similar cases have tended to strip the inhabitants of their agency and reduced them to “victims” or humanitarian subjects. In this article, I argue that the practices of quotidian life in Palestinian refugee camps are forms of reclaiming collective and individual agency. They are not only reactions but also attempts toward affirming political rights and achieving daily aspirations in an environment that has been constantly subjected to exception, control, and surveillance. The daily practices of the inhabitants of Qalandiya refugee camp can be understood as a protest against the political and social powers that manage, control, and surveil the camp. These political and social powers manifest in common spatial circumstances of Palestinian refugee camps, producing spaces of control and surveillance to serve their purposes. Meanwhile, with the prolongation of exile, a fourth generation of refugees has been born into overpopulated camps, surrounded by an oppressed, contradictive, and underdeveloped environment.

Framing Everyday Life: From Passive to Active

There is no doubt that Palestinian refugee camps are places of exception, control, and surveillance. Many scholars have discussed the contribution of the different political and humanitarian structures in instituting a “permanent-temporary” reality for the Palestinian refugees. The inaccessibility to many Palestinians of the three “traditional” solutions for refugees – return to the country of origin (rejected by Israel), host country citizenship (rejected by Palestinians), or resettlement in a third country – has prolonged their exile. For Palestinian refugees, this prolongation of exile is intertwined with the political question, meaning that there will never be permanent solution for the refugees as long as the political conflict persists.

The prolongation of exile and the persistence of the political question has allowed the emergence of different political structures that see Palestinian camps as either an asset or a threat to their political narrative (as for the Palestinian Authority and Israel) or subjects of humanitarian intervention (as for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – UNRWA – and other humanitarian agencies). These different political structures exert their power on different levels and through different means in an effort to produce camps that serve their political discourse. After sixty years of subjection to the influence of these political structures, the camp is still seen through the constant attempts by refugees to negotiate their lives with these institutions. Practices of daily life are essential to maneuver within the systems of control imposed on the camp.

The influence of political structures in Palestinian refugee camps has established what Nasser Abourahme and Sandi Hilal call the extraterritorial and extrajuridical state of the Palestinian camps. Stripped of political power vis-à-vis states, refugees became active
political agents advocating for their rights through embodying their political struggle in their everyday practices. Abourahme and Hilal, drawing on Eyal Weizman’s notion of “liquid geographies,” write of the inhabitants of Dahaysha camp: “In flexible territory a variety of actors and actions can, with varying effect, ‘all physically challenge the envelope of political space and transform it.’ It is in the space of relative maneuverability that Dahayshans consciously produce a space that challenges their marginalization as political actors in city and nation.”12 The everyday becomes a way to establish new systems of meaning that allow the emergence of new forms of what can be described as the ordinary – an ordinariness that is only ordinary within the boundaries of the camp.13

The Camp, Political Structures, and the State of Exception

Three kinds of political institutions operate directly or indirectly in Qalandiya camp, each associated with different spatial practices. These are humanitarian institutions, military powers, and representations of semi-autonomous governance. Humanitarian institutions were the core, and remain the most durable, form of institutional structures in the camp. Qalandiya camp was established as a refugee camp by the Red Crescent in 1948. Its administration was handed to UNRWA in 1951, its 1,500 inhabitants being officially designated as refugees at that time.14 Over the years, Qalandiya camp became a site for a number of different humanitarian agencies with different roles and intentions, but UNRWA remained the most prominent. UNRWA was and still is the body responsible for granting and maintaining refugee status for both the camp and its inhabitants. From the beginning, UNRWA’s intention was to sustain the camp’s temporality until the resolution of the political questions in regard to the Palestinian case, perceiving Palestinian camps as “humanitarian sites on the road to integration and, ultimately, resettlement in the Arab countries.”15 UNRWA’s persistence points to its contradictory nature: on the one hand, this persistence is politically intertwined with the “right to return”; on the other, it is evidence that its practices neutralized the political efforts of Palestinian refugees and absorbed their anger, transforming them into subjects of aid.

While UNRWA maintained, or was assumed to maintain, a “neutral” administrative role, Israel feared Palestinian refugee camps and adopted policies to fragment, replace, or normalize them. By the mid-1960s, camps took on real and symbolic significance as lasting evidence of the Nakba and incubators of armed resistance, challenging the legitimacy of Israel as a democratic state before the international community.16 In the late 1960s, following the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the camps gained more momentum as a political space. The PLO thought of refugee camps as a fertile environment to lay down a base for its armed resistance, seizing the despair and anger, especially after the loss of the 1967 war, to mobilize armed resistance and pressure Israel to recognize Palestinian rights, among them the “right to return.”17 In 1970, Israel embarked on a plan to create a trust fund for economic development and resettlement of refugees.
in an attempt to fragment the refugee camps and transfer their responsibility to local authorities in adjacent cities and villages. Other plans were proposed to dismantle UNRWA and build new residential projects near the refugee camps or to transform the camps into cities or merge them with nearby cities.

While most of these plans failed, the Israeli army worked to neutralize the political role of Palestinian camps through raids, closures, and imprisonment of their residents. After the Oslo accords of 1993, Israel still exerts a form of remote control over the refugee camps through closure of streets, isolation, night raids, and military provocation. Nevertheless, Israel still insists on abandonment of the right to return as a precondition of engaging in any peace process. The post-Oslo political landscape in the West Bank and Gaza reduced the political address of Palestinian refugees. The sustainability of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a structure is dependent on external donors’ views on peace negotiations – a process conditioned by Israeli “intransigence” in capitulating refugees’ right to return. “In this political endgame,” Abourahme and Hilal write, “refugees are not only unrepresented, they are ‘unrepresentable.’”

Meanwhile, the PA adopted economic reforms permitting a neoliberal economy to creep into Palestinian cities and villages, producing new forms of class polarization and new elite formations linked to NGO subsidization and undercutting structures of solidarity that existed during the first intifada. The refugees, once the most visible members of the Palestinian nation, found themselves reduced and isolated vis-à-vis native West Bankers. Yet within policies of exception and marginalization, refugees in the West Bank found moments of opportunity in the withdrawal of the Israeli army from cities and camps and the transfer of policing and administration to the PA, which is not allowed to enter the camps. Exclusion from the PA’s fabrication of legal order thus produces the camp’s extraterritoriality, while also fitting within a broader trend of marginalization of refugee camps within the PA’s urban policies. In the case of Qalandiya camp, this is exacerbated by the fact that it falls partly within Area C (under full Israeli civil and military control according to the Oslo accords) and partly within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Qalandiya camp is therefore excluded from municipal services, whether provided by Israel or the PA. The political structures in Qalandiya camp have thus imposed control, surveillance, and exceptionality, producing an extraterritorial, extrajuridical, and permanently temporary space.

An Agency of Everyday Practices: A Response or Reclaiming Space?

While there is a need to lead an “ordinary” life in Palestinian camps, and at the same time embody the different political rights within those needs, the production of the ordinary happens on several levels and through different, sometimes contradictory, modes of agency. Writing on “everyday activism” during the first intifada, Iris Jean-Klein argued for the “potentiality” of individual agency to drive quotidian practices,
whether oppositional, emancipatory, or hegemonizing.\textsuperscript{27} Even in the most turbulent
times, people try to lead ordinary lives in the camp as means of resilience and acts
of resistance.\textsuperscript{28} Beyond the regimes of control and exception imposed on the camps,
inhabitants feel a need to improve their living conditions, evoking “tensions” seen in
the camps’ physical and discursive expressions.\textsuperscript{29}

In her study of perceptions and reproduction of the ordinary in times of crisis in
al-Am’ari refugee camp, Dorota Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska frames the ordinary as a
state that refugees practice in their daily life to achieve and reclaim agency.\textsuperscript{30} I would
expand this definition to assume that the ordinary is a state people construct while
negotiating with the cause of the extraordinary. The complex sociopolitical nature of
the Palestinian camps imposes a (relatively) extraordinary context on their inhabitants,
yet the act of creating the ordinary from the imposed extraordinary is itself a tool to
restore collective and individual agency. What is ordinary for the refugee does not
have to be for the others.

Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska assumed two modes of agency in al-Am’ari camp
that produce and reproduce systems of meaning to achieve the “ordinary.” The first,
derived from Michel de Certeau, sees institutional structures – whether social, political,
economic, or of some other kind – engaged in the production of meanings. Individuals
then subvert these systems of meanings, “not by rejecting or altering them, but by
using them with respect to ends and references foreign to the system that they have
no choice but to accept.”\textsuperscript{31} Whatever the circumstances, individuals can “retain their
agency by delimiting the spaces of their everyday life.”\textsuperscript{32} The second mode of agency
grants individuals the ability to deconstruct and reproduce new systems of meanings
different from those imposed by the governing structures in the camps: it is the “actors
themselves who recognize and negotiate the distinction between ordinary and extra-
ordinary experiences.”\textsuperscript{33} Those new systems of meanings emerge through the attempt
of refugees to negotiate their space in the state of extraterritoriality and exception in
the Palestinian refugee camps. This agency allows the experience and the background
of individuals to be considered in the process of reproducing the urban environment.\textsuperscript{34}

The second agency is meant to alter the semiotic significations of the established
systems of meanings. This form of agency is temporary and unique to the individual
and to the context.\textsuperscript{35} As such, it might be useful to acknowledge that this agency does
not necessarily create but rather deconstructs and reinterprets existing systems of
meaning: a street will be transformed into a football pitch for a moment or, as I will
discuss below, a window transformed into a door. Drawing on Abourahme and Hilal,
I see this agency emerging as a tool to grant individuals ways to maneuver within and
around the politicized nature of the camp.\textsuperscript{36}

During my field work in Qalandiya camp, I identified two modes of agencies in
the camp: a collective agency that subverts and affirms and an individual one that
deconstructs. In the following sections, I examine how both modes of agency – the
agency to subvert and affirm and the agency to deconstruct – manifest on a spatial
level in Qalandiya camp.
Agency to Subvert and Affirm

Suspension of everyday life is a form of subverting established systems of meaning imposed by the Israeli military. Collectively, refugees decide to suspend their daily routine as a way of expressing solidarity with each other. This was seen frequently with regard to festive events like weddings, for example: camp inhabitants chose not to celebrate any weddings as a means of strengthening their solidarity and not due to a lack of opportunity.37 Where the Israeli army sought to control and pressure camp residents to abandon resistance by imposing measures meant to suspend daily life, the refugees subverted the meanings of such impositions to their favor. Refugees in Dahaysha, meanwhile, took advantage of the camp’s liminality and exceptionality, subverting the spatiality imposed on them through community-led improvement of the camp’s physical spaces. In one example, camp residents financed completely and constructed a bridge that connected the two sides of Dahaysha camp (figure 2).38

In the camp, development carries different significance than other spaces. While development typically carries associations with permanence and sustainability, development in the camp corresponds to a momentary need of the collective. Development and construction are meant to be temporary until the dismantling of the camp as a whole. Permanence and sustainability are diminished through the materials used, the quality of construction, or simply through perception and the assumption of temporariness. As one landlord in Qalandiya camp told me: “Do you see all those new commercial buildings at the entrance of the camp? . . . They are as temporary as the camp even if they seem new, once we return everything will be gone.” Even if this happens soon? “Even if this happens tomorrow.”39

Figure 2. Dahaysha camp bridge. Photo courtesy of Campus in Camps, 2013.
Figure 3. Qalandiya camp’s common space. Photo by Ahmad Alaqa, 2017.

Figure 4. Qalandiya camp’s entrance and commercial center. Photo by Ahmad Alaqa, 2017.
The spatial character of Qalandiya camp could be understood as the ultimate manifestation of the agency to affirm. Take, for example, the main public space of the camp. This space was not planned as a public space; rather, it is a portion of a street that extends from the entrance of the camp toward the main mosque (figures 3 and 4). This street is wider than others, giving it the potential to become a common space. The different social, political, and economic inputs in this public space affirmed its temporary status. The different Palestinian political institutions (the PLO, Fatah, Hamas, and so on) have presented a discourse that, along with the collective view of the inhabitants of Qalandiya camp, has sought of this space as a space of political mobilization and affirmation of Palestinian claims and rights. The different political factions in Qalandiya camp held events, raised flags, and organized parades. They painted political graffiti and hung posters of leaders and martyrs all around. These collective social endeavors did not oppose the Palestinian political narrative; rather, they affirmed it. For camp inhabitants, it was important to keep spaces in the camp politicized for the sake of their “right to return.”

Agency of Deconstruction

Political Dimensions
In a radio sketch played on Radio Dona Taraddod (meaning both Without Hesitation and Without Frequency), a stranger in his twenties opens the front door of a private house in an unnamed refugee camp in Palestine. He enters the living room. The family of the house sits on a sofa in front of the television. The stranger joins the family. He takes the remote control and starts changing the channels while eating some of the snacks lying on the table. The family continues as if nothing out of the ordinary is taking place. Later the stranger stands up and walks to the main door. As he opens it, the father asks, “Are you sure they’re gone?” The stranger replies “maybe” and leaves. It thus becomes clear that the young man was being chased by Israeli soldiers, and had entered the home to seek refuge from their presence in the common space of the camp.

The sketch sheds light on sociopolitical phenomena intertwined with the deconstruction of space and architecture in the camp. The stranger’s “invasion” of private space during family time is specific to the moment (characterized by the invasion of public space by the Israeli military) and to him (his vulnerability to arrest or assault as a young Palestinian man and, perhaps, an activist). In this moment, the assumed notions of spaces (in particularly regarding private property) are unmade by the young man and replaced with new ones. Space is reduced to its abstract form – its absolute form, mathematical space momentarily stripped of its function, history, and its notions – as part of the process of reconfiguration that allows the young man to mold the space to the needs produced by his current and past conditions.

Another manifestation of the agency of deconstruction on a political level can be found in the alleys of Qalandiya refugee camp. The semipublic alleys that constitute the camp spaces can momentarily be transformed into “private” refuge for those who are...
persecuted by different political structures (figure 5). While usually these alleys have specific functions constrained by social considerations of privacy, at certain moments the alleys can acquire other functions, reinvented as strategic escape and supply routes when it comes to supporting the resistance movements in the camp. During the second intifada, the Israeli army demolished large swathes of the Jenin refugee camp in an attempt to undo the spatial order of the alleys.

![Figure 5. Qalandiya camp alleys. Map by Ahmad Alaqr, 2018.](image)

**Social Dimensions**

Women’s access to the camp’s common space is limited by implicit and explicit social norms. Apart from the associations that provide space for women in Qalandiya camp like the Women’s Programs Center (Markaz al-baramiz al-nisawiyya) and the Child Center for Culture and Development (Markaz al-tifl li-l-thaqafa wa al-tanmiya), women also manage to find a common space in the private spaces of their houses. M.A., a 37-year-old married mother of four and an active member of the Women’s Programs Center, explained that every day she and other women in the camp meet in different living rooms inside their houses in Qalandiya camp. These living rooms become like a public space – anyone who is not a man can enter.
Thus, women turn these private spaces momentarily into public space, allowing other women from the camp to come and join them. They have altered the boundaries of common space and associated it with time. They unmade the private nature of living rooms temporarily and established a network of common spaces that are not fixed as either public or private, but are dynamic and flexible. The map below (figure 6) shows different living rooms in the camp that together form a temporary public space for women.

Figure 6. Qalandiya camp living rooms. Map by Ahmad Alaqr, 2018.

**Individual Aspirations**
K.S. is a 28-year-old man who lives in Qalandiya camp. During the second intifada, he was injured and lost both of his legs and now he mainly moves around by wheelchair. K.S. noted that the spatial characteristics of the camp do not correspond to his needs for accessibility. K.S. is not shocked by the absence of inclusive spatial production in the camp, as he believes that the spatial production should correspond to the political discourse of the “right to return,” which assumes an underdeveloped character of this production. Thus, it was important for him to comprehend and perceive his context differently. The agency to deconstruct emerges as a way for him to negotiate his daily needs, to produce a space that neither the physical environment of the camp nor the collective agencies of affirmation or subversion could provide him.
Illustration 1: a new form of common space. The Blue spaces are alleys, those spaces are vital for the different inhabitants of the camp especially activist. The red spaces are living rooms, women presented new forms of common spaces.

Illustration 2: Unmaking Qalandia camp by K.S
1. The alleys of the camp; Improvised to allow the minimum space for circulation within the camp. These alleys are semi-public and they are perceived differently by the different inhabitants of the camp. For K.S they provide him with alternative access to places that are not accessible to him.

2. Second Floor; For K.S, the second floor was constructed for his brother, he said that since the beginning they have been living in this area of the camp, and with the lack of space, the family had to go vertically.

3. Material; Most of the Buildings in the camp are constructed using Brick and concrete. Those Materials are known for their durability and that is in essence contradict with the purpose of the “temporary Refugee camp”. However, K.S sees the concrete and the brick as a response to more than 30 year of living in the camp. For him those structures are still temporary but for the relatively long period of “temporariness” concrete as well start connoting temporariness.

4 & 5. Window & doors; With the limited accessibility due to his disability, K.S rearranged the functions of some objects that institute his house. The side window became a main entrance for him while the doors and due to the presence of stairs; K.S transformed it into a storage place.

Figure 7. Unmaking Qalandiya camp by K.S. Drawing by Ahmad Alaqr, 2018.
Practices of daily life required K.S. either to ask the local community council and UNRWA to provide proper infrastructure for public amenities and for his house – which was not possible due to lack of funds – or to unmake the camp the way it is. This latter process entailed signifying the spatial and architectural elements of the camp in a way that would correspond to the needs specific to his disability. “I do not see what others see,” K.S. told me. “We see the same forms, but we identify them and process them differently.” K.S. deconstructed the meanings and the functions of the architectural elements that constitute his space and reinvented them to improve accessibility.

For example, K.S explained that after his injury, he wasn’t able to access his house anymore due to the lack of proper infrastructure. What had been the main entrance to K.S.’s house was inaccessible to him; instead, with the help of a ramp, he would access his house from the window at street level (figure 7). Thus, what had been a window is no longer one. K.S rearranged the house around the new “entrance,” shifting the functions of the living room closer to the window and transferring the entrance into a storage unit.

Thus, K.S. rearranged his house through overthrowing the ordinary significations of architecture. He did so, moreover, while trying to find a solution to access his house within the urban environment of the camp, produced to meet the minimum life standards in a standardized temporary sense. In order to cope with his accessibility issues, K.S described a system of mental mapping techniques that he uses to identify accessible spaces for him in the camp based on his previous experience. In this sense, he believes that in such an unpredictable environment, mentally mapping his accessibility allows him to better predict the environment.

**Conclusion**

Many scholars described the camp as sites of exception, control, and extraterritoriality, viewed by different political institutions as a threat (as in the case of Israel), a space to enforce narratives and discourses (as in the case of the PLO and Palestinian Authority), or a space for humanitarian administration (as we see in the role played by UNRWA). Although extraterritoriality carries negative connotations, refugees have created spaces to maneuver through and over the mechanisms of instituting extraterritoriality – spaces for expression, spaces of agency.

Inhabitants of Palestinian camps have found themselves in a permanent-temporariness, caught between the need to have an ordinary life and the need to sustain and embody their right to return, between policies of exception and the need to maintain a symbolic image of the camp. This has led to the emergence of different modes of agency that allow the inhabitant to subvert, deconstruct, and reproduce existing systems of meaning to achieve political aspirations and the needs of daily life. One mode of agency is associated with subverting existing systems of exception to embody political rights. This agency protests efforts to control the camps, normalize crisis, and foster
future aspirations. Such agency is manifested in the insistence on the temporary nature of the camp in the production of spaces there. The second mode of agency has a wide set of embodiments associated with social, political, or simply daily life needs. It is more individual and temporary, corresponding to the need of the moment. Such agency deconstructs the existing systems of meanings, allowing inhabitants to construct their own meanings, thoughts, experiences, and needs in the spaces opened up.

Ahmed Alaqra is an architect, artist, and researcher. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Paris Diderot, and studied previously at Birzeit University and University of Edinburgh.

Endnotes
15. Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Right to the Camp.”
16. Hiba Khalil Sa’di Mubayd, “al-Laji’un al-Filastiniyyun bayna al-ightirab wa-l-

17 Author interview with Odeh, UNRWA office at Qalandiya camp, July 2015.


19 Mubayd, “al-Laji’un al-Filaštiniyyun”

20 Abourahime and Hilal, “Production of Space.”

21 Abourahime and Hilal, “Production of Space.”

22 Abourahime and Hilal, “Production of Space.”


24 Abourahime and Hilal, “Production of Space”; Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Right to the Camp.”

25 UNRWA, “Profile”; UNRWA, “Kalandia Camp.”

26 Author interview with Yazeed, UNRWA office at Qalandiya camp, 15 July 2015.


28 Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Meanings of Ordinary.”


30 Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Meanings of Ordinary.”


34 Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Meanings of Ordinary.”

35 Woroniecka-Krzyzanowska, “Meanings of Ordinary.”

36 Abourahime and Hilal, “The Production of Space.”


38 Abourahime and Hilal, “Production of Space.”

39 Author’s personal communication with landlord in Qalandiya camp, August 2018.


41 Author interview with M.A., Qalandiya refugee camp, July 2015.

42 Author interview with K.S., Qalandiya refugee camp, July 2015.
Several years ago, I started working in the Khalidi Library (al-Maktaba al-Khalidiyya) in Jerusalem, supervising efforts to make the library’s collection accessible to researchers again. In addition to cataloguing books and scanning manuscripts, my job entailed opening boxes and files that had been stacked away. In the process, we were pleasantly surprised to find hundreds of letters and papers written by various members of the Khalidi family in different periods and covering a range of topics. Among these letters, a rare one stood out. Written by Siddiqa al-Khalidi to her son Ruhi, it describes the events surrounding the marriage of Ruhi’s brother, Thurayya, on 20 October 1905 in Jerusalem. Ruhi was then living in Bordeaux, France, where he served as consul-general of the Ottoman Empire, and was therefore unable to attend his brother’s wedding. His mother entrusted Thurayya’s bride, Nash’at bint Musa Shafiq bin Muhammad Tahir al-Khalidi, to write this letter detailing the marriage two months after the wedding.

The letter is four pages long and written in clearly legible Neskhi script (the letter and its annotated translation appear on pages 90 to 99). It is divided into several parts, each describing one of the various components of marriage: the engagement (al-khitba), that is, asking the father of the bride for his daughter’s hand; the presentation of engagement gifts of jewelry and clothing (al-milak); the marriage contract (al-kitab); the wedding ceremony and celebration (al-zifaf); and, finally, the wedding gifts (al-nuqut) for the newlyweds, which included further jewelry and clothing as well as household items and furniture. Siddiqa’s letter thus offers a window on marriage traditions in

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the final decades of the Ottoman era and in Jerusalem in particular, and is especially notable for having been written by a Palestinian woman. Although far less information exists on the women mentioned in this letter and in other documents in the Khalidi Library, it is clear that they played a significant role in the family, including in the establishment of the Khalidi Library itself: Hajj Raghib endowed the shares in the Hamam al-‘Ayn bathhouse and six shops that his mother, Khadija bint Musa al-Khalidi, had inherited from her father, to cover the running expenses of the library.2

Weddings in late Ottoman Palestine were of great social, political, and economic significance. As Beshara Doumani writes: “Like other rituals, weddings served many purposes: enhancing or affirming status, redistributing wealth among poor family members and neighbors, making allies, reconciling enemies, and sealing kinship bonds.”3 Despite their significance, however, information on Palestinian weddings in this period has not always been readily available. This may be, in part, because of their “everyday” nature, making them unremarkable in the moment. Further, since World War I and particularly since the Nakba of 1948, Palestinian history has tended to prioritize political history and, especially, the conflict with Zionism and its British sponsors at the expense of social rituals.4 However, efforts to document the full spectrum of Palestinians’ presence on the land before 1948, and in some cases before Zionist immigration, has at times included accounts of wedding practices.5 These are supplemented, too, by foreigners’ accounts, though these can be fragmentary and inattentive to social context.6

Given the importance of the letter and its topic, seldom covered in sources from the period, I approached the family committee to approve its publication. The letter includes details that are unknown even to experts and sheds light on marriage practices of Jerusalemite families at the beginning of the twentieth century.7 Before offering an annotated translation of the full text of the letter, it is worth spending a bit more time contextualizing it and introducing the main personalities mentioned, including reference to relevant letters and documents from the Khalidi Library archive.

**Engagement**

In the early twentieth century couples often got married without knowing one another, and sometimes without ever having spoken to one another. Usually, the families reached a tentative agreement before discussing the matter with the individuals to be married. It seems that this was the practice among both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, and in Palestinian cities as well as villages and rural areas.8 Once a marriage was agreed upon by the families (al-khitba), the engagement was marked by the exchange of gifts (al-milak), representing a material affirmation of the discursive agreement.

The affianced couple were not to meet during the engagement period, although the groom-to-be might visit his fiancée’s family with his mother. Even in cases when the couple knew each other before their engagement, they were typically kept apart after the marriage was agreed upon. (Wasif Jawhariyyeh recalls an acquaintance who,
before marrying, lived in the house of another family for an extended period. As the family’s daughter grew up, he wished to marry her, and agreed with the family on the terms of marriage. After their engagement, he was no longer allowed to see her until their marriage, three years later.9

Women, especially the mother of the groom, played a significant role in the initial stages of arranging a marriage. The mother of the groom was typically responsible for choosing the bride, and neither her son (the groom-to-be) nor her husband had the same degree of influence in this decision. The role of the groom’s father – or, if the father was deceased, his paternal uncle or other male elder – was to make the necessary social and religious arrangements to complete the wedding and make it a legal fact. Customarily, it was not acceptable for a son to ask his father to arrange his marriage; rather, the mother of the prospective groom would approach her husband (the father of the groom-to-be) or her eldest son to broach the subject. In this case, Siddiqa approached the family of the prospective bride to arrange the wedding, but asked them to refrain from making any announcement before she was able to approach Yusuf Diya’ Pasha, Thurayya’s paternal uncle, who served here in the patriarchal role, since Yasin al-Khalidi, Siddiqa’s husband and Thurayya’s father, had died in 1901.

Correspondence between Yusuf and Ruhi, found in the Khalidi Library archive, shows the central role that parents and other family members played in arranging their children’s marriages. This was particularly so for marriages within an extended family, which were viewed from the perspective of preserving familial inheritance and the wealth of future generations. Marrying outside the family was seen as leading to the fragmentation of real estate, considered the main source of wealth, and the subsequent dissipation of property and status.10 (Interrmarriage could also have a downside, leading in some cases to infertility; four of the seven children – two daughters and two sons – of Muhammad Sun’allah al-Kabir, who died in 1726, suffered from infertility.) Believing that younger generations did not comprehend the importance of this issue, elders took it upon themselves to arrange marriages to consolidate property within the family.

The bride or groom’s agreement (and their opinions more generally) do not feature in the letter. However, it seems that Thurayya was not initially keen to marry a Jerusalemite. Instead, he had sought a bride whose father held an important government post and who might help Thurayya secure a good position himself. In April 1903, Thurayya asked Yusuf Diya’ Pasha to intervene on his behalf with Fu’ad Effendi, a member of the municipal council of Beirut and previous member of the municipal council of Jerusalem – although it is unclear if he was interested in marrying Fu’ad’s daughter or simply wanted help in securing a job. On another occasion, Thurayya asked Yusuf to write to the qadi of Beirut and ask for the qadi’s daughter’s hand in marriage. Yusuf promised to do so after consulting with Ruhi and, in asking Ruhi’s opinion, noting that he had never “interfered in fixing marriages for relatives or non-relatives, because I myself was married off at a young age and never found success until this day.”11 In the end, it took the family two years to convince Thurayya to marry Nash’at, Musa Shafiq’s daughter. As Yusuf wrote: “We worked tirelessly to convince him to marry Uncle Musa’s youngest daughter; he finally agreed and obeyed his mother.”12
took place shortly after the family officially asked for the bride’s hand in marriage, an indication of the position of the families, as there was no need to wait in order to save for the dowry, as was commonly the case for less wealthy families.

**Marriage Contract and Wedding Celebration**

The marriage was registered via contract (*al-kitab*) at the shari’a court, and with it the young couple was officially married. According to custom, however, they could not consummate the marriage until after the wedding celebration (*al-zifaf*), which culminated the various stages or component steps of getting married. In a sense, the wedding contract marked the recognition of the marriage by God and state and the celebration marked its recognition by the community.

Family members attended both events, and senior male relatives served as representatives (*wakil*, pl. *wukala’*) and witnesses of the wedding contract. After the wedding contract was registered with the authorities, participants enjoyed a feast. The wedding celebration itself took place in the evening, and there is no mention of food or drink being served. The groom took a seat of honor, alongside close relatives, as part of the “unveiling” (*al-jalwa*) of the bride. This “unveiling” takes place on the wedding night, and may also refer to the bride’s celebration with her friends, during which she is dressed in her finest clothes and seated on a high seat or platform for everyone to see her. The jalwa usually takes place after returning from the bathhouse (*hammam*), where the bride is bathed and her body hair is removed, her hair is done, and makeup such as kohl applied. She then dons her best clothes and covers her face with a veil.

At the wedding celebration, the bride joins the groom and he lifts her veil, “presenting” her to those gathered as his wife. As the letter details, this was followed by dancing and music, and the newlyweds would then retire to consummate the marriage.

The celebration took place outdoors, indicating that it was, to a certain degree, a “public” event to include relatives, friends, and well-wishers from among Jerusalem’s notables. Weddings of elites were likely limited to members of the same social stratum. Attendance at Thurayya’s wedding was particularly low, according to one of Yusuf Diya’ Pasha’s letters, because of the recent death of a family member: “The wedding was private, attended only by notables, given the death of our cousin Muhyi al-Din al-Khalidi (Abu Darwish).” The implication seems to be that, coming so close after Muyhi al-Din’s death, a more lavish or ostentatious celebration would not have been appropriate.

Siddiqa’s letter also gives a sense that there were conflicts within the family – as in all societies – mentioning maternal uncles and aunts of the bride who did not attend various parts of the wedding. A sentence in the letter indicated that Siddiqa and Nash’at intended to visit Ruhi, but there is no record as to whether or not the visit actually took place.
Wedding Gifts

According to tradition, the newlyweds receive gifts known as *al-nuqut*. This was observed in cities and villages, and continues today. Gifts include household items and furnishings (*al-farsh*) as well as jewelry, textiles, and money. These gifts were intended to help the young couple start their new life together – and provided the bride with a certain amount of material support as she left her family home.15 Gifts were often given in the form of money, particularly by those other than close relatives of the bride and groom, and the favor was usually returned at a suitable occasion, such as the weddings of the children of gift givers.16

The value of gifts was linked to the financial status of the families of the bride and groom, particularly that of the groom or his father. Gifts in villages were often quite small during the Ottoman period, more commonly measured in piasters than liras. The engagement and wedding presents (*al-milak* and *al-nuqut*) at the wedding described in this letter, however, included jewelry made of gold and diamonds – rings, earrings, broaches, pins, and watch chains. Clothing and textiles, too, were of significant value, “a form of savings, akin to precious metals and stones. This was especially true for women whose estates clothes represented a significant proportion of the total worth.”17

For families of means, these were often brought from afar and embroidered, brocaded, or otherwise embellished with threads or ribbons of silver and gold.18 The description of furniture from Beirut and Damascus also indicates the status of the bride and groom, as well as the broader regional economic networks within which Jerusalem was embedded – a factor illuminated, too, by the letter’s use of a number of Ottoman terms, especially when referring to materials.

Such gifts are a clear indication of the family’s wealth and high social status in Jerusalem. A sense of the value of jewelry in the period can be inferred from material found in the shari’a court records of Jerusalem. In a shari’a court document from 1333 h./1914 AD, almost a decade after Thurayya’s wedding, a watch and chain was valued at 13 lira and 8 piasters, a diamond ring at 4 lira and 36 piasters, diamond earrings at 6 lira and 54 piasters, and a pair of golden bracelets at 3 lira and 27 piasters.19 Comparing these figures to the prices of material and estates registered in the shari’a courts can give us an indication of these sums’ value. In 1906, within a year of Thurayya’s wedding, three months’ rent for a shop was 1 lira and 84 piasters, a rotl of sugar cost 6.7 piasters, a rotl of soap cost 11 piasters; the expenditures of a wife and her two daughters were 5 piasters per day, while the expenditures of a young man of the Khalidi family were 1 lira and 42.5 piasters per month.20

As these figures show, the wedding and its associated costs were far beyond the average standard of living in Jerusalem at the time. Still, the listing and description of engagement and wedding gifts shed light on the expectations and kinds of gifts exchanged during marriage, if not their quality or value, during this period, as well as continuities across time. Further, they also indicate the kinds of material objects that were valued by Jerusalemite elites in the late Ottoman period. And finally, they indicate certain economic pathways that linked Jerusalem to locations, some relatively local and others farther afield.
Key Personalities

The most prominent figures in the 1905 letter are: Siddiqa al-Khalidi, the letter’s author; Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi (known as Ruhi), Siddiqa’s eldest son and recipient of the letter; Mahmud Thurayya al-Khalidi (known as Thurayya), Siddiqa’s son and the groom in the wedding described in the letter; and Yusuf Diya’ Pasha al-Khalidi, Siddiqa’s cousin and paternal uncle of Ruhi and Thurayya. Two of these four, Ruhi and Yusuf, were among the most significant contributors to the Khalidi Library, and it is therefore also possible to flesh out a number of the relationships mentioned in Siddiqa’s letter based on documents and correspondence from the library’s archive.21

Siddiqa

The letter’s author was Siddiqa al-Khalidi, mother of Thurayya, the groom. Siddiqa’s father, Muhammad Tahir bin ‘Ali bin Khalil bin Muhammad Sun’allah al-Khalidi al-Kabir, was secretary of the Jerusalem shari’a court and died before 1908. Her father had three brothers; Muhammad ‘Ali, Raghib, and Muhammad Sulayman.22 As for Siddiqa, she had six brothers: Musa Shafiq; Ibrahim Adham; Hasan; Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab; ‘Abd al-Muttalib; and ‘Ali, who died as a youth. Siddiqa’s brother Musa Shafiq (d. 1927) was the father of Thurayya’s bride and the director of the Khalidi endowment from 1323 to 1334 h. (1905–1915 AD), when he was relieved of his duties, only to commence them again the following year.23 Siddiqa also had four sisters: Nabiha, ‘A’isha, Labiba, and Jamila. Their mother was Nafisa bint Musa bin Sun’allah al-Khalidi.

Siddiqa’s late husband Yasin al-Khalidi is not mentioned in the letter, but his presence nonetheless suffuses it. Yasin – Ruhi and Thurayya’s father and Yusuf’s brother – was one of Jerusalem’s notables and chief clerk of its shari’a court. He took over management of the family endowments in 1281 h. (1864 AD) at the request and with the approval of his father, Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi, who had managed them to that point.24 Yasin was also a member in the general assembly in Beirut and a qadi in the city of Nablus. At the end of the nineteenth century, he was appointed mayor of Jerusalem, the second Khalidi to hold this position after his brother, Yusuf Diya’.25 In his social and professional capacity, Yasin attended official receptions in the city, and was listed among those who received Wilhelm II, the Kaiser of Germany, on his famous visit to Jerusalem in 1898.26 It appears that Yasin’s death in 1901 was preceded by more than a month of jaundice.27

The records of the family endowment, which Yasin managed for more than a quarter century, are fastidiously organized. Yasin left three ledgers listing the endowment’s revenues and expenditures, each of which begins with a detailed table of contents. Although the handwriting is difficult to decipher, since the words are very small and close together, the ledgers contain information of social and political significance, of which two examples will have to suffice here. The first involves the spread of print culture and intellectual networks in the late nineteenth century. Yasin was responsible for the distribution of Tarablus al-Sham newspaper in Palestine during its third and
fourth years of publication (1313–14 h./1895–96 AD). He listed sixty-eight subscribers

to the newspaper in this period; in addition to the governor of Jerusalem, forty-five

subscribers were from Jerusalem, twelve from Bethlehem, five from Hebron, and five

from Gaza. Yasin’s ledgers also suggest a sense of solidarity among family members,

as it seems that the endowment covered all expenses associated with the death of a

family member. In the case of Ibrahim Adham al-Khalidi, who died in April 1896, Yasin

listed the expenses of the funeral (kharja), including the cost of washing the deceased,

the burial shroud, digging the grave, alms and gifts to be given during mourning days,

and other related necessities.29

Ruhi
Muhammad Ruhi al-Khalidi, the eldest son of Siddiqqa and Yasin and recipient of

the letter, was born in Jerusalem in 1864.30 As a youth, Ruhi studied at a number of

educational institutions, including the Alliance School and the White Fathers’ (al-

Salahiyya) School in Jerusalem and the Sultaniyya School in Beirut. The Khalidi

Library also includes several letters of merit recognizing his excellent performance in

his first year at the Sultaniyya School in Beirut in 1883.31 From 1887 to 1893, Ruhi

studied at the Royal College (al-Maktab al-Malaki) in Istanbul, and then spent time

between Jerusalem, Paris, and Istanbul, where he attended the teaching circle of Jamal

al-Din al-Afghani. When Ottoman surveillance of Afghani extended to include Ruhi,

he returned to Paris, where he studied at the École libre des sciences politiques and

then the Sorbonne. After finishing his studies, Ruhi lectured at the École spéciale des

Langues orientales and in 1898 was appointed consul-general of the Ottoman Empire

in Bordeaux.32 He was serving in that capacity when Thurayya married.

That Siddiqqa closes the letter with her wishes that God reward Ruhi, too, with a bride

indicates that Ruhi was not yet married by the beginning of February 1906. He married

Hermance Painsol, a French woman, later in 1906 or 1907 and by January 1908 she had

given birth to their son Yahya (also known as Jean).33 In July 1908, Khalidi returned

to Jerusalem, after which he was elected to Ottoman parliament. He was reelected in

1912 and served as deputy speaker of parliament. Ruhi died on 5 Ramadan 1331 h.

(6 August 1913 AD) in Beşiktaş, a neighborhood in the European side of Istanbul.34

Ruhi’s collection is perhaps the most important in the Khalidi Library, and one

document indicates that he endowed the entirety of his personal library, including books

and manuscripts, to the family’s library. Ruhi’s donations include several unpublished

manuscripts, including the full text of his work al-Siunism aw al-mas’ala al-sihyuniyya

(Zionism, or the Zionist Question), only part of which had previously been discovered,

and the manuscript of the second part of his book al-Mas’ala al-sharqiyya (The Eastern

Question).35 Ruhi wrote a number of accounts based on his travels, including notes on

his 1907 trip to Spain titled Rihlat al-maqdisi ila jazirat al-Andalus (A Jerusalemite’s

Journey to the Andalusian Peninsula); a description of Istanbul; and an account of the

history, neighborhoods, and libraries of Paris. He also left a sixty-eight-page manuscript

titled Tarajim al-‘a’ila al-Khalidiyya (Biography of the Khalidi Family), which includes

excerpts from various biographical dictionaries. The collection also includes a seventy-
page memoir written in French and two notebooks in French belonging to Ruhi’s son Yahya, as well as dozens of papers on various topics, such as Middle Sudan, to which he had traveled, and the Jubilee of the Chemical Society.

A second part of the collection consists of correspondence to and from Ruhi, written in French, Ottoman Turkish, and Arabic. The latter were addressed mostly to his uncle, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi, and his brother Thurayya, as well as other relatives or non-relatives, and were often complaints or requests for assistance. Ruhi also maintained correspondence with owners of newspapers published in Syria and Egypt, such as a 1902 letter from Ahmad al-Jisr, owner of Tarablus al-Sham newspaper, in which he informed Ruhi of his intention to publish a magazine called al-Lubab and asked Ruhi to contribute to it.

Thurayya
Mahmud Thurayya al-Khalidi was Siddiqa’s son and Ruhi’s brother and, of course, the groom in the wedding described in the letter. Much of what we know about Thurayya al-Khalidi is what can be gleaned from the correspondence between relatives of the Khalidi family, including Ruhi and Yusuf Diya’ Pasha. In his letters, Thurayya showed great esteem for Ruhi as his elder brother and a kind of father figure after Yasin’s death. Thurayya always addressed his brother as “my lord, the great father, after kissing hands and feet” (al-sayyid al-walid al-mu’azzam ba’da taqbil al-aydi wa al-aqdam). The respect with which Thurayya addressed Ruhi might also be attributed to Ruhi’s professional position. In a December 1901 letter to Yusuf, Thurayya indicated that he was trying to improve himself academically by writing articles and sending them to Ruhi to review and edit. He wrote about archaeology, based on his work in British-supervised excavations at Abu Shusha to which he was appointed after the dismissal of Shawkat al-Khalidi. In a November 1902 letter, Thurayya informed Ruhi of a cholera outbreak in several Palestinian cities, including Hebron, Jaffa, and Gaza, mentioning that all these cities were under quarantine and people were prevented from entering or leaving them until the end of 1903; despite these efforts, the outbreak was not contained, and spread further. Thurayya al-Khalidi died in 1934.

Yusuf Diya’ Pasha
The last personality that figures prominently and repeatedly in the letter is Yusuf Diya’ Pasha al-Khalidi. Yusuf, born in 1842, was – with Yasin, ‘Abd al-Rahman, and Khalil – one of four sons of Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi (d. 1864), a progressive Palestinian intellectual and proponent of social and cultural change in the late nineteenth century, and Asma’ bint Musa al-Khalidi. Yusuf began his education in the kuttab of al-Aqsa mosque, but, desirous of a European education, later studied at the Protestant College in Malta. After two years in Malta, Yusuf’s brother Yasin arranged his transfer to Istanbul, where Yusuf attended the Military Medical School for one year and then Robert College, an American school established in 1863. After eighteen months at the latter, he returned to Jerusalem following his father’s death. Influenced by the various schools he had attended, Yusuf sought to set up similar institutions in Jerusalem. In
1867, he succeeded, with the help of Rashid Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria with whom he would retain close ties, to raise funds for the first rushdiyye school (state middle school) in Jerusalem.

Hoping that he would be appointed to a position in the school, Yusuf was instead made president of the Jerusalem municipality – the first member of the Khalidi to hold this position. In 1874, Yusuf joined the Ottoman translation bureau for six months, and was then sent to serve as the Ottoman consul (shahbandar) to Poti, a Russian city on the coast of the Black Sea. After six months, he was removed from this position and travelled in Russia, eventually arriving in Vienna, where he took a position teaching Arabic and Ottoman language at the Oriental Academy. In 1877–78, after having returned to Jerusalem, he was named representative of the district in the short-lived chamber of deputies. After the chamber was dissolved in 1878, Yusuf was expelled from Istanbul and returned to his position as president of the Jerusalem municipality. He continued to serve the Ottoman state in various positions, including as qa’immaqam of Jaffa and governor of the Mutki district in the predominantly Kurdish Bitlis province. There he studied Kurdish and compiled a Kurdish-Arabic dictionary entitled al-Hadiya al-Hamidiyya fi al-lugha al-Kurdiyya (Hamidian Gift for the Kurdish Language). Yusuf was also presciently aware of Zionist ambitions in Palestine and in 1899 he wrote to the chief rabbi of France, Zadok Kahn, imploring the Zionist movement to “let Palestine be left in peace.”

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Yusuf had returned to Jerusalem, where he remained active in civic life, including sponsoring the installation of iron pipes to deliver water to Jerusalem in 1901. Later that year, after Yasin’s death, Yusuf was again offered the presidency of the municipality, but he turned it down, citing ill health, and nominated Sa’id al-Husayni, who consequently received the position. In June 1901, according to the shari’a court records, Ruhi – visiting Jerusalem around the time of his father’s death – and Thurayya authorized Yusuf to manage their estates within and outside Jerusalem. By 1903, it seems that Yusuf felt that his end was near, writing in a letter to Ruhi: “I ask of you upon your arrival to Marseille to head to the marble vendors and order a beautiful headstone befitting a notable, regardless of the price. Our dear Armenian chief Serapion, may God preserve him for us, has convinced me to be buried in the German Quarter.” In a letter dated March 1905, Yusuf consulted Ruhi about donating his books to the library, expressing his reluctance to do so: “I noticed that people are not so keen on reading.” Ultimately, however, he decided to donate his books to the Khalidi Library, where they are held, along with Yusuf’s last will and testament, recorded by ‘Uthman al-Khalidi. Yusuf Diya’ Pasha died in 1906 in Istanbul.

The Khalidi Library includes dozens of letters between Yusuf and Ruhi. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they reveal Yusuf to be an avid reader, often telling Ruhi that he had read the latter’s articles in Tarablus al-Sham and al-Hilal newspapers, and asking him to “keep sending newspapers [from France] that publish content about our country.” Yusuf was also active in building the library’s collection and asked Ruhi to bring a copy of the French Encyclopédie to add to it. The Khalidi Library also includes two unpublished manuscripts by Yusuf – a four-page autobiography and a work of exegesis.
entitled *Mumahkat al-ta’wil fi munaqadat al-injil* (Disputes of Interpretation regarding Contradictions in the Gospels) – as well as correspondence between him and the German Orientalist Adolf Wahrmund, who had also taught Arabic at the Oriental Academy of Vienna. In these letters to Warhmund, Yusuf discussed the Ottoman-Russian wars and what he saw as Britain’s betrayal and manipulation of the Ottomans, with disastrous human costs. He expressed a desire for reform and modernization in the Ottoman world – to be achieved through implementation of “Muhammadan-Bismarckian ideas” (*al-afkar al-Muhammadiyya al-Bismarkiyya*) – and lamented the educational, economic, and legal deficiencies of “the East.”


Khader Salamah is a senior researcher and librarian at the Khalidi Library in Jerusalem and former director of Masjid al-Aqsa Museum and Library. His many research publications include *Fihris makhtutat Maktabat al-Masjid al-Aqsa* (al-Quds, 1987); *Fihris makhtutat al-Maktaba al-Budayriya* (al-Quds); *Idarat al-Awqaf al-ʻAmma, Maktaba al-Masjid al-Aqṣa*; and *Qaryat Zakariya* (2013).

**Endnotes**

1. Most of the letters are written on medium-sized pages, and they all have a serial number on the top corner in addition to the date in Hijri and sometimes the date in the Gregorian calendar, as well as the Ottoman Rumi or fiscal year. The fiscal year was innovated by the Ottomans to organize financial records, and it began on 1 March 1840. This calendar was used until the proclamation of the Turkish Republic when the Gregorian calendar was adopted instead on 1 January 1926. See Muhammad Siddiq al-Jalili, *al-Taqwim al-shamsi al-ʻUthmani al-musamma bi-l-sanin al-maliya al-Rumaniyya* [The Ottoman Solar Calendar Meaning the Rumi Fiscal Year] (Baghdad: al-Majma‘ al-ʻIlmi al-Iraqi, 1973).

2. This is according to a deed dated 8 Rabi‘ al-Thani 1322 (21 June 1904). *Sijill* no. 397, 245.


6. For a detailed study of marriage traditions in Artas village in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Hilma Granqvist, *Marriage Conditions in a Palestinian Village* (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1931). See also: Mary Eliza Rogers,


8 On the details of Christian marriages in the mentioned period (we assume that traditions of all religions that inhabited Jerusalem in that period were similar), see Jawhariyyeh, al-Quds al-‘uthmani, 111–26. According to ‘Asim al-Khalidi, both the groom-to-be and bride-to-be would be presented with the matter, but they had no say in the decision to accept or refuse an arrangement.

9 Jawhariyyeh, al-Quds al-‘Uthmani, 115.

10 Another method of keeping property within a family was through the establishment of family endowments (awqaf). See Beshara Doumani, Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). It should also be noted that intrafamily marriages (particularly cousin marriage) was common across socioeconomic classes, not only among elites, in Ottoman Palestine.


12 KLA, Ruhi al-Khalidi File, letter no. 46.


14 KLA, Yusuf Diya’ File, letter no. 15.


16 See Moors, Women, Property, and Islam, 81.

17 Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine, 57.

18 In the 1930s, an exhibition was held in Jerusalem to showcase Palestinian and Arab artisanship and artistry. The exhibition included a piece contributed by Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi, a leading Palestinian educator during the Mandate period: his grandmother’s dress. The dress, made in Istanbul, was embroidered with gold; clothing decorated with gold or silver thread or ribbons was known during the Ottoman era as sirma. (Since 2018, the Israel Museum in Jerusalem has been showcasing a similar dress dating from 1910 in Iraq.) See Jawhariyyeh, al-Quds al-‘Uthmani, 546; James W. Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon (Istanbul: Cagrı Yayınları, 2015 [1890]), 1198.

19 Sijill no. 412, 156.

20 Sijill no. 400, 9–10, 38. A rotl is a measurement of weight used throughout the Arab Mediterranean and varying quite widely. In the early 1920s in Palestine, one rotl was slightly less than six and a half pounds. See the report of the U.S. consul in Jerusalem, Addison E. Southard, “Soap Industry of Palestine,” in U.S. Department of State

21 At the library’s inauguration in 1900, its collection – the core of which were books and manuscripts endowed by members of the Khalidi family – comprised: 115 manuscripts and 642 books belonging to Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi; 102 manuscripts and 615 books belonging to Ruhi al-Khalidi; and 100 books belonging to Nadhif al-Khalidi. The collection also includes 91 journals. A note dating to 1886, fourteen years before the actual establishment of the library, records that 1,266 books were donated to the library without identifying their source – a figure remarkably close to the combined collections of Ruhi and Yusuf. KLA records no. 37, 38.

22 See *Sijill* no. 400, 113–16, 143–46.

23 *Sijill* no. 414, 100–2, 124.

24 KLA record 3, file KHD_Doc_15.


27 KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, letter no. 11.

28 *Tarabulus al-Sham* newspaper was issued twice a week; the first issue was published on 13 March 1893. It was the first newspaper published in the city of Tripoli, Lebanon, and continued – despite being suspended a number of times due to its opposition to the state – until the death of its owner, Muhammad Kamil al-Buhayri, in 1920. Under its editor-in-chief Husayn al-Jisr, it published progressive opinions, calling for the opening of libraries and academic and industrial schools for men and women. Husayn al-Jisr and Ruhi al-Khalidi were in correspondence, and the newspaper published at least one article by Ruhi, “Hikmat al-tarikh” (The Wisdom of History), in which he pointed to the country’s regrettable conditions, which had brought it to the brink of an uprising, leading to the newspaper’s suspension by authorities. See Philippe de Tarazi, *Tarih al-sihafa al-‘Arabiyya* [A History of Arab Media] (Beirut: Dar Sadr, 1914), vol. 2, pt. 3, 24; Adib Muruwa, *al-Sihafa al-‘Arabiyya: nash’atuha wa tatawwuruha* [Arab Media: Its Origins and Development] (Beirut: Dar al-maktabat al-hayat, 1961), 181.

29 KLA, ledger no. 5, 96.


31 All of the merit letters have the same text except for the name of the subject, for example: “First prize in religious sciences from the Sultaniyiya School for Ruhi al-Khalidi, First Grade Student from Jerusalem.”

32 In 1897, one Muhammad Rahim wrote to congratulate Ruhi for publishing his research on astronomy and for being appointed a civil officer (*ma’mur*) in the embassy in Paris. KLA, Ruhi al-Khalidi File, letter no. 36.


34 This is based on a document recently discovered in the shari’a court records. After his death, an official meeting was held in the presence of Siddiqa and Thurayya, to register the inheritance and identify beneficiaries. In the document, his mother says: “At this date Ramadan 5, 1331, my son, Muhammad Ruhi bin Yasin passed away in . . . . Beşiktaş.” *Sijill* no. 411, 24.


One is ten pages written in pencil and the other comprises drafts of letters.

The letters are currently being translated from French to English with the help of the French Cultural Center.

Jisr refers in his letter to a Marrakesh-related article (al-maqala al-Murrakushiyya) that Ruhi had written. KLA, Ruhi al-Khalidi File, letter no. 47.

KLA, Thurayya al-Khalidi File, letter no. 12.

KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, letter no. 9.

Biographical information on Yusuf Diya’ Pasha is drawn from Schölch, Palestine in Transformation, 241–52; and Manna, A’lam Filastin, 146–51.


On the back of a letter from Thurayyya, dated 23 December 1901, Yusuf wrote a note telling Ruhi about sponsoring the installing of iron water pipes in Jerusalem, for which he paid 6,500 Ottoman liras. With the installation of the pipes, water was delivered to al-Haram al-Sharif on the sultan’s birthday, and Yusuf Diya’ Pasha appears in a photograph of the ceremony at al-Haram al-Sharif. He attended on behalf of the mayor, his brother Yasin, who was ill with jaundice. See KLA, Thurayyya al-Khalidi File, letter no. 12; Sijill 393, 173, image 932; Vincent Lemire, Jerusalem 1900: The Holy City in the Age of Possibilities, trans. Catherine Tihanyi and Lys Ann Weis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 148.

KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, letter no. 1. Yusuf wrote: “I nominate Sa’id al-Husayni to be president . . . the governor asked me to accept the presidency, but I am physically weak and ill most of the days, and I cannot endure the burden of this commission.” On Sa’id al-Husayni, see Manna, A’lam Filastin, 129.

Sijill 393, 173, image 932.

KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, letter no. 16.

KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, letter no. 4.

KLA, Thurayyya al-Khalidi File, letter no. 23.

KLA, Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi File, document no. 33. See also Schölch, Palestine in Transformation, 246.

Yusuf describes the war as resulting in the deaths of more than one hundred thousand soldiers, more than half of them Arabs, including ten thousand Palestinians.

Yusuf described al-Tafila, Karak, al-Salt, and Jericho as lands “that are destined for ruin”; recounted discussions with Bedouin about progress; decried the state of chaos and rebellion on the island of Crete; and ended one letter by pointing to imbalance between East and West: “the foreigners have a law that they refer to in all matters, whether good or bad. We are the ignorant ones, and if we continue to close our eyes, we will undoubtedly become their servants . . . If any of us look at what we are wearing we will find that it is all made by foreigners starting with the boots and ending with the head dress, but if we look at the foreigners we know, we will find that they wear nothing made in Eastern countries.” However, a renewed focus on the study of science and implementation of “Muhammadan-Bismarckian ideas” would, according to Yusuf, put the Ottoman lands “on the right path.”

Jerusalem Quarterly 79 [ 89 ]
Siddiqa’s Letter: Original and Annotated Translation

Figure 1. Siddiqa’s Letter, page 1. Khalidi Library, Jerusalem.
1.1 My son, joy of my heart, may the Lord keep you happy here and in the afterlife.

1.2 I send you my exalted greetings. I received your letter, and I am glad that you are well and healthy. In it you informed me that nobody had written anything to you and that you did not know about anything since your brother is too shy to tell you the details. Thank God, the new daughter-in-law can read and write and she is sitting beside me writing this letter.¹

1.3 The engagement [al-khitba] . . . . I sent after Jamil Effendi² and informed him that I wanted my son Thurayya to marry Nash’at Khanum,³ provided that he not inform anybody, as his uncle, the Pasha,⁴ was in Jaffa and was not aware. So consult your father and mother and get back to me with an answer. On the fourth day, [Abu] Jamil Effendi⁵ visited me and notified me: my daughter is your daughter and my son is your son.⁶

1.4 Then we sent a telegraph to your uncle, the Pasha, asking him to come quickly. He arrived the same evening and asked me why I sent for him, so I gave him an account of it. Then I sent word to Abu Jamil that we would come for the milak on Thursday.

1.5 The engagement present [al-milak] . . . The diamond earrings that you know, and a silk suit⁷ worth five francs,⁸ a small box, a brocaded parcel,⁹ five silk handkerchiefs, and a lavender box,¹⁰ the value of all being two hundred lira. I placed them all within the small box and took a carriage with Nabiha Khanum;¹¹ Zaynab Khanum;¹² Umm Musa; Dhahra Khanum;¹³ Amina Khanum;¹⁴ the late ‘Abd al-Salam Effendi’s mother; ‘A’isha al-Sa’udiyya; Fatima, the wife of Shawkat Effendi;¹⁵ the neighbors;¹⁶ your uncle the Pasha; and ‘Uthman Nuri Efffendi.¹⁷ We went to Abu Jamil’s house and had lunch there. Lunch was stuffed chicken, stuffed zucchini, stuffed cucumbers, musaqqa’a,¹⁸ meat and rice, and yellow and green watermelon. We laughed and had fun and Sitt Amina played the oud,¹⁹ then we returned home.
Figure 2. Siddiqa’s Letter, page 2. Khalidi Library, Jerusalem.
2.1 The marriage contract [al-kitab] . . . I went to Abu Jamil’s house with the same people who accompanied me to the milak. The district administrator, the qadi, and the rest of the notables were in attendance.

2.2 The groom’s representative was your uncle, the Pasha, while your uncle Muhammad Effendi and Jamil Effendi served as witnesses. The bride’s representative was the mufti effendi, and her well-known uncle Hajj Raghib Effendi and Jamil Effendi served as witnesses. The marriage was officiated by Hajj Khurshid Effendi al-Shihabi. After the ceremony, glasses were passed around for toasts with American orange juice. After the men’s departure, I remained with those whom I mentioned earlier, including the Pasha and Nuri Effendi and also the female relatives of the deputy and we had lunch there. Lunch was a stuffed lamb, stuffed eggplants, stuffed cucumbers, musaqqa’a, meat and rice, kunafa, baklava, peaches, and an assortment of fruit. But to my dismay, her esteemed uncle did not attend the milak, while her well-respected uncle Muhammad Effendi did not attend the ceremony.

2.4 I found this behavior very regrettable.

2.5 The wedding celebration [al-zifaf] . . . On the evening of Saturday, 20 Sha‘ban, the wedding celebration was held in our house, that is, in the house of Ibrahim Effendi Labban.

2.6 We set up a great tent that we called the salon, and the groom came with his uncle, the Pasha, and sat in the place of honor. After the Pasha sat there for a brief time, he headed to Shawkat Effendi’s house. Then I came with the mother of the bride, Umm Jamil Effendi, who sat to the groom’s right, while I sat to his left. Sitt Nabiha Khanum stayed with the bride while she was unveiled. The tent was erected at the far end of the property. The bride walked from the house toward the tent and the groom stood up and scattered ten-piaster mettalliques over her head. Then he lifted the veil from her head and she sat beside him on the right. Sitt ‘A’isha al-Sa‘udiyya came and gifted the groom a watch and a matching chain, and a diamond ring.
Figure 3. Siddiqa’s Letter, page 3. Khalidi Library, Jerusalem.
3.1 Afterward I danced and after that Umm Musa came and danced as well, while Sitt Amina played the oud. After nearly half an hour the bride and groom got up,

3.2 holding hands, and headed toward the house that was the selamlik when you were here, and where the bed had been placed. After the bride and groom left, Sitt 'A’isha al-Sa’udiyya came and snatched the presents from the groom and there ensued great laughter.

3.3 As for the furnishings [al-farsh] . . . it consisted of one sofa; two armchairs, as well as two olivewood armchairs made in Damascus; a table also made in Damascus; a closet and a chest of drawers;

3.4 and crystal glasses, a tea set and a coffee set; seven mattresses, nine blankets, six pillows, and a bed set. As for the bed, I brought it from Beirut, and it is made from expensive yellow sandarac wood, and cost fifteen francs, and a mosquito net worth eleven francs.

3.5 The wedding presents [al-nuqut] . . . The next morning, the groom gave the bride a diamond broach, and another diamond broach, which your late uncle brought from Istanbul, on your behalf.

3.6 Her father gave her diamond earrings, Jamil Effendi gave her a diamond ring, Sadr al-Din Effendi gave her a watch and chain, Mu’az Effendi gave her a gold pin called a “souvenir.” Her esteemed uncle Raghib Effendi gave her five francs and Sitt Dhahra Khanum gave her five francs also, because your uncle

3.7 Nuri Effendi went to Jaffa on the day of the wedding, as if fleeing the wedding. As for your Aunt Labiba Khanum, she did not come to the wedding, and I think she would rather be flogged twenty times

3.8 than deign herself to be at this wedding. . . . The bride brought a Syrian quilt and a silk handkerchief wrapped in a parcel made of expensive fabric for you and a similar one for your uncle, the Pasha,

3.9 and for Nuri Effendi and Shawkat Effendi. As for the groom’s outfit, it was a complete sleepwear set, from socks to handkerchief.
Figure 4. Siddiqa’s Letter, page 4. Khalidi Library, Jerusalem.
4.1 I think this is enough, and your Aunt Nabiha Khanum sends her love and good wishes to you, saying may God bless you and your mother and your brother and may God reward you with a blessed bride. May God perpetuate your noble existence and grant me sight of you soon in good health. My son, I hope you do not delay writing to me, as nothing pleases me as much as reading your words, and God willing I will come to visit you soon with the new bride.

4.4 6 Dhu al-Qida 1323

Your mother,

Siddiqa

4.6 I forgot to tell you that your uncle, the Pasha, gave [as a wedding gift] diamond earrings.

4.7 [added in a different handwriting] Your Uncle Yusuf Diya’ wishes you the very best, and says: given the very cold weather I couldn’t write you a long letter, so forgive me this time, and may God’s peace and kindness be upon you.

Endnotes
1 The bride’s ability to read and write indicates that some Jerusalemite families enrolled their daughters in schools. It is worth noting that most schools, and girls’ schools in particular, in Jerusalem at the end of the Ottoman era were missionary schools. In 1903, there were four French schools and three German schools for girls in Jerusalem, and (mostly elite) families sent their daughters to these schools, as well as *katatib* (Qur’anic schools), to educate them. Although the Ottoman Empire passed a public education law in 1869, its impact was limited until the era of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–1909), when parents were obliged to contribute to the costs of school construction and teacher salaries. See Ela Greenberg, *Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow: Education and Islam in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 17, 29, 33; Yucel Gelişli, “Education of Women from the Ottoman Empire to Modern Turkey,” *SEER: Journal for Labor and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe* 7, no. 4 (2004): 121–35.

2 Jamil was the bride’s brother, Jamil bin Musa Shafiq al-Khalidi.


4 Yusuf Diya’ al-Khalidi.

5 Musa Shafiq bin Muhammad Tahir al-Khalidi (d. 1346 h./1927 AD).

6 *Al-bint bintik wa al-walad waladik*, meaning that the two families will be united in marriage.

7 The suit material is described as *janfas*, a fine silk cloth; the origins of the word are from the Ottoman Turkish *janvis*, a loan word from the Italian *canevaccio*, meaning “canvas.” See Husayn Lubani, *Mu’jam al-‘ammi wa al-dakhil fil Filastin* [Dictionary of Colloquial and Loan Words in Palestine] (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnan, 2006), 105.

8 *Lira faransawi*.

9 *Buqja*, from an Ottoman Turkish word meaning a bundle of clothes, is an embroidered cloth wrapping within which clothing is kept. In this context, not only the embroidered container, but its contents – which we do not know – were a gift to the

10 *Sanduq lawanda*, from the Italian word *lavanda*, the name of the lavender flower. Such a box would have been used to keep the possessions and clothes of the bride. See James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Istanbul: Cagrı Yayınları, 2015 [1890]), 1622.

11 Nabiha Khanum was the daughter of Tahir bin Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi and the aunt of Nash’at bint Musa Shafiq. *Sijill* no. 416, pp. 126–27.

12 Zaynab Khanum was the daughter of Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi and half-sister of Yusuf Diya’ Pasha on his mother’s side; her mother, Hafiza, was Thurayya’s aunt. *Sijill* no. 416, p. 3.

13 It is unclear if the Dhahra named here is the daughter of Dawud bin Muhammad Amin al-Khalidi (d. 1316 h./1898 AD) (see *Sijill* no. 397, p. 24) or the daughter of Musa ‘Imran al-Khalidi and Ruqayya al-‘Alami (see *Sijill* no. 398, p. 41–42).

14 Amina Badr al-Khalidi – daughter of Badr bin Mustafa al-Khalidi and Salma al-Ja‘uni, and sister of Shaykh Khalil al-Khalidi – was a great philanthropist, who endowed all her properties to build a university in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the project did not come to fruition, although there are detailed blueprints for the university in the Islamic Waqf Department in Jerusalem.

15 Fatima bint ‘Imran was married to Mahmud Shawkat bin Ibrahim Adham bin Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi, the half-brother of Musa Shafiq and son of Tahir bin ‘Ali al-Khalidi and Khalidiyya, the daughter of Badr and Salma. See *Sijill* no. 390, pp. 65–66; *Sijill* no. 418, p. 46.

16 *Al-jiwar*.

17 Son of ‘Ali Ratib bin Muhammad Tahir Effendi and Amina bint Muhammad, and brother of Sun‘allah and ‘Iraqiya. See *Sijill* no. 400, p. 115.

18 A room-temperature dish whose main ingredient is eggplant, often in a tomato sauce.

19 Though one might expect that playing the oud (and dancing), especially by women, would have contravened social norms among more conservative elements of Palestinian society in the late Ottoman period, this letter offers evidence that it was not unusual among urban elites. Further, Wasif Jawhariyyeh lists a number of musicians, dancers, and oud manufacturers in late Ottoman Jerusalem, and even mentions a woman oudist, Frusu Zahran, who was famous for her evening performances in Jerusalem, “especially at wedding celebrations of the wealthy peasants in Jerusalem district, in Abu Dis, al-‘Ayyariya, and al-Tur, and likewise in Bethlehem.” Jawhariyyeh, *al-Quds al-‘uthmani*, 148–53, quote at 149. On music in Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period, see Rachel Beckles Willson, “Hearing Palestine,” foreword to *The Storyteller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, 1904–1948*, ed. Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2014), ix–xvi.

20 The district administrator (mutassarif) of Jerusalem in that period was Ahmad Rashid Bey, who served in this position in 1905–6. See Salname 1323 h./1905 AD, 904; Salname 1324 h./1906 AD, 968.

21 The qadi of the Jerusalem shari’a court, appointed by a letter signed by an Anatolian military judge on 15 Ramadan 1313 h. (1895 AD), was ‘Abd al-Hamid bin Sa’id bin Ahmad bin ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Rafi‘i al-Trabulsi. He was born in Tripoli in 1855 and studied there and at al-Azhar in Egypt. In addition to Jerusalem, Trabulsi served as qadi in Hama, Latakia, Basra, Medina, Aleppo, and finally Izmir, where he died. See *Sijill mahkamat al-Quds al-shar‘iyya, raqm 388: fahrasa tahliliyya*, 22 Muḥarram 1314 h. (4/7/1896 m.)–8 Dhu al-Qa‘da 1325 h. (14/12/1907 m.) [Register of the Jerusalem Shari’a Court, No. 388: Analytical Index, 22 Muḥarram 1314 ḥijri (4/7/1896 AD)–8 Dhu al-Qa‘da 1325 ḥijri (14/12/1907 AD)], ed. ‘Abla al-Muhtadi, supervised by Muhammad ‘Adnan al-Bakhit (Amman: University of Jordan, 2006), 1, 15–16.

22 Likely Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Siddiqa’s brother.

23 The mufti of Jerusalem at that time was Muhammad Tahir al-Husayni (Sijill no. 388, 37).

24 By all indications, this is Hajj Raghib bin Nu‘man al-Khalidi, the bride’s maternal uncle,
not the brother of Siddiqa. Hajj Raghib bin Nu'man al-Khalidi was the son of Nu'man al-Khalidi (d. 1382 h./1865 AD) and Siddiqa al-Husayni; he had two brothers, Ahmad and Yahya, and two sisters, Manzuma and Hasiba, and was married to Haja Khadija, daughter of Hajj Musa bin Sun'allah. Sijill no. 395, 368; Sijill no. 397, p. 70.

25 Muhammad Khurshid bin Abd al-Rahman bin Yusuf al-Shihabi worked at the shari'a court as a second clerk in that period. Two members of the Khalidi family served as clerks in the court at that time, and the head clerk was 'Uthman Zaki bin 'Abd al-Rahman Nafidh bin Muhammad 'Ali al-Khalidi. Sijill no. 388, 18, 29.

26 Shurub al-burtuq shughl al-Amrikan. According to Salim Tamari, this likely referred to orange juice from the American Colony Hotel.

27 Harim na’ib effendi.

28 Rendered in Arabic here as bataljan. See Lubani, Mu’jam al-’ammi, 67; Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, 318.

29 The bride had three uncles on her mother’s side, and the letter does not specify which one Siddiqa means here.

30 Siddiqa may be referring here to Muhammad bin Salman bin ‘Ali bin Muhammad bin Khalil Sun’allah, the cousin of the bride’s father.

31 1323 hijri coinciding with 20 November 1905 AD.

32 The house can still be found on Chain Gate Road (Tariq Bab al-Silsila), house number 140, and it is part of the Khalidi family endowment. The children of Haydar Kamil al-Khalidi live there at present.

33 Shadiran kabiran, a large tent or canopy; the word shadir has Persian origins. Lubani, Mu’jam al-’ammi, 291.

34 Wa hiya tanjala.

35 Rash ‘ala ra’sha (al-matalik) al-mu’abbar ‘anha bi-l-’ushari. The metallique or mettalik was the “name given to a variety of low grade silver Turkish coins, which constituted a large part of the ordinary circulation, chiefly in Asia Minor.” Although the value of metalliques varied, these, called ‘ushari or “tenners,” seem to have been worth ten piastres each. Albert R. Frey, “A Dictionary of Numismatic Names: Their Official and Popular Designations,” American Journal of Numismatics 50 (1916): 148.

36 Burunj, from the Turkish, meaning a small cover worn on the head, most likely in this context referring to a head and face veil. Lubani, Mu’jam al-’ammi, 396.

37 Kustik, from the Turkish köstek, meaning the metal chain attached to a pocket watch; kustik is still used in Arabic to refer to the band of a wristwatch.

38 Salamlık, from selamlık, “the Ottoman Turkish term for the outer, more public rooms of a traditionally arranged house, used, for example, for the reception of guests and non-family members; it thus contrasted with the inner rooms which constituted the haram or harem for the womenfolk.” “Selāmlık,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill, 2012), online at dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_6699 (accessed 9 May 2019). See also Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, 1071.

39 Qultuq, from the Turkish qoltuq. Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, 1494.

40 Biru, probably from the French word “bureau”: a chest of long horizontal drawers, in which underwear and baby clothes are usually stored, often topped with a mirror in a decorated frame. Lubani, Mu’jam al-’ammi, 64.

41 Sandarin, from the Ottoman senderus: the sandarac or Tetracclinis articulata is a large evergreen conifer in the cypress family that is native to North Africa. Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, 1082.

42 1 February 1906 AD.
Diaries of the Fall


Review by Walid Habbas

In *The Recovery of Palestine, 1917: Jerusalem for Christmas*, Stanley Weintraub once again narrates the daily life of a great war by opening the diaries of notable individuals, joining his earlier works on wars erupting at (or for!) Christmas, such as World War I (2001; 2014), the Battle of the Bulge in World War II (2007), Pearl Harbor (2012), and others. The author served as a second lieutenant in the eighth U.S. army in Korea in the early 1950s, and went on to a career as a historian and biographer specializing in T. E. Lawrence, Richard Cœur de Lion, and Bernard Shaw. The two heroes around whom *The Recovery of Palestine* pivots are General Edmund Allenby (Weintraub attempts to show both his plans and his intentions as unblemished) and T. E. Lawrence who was “doing a great job” helping to fulfill the “imperial designs” in spite of his “pro-Arab ventures.” Weintraub is thus less a critical historian than an acolyte of “great men.”

In the midst of World War I, with British morale falling due to the Russian Revolution, which brought down the allied Czarist regime, and after several failed attempts by General Archibald Murray to conquer southern Palestine, British prime minister David Lloyd George turned to a new commander, General Edmund Allenby, who was asked to take Jerusalem before Christmas. Allenby (or “al-Nabi,” the prophet, as some misled Arabs pronounced his name at the time) was a brilliant general raised on the Bible and armed with George Adam Smith’s *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, handed to him by Lloyd George as “a better guide to a military leader whose task was to reach Jerusalem than any survey to be found in the pigeon-holes of the War Office.”
Weintraub includes many engaging details of the daily lives of the British soldiers who advanced without stopping from Gaza toward Jerusalem, with the goal of presenting the holy city to the British nation as a Christmas gift. In writing the details of this campaign, Weintraub reproduces the daily lives and the long nights of the British, Australian, and New Zealander troops, to illuminate the great obstacles facing this symbolic victory. Weintraub attempts to show that the on-the-ground realities of the war proved that the Ottomans were an easy prey due to the clever and unexpected military plans of Allenby and his chief of intelligence, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. The main obstacles were in fact natural ones: the “extreme climate” of the Sinai (the real “enemy”) was so intensely hot that metal weapons “had to be wetted before being lifted”; snakes and insects attacked the troops; wild storms and heavy rains slowed the troops’ progress; and so on. After surviving the Sinai campaign under Murray’s command, Allenby drew a number of lessons and chose to launch his campaign against Gaza and “penetrate Palestine” in late October so as to avoid the extreme summer sun.

It is no wonder that the book ends with the euphoria of the conquest, since Weintraub’s purpose is to narrate the details of this hard-won battle, emphasizing its symbolic importance for the British. Weintraub devotes only a few pages to events after 8 December 1917, the day when Izzet Bey, the Ottoman governor of Jerusalem, personally implemented his “last act as governor” by destroying the telegraph office in Jerusalem with a hammer. The next day, Husayn al-Husayni, the mayor of the defeated city, passed the holy city’s keys to Major General John Shea, asking him to protect Jerusalem as the Muslims had “protected it for more than five hundred years.” At last, the mission was accomplished and, as the New York Herald headline declared, “Jerusalem Is Rescued by British after 673 Years of Moslem Rule.”

On the way to conquer Jerusalem, the author implicitly differentiates between the real goals of the battle and those distributed for public consumption. On the one hand, the decision to wage war is based on economical and geopolitical considerations, and the Palestine campaign must be understood in the context of Britain’s growing “anxiety … about the security of Suez, its route to India.” On the other hand, any victory that paved the way to a British military parade in the heart of Jerusalem would make headlines in “British newspapers hungry for good news.” Weintraub is well aware of the magic of religious discourse in uplifting the morale of the British nation and tells the story of Jerusalem’s conquest as a hard-won victory motivated by the longing for biblical Jerusalem.

Indeed, what makes this victory unprecedented in the midst of World War I was the systematic employment of the biblical status of “stolen” Jerusalem. Thus, the author, deliberately, begins with a chapter titled “The Dream of Jerusalem,” where he digs deep in the diaries of prominent British politicians and re-reads the Bible, silencing some phrases and highlighting others, to place Jerusalem at the “center of the world.” Jerusalem becomes central not only to Jewish and Christian mythology, and to politician’s speeches, but also to the representations of the British masses, for whom Jerusalem was not a “destination” until 1917.

As in Weintraub’s previous works, this book is based mainly on diaries and autobiographies, but the poor organization of references and bibliography, as well as his
hagiography, leads this book to read more like a work of historical fiction rather than a work of historical documentation.

Weintraub tries hard to convert the Battle of Palestine into a novelistic tale full of plots, where the reader is pushed to sympathize with the biblically-motivated mission to conquer Jerusalem. In doing so, he joins the club of Orientalist historians who, in narrating the details of the battle for Palestine in 1917, place Jerusalem at the center of the world. The author continuously describes Jerusalem as the umbilical cord that combines the Zionist idea with British interests. As Allenby ordered British aircraft to bomb the historic Mount of Olives in order to force the Ottomans and Germans to withdraw faster regardless of the fate of Jewish holy places, Meinertzhagen expressed his anger and “became an ardent Zionist.” The mission to “free” Jerusalem became even more urgent as the Ottomans were seen to intensify the humiliation of the “Christians and Jews in the city.” Furthermore, in London, the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann offered the British troops ten thousand tons of acetone “for no fee” in the first years of the war; in its last months, the British troops were receiving aid from the mysterious Zionist spy Aaron Aaronsohn and his wife Sarah. The author presents these events successively to show that mutual interest during the campaign tightened the ideological connections between the Britain and the Zionist ideas. This mutual assistance was translated into the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917. The creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine became more attainable as the British troops took Nabi Samwel, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, on 21 November. The capture of the holy city became a matter of time.

The author refers repeatedly to the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the autobiographical account of Lawrence, the British Orientalist and army officer. Lawrence was not a passive witness recording his diaries during the battle, but an active participant who was, more than any other Briton, familiar with the society and engaged in the politics of the Bedouin of southern Palestine. The author seems to accept the controversial claim raised by Lawrence that Lawrence’s efforts were met by his rape by Hajim Muhittin Bey, the Dara’a district governor, and that the conquest of Jerusalem erased this dark moment when the Orientalist soldier attended the British army parade in Jerusalem, where his eyes met those of General Allenby as he descended from his Rolls Royce.

Through this “biblical” conquest, Jerusalem was re-centered again in the collective memory of the British – after being presented as a “gift for Christmas” to the dejected British masses in the war. Weintraub decided to publish his work one hundred years later, deploying his charming style, as if he was recounting another – modern – Crusade. As a book of history, The Recovery of Palestine, 1917: Jerusalem for Christmas narrates the battle of Palestine in a stereotypical and selective way.

Walid Habbas is a PhD student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He focuses on the political economy of the West Bank, including modes of Palestinian–Israeli economic interaction disaggregated by class and sector. His fields of interest are Israeli colonial structure, native agency, and the economy of borderlands.
Reversing Israel’s Deepening Annexation of Occupied East Jerusalem

International Crisis Group

I. Introduction

The stakes in Jerusalem are high. For Israeli Jews the city’s name, Yerushalayim (Abode of Peace), evokes the biblical seat of Jewish kings and the site of ancient Jewish temples. Virtually all members of the current governing coalition – in line with the majority of the Jewish public – agree on three fundamental policy principles: that Jerusalem should be Israel’s capital, that the capital must include parts of occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City and its immediate environs, and that it ought to have a Jewish majority. This consensus stands because most Israeli Jews view the modern city in continuity with the biblical city – return to which Jews across the world have prayed for two millennia.

For Palestinians, the city of al-Quds (the Holy) also lies at the core of national and religious identities and shapes political objectives. Palestinians point to their historical role as defenders of al-Aqsa mosque, located in the occupied Old City. Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leaders assert that a Palestinian state without a capital in East Jerusalem is “worthless”.

The modern diplomatic history of the conflict over Jerusalem began with UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (November 1947), which called for the partition of Mandatory Palestine into two states (one Arab, one Jewish, with equal rights for minorities in each state) and specified that the Jerusalem area – the Jerusalem municipality and several surrounding towns, including Bethlehem – would comprise a corpus separatum under a Special International Regime.

Editor’s Note:
The following has been excerpted from the full report published in June 2019 by the International Crisis Group, available online at www.crisisgroup.org
By the end of the 1948 war, Israel had expanded its boundaries well beyond those of the 1947 partition plan into the corpus separatum, including the western half of Jerusalem. Jordan, which took control of the West Bank, declared a second capital (after Amman) in East Jerusalem, over an area of 6 sq km, which included the entirety of the Old City and most of its holy sites. In 1950, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, declared a capital in the part of Jerusalem under its control. Israel built most of its governing institutions there. The UN and the international community rejected both Israel’s and Jordan’s unilateral declarations and remained committed to the idea of a Special International Regime for Jerusalem.

Following the 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank and unilaterally expanded the city’s municipal boundary to encompass the formerly Jordanian-ruled areas (6 sq km) as well as an additional 70 sq km that included dozens of surrounding West Bank villages. In so doing, Israeli leaders weighed several factors: security considerations, preserving land for future development, historical and religious attachments, and bringing into the city “maximum territory and minimum population.” In 1980, the Knesset passed a Basic Law declaring that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.” The Oslo Accords of the 1990s defined Jerusalem as a final status issue, leaving it under Israeli rule during what was supposed to have been an interim period. During final status negotiations in 2000, Israeli and Palestinian leaders discussed partitioning the city, yet the talks collapsed over several issues, notably disagreement about sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The second intifada erupted in September 2000, beginning the most violent Israeli-Palestinian escalation since 1967. In 2001, Israel shut down Orient House – the PLO’s de facto headquarters in Jerusalem, where political, social and cultural activities took place – and has since forbidden all Palestinian political activity in East Jerusalem. Suicide bombings, which took a particularly high toll in Jerusalem, led the Israeli public to support erecting a massive separation barrier to prevent entry of would-be attackers from the West Bank (very few attackers came from East Jerusalem). Cut off from the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA) and without local leadership, large families in East Jerusalem attempted to fill the political vacuum. But they could not prevent the dissolution of the area’s social fabric or the rise of criminality. Because boundaries are porous, particularly for drugs and crime, these problems have begun to plague the city’s Jewish population as well.

Whereas elsewhere in the West Bank the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) determined the barrier’s route, based partly on security considerations, in Jerusalem Prime Minister Ariel Sharon saw to it that the barrier’s path was guided primarily by political considerations: setting Israel’s potential future borders. Though the barrier for the most part followed the city’s municipal boundaries (themselves unilaterally determined by Israel in 1967), it also strayed from them in two important respects: first, it included within Israel several large settlement blocs outside municipal Jerusalem (Givat Ze’ev to the north, Ma’ale Adumim to the east and Gush Etzion to the south); and second, in two crowded Palestinian-populated areas within municipal Jerusalem, Shuafat refugee camp (as well as parts of adjoining Anata) and Kafr Aqab, Sharon opted to route the fence inside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, thus placing Shuafat/Anata and Kafr Aqab east of the barrier. (Sharon did the same in part of al-Walaja, in the southern part of East Jerusalem, as well
as in al-Sawahra, in the east.) Soon thereafter, the Israeli police stopped operating in these areas. All other Israeli authorities followed suit, leaving these Palestinian Jerusalemites forced to pay municipal taxes, lest they lose their residency, while receiving almost no municipal services. Lawlessness, poverty and crime increased.

Tens of thousands of West Bankers moved into the areas without Israel’s permission, residing illegally, according to Israeli law, within occupied East Jerusalem, even though both it and the rest of the West Bank are occupied territory under international law: some came for cheap housing, built in the absence of regulations; some were married to Jerusalemites, whom Israel has, as a rule, refused permission to live with their West Bank spouses in Jerusalem west of the barrier. Others wanted proximity to higher-wage employment in the Jerusalem area; and still others sought a refuge from both the PA and Israel. The municipality estimates, conservatively, that the number who moved into Shuafat/Anata and Kafr Aqab is between 40,000 and 60,000, for an overall Palestinian population living inside these two areas estimated at 140,000; these figures do not include the much smaller populations in the other two areas east of the barrier, al-Sawahra and al-Walaja. During the outbreak of attacks by Palestinians in 2014-2017, which some have called the al-Quds Intifada, roughly half the perpetrators came from these areas.

On 6 December 2017, the U.S. recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital; in May 2018, it relocated its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; and on 4 March 2019, it shut down its Jerusalem consulate and merged it into the embassy. Farther away but in the same vein, on 25 March the U.S. recognised Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights. These moves lent encouragement to Israel’s leading political and rabbinic advocates of annexation, who argue that steps once deemed impossible (because of international opposition) have now become possible. Israeli leaders have advanced several ambitious plans to consolidate control of the occupied East Jerusalem. Israel’s government purposely met to authorise the five-year plan for doing so the day after the U.S. inaugurated its embassy in Jerusalem, seeking “maximal symbolic gains and international backing”.

This report sheds light on Israeli policymaking in occupied East Jerusalem. It analyses existing policy plans; it also describes intra-Israeli power struggles that affect Jerusalem policy as well as these policies’ probable impact on the conflict and prospects for its resolution. It is based primarily on nearly a hundred interviews with Israeli officials and elected leaders, PA and PLO officials, diplomats and civil society activists between January 2018 and May 2019.

II. A Jewish Majority in “Unified Jerusalem” at Minimum Cost

A. Demographic Manipulations
Since 1967, successive Israeli governments have sought to maintain a large and lasting Jewish majority within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, as unilaterally determined
by Israel shortly after it occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank in 1967. Israeli governments pursued these objectives primarily through settlement construction, bringing Jews to East Jerusalem and neglecting the Arab parts of the city to impede Palestinian natural growth and nudge Palestinians to depart.

But Israel has consistently failed to hit its numeric targets. The size of the city’s Jewish majority has continued to shrink, declining from a ratio of 74 Jewish to 26 Palestinian residents in 1967 to a 62:38 ratio in 2016. Part of the story is Israel’s failure to attract Jewish Israelis into the city, combined with Jewish outmigration to other parts of Israel. But the primary reason for the narrowing Jewish majority is that Palestinian population growth has outpaced that of the Jewish population. In response, Israel adjusted its demographic objectives downward. Whereas in 1973 the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Checking Development Rates in Jerusalem (aka the Gafni Committee) set a goal of preserving the ratio that existed at the time (73.5 per cent Jews to 25.5 per cent Arabs), in 2007 the Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 reset the target to a 60-40 ratio. Israeli officials increasingly doubt the feasibility of even this lowered objective. A candidate in the 2018 mayoral race, Ze’ev Elkin, the current Jerusalem affairs minister, warned Jerusalemites that by the 2023 municipal election the city may no longer have a Jewish majority.

B. **Territorial Schemes**

Israel’s territorial policy objectives in Jerusalem – building large Jewish population centres in and around the occupied East to ensure permanent Israeli control of the city – have proven more attainable. Israeli settlement in and around occupied East Jerusalem consists of three “belts”: an outer belt that defines what Israel calls Greater Jerusalem; a middle belt connecting West Jerusalem to Mount Scopus (a UN-protected enclave with Israeli institutions from 1949 to 1967); and an inner belt encircling the Old City.

The outer belt, which circumscribes a purported Greater Jerusalem, comprises three “fingers” of suburban settlement, each of which extends roughly 10 km from the city’s municipal boundaries into the occupied West Bank: Givat Ze’ev in the north, Ma’ale Adumim in the east and Gush Etzion in the south. There is a broad Israeli consensus that, with or without a peace agreement, the three main Greater Jerusalem settlements should be incorporated into the State of Israel. Moreover, Israeli governments have been making slow but steady progress at merging these settlements, as well as Jerusalem’s western suburbs, into a single metropolis, with common infrastructure, such as public transport networks.

In the middle belt, Israel has built many new Jewish settlements in areas of occupied East Jerusalem within the city’s municipal boundaries. The oldest of these – Givat HaMivtar, Maalot Dafna, Ramat Eshkol and French Hill – were built to connect West Jerusalem with the East Jerusalem area of Mount Scopus. Others were established with the intention of encircling, from the occupied East, the Jewish and Arab city centres, thereby cutting off East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Today only a small strip of Palestinian-inhabited territory remains, between Mount Scopus and Jabel Mukaber, constituting the only significant opening from East Jerusalem into the West Bank.
The innermost belt encircles the occupied Old City and its surrounding basin, which includes the revered historical and holy sites. Here the main direct driver of settlement activity is not the Israeli government but settler groups, including non-governmental organisations and yeshivas (institutes of religious learning), that enjoy government backing for their archaeological, educational and touristic projects. These groups are building a contiguous ring of Jewish settlements and national parks in East Jerusalem to surround the Old City in the hope of preventing an Israeli withdrawal from it in any eventual settlement.

In addition to settlement facts on the ground, Israel has pursued its territorial goals by encouraging a consensus in Jewish public opinion in favour of safeguarding Jerusalem in its expanded form as “eternally united”. Jerusalem scholar Ian Lustick has characterised this policy, which the state promulgated through the school system, legislation (including the abovementioned Jerusalem Basic Law) and politicians’ speeches, as the “fetishisation of Yerushalayim”. In effect, this policy extended the deep, religious and historical attachment that Jews feel to the Old City, less than 1 sq km in area, outside the city walls to include over two dozen distant villages. One former senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asked to explain the logic of his government’s insistence on including the Shuafat refugee camp within the capital boundaries that Israel claims, retorted: “If we give up on Shuafat, we put the Old City in danger”.

III. Squaring Circles

Despite extensive construction in Jewish areas of Jerusalem, both in the West and in settlements within the occupied East, and the severe impediments placed even on natural growth of Arab neighbourhoods within the city, Israel has failed to achieve its goal of establishing a durable and substantial Jewish majority. A former Israeli minister described the dilemma: “East Jerusalem remains stuck in our throat: we can’t swallow it and we can’t spit it out”.

Israeli leaders have contemplated several ambitious ways of maintaining a demographic majority in a unified greater Jerusalem. Some plans face the demographic challenge head on by altering municipal boundaries to include additional Jewish settlements within the city or to exclude Palestinian areas. Other plans aim to expand the supply of residential units for Jews in West Jerusalem, thereby increasing the proportion of Jews inside the municipal boundaries. Though Israel has adopted none of these proposals thus far, they all deserve attention, not only because they are likely to resurface in the future, but also because the political dynamics that prevented their adoption remain relevant. The main policy Israel aims to pursue, in what would be a departure from its longstanding neglect of the city’s Palestinian population, is a plan to economically integrate Palestinian East Jerusalem and its population into Israel while diluting Palestinian national identity, with the hope that Palestinians will accept Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, participate in municipal elections and identify as residents and citizens of Israel.
A. **Telling Failures**

Since 1996, Israeli officials have advocated expanding the municipal boundaries of the city in order to include major settlements and to prepare the ground for removing large Palestinian-majority areas. Most such proposals in the Knesset had the city absorbing the settlements surrounding the city through full annexation and excising its Arab areas so their residents would lose the right to vote in its municipal elections, voting instead for a new, separate council. Increasing support for full-fledged annexation, a term Israel avoided using after 1967 to spare itself international opprobrium, reflects a growing Israeli sense of impunity. The gap between Israel’s de facto annexation – through the application of Israeli law in East Jerusalem – and formal, full-fledged annexation is more than a difference in terminology. While Israel decided in 1967 that its laws would extend to occupied East Jerusalem, it never fully applied them there as it did west of the Green Line: it did not force Palestinian Jerusalemites to take up citizenship, it allowed Palestinians to use non-Israeli (first Jordanian, then Palestinian) school curricula and it did not complete land registration. Israel is now intent on gradually closing the latter two gaps.

1. **Greater Jerusalem Law**

In 2007, Likud MK Yisrael Katz introduced a draft bill, the Greater Jerusalem Law, which he has made several attempts to guide to passage. If passed, the bill would expand the city’s municipal boundaries to include the five settlements of Beitar Illit, Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Gush Etzion and Efrat, defining them as “daughter municipalities”. In addition, the plan would give the same sub-municipal status to four Palestinian areas that are now part of the municipality but lie beyond the separation barrier: Kafr Aqab, Shuafat refugee camp/Anata, al-Sawahra, and al-Walaja.

In this way, Israel would kill two birds with one stone: it would upgrade the status of the five illegal settlements lying outside the municipal boundaries, while imposing a distinct administrative status on the four Palestinian neighbourhoods within the city, paving the way for their full excision from Israel’s Jerusalem municipality and, in the long run, possibly putting at risk their inhabitants’ status as Israeli residents. Should Palestinians in these areas lose their status as residents of Jerusalem, they, like Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank, would be required to obtain permits to enter East Jerusalem or Israel. Thus, Jerusalem’s Jewish population and Jewish settlements would increase in size, while the city’s Palestinian population and territory would shrink.

Since MK Katz began promoting the bill in 2007, it has failed to win government support, even after it was watered down to remove mention of full annexation, due both to international pressure and the opposition of self-styled centrist parties that were in the coalition from 2007 to 2017. In July 2017, it won Prime Minister Netanyahu’s support, following an embarrassing episode in which he first installed and then, under local and Jordanian pressure, removed metal detectors at the entrances to Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Netanyahu shifted to supporting the bill because he wanted to appear strong after backtracking on the metal detectors.

But, even then, it faced opposition. Ultra-Orthodox politicians announced they would oppose the measure, primarily because a clear majority of the residents in the expanded
areas are not ultra-Orthodox and their inclusion would weaken the odds of an ultra-Orthodox candidate becoming Jerusalem’s mayor. But ultra-Orthodox politicians also withheld their support because of anticipated international community opposition. Even the Trump administration opposed the law. Coalition chairperson and Likud MK David Bitan explained: “There is American pressure that claims this is about annexation and that this could interfere with the peace process”\textsuperscript{10} The combination of ultra-Orthodox opposition and U.S. pressures led to an indefinite postponement. Since then, efforts to rally support for the legislation have stalled.

2. The Elkin plan and its discontents
Since 2017, Jerusalem Affairs Minister Ze’ev Elkin, a mayoral candidate who lost in October 2018 but retained his ministerial post, has advocated excising the city’s Palestinian areas that lie beyond the separation barrier. Israel’s Jerusalem Basic Law prevents the interior minister from altering the city’s municipal boundaries, in contrast to his authority elsewhere in the country. Elkin therefore sought to enable excision by amending the Jerusalem Basic Law. His proposal differs from another, unpopular Likud proposal, which called for handing the excised areas to the PA as a step toward a potential two-state partition. Instead, Elkin has proposed transforming the excised areas into separate local municipal councils. According to Jerusalem expert Nadav Shragai, the Elkin plan’s initiator, excision will turn the demographic dial back to a ratio of 69 per cent Jews to 31 per cent Palestinians.\textsuperscript{11} (In contrast, retaining the territory would leave Israel responsible for the 40,000-60,000 inhabitants of East Jerusalem who do not have Jerusalem residency, leaving Israel to grapple with demands to grant these Jerusalem inhabitants residency, or, less probably, devising policies that would force them to leave.)

Others are more sceptical. A municipal official claimed that the Elkin plan is likely to deliver much more partial results, primarily because many residents of these areas have prepared for the possibility of excision by changing their formal address to one west of the barrier and that many will relocate westward as soon as excision seems imminent. Palestinian Jerusalemites and some Israeli human rights activists share the belief and fear that such excision would be a step toward extensive residency revocations. If Israel were to revoke residency rights for the excised areas’ inhabitants, it could serve as another sort of precedent: when negotiating a peace agreement with the Palestinians, previous Israeli prime ministers have considered excising Palestinian towns in Israel proper by transferring them to a Palestinian state in exchange for annexing large settlement blocs in the West Bank.

The argument for such an excision of Palestinian towns in Israel, done against the will of the local population, could be strengthened if a precedent were established in which Israel had already altered the status of Palestinians in areas it considers its sovereign territory. Jerusalem municipal councillors from both left and right share the sense that excision would turn an already dire situation into an outright catastrophe. Excision has failed to win support in the Knesset largely because of internal divisions on the right, where hardline religious Zionists caution that any reshaping of Jerusalem’s boundaries could create a situation in which it would become clear to all Israelis that
the notion of Yerushalayim is malleable. As a member of Jewish Home party explained, making reference to Tzipi Livni, a prominent proponent of a two-state partition, “if you can divide Jerusalem this way today, Livni will divide it in a different way tomorrow”.12

In an attempt to win a Knesset majority for changing the Jerusalem Basic Law so as to allow excision – an unpopular move among right-wing voters who take Jerusalem’s “eternal unity” as an article of faith – Elkin and Education Minister and Jewish Home chairperson Naftali Bennett proposed in July 2017 an amendment that coupled excision with a more popular move: an increase of the necessary parliamentary majority for handing any of the city’s pre-excised parts to a foreign entity (such as the Palestinians). This way, a future Palestinian state would be less likely to gain control of these occupied areas, irrespective of whether they remained inside Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. Netanyahu backed the move.

But hardline religious Zionists, led by MK Betzalel Smotrich, successfully rallied the Jewish Home party against excision because they feared that it would set the stage for future partition of the city. The hardliners forced Bennett to retract his support for excision and to modify the legislative amendment hours before the vote. As a result, the final text included only the increase in the size of the parliamentary majority needed to hand to a foreign entity areas within the city’s current municipal boundaries, not the part about enabling excision, which did not pass. Advancing excision in the future will therefore be impossible through a mere directive from the interior minister, as Elkin had planned. It will now require securing a Knesset majority in three votes.

Though few voters in the municipal election chose candidates based on their East Jerusalem agendas, had Elkin won he would almost certainly have used city hall to promote excision and strengthen his hand against annexationist opponents of excision such as Smotrich, potentially gaining support for his original plan of amending the Jerusalem Basic Law. His victory would have given excision electoral backing and institutional authority. Mayor-elect Moshe Leon, by contrast, who competed with Elkin for Likud votes, was the candidate most vocally critical of excision, on the grounds that it would ultimately turn over parts of Israel’s capital to the PA.13 A municipal official stated that once Leon takes office “he will quickly realise excision is sensible, but in public he will likely oppose it so that he will not appear to go back on his word”.14

B. New Policies: Investing in East Jerusalem’s Economy

The main new policy approach that has managed to win support across the political spectrum is primarily economic. On 13 May 2018, known in Israel as Jerusalem Reunification Day, marking the 1967 consolidation under Israeli rule of the city’s western and occupied eastern parts, Netanyahu’s cabinet passed a decision entitled “Narrowing Socio-Economic Gaps and Economic Development in East Jerusalem”.15 Announced with great fanfare, this plan, to be carried out over the next five years, shifted course from decades of neglect of Palestinian East Jerusalem by national governments and mayors alike. The five-year plan allocates nearly 2 billion shekels (over $500 million) for the years 2018-2023, focusing on improving education, advancing employment and upgrading public spaces.16 The plan does not stipulate that spending is to be done only on the
western side of the barrier. It is likely, however, that the state will spend only low sums east of the barrier, because the municipality provides limited services there as it is.

The magnitude of investment and the seeming willingness to take responsibility for East Jerusalem have various conflict-relevant implications. These include, most importantly, facilitating greater Israeli government and municipal presence in the Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem as part of a shift from broad neglect of Palestinian areas to the beginning of what is intended to be a decades-long process of absorbing most of East Jerusalem into Israel. Likud ministers, both two-staters and annexationists, who advocate this shift see it as an element of a long-term policy to remould the national identity of Palestinian Jerusalemites from “Palestinian” to being “Arab of Jerusalem”.17

The five-year-plan, known as Government Decision 3790, is premised on continued Israeli rule over East Jerusalem and continued Israeli rejection of either a PA presence in Jerusalem or the establishment of Palestinian municipal self-governance (see Appendix B for a summary of the plan’s main elements). It expands and deepens Israeli municipal control over occupied East Jerusalem by allocating funding for services and activities that Palestinian residents and human rights organisations have long called for. Yet it is unlikely to fully achieve its stated objective of redressing socio-economic inequality in Jerusalem: $106 million per year over five years falls far short of the amount needed to address gaps accumulated during more than 50 years of neglect.18 Unless the state increases the overall sum considerably, future five-year plans will also fail to close the gap between the city’s Jewish and Palestinian residents, as the Jewish population advances in prosperity more rapidly than the Palestinian one.

The plan also has the potential to significantly escalate tensions in Jerusalem and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more broadly. Palestinians vociferously oppose two of its elements – one encouraging East Jerusalem schools to shift to Israeli curricula (nearly half the plan’s education budget is conditioned on acceptance of Israeli curricula), which they see as a threat to their national identity, and the other registering lands in Israel’s registry, which would secure legal ownership for some Palestinian lands but could also put much illegally built housing at increased risk of demolition and open the door to Israeli confiscation of unregistered lands. Carrying out these policies will further heighten tensions between East Jerusalemites and the government of Israel, as well as between Palestinians who cooperate with these controversial steps and Palestinians who do not. It will also push the PA toward greater advocacy concerning the Jerusalem issue, thereby stoking tensions between the PA and Israel. One effect of such a clash could be to improve the PA’s poor standing among Palestinian Jerusalemites.

Israeli criticism of the plan has come mostly from the political left, though even these critics welcomed significant elements of the government’s decision. Most of their criticism pertained to what the plan fails to include. Advocate Oshrat Maimon of Ir Amim, an Israeli non-profit devoted to making Jerusalem more equitable for Israelis and Palestinians, said the plan is missing a chapter on planning for new construction for Palestinians in East Jerusalem: she said the existing limit on construction “is the core of the problem for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and it is no coincidence that it is absent”.19
In the same vein, Haaretz’s Jerusalem correspondent argued that the plan ignores the Palestinians who live beyond the separation barrier; while pretending to welcome hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living west of the barrier into Israel, the plan in effect continues the policy of denying them citizenship, as evidenced by increasing rates of rejection of Palestinian Jerusalemite applications for citizenship. Furthermore, because the plan does not create electoral incentives for Israeli politicians to invest in the city’s Arab districts, incentives they have lacked for more than 50 years, there are good reasons to be sceptical about the degree to which Israeli politicians would put in place even the plan’s less controversial components.

The newly elected city council has significant influence over how the state will carry out the plan. From the outset, in the words of one municipal official, “policy-making behind the five-year plan saw a constant, ongoing tension between the professionals and the nationalists: those who act primarily with urban service provision in mind and those who act with assertion of sovereignty in mind”.20 The new municipal governing coalition is a mixed bag: the newly elected mayor and the ultra-Orthodox politicians who form the majority of the new municipal coalition see the assertion of sovereignty through the five-year plan as a low priority and therefore tend to side with the professionals, albeit without much enthusiasm. Some refer to Shas chairperson Aryeh Deri, whose support for Leon was decisive in the latter’s victory, as “Jerusalem’s real mayor”.21 And Deri is reputedly less than eager to invest in Palestinian-populated areas in Jerusalem.

In contrast, the city council also includes the national-religious activist Arieh King, chairman of the hawkish settler organisation Israel Land Fund, who secured the Israel Heritage file (which affects municipal policies in East Jerusalem toward the city’s sensitive historical core) on the city council in exchange for his support for Leon in the second round of voting. Some settler leaders saw the new mayor’s decision to join several of them at a Hanukkah candelabra lighting at the Small Western Wall (a rarely visited section of the Western Wall inside the Old City’s Muslim quarter) as an encouraging sign that he will grant King a free hand in East Jerusalem. The nationalist objectives advocated by Jerusalem’s settler leaders resonate in the Union of Right-Wing Parties and much of the Likud.

IV. Economic Integration, Political Separation

Israel’s five-year plan evinces a desire among some to integrate the city’s Palestinians into Israel’s economy. But economic integration sits in tension with the state’s concurrent effort to keep Palestinians separate from the Israeli polity. This latter effort is most evident in Israel’s policy of denying citizenship to the small but growing number of East Jerusalemites requesting it. It is also apparent in state polices that discourage Palestinian residents from exercising voting rights in municipal elections. With a few exceptions on right and left, Israeli politicians have not promoted the political participation of East Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents. Indeed, as soon as a Palestinian, Aziz Abu Sara, stated that he was running for mayor in order to advance the establishment of two capitals in
Jerusalem, Israeli hawks presented legal challenges to his candidacy. The Interior Ministry quickly began an inquiry into whether Jerusalem has been Abu Sara’s centre of life over the last seven years, leading him to withdraw.

Palestinians, for their part, have shown little interest in participating in Israeli politics. Early in the 2018 municipal campaign, despite the longstanding Palestinian boycott of municipal elections and the prevailing hostility on social media networks toward the Palestinian candidates who had signalled they might run, some polls indicated that Palestinian demand for local political participation might be growing. Yet Palestinian participation in the October 2018 election was even lower than in previous years.22

As detailed below, the vast majority of Palestinian Jerusalemites agree that the costs of electoral participation in an institution that is part and parcel of a deepening Israeli occupation – including a sense of national betrayal and likely social sanctions from fellow Palestinians – outweigh its limited potential benefits. Palestinian Jerusalemites have the worst of both worlds: they have full obligations to the municipality (in terms of taxes and fines) but receive very limited services (as evidenced in their low share of the municipal budget). The Palestinian Authority and PLO discourage them from advancing their rights in the city via the ballot box, yet the PA has provided them with only modest support, whether financial (eg, in the share of the national budget they are allocated) or political. Meanwhile, East Jerusalem has been suffering socio-economic degradation, marked by increasing criminality, drug use and prostitution, as organised Palestinian political activity has withered.23

The October 2018 election showed that widespread Palestinian participation in Jerusalem's municipal elections remains a pipe dream, despite some signs that change might come. Israeli officials praise what they believe to be a growing Israelisation of Palestinian Jerusalemites. They are overstating the case, though Palestinians are indeed weighing the pros and cons of participating in future elections. Their choice became real when Ramadan Dabash – the Palestinian candidate for city council who, as chairperson of Sur Baher’s community administration (minhal kehilati), cooperated with the Likud to secure resources for his community – set a precedent by not withdrawing his candidacy before election day, as all previous Palestinian candidates have done. Dabash has stated that he stayed in the race despite harsh threats and an alleged attempt to kidnap his child by activists who opposed his candidacy.

In the end, however, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, abstained almost entirely from voting. Focus groups held in East Jerusalem during the months preceding the election suggested that if different Palestinian candidates had run with the backing of Palestinian factions, the participation rates might have been considerably higher, but given past Israeli legal and political opposition to Palestinians running on nationalist platforms it is unclear that Israel would allow such candidates to run. There is also little reason to think that Palestinian factions would field such candidates at present. As long as East Jerusalem remains occupied, the candidate would face the same kind of factional and hence popular opposition that led to meagre electoral participation in October 2018.

In sum, Palestinians are no more interested in fully participating in the Israeli polity than Israelis are eager to include them. In this sense, Israel’s continued emphasis on
economic as opposed to political integration of East Jerusalem suits both sides – even as many Palestinians reject components of the five-year plan, such as land registration, that are part and parcel of the plans for economic integration.

V. An Intra-Israeli Debate

As seen, contestation over government policies in East Jerusalem has not been an argument between the Israeli right and the Israeli left, whose direct influence is negligible today. Rather, the dispute has taken place almost entirely within the right-wing coalition that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed after the 2015 election. Virtually none of its members publicly supports Jerusalem’s partition. Rather, all operate on the premise that Jerusalem, east and west, is and will remain under Israeli rule – the difference being primarily whether to rid Jerusalem of the Palestinian-populated areas beyond the barrier or keep them within the city’s municipal boundaries.

The outcome of Israel’s 17 September 2019 election could have far-reaching consequences not just for Jerusalem but for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole. Prominent Likud leaders, including Netanyahu and Jerusalem Affairs Minister Ze’ev Elkin, seem increasingly ready to relinquish some control over territory in order to increase the Jewish majority in the city and concentrate resources on gradually integrating the remaining Palestinian-populated areas into Israel – economically and socially at first, with the goal of ultimately integrating them politically to the point that they vote in elections and accept Israeli rule. Elkin, the primary advocate of excising East Jerusalem Arab neighbourhoods from the city, lost in his 2018 bid to become Jerusalem’s mayor, but, tellingly, won the vast majority of votes in strongholds of the Likud and Jewish Home parties. Right-wing Jerusalemites evidently did not consider Elkin’s proposal as having crossed a red line. Perhaps incoming Jerusalem mayor Leon could embrace the idea without paying too severe a political price.

The narrow right-wing government Netanyahu likely hopes to form after the September 2019 election may appear to be an improbable champion of excision. The national-religious Union of Right-Wing Parties, an electoral list – made up of Jewish Home, National Union and Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) – that secured five seats in the April 2019 election and is integral to a prospective right-wing coalition, has firmly opposed it so far. Opponents of redrawing Jerusalem’s boundaries, including Jerusalem council members who lead the Jerusalem-based pro-settler organisations the Israel Land Fund (Arieh King), Elad (David Be’eri) and Ateret Cohanim (Matti Dan), represent a small yet influential hardline constituency. As noted above, they already scored a success when countering Bennett and Elkin on this front by rallying the Jewish Home party in opposition to excision. They intend to persevere in preventing excision. But their success in convincing the Union of Right-Wing Parties to toe that line is uncertain because the leadership is now divided on the matter. The divisions might open the door to excision even in a future coalition that depends on the support of the Union of Right-Wing Parties.
A municipal official explained why the policy rationale for excision, over which right-wing Israeli leaders are at odds, could prove politically decisive:

[Outgoing Mayor] Barkat supported excision for Jerusalem-related reasons alone – in order to discard a part of the city that drew all of it downward. Elkin, however, sees this as a preview for the West Bank. For him, establishing a working precedent of a municipal council for people with Israeli residency but not citizenship is advantageous because it raises the question: why not apply it elsewhere? This is the pilot.24

Netanyahu, like the former mayor, seems to be ambivalent about the annexationist agenda, despite his end-of-campaign pledge to annex West Bank settlements. His support for excision more likely stems from a limited, Jerusalem-related reason: preserving a Jewish majority in the city.25 Yet if excision takes place, annexationists to the prime minister’s right could seize upon the precedent, even if only after the Netanyahu era. Elkin’s statements that “today’s Jerusalem is the demographic DNA of Israel in twenty years” and that “we must develop models for handling the challenges in Jerusalem which will help us handle the future challenges in Israel” seem in line with annexationist thinking.26 Likud MK Tzipi Hotoveli has been advocating gradual rollout of the annexation and naturalisation paradigm, saying: “We must bear in mind that this [Palestinian population] is a hostile entity and it is impossible to turn them into citizens overnight. There is an intermediate phase of residency that can serve as a sort of candidacy period for citizenship. The drastic step of immediate citizenship for a million and a half Palestinians would be irresponsible and to think of doing such a thing is not serious”.27

Even if a narrow right-wing coalition similar to that in place from 2015 comes to power, a shuffling of the ministerial deck might, for example, place the interior ministry or justice ministry in new hands, opening up other avenues to change in East Jerusalem. The former ministry controls residency request approvals and residency revocations; the latter controls Israel’s Land Registry. Furthermore, as noted above, the Israeli government had postponed implementation of some Jerusalem policies – such as the Greater Jerusalem Law – out of deference to the Trump administration, which feared they would disrupt its peacemaking efforts. Such policies could be revived if the U.S. peace plan fails to gain traction among Palestinians as is widely expected.

VI. Exiting the Road to Nowhere

President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital has reversed decades-old stated principles of U.S. peacemaking and emboldened Israeli decision-makers to take steps to consolidate control over East Jerusalem. Not surprisingly, Palestinians feel deeply threatened in Jerusalem. Arabs and Muslims continue to be united around the demand that East Jerusalem, including much of its Old City and surrounding areas, be
Palestine’s capital. Mounting tensions at the Holy Esplanade exacerbate their sense that this envisioned future is growing less likely.

Much depends on what coalition government emerges from the 17 September 2019 parliamentary election. In the less probable event of a coalition that is led by or includes self-defined centrists like the Blue and White party, the government might be more receptive to international calls to refrain from altering the legal status of Palestinian inhabitants of the areas between the separation barrier and Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. On the other hand, it would also be freer to ignore any pro-annexationist objections from the Union of Right-Wing Parties to excision. It is thus at least conceivable that it be more inclined to excise Palestinian areas.

In the more likely scenario of a right-wing coalition, Israel’s international partners could argue to both the opposition and putative centre-right parties in the coalition, such as Kulanu or perhaps Israel Beitenu, that it is in Israel’s strategic interest to block excision of Palestinian areas and press the government to discard the five-year plan’s most inflammatory components (East Jerusalem land registration and Palestinian adoption of Israeli curricula). These parties might be receptive to the argument that excision could lead to large-scale movement of Palestinians from areas beyond the barrier into the city centre, the spread of crime westward to Jewish population centres, and heightened risks of violent escalation—all outcomes that would harm Israel’s interests. They might also be persuaded that East Jerusalemites oppose land registration so strongly that imposing it might cause unrest. Lastly, they might be swayed by the fact that local Muslim religious authorities reject the idea of Palestinians adopting Israeli curricula. That policy is feeding religious tensions in Jerusalem, with adverse consequences for all sides.

Palestinian leaders may well decide to collectively boycott the land registration process, much as they have done by refusing to accept Israel’s material incentives for shifting Palestinian schools to Israeli curricula. Opponents of Israel’s deepening de facto annexation of East Jerusalem may follow suit. Turkey and Jordan could impede the land registration process to some extent by preventing Israel and individual land owners from accessing the deeds they possess to lands in Jerusalem, notably in the Old City and its immediate environs, in support of such a boycott. Historical Western sponsors of churches could similarly support a boycott in order to pre-empt land registration that would likely affect the large number of church properties owned by foreign states in Jerusalem, and fear Israeli expropriation.

At the same time, Palestinian leaders in Jerusalem should consider seizing upon Israel’s departure from its longstanding neglect of Arab East Jerusalem to explore low-profile cooperation in addressing shared challenges. Some instances of cooperation have become public, though both sides wish to keep such efforts inconspicuous, and thus deny the reports. In the less probable event of a coalition that is led by or includes self-defined centrists like the Blue and White party, the reconstituted Waqf Council, which is now more representative of Palestinian society in East Jerusalem, might conceivably obtain Israel’s permission to help establish and provide diplomatic cover to a subsidiary institution whose task would be to extend some municipal services to Palestinians and perhaps one day act as the embryo of an East Jerusalem municipality. Though Israel
would have many reasons to reject such an arrangement, seeing it as a step toward Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem, it is not impossible to imagine that it could accept it under certain conditions.

The EU and relevant Arab states should use whatever leverage they have with Israel to discourage excision of Palestinian areas and press Israel to discard or indefinitely postpone its five-year plan’s most provocative components (East Jerusalem land registration and Palestinian adoption of Israeli curricula). European states could, for example, warn that excision would bring them closer to recognising the State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that Israeli annexation of parts of East Jerusalem would certainly bring about such recognition. Together with Arab countries, they could provide financial incentives for Israel to shelve policies that advance the de facto annexation of East Jerusalem. These incentives could include discreet offers to provide support for PA activities in areas of Jerusalem east of the separation barrier and to invest in these areas on condition that Israel relax its ban on PA activities in the city. They could also include funds to help Palestinian Jerusalemites establish civic leadership bodies that will attempt to operate both east and west of the separation barrier.

Such investments in East Jerusalem would come at a political cost to Israel – undermining the notion of Jerusalem as the country’s undivided capital – but they can help mitigate the spread of militancy, curb the negative impact of decades of neglect such as crime that spills over to West Jerusalem, and create a mechanism for addressing conflict in East Jerusalem. As poverty, despair and instability increase in East Jerusalem, especially in areas adjacent to large Israeli settlements, so, too, may Israel’s willingness to consider making such trade-offs.

One should not expect interactions to be harmonious: Palestinians will push for more autonomy and attempt to reject certain Israeli policies, while Israel will impose restrictions on Palestinian authority and promote policies that it favours. But though Israel will be the final arbiter of policy in East Jerusalem so long as it continues to occupy it, Israelis will have to make some concessions to the 40 per cent of the city’s inhabitants who are Palestinian if they want to lessen the chance of chronic and possibly escalating unrest.

In the less probable event of a governing coalition that is led by or includes self-defined centrist like the Blue and White party, Israel could and should consider going farther – ending its ban on the establishment of an East Jerusalem municipality with which it could cooperate west of the barrier, possibly by casting such an event as part of the standard Israeli practice of encouraging public participation in urban planning. (Israel would almost certainly refuse to allow an East Jerusalem municipality to operate east of the barrier, though it is unclear how capable it would be of enforcing a ban in areas where it has little presence.)

And, whatever coalition emerges from the September elections, in order to mitigate the lawlessness, poverty and crime in the areas of East Jerusalem lying east of the barrier, Israel should relax its ban on PA activities there. Instead of prioritising the dire problems in the neglected areas east of the barrier, the five-year plan appears to continue to ignore them. These areas will likely deteriorate further, becoming potential breeding grounds for militancy, poverty, drug abuse, crime and ill health, all of which will affect the rest of
Jerusalem. With Israel unwilling to assume responsibility in these areas, it should be in its interest to allow the PA to do so.

Jerusalem is at the core of both Palestinian and Jewish national identities. Without resolving competing claims to Jerusalem, there can be no Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israeli unilateral changes will only breed resentment and increase risk of violent conflict. Regardless of how the conflict in the city is resolved, Jerusalem residents, as well as both governments, could benefit if Israel were to have a Palestinian inter-locutor on both sides of the separation barrier.

VII. Conclusion

Whatever coalition emerges from the September 2019 elections, the next Israeli government almost certainly will seek to further Israel’s hitherto incomplete annexation of parts of occupied East Jerusalem by continuing to implement the five-year plan, now in its second year. As part of this broader socio-economic plan, which marks a shift away from longstanding neglect of Palestinian-populated areas in East Jerusalem, Israel appears intent on advancing two particularly harmful policies: cataloguing all occupied East Jerusalem lands in the Israel Lands Registry and inducing Palestinian schools in East Jerusalem to adopt Israeli curricula. Likewise, seeking to preserve a Jewish majority in Jerusalem, the next government may well decide to excise Palestinian areas east of the barrier, placing them in separate Israeli administrative units outside the municipality’s jurisdiction.

These unilateral policies would exacerbate the conflict in and over Jerusalem. They would harm hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, particularly the more than one hundred thousand Palestinians in areas Israel may excise, and present a perilous precedent for Israeli annexationist ambitions in the West Bank. All stakeholders opposed to such a move should do what they can to halt these policies as a first step toward reversing Israel’s de facto annexation of East Jerusalem.

Jerusalem/Brussels, 12 June 2019
Endnotes

1 Crisis Group interviews, PLO Executive Committee member, Ramallah, March 2018; PLO Planning Unit official, Jerusalem, April 2018; PLO ambassador, Jerusalem, June 2018.


3 There are no exact figures, not least because many Jerusalem ID holders residing in these areas have registered under new addresses lying west of the barrier, for fear of excision. An Israeli official said the municipality’s “conservative estimate” of the population without permanent residency now residing in the area was 60,000. Crisis Group interview, Israeli official, Jerusalem, September 2018. Another official suggested a lower figure, arguing that the prevalent government assessment is “at least a third of the 120,000-140,000 residents” of these areas. David Koren, “The Arab Neighbourhoods between the Security Fence and Jerusalem’s Municipal Boundary”, Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 2 January 2019. Since Israel erected the separation barrier, West Bankers with spouses from East Jerusalem have often chosen to reside in the areas of municipal Jerusalem beyond the barrier so that the Jerusalemite spouse would not lose his or her permanent resident status (which is removed when Palestinians are found to have their “centre of life” outside the city for more than seven years). The children of such couples are eligible to receive permanent residency, but, in many cases, Israel has not granted it. Crisis Group interviews, East Jerusalem residents, Shuafat and al-Tur, November 2018. The large-scale move into these areas after the barrier’s erection was further catalysed by the abundance of relatively low-cost housing once enforcement of Israeli construction standards and restrictions were removed and tall residential buildings were densely built.

4 Crisis Group interview, Israeli official, Jerusalem, June 2018.

5 In 1967, Jerusalem’s population was 74 per cent Jews and 26 per cent Palestinians; in 1990, it was 72 per cent Jews and 28 per cent Palestinians; in 2000; it was 68 per cent Jews and 32 per cent Palestinians; and in 2016, it was 62 per cent Jews and 38 per cent Palestinians. The 2016 ratio works out to 550,100 Jewish and 332,000 Palestinian residents. “Jerusalem: Facts and Trends”, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, 2018. A former municipal councillor pointed out that Interior Ministry figures for Jerusalem’s overall population are consistently some 10 per cent higher than those kept by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, January 2019.


7 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, April 2019.

8 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, October 2018.

9 Thanks to their status within the area of Jerusalem, residents would be entitled to vote in the city’s municipal elections. The law further provides a degree of autonomy to the daughter municipalities whose specific authorities the interior minister is to determine: “The daughter municipalities would have councils elected by their residents on the date of elections for the Jerusalem municipality”. Draft Law “Jerusalem and its Daughters – 2017”, P/20/4386, tabled 10 July 2017. On file with Crisis Group. The five settlements have a total population of roughly 140,000 Jewish Israelis. Some of the leadership in the relevant settlements opposes the law, despite the putative additional legitimacy that annexation would win for their locality in Israeli public opinion. They oppose it in part because of taxes: if residents of settlements now outside the municipality were to join Jerusalem, they “would have to pay for Jerusalem’s poverty”. Crisis Group interview, settlement council member, Jerusalem, July 2018.

10 Israel Army Radio, 29 October 2017.

11 Nadav Shragai, “A Jerusalem Solution: One Sovereignty, Multiple Local Authorities (including for the Arab Neighbourhoods)”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 20 February 2018. Elkin himself argues that roughly half of these areas’ residents are not Jerusalem residents, and he claims that his plan therefore “would discard between 50 and 60,000 city residents. Bringing the ratio

12 Crisis Group interview, Jewish Home activist, Tel Aviv, March 2018.

13 Leon said: “If you transfer territory from Jerusalem to an Arab municipal authority, tomorrow another American president or a different left-wing prime minister will say, ‘seeing as you have given up on this territory, let’s pass it to the Palestinian Authority’.” Uzi Baruch, “Moshe Leon to Arutz 7: Jerusalem Needs a Manager, Not a Politician,” Arutz 7, 8 August 2018

14 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, November 2018. A knowledgeable former Israeli official ruled out Elkin’s plan on account of its political and constitutional complexity, as well as the ill-fated precedents of such local authorities in Arab areas of Israel. Elkin’s proposal for governing the new local authority with an appointed committee draws on a similar mechanism which Israel has long used in Arab localities across the country, but which – it more recently has conceded – has failed to secure local legitimacy. The interior ministry no longer appoints such governing committees, calling instead for independent elections. Elkin indeed failed to secure the broad political support for amending a Basic Law. Instead, the former official encouraged pursuing policy alternatives with an eye not only to demographics but to the lawlessness reigning there. The alternatives include keeping everything in limbo; handing the areas over to the PA unilaterally or as part of an agreement; Elkin’s plan of establishing additional local authorities within the current municipal boundaries; retracing the barrier so that it correlates with municipal boundaries; redividing de facto service provision based on the barrier’s route (the Israeli army on the barrier’s West Bank side and the municipality to its east); forming an accompanying security mechanism for municipal employees and subcontractors working on the eastern side of the barrier while granting the municipality a major budget increase for service provision to all residents of these areas (with and without Jerusalem residency permits); and establishing for these areas a new Israeli administrative unit that would renew old buildings, invest in job training for Jerusalem ID holders and expel inhabitants who do not carry a Jerusalem ID. See Koren, “The Arab Neighbourhoods”, op. cit. But given the huge inequality in resources allocated to Palestinian areas compared to Jewish ones, it is highly unlikely that politicians will carry out any plan that relies on budgetary increases for Palestinians, who for the most part do not vote.

15 The government announcement issued on the day the cabinet took Decision 3790 framed it as one of five decisions pertaining to the “strengthening of Jerusalem”. The four other decisions were: allocating 350 million shekels [$99.9 million], with an emphasis on the “Old City Basin”, for the “restoration and preservation of infrastructure, public spaces and sites of historical, cultural and archaeological importance in the city and around it”; a national plan for “revealing ancient Jerusalem … with ongoing, constant governmental activity to heighten and emphasize the city’s role as King David’s capital and the modern capital of Israel”; advancing a tourist cable car for the historical core of Jerusalem; and encouraging cinema studies in Jerusalem. Announcement of the Cabinet Secretary at the end of the government meeting of 13 May 2018, Prime Minister’s Office, 13 May 2018 (Hebrew).


17 Crisis Group interview, Likud Central Committee member close to Likud ministers, Jerusalem, January 2019. So far, Israeli policies have been limited to drawing East Jerusalemites into Israel’s economy, not its polity through the extension of citizenship. Interior Ministry officials claim change is imminent, and that wait times for citizenship will be dramatically reduced from an average of six years to one. “Israel vows to drastically cut wait time for Jerusalem Palestinians’ citizenship applications”, Haaretz, 26 February 2019.

18 An Israeli official supportive of the five-year plan said: “We are fully aware of the wide gaps. You can’t fix the omissions of 50 years in five. But we have to start somewhere”. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, March 2019. He gave a few striking examples based on government data: Arab per capita
income stands at 40 per cent of that of Jews. Some 79 per cent of Arab families are poor compared to 23 per cent among Jews. An estimated 68 per cent of Arab pupils do not obtain a high-school diploma compared to 30 per cent among Jews. There are roughly twenty times more playgrounds per 100 children in Jewish areas than in Arab ones.


20 Crisis Group interview, municipal official, Jerusalem, November 2018. The official stated: “Sometimes, for example on sewage, the two logics did not clash. On other occasions, like education, they did. Once the fatwas forbidding Israeli curricula took hold, the Educational Administration of Jerusalem won the day when it insisted that Hebrew teaching would be provided informally within schools during the afternoons, even though Elkin pushed for full linkage between funding and acceptance of the Israeli curricula”.

21 Crisis Group interview, former municipal councillor, Jerusalem, April 2019.

22 In the 2018 municipal elections in East Jerusalem, 1.6 per cent (3,500 of 213,000) of eligible voters, including settlers (Israel’s statistics merge the two populations), exercised their right to vote. Crisis Group interview, Yair Assaf-Shapira and Omer Yaniv, researchers with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 4 November 2018. This rate represents a continuation of a drop in Palestinian voter turnout in municipal elections. For Palestinian voter turnout rates since 1967, see Jonathan Blake et al, “What Might Happen if Palestinians Start Voting in Jerusalem Municipal Elections?”, Rand Corporation, October 2018, p. 12. The reasons seem political rather than cultural: the minuscule participation rates contrast starkly with the whopping 84 per cent participation rate among Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel – which is much higher than the 55 per cent participation rate among Israeli Jews. “Israeli Arab municipal elections: more violence, but more women”, Haaretz, 4 November 2018. The polls were misleading because they asked Palestinians about their general openness to electoral participation, a question that did not distinguish between, on one hand, electoral participation in occupied Jerusalem today, and, on the other, electoral participation in a future scenario in which East Jerusalem is not occupied.


24 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, November 2018. A PLO official said the dangers of such excision outweigh the minor benefit it may yield in facilitating future Israeli concessions over the excised areas. He noted, however, that “in parts of the West Bank like Hebron, where the PA isn’t popular, the population might opt for such a model because they would secure Israeli residency rights, with all the associated benefits, and a modicum of self-governance through institutions that collect their taxes and then invest them in the community”. Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, December 2018.

25 “During the last year or so Netanyahu has been telling me he is concerned that separating ourselves from the Palestinians is becoming harder”. Crisis Group interview, former senior Netanyahu adviser, Tel Aviv, November 2018.


27 “Hotoveli Presents: The Gradual Plan – Annexation – Naturalization”, Sovereignty, no. 2 (January 2014), p. 4. A settler leader who supports annexation of the West Bank (which he referred to as Judea and Samaria) and naturalisation of all its inhabitants said he views such an eventuality positively because “Israel’s interest is to grant all West Bankers permanent residency. It gives them the right to apply for citizenship. But how many have actually applied [for citizenship] in East Jerusalem? Judea and Samaria’s Arabs would act the same”. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, November 2018.
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The Suppression of the Great Revolt and the Destruction of Everyday Life in Palestine
Charles Anderson

Resistance and Survival in Central Galilee, July 1948–July 1951
Adel Manna

Building to Survive: The Politics of Cement in Mandate Palestine
Nimrod Ben Zeev

To Subvert, To Deconstruct: Agency in Qalandiya Refugee Camp
Ahmed Alaqra

Thurayya’s Wedding: A Glimpse of Ottoman Jerusalem from the Khalidi Library
Khader Salameh