Pilgrims and Pilgrimage

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Chloe Bordewich

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* Peer reviewed article.
Pilgrimage to the Holy Land has been a perennial source of travel literature and scholarship, ranging from pietistic medieval narratives during and after the crusades to the fada’il literature of Muslim visitors (for example, Mujir al-Din al-‘Ulaymi’s al-Uns al-Jalil bi-tarikh al-Quds wa al-Khalil) and works of historical sketches and photographic imagery that aimed at transporting the holy sites to people who could not bear (or afford) the hardships of nineteenth-century travel. They also include “secular pilgrimages” – mostly satirical – immortalized by Mark Twain (Innocents Abroad) and Herman Melville (Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage to the Holy Land) during their late nineteenth-century sojourns to Jerusalem.

By the beginning of the Tanzimat period, developments in transportation and communication catapulted Jerusalem, which had been a somnolent provincial capital of southern Syria, toward becoming a globalized city. Not the global city of God that was heralded by Constantine and Queen Helena; rather, it was globalized as a destination for pilgrimage, and virtually globalized through iconic representation and the marketing of its images and religious paraphernalia to a global audience of believers and non-believers alike. In her penetrating study of this transformation of sacred space, Anabel Wharton (Selling Jerusalem) discusses the commoditization of religion in which pilgrimage to the city has now been replaced by simulacra – that is, the replication of holy objects, relics, and actual sacred sites, in universal fairs, artistic exhibitions, and film. A good example of this spectacularized Jerusalem, as Wharton calls it, is the
Editorial

Holy Land Experience constructed in Orlando, Florida, as a Disneyland type experience, where the attractions (for the tourist-pilgrim) are “replicated biblical sites, each of which acts as a stage for periodically performed entertainments.” These are spectacles of the holy city in the Western (or, rather, the Western evangelical) imagination, not the performative spectacles in Jerusalem. But what is common to both is the commoditization of religion and the fetishism of religious relics. In Jerusalem, however, popular religion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had a mobilizational potency that challenged this commodification and transcended it. In the spectacles of Sabt al-Nur during Holy Week, for example, the participating crowds brought together spectators, actors, and believers seeking redemption at the same time.

Jacob Norris, the author of “Saint Marie-Alphonsine and the Resurrection of Jubra’il Dabdoub” (in *JQ* 73), an outstanding piece on the sociology of religiosity, is the guest editor of this issue’s rich collection on pilgrims and pilgrimage to Palestine. Norris’s introduction (page six) reviews for the reader the highlights of the themes of this collection: “Jerusalem syndrome” and religious mania among pilgrims during the British Mandate; the position of Abu Ghush and the exactions of pilgrimage routes from Jaffa; understanding pilgrimage as a sacrament; comparing holy cities in conflict; the sacred status of Joseph’s tomb in Jerusalem as a contested space; Jerusalem tattooists and European pilgrims; and the photography of the École biblique on nineteenth-century pilgrimage, along with photos of the sacred trees at shrines. We are also delighted to publish a review of *Ordinary Jerusalem* – no ordinary book – on our pages. Our Facts and Figures section shows the data for the annual activity of West Bank hotels since 1996.

This issue contains one major article not related to pilgrimage. “Loyalty and Betrayal” is the subject of Chloe Bordewich’s intriguing study of Ottoman intelligence and the memoirs attributed to the enigmatic ‘Aziz Bey, the presumed head of the Ottoman General Security Directorate in Damascus during World War I. Bordewich successfully deconstructs (and in some cases deciphers) a number of Arabic, Turkish, and Ottoman contemporary documents in search of what really happened between 1916 and 1918. Several issues emerge: although ‘Aziz Bey is a real person, and seemingly a leading figure in Ottoman intelligence as well in the Special Operations Department (*TeVškilat-i Mahsusa*), his actual presence in Damascus or Jerusalem, as well as his authorship of this memoir, is questionable. A main target of Ottoman intelligence at the time was Arab secessionist movements, as well as groups who were in contact with British and French colonial forces, and the publication of ‘Aziz’s so-called diary (in *al-Ahrar* in 1932, and again in book form in 1937) prompted internal debates in the post-war Arab Levant on the role of Arab figures who were functionaries of the Ottoman administration, and especially those who collaborated with Cemal (Jamal) Pasha in Syria and Palestine during the war. The conflicted positions of Emir Shakib Arslan, a close ally of Jamal Pasha, and Shaykh As’ad al-Shuqayri, the mufti of the Ottoman Fourth Army from Acre, came under particular scrutiny. Both figures justified the crackdown on Arab nationalists by Jamal Pasha as a
preventive measure in defense of the “integrity of the Ottoman state.” Bordewich also introduces new material on the interception of the NILI group (a pro-British Jewish spy ring that operated from Atlit and Zichron Ya’akov under the leadership of Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn), and the presumed use of sexual allures to trap oppositional political figures. It seems that this discovery by Ottoman intelligence was a turning point in Jamal Pasha’s (and possibly the CUP’s) attitude toward Jewish settlement in Palestine – from admiration for their modernist technology and communal settlements to hostility and enmity. Bordewich’s original and penetrating research of intelligence and espionage in Palestine and Syria thus adds significantly to our knowledge of Arab and Turkish nationalism in the waning days of the Ottoman state and the political fallout of wartime maneuvering in its aftermath.

Corrigenda:

In Jerusalem Quarterly 77, the caption of Figure 3 (page 130) of Nadi Abusaada’s article “Self-Portrait of a Nation” misstated the Exhibition and the year. The correct caption should be: Figure 3. Two pages from the guidebook for the Second Arab Exhibition showing an architectural plan and a list of participating companies. Source: Arab Exhibition Company, 1934.
To study the world of pilgrimage in Palestine is to delve into the very fabric of Palestinian society. Perhaps more than anywhere else on the planet, Palestine, and particularly Jerusalem, is indelibly associated with pilgrimage. The landscape is littered with sites – shrines, tombs, caves, springs, mountains – which have for millennia attracted worshippers from near and far. Performing pilgrimage and welcoming others performing pilgrimage has been an integral part of Palestinian life for as long as history records. Little wonder, then, that this special issue of *JQ* provides the reader with a treasure trove of observations, analyses, vignettes, and snapshots of Palestinian society in all its beguiling complexity.

So often, our understanding of pilgrimage in Palestine is mediated through the eyes of outsiders. In these accounts, Palestine and its inhabitants tend to be objectified, fossilized, and romanticized, washing over the dynamic ways in which Palestinians themselves engage with pilgrimage. The articles and essays in this edition of *JQ* push back against that trend, examining from different angles how pilgrimage has been a driving force within Palestinian society. In a country so saturated in the rituals of pilgrimage, interactions in and around shrines become a key catalyst for socioeconomic and political change.

To embark on a pilgrimage is to transport oneself beyond the boundaries of our material existence, yet also to engage in a very physical journey that requires constant social interaction. The transformative potential of this double-sided journey has long interested scholars of pilgrimage. In western anthropology, Edith and Victor Turner famously characterized
Christian pilgrimage as a “liminoid” experience – a ritual that involves the temporary abandonment of familiar structures and a testing ground for new social possibilities.¹

The Turners’ observations have been sharply critiqued over the years, but the transcendental nature of pilgrimage remains a central theme for many scholars, both religious and secular.² Islamic jurisprudents, for example, have long explored the importance of pilgrimage as a transition into an otherworldly state where closer communion with God becomes possible.³ But as in most religious traditions, Muslim pilgrimage is no solitary enterprise. For pilgrims on Hajj, the transition is marked by a change into plain clothing, coupled with a series of communal rituals, all aiming towards the forging of a universal Muslim community where distinctions of class and sect are eroded. This interface between the inward, spiritual journey and the essentially social context in which it takes place is what makes pilgrimage such a fruitful topic for scholars of social history. My own work on Bethlehem in the nineteenth century is a case in point. My initial interest in the town’s history was focused on the global migrations carried out by Bethlehemites in this period and how these movements in turn influenced life back in the town. But it became impossible to understand these movements without an appreciation of how Bethlehem’s long held status as a pilgrimage center had given local residents the tools to begin trading abroad.⁴

In Bethlehem, pilgrimage is not just a factor in the town’s development; it defines the very identity and economic livelihood of its residents. This is not a straightforward process of western objectification through the biblical lens. The town has long been an important site for Muslims and Jews, as witnessed by Muslim and Jewish travel accounts stretching back at least a millennium, as well as the presence of the town’s longstanding Muslim community, the so-called Harat al-Fawaghra.⁵

More recently, Bethlehem has repositioned itself as a magnet for a more secular type of pilgrim: activists drawn to the town’s plethora of NGOs, cultural institutes, and refugee community groups to express their solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. But whoever the visitor, the most interesting feature of this process for me is how Bethlehemites have been active players in the projection of their identity to the outside world. Centuries of interaction with pilgrims have given them a deep-seated sense of their own importance as the inhabitants of such a globally significant town, yet at the same time the ability to adapt to new ways of defining that importance. This is no mere “performance”; rather it is the symbiotic interplay between locals and outsiders that defines all pilgrimage societies.

I have been fascinated to read through the various contributions in this issue of JQ and learn how these interactions play out within other pilgrimage contexts in Palestine. In Chris Wilson’s innovative study of how “religious mania” was diagnosed and treated during the mandate period, pilgrimage appears as both cause and cure. Here the powerful, sometimes debilitating, experience of pilgrimage in Palestine is expertly contextualized within the prevailing intellectual, medical, and political paradigms of British colonial rule. Refusing to separate out European and Palestinian ways of understanding these states of rapture, Wilson reminds us that pilgrimage has long been a great leveler within Palestinian society.

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Mustafa Abbasi, meanwhile, provides a valuable account of how pilgrimage has shaped not just the spiritual lives of Palestinians, but also their social ones. As the quintessential pilgrimage way station, the village of Abu Ghush (and the family from whose name it derives), owes its very existence to the pilgrimage routes that ran from Jaffa, up through the Bab al-Wad pass and on to Jerusalem. Describing how the Abu Ghush family expertly positioned itself in the eyes of the Ottoman state as a vital facilitator of those lucrative pilgrimage routes, Abbasi demonstrates how European pilgrims were often at the mercy of local Palestinian actors, at least until the end of the nineteenth century.

Thomas Hummel’s article flips the perspective to examine the theological ways in which Christians of various denominations have understood pilgrimage to Jerusalem as a sacrament. Despite official doctrine to the contrary, Hummel demonstrates how Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians have all described pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the language of sacramental theology. The resulting impression is the re-emergence of the physical Jerusalem into the Christian limelight, serving as a gateway to the heavenly Jerusalem that so often dominates Christian thought on the subject.

Jerusalem also forms the focus of Mick Dumper’s contribution, but this time in the context of the city’s contested status within the Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Walking us through his comparative methodology, Dumper arrives at the sobering conclusion that there are certain features of Jerusalem’s status as a ‘holy city’ that preclude the peaceful resolution of the conflict and with it the various forms of colonial control that define Palestinian life there. Dumper asserts that the most important of all these features, and one that sets Jerusalem apart from the other cities he has studied, is its centrality to the foundation myths of the world’s three major monotheistic faiths.

Jerusalem occupies a central position within Palestine’s sacral landscape, but it should be viewed as just one nodal point within a network of pilgrimage sites that span the entire region. Alex Shams concentrates on one such site, Joseph’s Tomb (Qabr Yusuf) in Nablus, and the way it has become associated among Palestinians with Zionist colonization. Shams takes care to remind us how local vernacular attachments to these smaller pilgrimage shrines (maqamat) had developed over centuries among Palestinians (Muslims, Christians, and Jews) before the intrusion of western biblical archaeology in the nineteenth century. That process of appropriation, argues Shams, has greatly accelerated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries under Israeli occupation, to the point where local Nabulsis have attempted to desecrate Qabr Yusuf on a number of occasions.

But Palestinians’ interactions with foreign pilgrims are not always steeped in violence and tension. For centuries, Palestinians have depended on pilgrims arriving from abroad for their economic livelihood. In many instances these interactions have enabled a creative process, leading to new cultural forms. Marie-Armelle Beaulieu’s essay on Jerusalem tattoos provides a classic example. In the post-Crusader period, European pilgrims became increasingly interested in the ancient practice of tattooing among local Christians in the Jerusalem area. Adapting their designs to cater to Catholic sensibilities (in particular the Crusader “Jerusalem Cross”), local tattooists did a roaring
trade among European pilgrims from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. More recently, this art has been revived in Jerusalem, tapping into global trends in fashion and demonstrating once again how pilgrimage is continually reshaping cultural and economic life in Palestine.

As well as the written contributions, we are treated in this special issue to two photo essays by Jean-Michel de Tarragon and Arpan Roy, both on the theme of pilgrimage. In Tarragon’s essay we are guided through a fascinating selection from the vast photographic archive held at the École biblique et archéologique française in Jerusalem. Meanwhile Roy’s essay on sacred trees offers a thought-provoking journey into some of the sites first discussed in Taufiq Canaan’s famous essay *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries*, both updating our knowledge of what has subsequently happened to these sites and suggesting ways we might rethink their meanings to Palestinians. Together, these photo essays bring to life in dazzling visual form the same set of themes discussed in the other articles: spiritual rapture, communal ritual, the materiality and embodied experience of pilgrimage, local agency versus foreign appropriation, and above all the extent to which pilgrimage is embedded in Palestinian life and the Palestinian landscape.

In the section titled Letter from Jerusalem, George Hintlian provides an overview of two thousand years of Christian Pilgrimage to the Holy Land. He traces the shifting economics of pilgrimage from the early Byzantine and Crusader period to the onset of packaged tourism of sacred spaces in the early twentieth century. Tourist guides of the city—now numbering over 5,000 in English alone—leave a written testimony of the changing spots that attracted Christian piety to Jerusalem.

Finally, we are pleased to include in this issue an excellent piece of scholarly writing that steps outside the pilgrimage theme. Chloe Bordewich unravels the mystery of the Jerusalem-based Ottoman intelligence officer, ‘Aziz Bey, and in so doing confronts the Arab world’s struggle with its Ottoman past. Also, Helga Baumgarten provides us with a detailed review of Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire’s edited volume, *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940*.

*Jacob Norris is senior lecturer in Middle Eastern history at the University of Sussex in the UK. His current research is focused on Bethlehem and the global migrations of its residents in the nineteenth century. More information on this project can be found at [http://www.sussex.ac.uk/history/bethlehem/](http://www.sussex.ac.uk/history/bethlehem/)*

**Endnotes**


2 Most of the criticism of the Turners’ work has focused on their creation of an artificial distinction between the “liminoid” state of pilgrimage and people’s everyday lives. For a summary, see Simon Coleman and John Eade, eds., *Reframing Pilgrimage: Cultures in Motion* (Oxfordshire and New York: Routledge, 2004), 1–25.


As a city holy to the three monotheistic religions, the place of Jerusalem is unique, special as well for accommodating pilgrimage to sites which have affinities to each other and overlap to a certain degree. Its unchanged topography has played a reinforcing role: that the last judgment and redemption will occur over its hills and ravines has forged its eternal status in the soul of the believer. For the purposes of this article, I will deal with Christian pilgrimage to Jerusalem and its role a catalyst shaping the present.

The birth of Christianity in Jerusalem was not just a dot on the map of the world. Its ripples travelled beyond the seas, oceans, and continents, creating a new moral code and world outlook. As it struck roots on a global scale, visiting the holy sites became an irresistible driving force in the souls of Christians, whether rich or poor. Palestine became the metropolis of pilgrimage and salvation, intimately connected to the soul. Around the Mediterranean Sea, once the center of the pagan world, a new religion with new temples developed.

In the first millennium of Christianity, most pilgrimage sites were located in the Middle East, in Cappadocia, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Greater Syria. Pilgrims who made the journey by land visited these sites and were impregnated by them. Today, when the term “cradle of civilization” is used, it generally refers to the East and people visualize the physically empty shells, the ruins scattered all over the region. But the Near East constituted the backbone of faith from where divine wisdom flowed, the repository of relics. Pilgrims sought to carry home a chip of a relic as a sacred object to fortify faith for future generations. In the first millennium
of our era – a brief time in the history of human civilization – three monotheistic religions were present on the Mediterranean stage, each one claiming to have the last word on prophecy and human destiny.

Despite initial hostility between Christianity and Islam, tolerance gradually set in with time. The march of Arab armies through Gibraltar and the conquest of the Iberian peninsula had a profound impact on Europe’s perception of Islam while in the East on the ground tolerance for Christians continued as evidenced by archaeological finds. Under the Abbasids, there was a shift. Naturally Islam brought with it a new world order in the Middle East, a new geography with shifting borders where pilgrims had to negotiate their way with the new rulers in the Holy Land.

The Crusades, which is usually painted in religious colors, ushered in a major cultural encounter between the East and the West. It was the trigger for an interdependent process which grew stronger in time. Though the Crusades had a violent beginning, a realization set in that East and West had many aspects to share in commercial and cultural exchange. Perhaps this seesaw is a law of Nature. The Crusades taught the West that negotiation can obtain better results than warfare. On the other hand, the architectural and urban heritage that the Crusaders left behind indicated to the East the esteem in which the West held its objects of faith. The Crusades, in my view, was not the beginning of a split between the East and West but rather the launching of interfaith contact.

And indeed, pilgrimage to Jerusalem never stopped. Eastern Christians used the traditional land routes, while Western Christians used the maritime routes, mainly through Mediterranean ports. One of the primary achievements of the Christian faith is the creation of a sacred geography in Jerusalem: after the passage of twenty centuries, Holy Week can be celebrated to its minutest detail in the very sites where the last drama of Jesus took place. Jerusalem is graced with a topography which has not fundamentally changed. The city is also a place where one of the strongest oral traditions has prevailed; the determination of early Christians in the first centuries to remember and pass on the sites and sequence of these events was strengthened by their status as a persecuted minority in the Roman Empire. These memories were corroborated by the Gospels and the writings of the Church Fathers and were followed, in the Byzantine period, by an imperial project to erect sanctuaries that perpetuated these memories of place and event. Quite early, topography was placed at the service of sacred history.

The unbreakable link between Europe and the Middle East made the Holy Land the receptacle of many cultural trends and influences, a kind of melting pot with the exception of theology. Unlike the first millennium where many church councils were held in the East, in the second millennium, the seat of theology was in European universities. Jerusalem itself was not the theater of theological disputes and controversies. The local Christians focused on the safeguarding of the Holy Places. It was easier for local Christians who shared the language and the culture of the rulers to communicate with the local authorities. The only resident foreign fraternity operating in the Holy Land up to the nineteenth century was the Franciscans.
Despite the tensions in the aftermath of the Crusades, Jerusalem remained a travel destination. Starting with the Middle Ages, there are lengthy descriptive accounts, some mentioning the whole pilgrimage journey, others focusing on Jerusalem. Pilgrim literature has provided us with sketches, maps, and reports on local customs and fauna. Tens of thousands of books have been written about Jerusalem. Travel to the Holy Land also stimulated curiosity about the Orient which proceeded until the advent of the Ottomans when Europe felt threatened by Ottoman expansion into Europe. In addition, arbitrary taxation by the Ottomans obliged local Christian institutions to reach out to their co-religionists in various parts of the world for financial support. Catholics looked to European powers like France, Italy, Spain, and, of course, the Papacy. The Greeks turned to Russia while Armenians reached out to far-flung communities across the globe, but particularly in Turkey, Russia, and the Far East. Church emissaries went back and forth to all corners of the earth to fundraise. Along with financial benefits came enriched know-how and exposure to new ideas. With time these overseas connections were institutionalized; many artifacts were sent as votive gifts to the churches in Jerusalem, thus creating art collections of gold and silver objects, textiles, manuscripts and ceramics. Christian art in Jerusalem is a byproduct of pilgrimage. Global pilgrimage made Jerusalem the most international city in the East after Constantinople. Pilgrims returned home bearing the honorific titles of Hajina, Maqdis or Mahdes, carrying these honorifics to their graves.

In the nineteenth century, most technological innovations, such as photography, railways, and modern roads, made their appearance in Jerusalem only a few decades after their introduction in the West. Political developments in the region opened up Palestine to the world, enabling foreign companies, consulates, and organizations to operate in the area. Jaffa and Jerusalem were the main beneficiaries of this policy. In a matter of half a century after 1850, sixty institutions were established in Jerusalem associated mainly with European consulates, Catholic orders, and Protestant churches. Everybody was keen to have a foothold in the Holy Land and one avenue was providing medical and educational services to the local population. As one inspects the architectural landscape of Jerusalem, one finds that one third of present Jerusalem with the present Old City walls is marked by construction activity in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The revolution in the means of transport at that time brought the cities of the East together. Almost every maritime agency had regular shipping lines to Palestine, the most active being the Austrian, Russian, French, and Italian who had stopovers in all of the Mediterranean ports. Similarly, foreign postal services, equivalent to banking services, operated along these routes. The influx of all these institutions and services rejuvenated Palestine, with Jerusalem and Jaffa the centers of gravity. The vast educational network provided the opportunity to learn foreign languages in the newly opened Western institutions. The local population became multilingual, a vital tool for employment, commerce, guiding, and catering. Many chains of hotels and hospices were established to attract Western travelers, the most popular being the Thomas Cook Company.
Greater Syria (Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine) and Egypt were merging commercially, culturally and socially. Regional pilgrimage to Jerusalem became an annual event, stretching from the Lent period through Holy Week. The main means of transport became the railway and shipping lines. One could easily sail from Alexandria or Beirut to Jaffa, or take a night ride on the train from Port Said to Lydda. People intermingled but the greatest occasion was Easter when the city overflowed with pilgrims who rented rooms and stayed with local families. Enduring friendships were established; some ended in marriages: if the bride was from Constantinople or Istanbul it was a status symbol, as women from Istanbul stood for modernity and the latest fashion. Next in the hierarchy came a bride from Cairo or Alexandria. Somewhat latter, a bride from Beirut was also prestigious.

On the cultural level newspapers and books published in any part of the Near East became readily available. Cultural events and trends in Beirut and Cairo were closely monitored. Writers and musicians traveled and gave presentations and concerts across the region. Literature and music unified the Near East.

On the church front, the local seminaries recruited from all over the Middle East. Jerusalem and Bethlehem became the center of the industry of mother of pearl or olive wood objets de piété. Crosses, icons, aromatic soap, funeral shrouds, and rosaries were produced and found their markets.

Pilgrimage to Jerusalem created an indestructible link between the Christians of the East, with a calendar of feasts and celebrations. Any pilgrim going back to his or her town or village was a transformed person carrying a luggage of traditions and impressions of celebrations on the very spot where it all took place. The Holy Fire ceremony was a much anticipated and meaningful moment for the Christians of the East, irrespective of their denomination; it unified all – more than any other event on the holy calendar.

The increased flow of pilgrims necessitated modern guidebooks in many languages. A casual perusal of Baedeker at the time reveals a Jerusalem which offered modern facilities. The city became the destination of celebrated writers and royal guests and they have left behind a literary legacy of five thousand books in English alone. Memoirs of resident Europeans provide us with detailed information about how the city functioned.

Archaeology, a discipline hardly two centuries old, arrived very early in the Holy Land. This new discipline added a fresh dimension to our knowledge of the Bible and the Holy Scriptures. The Holy Land and Egypt hosted the greatest number of archaeologists, some of whom spent a lifetime on their projects, shedding new light on the religious narrative. It would be hard to imagine Holy Land studies without the labor and input of archaeological investigation.

At the beginning of the First World War the population of Jerusalem had reached sixty thousand, as opposed to only four thousand in 1826. After the war, the British Mandate consolidated the institutions begun in the late Ottoman period and created a new bureaucracy. Air travel was a crucial element to bring in pilgrims, while on the regional level, cars and buses were instrumental in safe and efficient transport.
During Easter Week, hundreds of buses made their way from neighboring countries. Sometimes they were housed in open fields and tent towns. This mode of travel had a forced end after 1967 for obvious reasons, dealing a serious blow to pilgrimage from the Middle East.

In the twenty-first century, when mass tourism is the norm, patterns are changing. Alongside traditional pilgrimage, we witness evangelical groups who are oriented to the Old Testament and, along with their messianic drive, have a political agenda. There is also a huge growth of Russian and South American pilgrimage which is pietistic. It is too early to predict how this mass tourism will impact the city but we have an obligation to safeguard the integrity of a city shaped by centuries of collective human effort and love.

George Hintlian is a Jerusalem historian specializing in the 19th century and Christian heritage. At present, he is a resident scholar at the Gulbenkian Library in Jerusalem, and is a member of the Advisory Board of the Jerusalem Quarterly.
Beyond Jerusalem Syndrome: 
Religious Mania and Miracle Cures in British Mandate Palestine

Chris Wilson

In 1937, Dr. Heinz Hermann, the medical director of Ezrath Nashim (Women’s Aid), a private Jewish mental hospital in Jerusalem, published an article on “Jerusalem fever” (Jerusalem-Fieber) in Folia clinica orientalia. Based in Tel Aviv and granted a publishing license in September 1937, the German/English-language medical journal proved a short-lived affair, eclipsed by the success of the Hebrew-language medical journal Harefuah (Medicine) among European Jewish doctors in Palestine. But Hermann’s argument, that there was a distinct psychiatric condition linked to the uniquely holy city of Jerusalem, would go on to enjoy a long career, repackaged and popularized later in the century as “Jerusalem syndrome.” Grounded in his clinical experience of the numerous prophets and messiahs who could be found wandering the streets of Jerusalem in the 1930s, the idea that a particular place could be mentally dislocating chimed with some contemporary trends in the history of the psy-sciences, particularly psychoanalysis, when Hermann published his piece in 1937. No less a figure than Sigmund Freud had just penned an open letter to Romain Rolland, in which he reflected on his own moment of “derealization” on a trip to the Acropolis in 1904. At a remove of thirty years, Freud boiled down the essence of the experience to a sense of incredulity at reality. “By the evidence of my senses,” he wrote, “I am now standing on the Acropolis, but I cannot believe it.” Hermann the psychiatrist had good reason to be cautious about tapping into psychoanalytic thought. His predecessor as medical director of Ezrath Nashim, Dorian Feigenbaum, had been dismissed in 1924 after delivering a series of lectures
on the unconscious, dream theory, and the Freudian theory of neurosis. In this case, however, Hermann’s clinical experience had led him into the same kind of field of inquiry as Freud.

Jerusalem fever represented the most medically sophisticated attempt to come to terms with mental illnesses of a seemingly religious nature in British Mandate Palestine. But it is hardly the only point of overlap between the histories of psychiatry and mental illness, on the one hand, and of religious belief and practices, on the other. Long before the establishment of either the British Mandate in the aftermath of World War I, or the Ezrath Nashim hospital in 1895, stories circulated about European and American travelers who appeared to be deranged by their encounter with the “Holy Land.” These cases continued into the Mandate period, and in spite of Hermann’s efforts, resisted medicalization. They were messy, defying easy categorization as medical cases and spilling out into other registers: Mandate authorities saw them as potential threats to public order; others observed and reported them, with no small degree of voyeuristic glee, as curiosities, further colorful exoticisms unique to Jerusalem. In parallel to these discussions of European and American cases of religious mania, folklore research – by Europeans and Palestinians – sought to record for posterity a rich set of beliefs and practices among Palestinians around mental illness, involving jinn (spirits), saints, and shrines.

These distinct ways of framing the connection between mental illness and religious beliefs and practices were largely kept apart at the time, and in scholarship since. Medicalized approaches to the question of mental illness have hitherto been studied largely in terms of the exploits of European Jewish psychiatrists in Palestine, with the role of the Mandate health department – which employed British and Palestinian Arab, as well as European Jewish, doctors – deemed marginal to this field of inquiry. On the other hand, studies of European and American travelers to Palestine, including those who appeared to have been driven mad by the experience, have tended to take as their point of departure the question of Orientalism. Work on Palestinian folklore research, meanwhile, has foregrounded its complex position within a political history of Palestinian nationalist assertion. This article brings these different approaches to the relationship between mental illness and religious beliefs and practices into the same frame of analysis for the first time, taking the notion of pilgrimage – broadly conceived – as a kind of golden thread knitting together these different registers. While the term pilgrimage is likely to bring to mind first and foremost the hajj to Mecca and Medina, this article thinks through the question of mental illness in relation to other pilgrimages and pilgrims. The pilgrims considered here include, in the first place, Christians whose travel to Palestine was religious in motivation.

While Christian pilgrimage stretched back to medieval times, over the course of the nineteenth century this stream of Christian pilgrims was joined by a flood of other European and American visitors to Palestine, propelled by the development of trade, tourism, and – in the case of Jewish travelers – Zionism. Some of the Europeans and Americans examined here came to Palestine driven by divine inspiration; others may not have come with explicitly spiritual motivations, but nevertheless experienced a
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profound spiritual or religious disturbance once in the Holy Land. As the example of “Jerusalem fever” suggests, pilgrimage, conceived at its broadest as denoting a journey towards the holy, could be considered – by medical professionals and lay people alike – as a causal factor in the appearance of mental illness. Yet pilgrimage figures here as more than a potential cause of mental illness. For Palestinians, pilgrimages held out the possibility of cure: Christians and Muslims alike sought supernatural relief within an extraordinarily rich landscape of sites associated with saints and spirits; Jews also journeyed to sites like Safed and Meron, centers of mysticism for centuries, hoping for relief. This article proceeds by first developing the idea of pilgrimage as a kind of cause of mental illness, before turning to pilgrimage as a form of cure for mental illness.

Before Jerusalem Fever

By the time Hermann turned a clinical eye on the prophets and messiahs of Jerusalem in the 1930s, stories about European and American “cranks” in the city had been circulating for decades. One of the most influential vehicles for these stories was the work of the American Ada Goodrich-Freer. Goodrich-Freer had made a name for herself in Britain for her work in the 1890s on precognition and hauntings, but after being disavowed as a fraud by the Society of Psychical Research, she moved to Jerusalem in December 1901. Over the decade she spent in the city, she turned her attention to folklore research – an interest shared with the German Orientalist Hans Spoer, whom she married in 1905 – and in particular to documenting “the practical outcome, psychological and religious, of a history so unique . . . as that of the Holy City.” Writing in 1904, Goodrich-Freer noted the number of individuals suffering some form of religious mania in Jerusalem. Given the city’s religious significance, she reasoned, “it is hardly surprising that all the more striking eccentricities of Christianity seem to have been, at some time or other, represented within her walls, from the self-tortured ascetics of the earliest Christian centuries, down to the latest extravagances fresh from America.” The eccentricities she encountered while in Jerusalem ranged from an Englishwoman who was reported to be in constant readiness to welcome Christ’s return with a cup of tea, to those who believed themselves to be prophets. An “Elijah” presided over a colony of English and American followers, for instance, but he was only the tip of a rather large iceberg. “Scarcely a year goes by without the arrival of someone who dares,” she wrote, “to assume a personality still more sacred.” Listing the range of eccentrics the city appeared to encourage, and who were drawn particularly to the Mount of Olives, Goodrich-Freer repeated a joke she claimed to have heard circulating: “At a time when there was a talk of erecting an asylum for imbeciles, we should not be altogether in the wrong if we took down the walls of Jerusalem, and built them up again, so as to include the suburbs.”

As her recounting of this joke suggests, Goodrich-Freer treated many of these stories as amusing anecdotes, not cases of mental illness which needed to be taken seriously or shown compassion. Her inexact language reinforces this impression of carelessness: although her chapter on these cases took as its point of departure
the language of “religious mania” and “insanity,” she quickly slipped into writing about “cranks,” “eccentricities,” and even “imbeciles” – a term with a very different valence indeed. The capaciousness of her understanding of the term “cranks” can be seen in the fact that she included within the remit of this chapter the American Colony of Overcomers, or simply the American Colony, a community founded in Jerusalem in the 1880s by American evangelicals whose pursuit of poverty, chastity, and obedience had resulted in “certain extravagances,” in Goodrich-Freer’s view. Decades later, the leader of this same community of “cranks” offered her own reflections on the question of religious mania in Jerusalem. Bertha Spafford Vester had been brought to Jerusalem by her parents as a child in the 1880s, and became the administrative head of the American Colony after her mother’s death in 1923. In her memoirs, she adopted a different approach to the question of religious mania. “Religious fanatics and cranks of different degrees of mental derangement seemed drawn as by a magnet to the Holy City,” she wrote, echoing Goodrich-Freer’s representation of the city as fertile soil for religious eccentricities. Yet Vester, rather than treat them merely as amusing anecdotes, attempted to understand the causes of these manifestations of religious mania and showed greater awareness of the sometimes serious consequences of these cases:

During our lives in Jerusalem we witnessed many tragedies caused by religious frenzies and fanaticisms, and followed the courses of numerous unbalanced cranks. There is a thread of similarity in all their stories of the same sad, exaggerated egotism. Something in the brain suggests the idea that they are unique and chosen by God, or reincarnated to fulfil some tremendous purpose. I could continue indefinitely, for the simples in Allah’s Garden were many, seeming to gravitate to the Holy Land to enter our lives for long or short periods of time, sometimes with direful consequences.

Again, the imprecision of language – “frenzies,” “cranks,” “exaggerated egotism,” and “simples” – indicated the difficulty in finding a vocabulary with which to talk

Figure 1. Bertha Spafford Vester, c.1930, from the papers of John D. Whiting. American Colony Photographers, Matson (G. Eric and Edith) Photograph Collections, Library of Congress.
about these cases, which seemed to defy straightforward medicalization. But Vester’s account is nonetheless more compassionate in tone. In part, this may have been a result of her own experiences as part of a community maligned as “cranks.” The difference in attitude between Goodrich-Freer and Vester may also have reflected the attempt of the latter’s family at the American Colony to look after some of these individuals. Vester’s mother, for instance, had once tried to care for an American Jewish man who had come to Palestine late in the nineteenth century convinced that he was the prophet Elijah. “By this time we knew several like him, who thought they were John the Baptist or Elijah, or another of the prophets,” she noted, adding: “There were several Messiahs, too, wandering about Jerusalem.”19 In this instance, Elijah – as he insisted on being called – made a pilgrimage to the Mount of Olives, expecting it to cleave in two before him; when it did not, he blamed Vester’s family and attacked them while drunk on arak. Restrained, and given food and strong coffee, he calmed down enough for a return journey to the United States to be arranged with the help of Vester’s family.20 Elijah was not the only American in the late nineteenth century to mix strong conviction with strong drink in Jerusalem. Another – this time a Texan who insisted on being called Titus21 – had come to Jerusalem “like so many others . . . in answer to what he considered a special call from God.” Convinced that he had to be in Jerusalem to fulfil his destiny, as time passed and this destiny remained seemingly unfulfilled, he started drinking and making inappropriate advances on the women of the American Colony. “Titus was drinking heavily now of the powerful local arak and looking crazier than ever,” Vester recalled. Though Titus spent most of the day shouting loudly, he could not bear other people making noises, and during Ramadan emptied his chamber pot over a man announcing the end of the day’s fast. A serious incident was only avoided once it was realized by the justifiably angry crowd that Titus was “simple” or rather, “touched.” “Allah has touched him,” Vester recorded the crowd as saying, adding her own explanatory gloss, “as they do in such cases, only they simply say, “Touched,” and pat their heads.” She concluded: “Many of the dervishes were “touched.””22 Vester’s explanation confuses rather than clarifies matters, not least because she does not record the original Arabic used. While there is clearly a sense in which Titus appears to have been understood as a “holy fool” (majdhub), rather than a “secular fool” (mahbul), nothing in her account suggests that he was seen as possessing blessing power (baraka), one of the usual attributes of the majdhub.23 Vester’s blurring of distinct categories in Arabic mirrors her earlier blurring of categories in English, and points once more to the wider problem of pinning down exactly what was at work in these cases.

Although writing about their experiences before the establishment of the British Mandate, Goodrich-Freer and Vester highlight the variety of approaches to the question of religiously inspired mental illnesses. Vester’s attempt to understand the causation of these kinds of mental illness at a more theoretical level – as a result of an “exaggerated egotism” or, more immediately, too much arak – was echoed in more clinical terms by Hermann in the 1930s. A second approach, clear in both accounts – though more pronounced in Goodrich-Freer’s and coexisting somewhat uneasily with Vester’s efforts to understand and help these cases – was a kind of voyeuristic
interest in such eccentricities, which also persisted into the interwar years. Vester’s account also highlights how these religious eccentricities could slide into threatening or violent behavior, necessitating a response – which increasingly came not from the community but, after World War I, from the Mandate government. A final approach to religiously inspired mental illness, only hinted at in Vester’s account of the labeling of Titus as “touched,” was ethnographic in inclination, seeking to capture Palestinian understandings of mental illness. Goodrich-Freer had also written about attitudes among Palestinians toward “the congenital idiot, whom they treat as God’s fool, on the supposition that his soul is in heaven.” But, revealingly, her comments on beliefs and practices among Palestinians around mental illness came in a separate chapter to her recollections about European and American cranks in the Holy Land. In that respect, Vester’s account of Titus, who both conformed to wider patterns of “Jerusalem fever” as an American overcome by the sanctity of Palestine, and yet was also recorded as being treated by Palestinians as falling under an alternative category of understanding as “touched,” represents a rare instance in which these two distinct registers – normally kept apart – came into contact with one another.

Prophets and Public Order

For the most part, religiously inspired mental illness came to the attention of British Mandate authorities only when it was accompanied by violence or the threat of violence. This was entirely typical of the Mandate’s wider approach to the question of mental illness, though of course this prioritization of the violent was not unique to the Mandate: the 1876 Ottoman law relating to asylum for lunatics required that the government be informed “if any member of a family becomes a lunatic and is in such a condition to necessitate his being bound,” a requirement which placed emphasis on cases in which physical restraint was deemed necessary. The British had established the first government mental institution in Palestine, a mental hospital in Bethlehem, as early as 1922 and continued to expand their provision for the mentally ill across the Mandate period, opening a second government mental hospital in Bethlehem in 1932 and a third in Jaffa in 1944, along with criminal lunatic sections for male and female prisoners. But supply never kept up with rising demand for treatment from Palestinian Arabs and Jews alike. This was in spite of the fact that, in addition to the government mental institutions which accommodated Muslim, Christian, and Jewish cases, Palestinians looked north to ‘Asfuriyya, a privately operated mental hospital founded by Christian missionaries outside Beirut, while Jews (and a small number of Christians and Muslims) sought treatment at Ezrath Nashim – both of which predated government institutions by more than two decades. As a result of ever-increasing pressure on accommodation, the government health department prioritized only the most urgent cases, which in practice meant those deemed violent. In 1936, the senior medical officer in Jerusalem explained that, accommodation being limited, “the policy of this department has been to admit violent cases only, who are considered dangerous to themselves and others.”

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It is unsurprising, then, that some of the most vivid accounts of cases of religious mania during the Mandate period came not from medical officers, but police. Members of the Palestine Police force recall the kind of madness which could seize pilgrims as they visited the holy sites at Jerusalem, and in particular the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. One former Palestine Police officer recounted how, at the church, “everyone goes mad sort-of-thing”; their job, while stationed there, had been “to make order out of chaos.” Another, Douglas Duff – who joined the Palestine Police in 1922 – wrote at length about his experiences of policing the Holy Sepulchre in his memoirs. He had “dealt with cranks and lunatics and people temporarily crazed by their emotions in such a place,” including one “almost unbelievable stigmatic, who suddenly and ecstatically displayed the marks of the Nails, the Crown of Thorns, and the lance-thrust in his side, which he said had spontaneously appeared on his body.” Duff had only “retained [his] sanity by realizing there must be something natural, and not spiritual, about them,” but the appearance of stigmata nevertheless “almost caused a massacre among the awestruck multitude.” “We had to be severe, and very quick, in dealing with him,” Duff recalls, “but we fought off the shrieking people before they could go mad themselves,” and brought the stigmatic to hospital. Although the priority had been to maintain order and prevent the contagion of madness from spreading, reflecting on the incident years later, Duff came to a conclusion about the nature of the stigmatic’s condition. In his opinion, the “poor, deluded fanatic . . . was no rogue, like so many were; it was some intense mental paroxysm which had brought the stigmata into existence.” The visible, physical symptoms manifested by the man in this instance became a proof of the depth and authenticity of his emotional response to being at such a holy site.

Since Fanon’s diagnosis of colonialism as “a fertile purveyor for psychiatric hospitals,” the link between contexts of political oppression and mental illness has been an important line of investigation for many. Yet Duff did not place this incident at a particular point in the political history of the Mandate, frustrating attempts at a similar reading here. Instead, he located it within a sacramental calendar, as occurring and comprehensible within the context of the heightened religious fervor of Holy Week. Outside the very particular context of Holy Week in the Holy Sepulchre, however, messiahs and prophets on the streets of Jerusalem could draw crowds – and the attention of the police – with messages which touched more directly on politics. In July 1930, the Palestine Bulletin related the following story:

A new John the Baptist has been preaching the coming of the Messiah in the streets of Jerusalem. Crowds gathered in Jaffa Road and at Damascus Gate to hear him harangue and prophesy. These are strange times, he said, all things are reversed, and the world is suffering the pangs of the pre-Messianic era. The police dispersed the crowds and asked the new John to go on his way before he had an opportunity to make many converts.
This new John the Baptist – one Mr. Kilpin – had harangued the crowd in English, but subsequently told a reporter that “it was his intention to learn Hebrew in order to announce the coming of the Lord to the Jews.” Regardless of his intention, his message of reversal and upheaval would have resonated in a place which had experienced much of both in the previous decade or so: the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the beginning of British colonial rule, the development of an increasingly muscular Zionist movement, and – most recently – the demonstrations and riots of August 1929. If Kilpin’s message of reversal and upheaval is likely to have aroused suspicion among the police, the location of his gatherings would have certainly sparked alarm and dredged up dark memories: on 23 August 1929, crowds emerging from Friday prayers had gathered at the Jaffa and Damascus Gates, and along Jaffa Road, and had been violently dispersed by the police and other British forces.

If the political context helps explain the speedy response of the police to the appearance of this new John the Baptist, a third case – that of the “Modern Messiah,” as the *Palestine Bulletin* dubbed him – suggests the importance of environmental history and gender. This was the case of an old Jewish man who had spent six months living in the caves of the Sanhedrin tombs outside Jerusalem and claimed to be the Messiah. Hundreds of Jews were reported to be visiting him, particularly on Saturdays, Shabbat, suggesting that they may have viewed him as a kind of guide or even rabbinical figure. Part of his appeal seems to have been his ability to offer an account of one of the
most traumatizing events in recent memory: the devastating earthquake which rocked Palestine in July 1927. He folded the earthquake into an eschatological frame, declaring to his followers that “the redemption, of which the earthquake was the forerunner, will come shortly.” In January 1928, things escalated. A young, married Bukharan Jewish woman had been visiting the Modern Messiah, bringing him food, and her concerned parents had gone to the cave to try and get him to leave. A quarrel had broken out, and the police had intervened and brought the Modern Messiah to the police station in Mea She’arim to protect him from the wrath of the young woman’s family. In the end, the Modern Messiah was rescued by a Dutch Jewish man, who took him into his own home for a few days before lodging him in a pension. No such kindness was forthcoming for the young woman, who was taken to an unnamed asylum. The *Bulletin* reported that she believed “she is God’s daughter and that her lover, the Messiah, is God’s son,” and “insists on her being taken to him.” In this instance, the police’s concern about the perceived threat to public order posed by the Modern Messiah was accompanied by the newspaper’s rather prurient interest in the content of the young woman’s delusions.

The very different fates of the Modern Messiah and the Bukharan Jewish woman suggest the importance of gender in marking out the boundaries between permissible (albeit sometimes disruptive) religious eccentricity, on the one hand, and mental illness requiring medical intervention and institutionalization, on the other. Women who – whether sincerely or not – cast their transgressive behavior in a religious idiom were not accorded the same latitude as male messiahs and prophets. As the example of the Bukharan Jewish woman also highlights, some of those who came to the attention of the police could subsequently find themselves scrutinized by medical authorities, too, as the police handed over these cases to the department of health. Gordon A. had come to the attention of the government after failing to pay the rent for the house in which he had been living in Jerusalem between 1928 and 1929. He was “admitted” to the central prison in Jerusalem in April 1929, awaiting deportation from Palestine to Canada. Questioned about his failure to pay rent, he told the medical officers sent to examine him that:

> I signed a contract for the House of God, House of Israel, House of Zion. These are responsible for payment. I am only a servant of the House of God. God has power to overrule in all cases. His judgement is superior. Money is the root of all evil; can righteousness be indebted to wickedness? Let the landlord ask from the House of God. It is God’s Spirit that is responsible for payment, I am only a servant. I don’t care if I am in a house or at the wilderness or in a prison, it is God’s will.

Unsurprisingly, his medical report concluded he was “suffering from a religious form of paranoia,” alongside chronic rheumatism which made movement difficult. Although “quite cheerful usually,” he was “very easily irritated if discussions of a religious nature are argued with him.” In light of this, the report declared him “fit to be deported,” with a special attendant provided to look after him on board the ship. The government
agreed to his deportation on the condition that he be supervised, and his attendant was given detailed advice on managing his ward by the prison’s medical officer: Gordon A. was not to be allowed to mingle with other passengers, was to eat separately, and was not to be irritated in any way – above all by discussions of “any religious points, as this infuriates him and renders him very excitable.”

Folklore and the Devil

Gordon A.’s explanation that God would pay his rent had resulted in a medical verdict that he was suffering a religious form of paranoia and a fit case for deportation. A few years later, early in 1934, Fatima S. appeared before the Mandate’s court of appeal in Jerusalem charged with a much more serious crime: murder. Described in a press account of the case as “a middle-aged peasant woman of the village of [Kafr] ‘Ana, in the Jaffa district,” she had been sentenced to death by the court of criminal assize for the premeditated murder of her blind husband with an axe. In a statement given to the police, Fatima S. confessed to the murder, a confession she repeated before the court:

I was deceived by the devil. The accursed Satan deceived me. That demon struck me to kill my husband. Therefore did I take an axe and gave him two blows upon the head. Then I took his body and flung it in the well.

She had appeared at the court of criminal assize without legal representation, and had initially pleaded guilty to the charge, a plea the court itself had advised her to withdraw. At the court of appeal, however, she was represented by Henry Cattan, who argued that the defendant could not have been in her right mind at the time of the murder. He asked for a medical examination of the defendant, which the court granted, ordering that she be examined by Dr. Mikhail Malouf, the medical superintendent of the government mental hospitals at Bethlehem. Fatima S. was kept under observation for a month at the women’s prison in Bethlehem and brought back before the court in April. Malouf “certified that during this period no indication of mental deficiency or of lunacy could be observed and that her mentality was the normal average mentality of a woman of her class in Palestine.” She was not, in other words, a case that could be found “guilty but insane,” in his view. In the end, the court overturned the death sentence imposed on Fatima S. by the lower court, but on technical grounds: the sole witness who could provide evidence for premeditation was her daughter, whose testimony was inadmissible. Even as they handed down this reprieve, however, the court made clear that they, like Malouf, believed the woman was responsible for her actions; the judgment declared that the court had taken no account of the counsel’s plea in mitigation. On the contrary, they expressed their feeling that the crime had been “committed in circumstances of great brutality.” In line with this, they sentenced her to fifteen years in penal servitude.
Faced with a Palestinian peasant woman, the judges found themselves grappling with the question of what some transcultural psychiatrists today call “normative uncertainty.”

This is a concept with which historians of colonial psychiatry have long been familiar. Megan Vaughan puts it best: in order for colonial officials to reach a conclusion about the insanity of a given individual, they first had to work out whether it was “normal” for Africans, for instance, to have visions, or for Malays to suffer group hysteria.

Only once the “normal average mentality” had been identified, could a decision on the sanity and therefore legal responsibility of an individual be reached. In this instance, it was Malouf who took up the role of a kind of cultural interpreter at the order of the court, helping the Mandate’s judges determine what was normal among the rural population of Palestine. This was not an altogether easy position to fill. Concern about British overdependence on a variety of Palestinian intermediaries had been expressed by a number of officials: Joseph Broadhurst, of the Palestine Police, had worried that the prosecution of crime was left almost entirely in the hands of the Palestinian officer, “who knows both the language and the mentality of the people.”

Edward Keith-Roach, district commissioner, similarly lamented that British officers were “in the hands of translators, mostly Arab Christians” – like Malouf. Malouf was performing interpretive work of a slightly different order here: not the translation of Arabic into English, but the identification of the “normal average mentality” of a woman of Fatima S.’s background. For all these anxieties around interpreters, however, in this instance at least, his representation of Fatima S. as belonging to a different mental and moral universe was seized upon by the court as chiming with their own horror at the brutality and insensibility of the crime committed – and, critically for the defendant’s chances of a full reprieve, the world from which it was thought to have sprung. Deemed normal for a woman of her background, Fatima S.’s explanation – in spite of its invocation of Satan – did not seem to the court to be sufficiently unusual to call into question her sanity and therefore her legal responsibility. As in the case of the Bukharan Jewish woman who sought to cast her transgressive behavior in religious terms, Fatima S.’s attempt at explanation and absolution through a turn to the supernatural was unsuccessful, though here the consequences were different: she was not sent to a mental hospital, or even a criminal lunatic ward, but to a prison.

Although it was Malouf, a medical doctor, who had been called upon to interpret Fatima S. to the court in this instance, uncovering the “normal” among the Palestinian peasantry was a task more properly the domain of folklore researchers, both European and Palestinian. While religious mania among Europeans and Americans in Palestine was viewed through the lenses of medicine, voyeurism, and security, it was primarily through folklore research that mental illness and religious beliefs and practices among Palestinians were linked together. The clearest examples of this come from the work of the Palestine Oriental Society, which met for the first time in March 1920. While the society published on a range of intellectual concerns, and included European biblical scholars as well as Palestinian Arabs and Jews, as far as folklore research was concerned, it was a group of Palestinian Arab – largely Jerusalemite – ethnographers who predominated. Loosely headed by the well-known medical doctor Taufiq Canaan,
this group contributed an eclectic array of essays on Palestinian folklore. Writing to record for posterity the customs of a peasantry whose way of life they perceived as rapidly disappearing, their work has been read for its proto-nationalist assertion of the depth and authenticity of Palestinian roots in the land. Written in English and aimed at a European audience – including those affiliated with the British Mandate administration – this aspect of their folklore research as a strategic riposte to Zionist narratives is undeniably important. Yet their work – which contains, among many other things, a rich set of writings on folk beliefs and practices around mental illness – can be read through the lens not just of political history, but the history of medicine too.

In 1924, Stephan Hanna Stephan – himself a civil servant in the Mandate government, as well as archaeologist and curator – published an article entitled “Lunacy in Palestinian Folklore” in the society’s journal. This was one of the most substantial investigations of the subject published in the journal, or anywhere, and had much to say about beliefs around the causes of mental illness. The article began by listing the thirty-one terms used in the Arabic of the day to describe states of lunacy, the most common of these being majnun. The significance of this term, Stephan explained, lay in the fact that, even in its etymology, it conveyed the extent to which folk understandings of mental illness were closely tied to belief in the action of jinn. There were exceptions to this belief: amulets, plants like the so-called lunatics’ apple, sudden nervous shock, and even love, when mixed with other strong emotions, were also thought to have the potential to derange an individual. But in the majority of cases, responsibility for madness was laid at the feet of jinn. They were credited with inflicting insanity as a punishment for a range of actions, from transgressing universal moral laws to more specific offenses, like shouting into a cave or well and thereby disturbing its resident spirit. Epilepsy too was inflicted by evil spirits (jinn tayyar), as were other, more specific conditions – hysteria, melancholia, neurasthenia, even nervous impotence on the part of a husband. Stephan’s article was certainly the most comprehensive exploration of the subject, but the connection between the term majnun and belief in possession by spirits had been made clear to English-speaking audiences as early as 1910, in a discussion published in the *British Medical Journal*. And in 1934, the same year Fatima S. was put on trial for murder, Taufiq Canaan – who had been extensively cited in Stephan’s article – published his own piece on modern beliefs and practices among Palestinians in which he reaffirmed that, as a result of ignorance about modern medicine, there was a “deeply-rooted belief that sickness is attributable to the action of evil spirits.” A central goal for the ethnographers of the Palestine Oriental Society may have been to make the case for a Palestinian connection to the land. But their work had other effects, too. By emphasizing the centrality of belief in the action of jinn as a cause of mental illness in Palestinian folklore, their work helped inform Mandate-era understandings of what ought to be considered normal among the Palestinian peasantry – with sometimes profound consequences for individuals like Fatima S.
Miraculous Treatments

For Europeans and Americans, the belief that they had been overwhelmed by their encounter with the Holy Land meant that pilgrimage was figured as a cause of their madness; among Palestinians, the connection between mental illness and religious belief was made in a different, ethnographic register. Pilgrimage did not figure as a causal factor; rather, pilgrimage was one of a number of methods of cure pursued by Palestinians. Not pilgrimage but a different kind of movement solved the problem of the European and American mentally ill, at least as far as the Mandate was concerned: deportation. Vester’s “Elijah,” deported to the United States, and Gordon A., deported to Canada, are two cases in point. Among government employees, it appears to have been standard practice to repatriate the mentally ill to England for treatment. The foundational problem in all these cases was the perception that suitable treatment was unavailable within Palestine itself. The senior medical officer at Jaffa articulated this in the late 1930s, in relation to one case in which the relative of a young English lady “who showed signs of mental disease when she was on a visit to Jaffa”; he expressed horror at the notion of placing her in a government mental hospital, and took her to ‘Asfuriyya outside Beirut instead, where she could receive treatment in a private institution. The medical officer agreed with their decision, opining with regard to Palestine: “I know of no place in which patients of a high standard of life can be accommodated.”

If religiously inspired madness among European and American visitors to the Holy Land was not met primarily with religiously inspired treatments, the story was different for Palestinians. From the late nineteenth century, gruesome accounts of the fate of the insane in the region in the absence of any modern psychiatric institution had circulated throughout Europe and America, not least a result of the efforts of the Swiss Quaker missionary, Theophilus Waldmeier. Waldmeier, fundraising for the Lebanon hospital for the insane at ‘Asfuriyya, sought to leverage potential sponsors into action by describing in detail “the cruelty with which the poor lunatics are treated and tortured to death.” In one Maronite convent at Mount Lebanon, he informed readers in 1897, lunatics were chained in a cave and beaten. In the same appeal, he recounted the story of an insane woman from Brumana, who had been taken to a priest; he beat her almost to death with a large silver cross, and when the ordeal was over, she went and drowned herself in the sea. Once the hospital opened its doors in 1900, Waldmeier kept up the pressure on subscribers by including photographs of lunatics who had been branded on the head with the sign of the cross including photographs -in annual reports and other promotional material–of lunatics who had been branded on the head with the sign of the cross.

Although Waldmeier’s focus was Mount Lebanon, he had written about the treatment of the mentally ill further south in Palestine in his initial appeal for funds. Near Bethlehem, he noted, there was a monastery dedicated to St. George, often conflated with al-Khadr, and revered by Christians and Muslims alike. “The legend tells us that St. George killed the dragon, and that the dragon was a demon, and in consequence,” Waldmeier continued, “the people believe that St George is also able to subdue and cast
out demons” – including those believed responsible for insanity. The Orthodox monks of the shrine had built cells for the treatment of the insane, in which “the insane are half or quite naked, with heavy iron chains round their necks, running through a hole of the wall of the cells into the church of St George, where they are fastened round a stone pillar.”68 This kind of treatment was seen as a natural corollary of the belief that madness was the work of evil spirits, something Ada Goodrich-Freer, writing around the same time, also noted. The Muslims of Palestine, she wrote, “assume (who knows with what justice?) that insanity is due to the presence of an evil spirit,” and that as a result “their treatment is based on the theory of exorcism, of making his tenement unpleasant.” She too described how the insane were “sometimes shut up under the Haram area, or chained to a pillar in the church at al-Khadr, or sent to the cave of Elijah,” where she believed the “awful sacredness of the place” might shock them out of their insanity.69

While we might expect Goodrich-Freer – spiritual medium and psychical researcher – to be less skeptical of a form of treatment which relied on supernatural agency, Thomas Chaplin, trained as a medical doctor, was also generous in his evaluation of the value of this treatment. He suggested this treatment worked in the same way any sudden fright might, “producing a kind of shock to the nervous system which proves beneficial.”70 Written at the end of the nineteenth century, Chaplin’s recognition of the potential value of a shock for the treatment of mental cases anticipated a turn to somatic treatments within psychiatry in the interwar period. These treatments – through the administration of cardiazol, insulin, and electricity – similarly relied on a shock to the body to cure the mind; all were introduced into mental institutions in Palestine across the late 1930s and 1940s.71

The practice of bringing the mentally ill to the church of St. George near Bayt Jala, just outside Bethlehem, was still being reported after the establishment of the Mandate. Both Stephan Hanna Stephan and Taufiq Canaan wrote about this practice in the Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society in the mid-1920s. Echoing earlier accounts, Canaan described how the insane were restrained with chains in the belief that, once cured, St. George himself would release them. Unlike Goodrich-Freer, Canaan’s focus was less on the “awful sacredness” of this method, and more on the role played by the monks in assisting the process of “cure”:

The patients received no medical treatment at all, but had to be cured by the miraculous intervention of St George. The head of the church found it very often necessary to hasten the cure by driving out the devil. This was done by thorough beating and prayers. No wonder that these poor creatures were furious when the priest fell into their clutches. Whenever a patient’s condition got somewhat normal the priest secretly unfastened the chain from the church, and told the patient that the saint declared him cured. Only a simple straw mattress was given them. The two who were bound in front of the church had not the least protection from the frightful summer heat or the cold of the winter. Their food consisted of bread – sometimes very hard – and water. Both were given
to a very limited extent. The odor of their evacuations used to make the place unsupportable.  

But the church, Canaan noted, had been renovated shortly before the outbreak of World War I, and the treatment of the insane improved accordingly. A sanatorium had been built a short distance from the church, comprised of “good rooms,” with hygiene “in every respect better.” The method of treatment, however, had obviously not changed completely; each room came equipped with a chain which ultimately connected, either physically or symbolically, the lunatic back to the saint’s sanctuary in the church, so that miracles could continue to be worked. In spite of these changes, Canaan noted “the present government has forbidden the acceptance of insane in this place.” Stephan added a few additional details, reporting that under usual conditions an individual would be “healed” in two or three weeks. But now, he concluded, echoing Canaan, “this practice has ceased and the government has a lunatic asylum near Bethlehem which employs modern methods” – a reference to the government mental hospital which had opened its doors late in 1922. 

The termination of this practice was noted almost in passing in both Canaan’s and Stephan’s articles – indeed, reduced to a footnote in the former – and it seems to have slipped under the radar in the colonial archives, too. Douglas Duff, in Palestine from 1922, wrote in his memoirs that he had seen “some extraordinary cases where cures were effected” at the monastery of St. George near Bethlehem, so it may be that the ban on receiving the insane at Bayt Jala was not put in place until the middle of the 1920s, rather than immediately – or that it only gradually became effective. While the case of al-Khadr seems to follow the contours of the story sketched by Eugene Rogan of a European attempt from the late nineteenth century to wrest control of the mentally ill in the Levant from “men of religion” to “men of science,” the lacunae in the colonial archive around this story suggest a lack of real or sustained interest in this endeavor on the part of the Mandate government. The health department appears to have been markedly less evangelical about educating the population of Palestine on mental illness than on hygiene, for example. But it is important not to overstate British tolerance for therapeutic pluralism in Palestine. When a Lebanese man, “Salim Abdu Harb,” appeared in Jerusalem promising to cure the insane by branding a cross on their foreheads, he was arrested for practicing as a doctor without a license. 

There is another – albeit speculative – way of framing the story of the Mandate and the monastery of St. George, however, when it is set alongside the decision by the department of health to establish the first government mental hospital in Bethlehem. The site made sense in practical terms; a building thought suitable was available, and the town was centrally located. But this was certainly not the path of least resistance. Ronald Storrs, then-governor of Jerusalem, wrote to the chief secretary of the new civil government protesting “the placing of a lunatic asylum anywhere in Bethlehem,” a move he considered “unsuitable and prejudicial to the interests of one of the most important towns in my district and indeed of Palestine.” The proposal also came under criticism from the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, who wanted
to take possession of the building for their own purposes. It is intriguing, then, that in the face of opposition the British chose to locate their first mental hospital quite so close – only a mile or so – to a shrine to which the insane had long been brought for treatment. Was this an effort to feed off and redirect more established strategies for managing the mentally ill in Palestine? While there is no explicit reflection on this in the colonial archive, such proximity would have been difficult to overlook by those who physically made the journey to and from the hospital in the Mandate period, as they retraced many of the same routes that had been used for generations by pilgrims seeking cure from al-Khadr.

**Pilgrimage and Cure**

Other religious forms of treatment persisted across the Mandate period, and not only for Christian and Muslim Palestinians. In May 1935, W. P. H. Lightbody, the acting director of medical services, wrote to Reuben Katznelson, head of the Jewish National Council’s health section, with a complaint. A month earlier, Katznelson had drawn up a list of seven “severe mental cases” in Jerusalem and approached Lightbody to request admission of the two most serious to the government mental hospital at Bethlehem. Although the hospital was almost permanently overcrowded, Lightbody managed to create two vacancies. But when the district medical officer was sent to the homes of the two individuals, he found that one had already been admitted to a private Jewish institution, and the other – the nineteen-year-old Amram K. – was not at home but had gone north, to Tiberias.

Katznelson wrote back to express his regret that “circumstances of an accidental nature, which I could not have foreseen, interfered with the settlement of these two deplorable cases.” He explained that a wealthy private individual had paid out of his own pocket for the first case to be temporarily accommodated in a private institute, but that since this was only temporary, she still required admission to the government mental hospital. As for Amram K., the explanation was a little more complicated:

As you may have heard, there is a belief common in certain circles of very orthodox Jews that a visit to the Holy City of Meron during the Lag B’Omer holiday has a curative effect on sick persons. Accordingly, Amram K.’s family took him to Meron during the recent holiday in the hope that the visit would bring about a cure. As I need not tell you, the hoped-for cure was not effected, and the man is back in Jerusalem.

Furnished with this explanation, Lightbody again dispatched the medical officer to visit Amram’s home, where he found the young man alone, lying quietly in bed. Amram had worked for a time at some printing press in Jerusalem, he told the medical officer, but then – as he put it – “was not feeling well.” His neighbors were able to add some detail: though mostly quiet, Amram at times would get excited, shouting and trying to get out of the house. But he had never attacked anyone – “at present,” the medical
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officer editorialized. With the government mental hospital already overcrowded, the medical officer concluded that he was not an urgent case for admission. He added a final detail, having obviously asked about the recent trip: “His mother took him to Safed and Tiberias for a change of air.”

Judged a non-urgent case, Amram fades out of sight of the colonial archive. Yet the story of his journey north, and the competing narratives about its nature – for miraculous cure or change of air – ties together some of the themes which have emerged from thinking about the connection between mental illness and the holy in the context of British Mandate Palestine. In the first place, this case underlines that the families of the mentally ill pursued multiple forms of treatment simultaneously. Even as Amram’s family brought him to the attention of the Jewish National Council’s health service, they were shopping around for other options. Given the overcrowding at the government’s mental hospitals, we might conclude this was an eminently rational strategy. If this story reveals something of how families sought to manage mental illness, it also has something to say about the way in which the Mandatory state’s knowledge of “alternative” treatments was contingent, if not deliberately partial – an attitude already clear from the relatively unremarked upon closure of the shrine of al-Khadr. The pilgrimage for Lag B’Omer was a popular one, drawing thousands of Jews – particularly Mizrahim – to the grave of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai outside Safed across the 1930s. Given its popularity, it is unsurprising the Mandate kept a close eye on it, deploying police to keep order, especially in the second half of the decade. In 1935, the year Amram travelled north with his family, the district commissioner Edward Keith-Roach was also in attendance at the observances at Meron. Mandate authorities were clearly aware of the significance of this pilgrimage. And yet in the explanation offered to the medical officer on his visit to Amram’s house, reference to any religious dimension to his journey north was elided. Only Katznelson’s alternative explanation, prompted by the need to account for the inconvenience caused to the department of health, explicitly alerted Mandate authorities to another possible reading of Amram’s journey as a pilgrimage aimed at securing miraculous cure for mental malady.

Without the unforeseeable coincidence of medical and miraculous treatment for Amram’s condition, the story of his pilgrimage would never have made it into the colonial archive; “change of air” is all that would have been recorded, contingent on the medical officer bothering to inquire in the first place. This reflects a wider and partially willful myopia on the part of the British Mandate, which conserved its energies for what it viewed as the most serious cases of mental illness and so enabled a kind of fracturing whereby medical, security, voyeuristic, and ethnographic approaches to the connection between religion and mental illness could remain distinct. As this article has shown, points of overlap were relatively rare: the Texan Titus being excused for his behavior as “touched,” or the suggestive proximity between the monastery at Bayt Jala and the first government mental hospital at Bethlehem, are as exceptional as the coincidence in Amram K.’s case in that respect. Yet these points of intersection complicate attempts, made at the time as well as in the scholarship since, to silo off different modes of
thinking about and dealing with mental illness into discrete registers – from Hermann’s clinical approach to the Jerusalem-Fieber of European and American visitors, to the folklore research of Canaan and Stephan on beliefs and practices among Palestinians.

If this marked out European and Palestinian approaches to mental illness – even religiously framed mental illness, specifically – as being fundamentally different objects of study, stratifying them as modern and premodern respectively, there were attempts to invert this way of thinking and the kind of stratification it produced at the time. In the foreword to the first issue of the new Journal of the Palestine Arab Medical Association in 1945, Dr. Ibrahim B. George turned this hierarchy of modern and premodern, medical and superstitious, European and Arab, on its head, reminding readers:

The Arabs were the first to introduce their hospital system into Europe, where specialists took charge of different hospital departments. Hospitals for the mentally deficient and insane were an Arab innovation of the same period when opium was used as a sedative. This at a time when in Europe the insane were imprisoned and chained as a means of ridding them of witches and devils.87

George’s inversion of these hierarchies is a reminder of the urgent political context in which these histories of health and medicine played out, as Palestinians faced up to both British colonialism and Zionism. But his act of inversion left undisturbed the foundation of these hierarchies, a narrative of disenchantment and medical progress. Thinking with pilgrimage, generously conceived, allows for the operation of these hierarchies and discrete registers of discourse to come more clearly into the light, and at the same time for a more complicated story of the multiple entanglements of unorthodox religiosity, medical modernity, and mental illness to unfold.

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Endnotes
1 The author is very grateful to Andrew Arsan, Jacob Norris, Alex Winder, and the two anonymous reviewers, in particular, for their encouragement and thoughtful engagement with this paper.


10 For one of the most evocative accounts of this landscape of everyday religiosity, see James Grehan, *Twilight of the Saints: Everyday Religion in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Oxford, 2014).


15 While Goodrich-Freer deployed terms like “crank” to connote those whose religious practices or beliefs she portrayed as “extravagant” or “eccentric,” “imbecile” – here, surprisingly used in a similar manner – was generally used to denote what we might today discuss in terms of cognitive or intellectual disability.


21 The “Titus” being evoked here is likely Saint Titus, one of the disciples of Paul the Apostle.


26 For more on the strategies pursued by families in Mandate Palestine to secure the treatment of mentally ill relatives, see Wilson, “Petitions
and Pathways.” In the 1930s, the Ezrath Nashim mental hospital would be joined by a number of other private mental hospitals founded by European Jewish psychiatrists.

27 Senior Medical Officer, Jerusalem, to District Commissioner, Jerusalem, 16 June 1936, ISA M 6627/28.

28 Middle East Centre Archives, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, Wells GB165–0393.

29 Douglas V. Duff, Bailing with a Teaspoon (London, 1953), 118–19. Duff, the author of many adventure and detective stories for boys in the years between his service in Palestine and the publication of his memoirs, may be suspected here of retrospectively ramping up the tension for dramatic effect. I am grateful to Alexander Winder for this point.


33 Palestine Bulletin, 2 July 1930, 1.


36 Palestine Bulletin, 6 January 1928, 3.


38 Although the sincerity of these representations would be difficult to determine in any case, the extant primary sources simply do not allow more than speculation on this point. Thinking in terms of how those deemed to be mentally ill conceived of their own behavior and condition beyond the clinical and medical labels attached to them is nonetheless a valuable line of inquiry within social histories of psychiatry and disability studies. For more on the latter, see a recent excellent roundtable in LIMES, especially Sara Scalenghe, “Disability Studies in the Middle East and North Africa: A Field Emerges,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51 (2019): 109–12; and Beverly Tsacoyianis, “From Patient to Survivor: Mental Health and Disability Studies,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51 (2019): 124–26.

39 To preserve anonymity, I give the names of all individuals deemed mentally ill and whose names appear only in the archive, by full first name and an initial. On the complex issues surrounding the anonymizing of psychiatric patients, see David Wright and Renée Saucier, “Madness in the Archives: Anonymity, Ethics, and Mental History Research,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 23 (2012): 65–90.


42 George Heron, Director of Health, to Senior Medical Officer, Jerusalem, 17 June 1929, ISA M 6634/8.

43 Instructions to Mr. Schneider re: Gordon A., from Dr. A. T. Sternberg, n.d. [1929], ISA M 6555/7.

44 Palestine Post, 25 January 1934, 1. See also Michael McDonnell, ed., The Law Reports of Palestine: Being Cases Decided in the Years 1920–1933 Inclusive by the Supreme Court of Palestine Sitting as a Court of Appeal in Civil and Land Cases, a Court of Criminal Appeal, a High Court of Justice and a Special Tribunal, and by the Court of Criminal Assize of Palestine; and Cases Decided in the Years 1920–1933 by the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on Appeal from the Supreme Court of Palestine (London: Waterlow, 1934–35), 77. The translation given here (“struck”) might appear to suggest that Fatima S. was presenting herself as having been “struck” by a jinn (madrub), as opposed to inhabited or possessed. But being “struck” by a jinn was linked to paralysis or physical injury, rather than action outside the control of the individual, which appears to better fit the particulars of this case. For this distinction, see Dols, Majnun, 294–95. Unfortunately the original Arabic is not recorded in either account of the trial, so it is not clear what term Fatima S. used to describe her condition.

45 Henry Cattan would go on testify before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine in 1946, and to publish extensively...
on the Palestine question in international law; at the time of Fatima S.’s case, however, he was a recently qualified barrister.

46 *Palestine Post*, 22 May 1934, 2.

47 Judgement in Court of Appeals, 19 April 1934, ISA P 187/7.


52 There is a well-developed literature on the difficulties women in criminal-legal contexts around the world faced in being recognized as both “mad” and “bad” by courts; rather than hand down verdicts like “guilty but insane,” courts tended to find women sane except in cases of spectacular violence. This meant that, by contrast to the feminization of psychiatric populations in almost every other institutional context, the number of criminal lunatic women tended to be much lower than that of men. For a summary of these arguments, see Robert Menzies and Dorothy Chunn, “The Gender Politics of Criminal Insanity: ‘Order-in-Council’ Women in British Columbia, 1888-1950,” *Histoire sociale/Social History* 31 (1998): 241–79.


57 The roots of “lunatics’ apples” – *mandragora officinarum* or mandrakes – are hallucinogenic when ingested, which explains in part this association.

58 For more on the jinn, see Rothenberg, *Spirits of Palestine*, and Amira el-Zein, *Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn* (Syracuse, 2009).


63 Senior Medical Officer, Jaffa, to Director of Medical Services, 6 February 1939, ISA M 6628/15.


65 Waldmeier, “Appeal.”

66 *Annual Report of the Lebanon Hospital for Mental Diseases* 7 (1905): 17. This and other annual reports from ‘Asfuriyya are from the Saab Medical Library, American University of Beirut, and are available online at ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/saab/asfouriyeh/annual-reports/index.html (accessed 27 May 2019).
67 For the shared appeal of St. George/al-Khadr to Christians and Muslims, see Grehan, *Twilight of the Saints*, 141–63.
75 Or both. Duff, *Bailing with a Teaspoon*, 144.
77 For instance, medical officers were recorded as giving a total of forty-eight hygiene lectures to 321 teachers in town and village schools in 1930 alone; no similar effort was made for mental illness. See *Annual Report of the Department of Health* (1930), 62.
79 R. Storrs to Civil Secretary, Government House, Jerusalem, 20 April 1922, ISA M 6627/24.
80 R. Briercliffe, A/Director of Health, to Chief Secretary, 14 September 1922, ISA M 4087/6.
81 There are suggestive parallels here with the establishment of the Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross in Lebanon in the 1930s on a hill outside Beirut known to locals as the “the possessed mount,” parallels which point to the need for further investigation of the blurring of saintly and secular modes of healing across the region. See Elias Aboujaoude, “The Psychiatric Hospital of the Cross: A Sane Asylum in the Middle East,” *American Journal of Psychiatry* 159, 12 (December 2002): 1982. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this parallel to my attention.
82 W. P. H. Lightbody, Acting Director of Medical Services, to Reuben Katznelson, Vaad Leumi, 23 May 1935, ISA M 6627/27.
83 Katznelson to Lightbody, 6 June 1935, ISA M 6627/27.
84 Medical Officer, Villages, to Senior Medical Officer, Jerusalem, 1 July 1935, ISA M 6627/27. From the sixteenth century onwards, Safed in particular had been strongly associated with Jewish mysticism or Kabbala, an association which helps explain the decision of Amram K.’s family to bring him there for healing.
85 By some accounts, it also attracted Palestinian Arabs. See: *Palestine Bulletin*, 24 May 1932, 1; and *Palestine Post*, 15 May 1933, 5; 22 May 1935, 7; 30 April 1937, 9. Attendance dropped with the beginning of the general strike and Arab revolt in 1936.
86 *Palestine Post*, 22 May 1935, 7.
“Guardians” of the Road:
Abu Ghush Family in the Jerusalem Mountains during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
Mustafa Abbasi

The village of Abu Ghush, which is revealed in all of its beauty to those traveling along the mountain roads towards Jerusalem, is among the few Arab villages that have survived in the region that extends from Bab al-Wad to the environs of Jerusalem.¹

Villages such as ‘Imwas, Bayt Nuba, Yalu, Dayr Ayub, Latrun, Bayt Mahsir, Suba, Lifta, and Dayr Yasin have ceased to exist, some of them since the 1948 war and some after the 1967 war. For the moment it seems as though this village is determined to continue guarding the historical road that links Jaffa to the Holy City. The question of the survival of this village, in spite of its strategic location, is not the concern of this article. However, it seems it is not simply by chance, but due to the ability of its leaders to maneuver during periods of crisis and upheaval as they have done over the course of generations. A study of the distribution and location of the settlements over the history of Palestine shows that villagers were, in most cases, apprehensive about settling on main traffic routes. They knew that building a settlement on such a route was liable to incur catastrophe during times of struggle and warfare. Exceptions to this general rule are settlements that, from the very start, were founded by their leaders at key points or on strategic routes in accordance with the demand of the authorities. A number of families fulfilled this function during the Ottoman period, such as the Turabay family which settled in the area of the valley of Marj Ibn ‘Amir (Jezreel Valley) and guarded the crossroads that linked Syria with Egypt through Khan al-Tujjar. From there the trade route divided, with one road going towards Megiddo and the coastal plain,
and the other to Samaria and Jerusalem. This gave the family the title of “Amirs of the Two Roads.”

The story of the ‘Asadi family in the village of Dayr al-‘Asad in the Galilee represents another example as reflected in the research of Aharon Layish. According to him, the Ottoman Sultan Selim I adopted the intentional policy of “colonization and Islamization” in this area as well. For example, in the village of Dayr al-Bi`ani in the valley of nahiya (subdistrict) al-Shaghur, he settled the Sufi shaykh Muhammad ‘Asadi, together with many of his followers, in his desire to strengthen the Muslim character of that region, in addition to guarding the road that linked Acre with Safad.

Other prominent families were the Radwan family in the Gaza district, and the Farukh family that alternately ruled the districts of Nablus and Jerusalem. These families, which bequeathed their ruling authority to their descendants and reached the peak of their powers in the seventeenth century, fulfilled important functions in preserving order and security in their districts, and participated in the convoy and safety of the Muslim pilgrimage caravans to Mecca.

The system of relations between the central government and the ruling families was complex. On the one hand, the families needed the authorization and legitimacy of the government, which entailed the renewal of the appointment every year in an official firman (mandate) from Istanbul. On the other hand, the ability of the government to enforce its authority over them changed in accordance with circumstances. With the degree of power possessed by the governors of the Damascus and Sidon provinces, it appears that Palestine was subordinate to them in the administrative sense. When the provinces were ruled by strong governors, the influence of the notable families was lessened, and when the governors were weak, the power of these families increased and reliance upon them for collecting taxes and providing security grew greater.

The eighteenth century was characterized, more than previous ones, with the growth of local powers and governors. This was the result of the weakening of the central government, the decline of the system of military feudalism, and the strengthening of the social and political elite system. According to this system, the multazim who stood at the head of the sanjaks were appointed by the authorities to collect taxes and to preserve the security of their provinces. In time, this function became the main leverage for the installation of local powers. In some of the regions in Palestine, a new generation of local families emerged which inherited their power from the Abu Ghush, Turabay, and ‘Asadi families. Some of them were urban families such as the Tuqan family which controlled the Nablus area and supplanted the Farukh family. And some were village families such as the Jarrar family which controlled the area of Jenin and Northern Samaria and filled the gap left by the Turabay family. The Zaydan family in the Galilee rose after the decline in the status of the M’ani dynasty in Lebanon. As for the family of Abu Ghush to the west of the Jerusalem mountains, it appears that it continued to fulfill its function as in the past, and even established itself more strongly because of the declining powers of the central government.

It is interesting that the attention in research dealing with the history of the dominant families and local powers was directed more towards the families in the region of Jabal
Nablus. The picture that arises from these studies is that the families of this region succeeded in maneuvering and preserving their autonomy vis-à-vis the government. Donald Quataert, who researched the relations between the center and the periphery, regarded the region of Jabal Nablus as a classic example for understanding the abilities of those families to maneuver between their desire to maintain internal autonomy and their relations with the central government. The research of Beshara Doumani on the city of Nablus also reached similar conclusions, although Doumani focused more on economic sources and economic power as a vital tool in preserving the relative autonomy of this region.

The information in hand about these village families is not identical in extent to those that exist for the urban families. Most sources therefore dealt with the urban population, in addition to the fact that among the villagers there was no tradition of records or documentation of the range found in cities, if at all. Nevertheless, we do find a few researchers and historians, such as ‘Izzat Darwaza and Ihsan Nimr, who dealt with the families and personalities of the villages who fulfilled an important function before the beginning of the reforms and modernization towards the middle of the nineteenth century. From these sources it appears that in the region of Jerusalem, a number of village families became prominent. Three strong and important ones are Abu Ghush, Samhan, and Barghuti. What is common to all of them is that they were the families of village shaykhs who fulfilled various functions such as managing the affairs of the nahiya. Or, as in the case of the Abu Ghush family, in addition to managing the nahiya of Bani Malik they also had a security function in accompanying traveller and pilgrimage caravans, and were responsible for the safety of the traffic route from the area of the coastal plan through Bab al-Wad up to Jerusalem. This article examines the history of this family and its vital role in securing the most important axis for European pilgrims to the Holy Land, and will attempt to answer the following four questions:

- What are the origins of the Abu Ghush family and when did it become an important factor in the mountains of Jerusalem?
- What functions did it fulfill with regard to securing pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and how did European pilgrims regard the role of the family in the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century?
- Why did a conflict break out between the family and the Egyptian government in 1834, and what implications did this have on its status?
- What were the changes that occurred in the status of this family towards the end of Ottoman rule?

The Origin of the Family

There exist several versions concerning the origins of the Abu Ghush family. Manna, Rubin, and Scholch claim that its origin is Circassian, and that the family arrived in Palestine at the beginning of Ottoman rule with Sultan Selim I in 1516. It is almost
certain that the family began to show prominence even then. At first, they settled in the villages of ‘Imwas, Bayt Liqya, and ‘Ajanjul at the meeting point between the mountains of Jerusalem and the coastal plain. Later on, as we shall see, they settled in the village of Qaryat al-‘Anab (Abu Ghush today), and controlled the nahiya of Bani Malik to the west of Jerusalem.¹¹

James Finn, the British consul in Jerusalem during the years 1845–63, also referred to the family and its origins. He said that their faces were light-colored, which could be attributed to their Circassian origins, and he added that the Abu Ghush tribe originated in certain Circassian Mamluks who accompanied Sultan Selim to Jerusalem in 1516.¹² William Lynch, who explored Palestine and especially the area of the Dead Sea in the nineteenth century and met one of the shaykhs of this family, also noted: “This sheikh was of a light complexion, with a European-looking [sic] and wearing a red moustache.”¹³

It does not seem to be by chance that the family has recently affiliated themselves with their Caucasian origins and even received generous support from Chechnya to build a large mosque in the village, dedicated in 2014 and named for the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadirov. On the other hand, some family members insist that their origin is Arab. According to them, their forefathers left Yemen for Egypt, and from there they arrived in Palestine. Even then the leaders were of the “Yemeni Arab” faction, that is to say, belonging to the southern Arabs. This is to differentiate them from the “Qaysi Arabs,” or the northern Arabs. According to their version, Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent, the son of Selim I, was the one who imposed upon them the role of guarding the road to Jerusalem, and even granted a firman in this connection. It seems that this version of the family is correct, since Sultan Sulayman was known to have contributed greatly to the development of Palestine and especially the construction of the walls of Jerusalem, in addition to building a number of khans and securing the transport routes and trade convoys between Syria and Egypt. They were known then by the name of Abu Ghuth, that is to say, providers of assistance, and in time the name was corrupted into Abu Ghush.¹⁴

In reference to the stages of their installation and expansion, Finn noted that the family members took control over the village of Bayt Liqya at the mouth of Wadi Salman which leads towards the coastal plain. During a long period of time they multiplied, and imposed their authority on the neighboring district.¹⁵ Later on they struggled against the Bani ‘Amar who had settled between ‘Imwas and Ras Karkar, and defeated them, taking land and demanding taxes from them, which led to conflicts and wars between them. At a certain stage a pact was made between the people of Bayt Liqya and the Bani ‘Amar, which forced the Abu Ghush clan to transfer to a region among the mountains, to the villages of Qalunya and Suba. There they settled and later took control over the village of Qaryat al-‘Anab. According to Finn: “The next event in their history was their invasion of Kiryat al-‘Anab, and their settlement in the village and its lands, from which they expelled a family called Bakhakhra.”¹⁶

Ben-Dov says that the village of Qaryat al-‘Anab had existed since the Mamluk period in the fifteenth century, and that there was an ancient khan in that location. Its name is mentioned in the records of the waqf of al-Madrasa al-Hasaniya in Jerusalem.
According to him, half of the income of the village was earmarked for that madrasa. Ben-Dov bases himself on a long list of testimonies by travelers from the beginning of the fifteenth century until the eighteenth century. From these testimonies it appears that the village was small, and that the spring inside it was not suitably maintained. In addition, he refers in detail to the reports about the imposition of fees charged for the passage of pilgrims, sometimes done in a violent manner.17

Apparently, the establishment of the Abu Ghush family in the village of Qaryat al-‘Anab, instead of the Bakhakhra family, on the main road near the spring, gave them a central position especially regarding the security of convoys of pilgrims. The importance of this location is mentioned by Finn:

They dwell on the high road from Jaffa to Jerusalem at a distance of three hours from the latter, at a place that commands a long view of the approach of travelers and pilgrims, since the road passes at a rifle range from the houses. Among them is an abandoned Christian church that still stands with its small and beautiful windows that can be used as embrasures for shooting. The village is undoubtedly built in a nice and attractive way, the cultivation of the mountains around it is of extraordinary quality, and superior to all others along that route as though the place excels in quietude and peacefulness.18

In this connection, Glass, who researched the subject of land purchases in the village from the end of the nineteenth century until 1948, noted that the style of building in the village was congested, the houses crowded together and divided into blocks. The dense construction with courtyards created a village that was extremely fortified and protected from external attacks.19

In view of the above, it may be summed up that the family members most probably had already settled in the area since the beginning of the Ottoman period, and that their settlement in this area was accompanied by struggles with families who had been living there before them. At first they settled in the area of the villages of Bayt Liqya and ‘Imwas, and later on they moved to the village of Qiryat al-‘Anab, and made it their bastion. It is difficult to determine with certainty when this occurred. Rehav Rubin notes that this may have been after the middle of the seventeenth century when Shaykh Isma’il al-‘Inbawi (d. 1689) received the family members in his village, or at most in the early eighteenth century, and in time they became the majority and the dominant power.20 As we have seen – and apparently the family settlement in a strategic place
on the pilgrims’ route between Jaffa and Jerusalem was not coincidental – the Ottoman sultan understood the importance of this axis, and decided to settle a strong and loyal family there.

The Family’s Role in Securing Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century

As mentioned above, the beginning of the establishment of the family in Palestine most probably occurred during the reign of Sultan Selim I and his son Sultan Sulayman. However, the sources mention that Shaykh ‘Issa Muhammad Abu Ghush, who gained prominence in the mid-eighteenth century, was the one who created a significant transformation in the status of the family until his death at the end of the eighteenth century. We do not have in hand much information about Shaykh ‘Issa, but apparently he established the hold of the family over the village and over the nahiya of Bani Malik, and he became the most prominent village shaykh on the important route linking Jaffa with Jerusalem. The traveler Mariti described the place in 1767 as a large village (“grosso villagio”).

After the death of Shaykh ‘Issa, his four sons became prominent: Othman, Ibrahim, Jabir, and ‘Abd al-Rahman. Othman, the eldest son, inherited from his father, but he ruled for a relatively short period until his death (presumably in 1811, although according to another version in 1818) when the leadership passed to his brother Ibrahim. During his rule he was forced to deal with the French invasions in 1799, and with the demands of the Ottoman government to recruit forces to fight against the French forces in Egypt. Perhaps this background may explain the meeting between him and the British admiral Sir Sidney Smith who assisted in defeating the French forces that besieged Acre. In addition, in 1811 he hosted the traveler Lady Hester Louis Stanhope who described the importance of the location of the village. In contrast with many other travelers, she specifically noted with praise his attitude towards her and the warm reception he conducted in her honor. She writes that: “Abu Ghush received us with courtesy, slaughtered a sheep for us, gave fodder for our animals and supplied all our needs . . . his four wives cooked the food for us with their own hands.”

In addition to their agricultural work, trading in salt which they bought from the Bedouins, and being the multazim shaykhs of the Bani Malik nahiya, the main role of the family was the security of the strategic traffic route that ran from the coastal plain through Bab al-Wad and up to Jerusalem. Among other things, this included escorting the caravans of pilgrims and travelers to Jerusalem and back again. It is interesting that most sources clearly stated that the family collected the transit fees without giving these escort services, or that it was only partially given. For them it was sufficient that all those living in the region knew that Abu Ghush was responsible for the safety of the travelers in this area – and that anyone who dared to attack the pilgrims or the caravans would find himself in conflict with them. In exchange for this service that
was sometimes given directly, but mostly indirectly, they would charge transit fees or “ghafir” tax, as they called it. 26

Rabbi Hayim Yosef Azulai, who traveled from Jerusalem to Jaffa in 1764, complained about the behavior of the family leaders to charge a transit fee, and sharply denounced this practice. 27 In 1829, Rabbi Ya’akov Elyashar described the journey of Jewish pilgrims between Jaffa and Jerusalem as follows: “And towards evening as they were approaching Jerusalem . . . they paid the sheikh of Abu Ghush, head of the village of Qi pryat al-‘Inab . . . a fixed tax for each person.”28

Ben-Dov states that the charging of a transit fee was customary even before the appearance of the Abu Ghush family, but it perfected the method and increased the fee. He writes: “The ‘sheikh’ used to stop the caravans going up to Jerusalem and coming down from it, and take his share . . . testimonies of the travelers about the amount they had to pay for the transit fee differ from time to time, but it seems that in most cases it was not especially large. One thing did not change, it was not wise to avoid payment.”29

In this connection, Finn maintains that in view of the weakness and incapacity of the government, the family members charged a fee from those going to the holy places, just as the Bedouin shaykhs did in their desert encampments. The Turkish governors could not, and perhaps did not want to, stop this custom. But after the Egyptian invasion in 1831, this was immediately ended, and an Egyptian military force ensured the safety of the road. 30 However, it is interesting that Finn does not mention the fact that it was the authorities who appointed the family and also helped them settle there in order to secure the pilgrimage route.

Mary Eliza Rogers visited the place in 1855 and noted that the village houses were fortified (see figure 1); according to her, the village looked rich and prosperous, and the village shaykh tended to show great kindness to the Frank (European) travelers passing through his village.31

As for the method for carrying out the task of security and charging the fee, it appears that the family recruited a significant military force. It is difficult to determine with certainty the size of the force that the family set up, but apparently they could recruit hundreds of fighters when needed.32 Hence, the task of escorting and maintaining security required some expense, a background against which the collection of the fee can be understood rather than, as some sources claimed, that it was a transit fee without justification.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century, the position of the family became even more established thanks to Shaykh Ibrahim, the son of Shaykh ‘Issa. Ibrahim gained prominence during the period of the Sidon province governor, Sulayman Pasha (1804–19). Suleiman invited him to Acre, heaped praises on him, and gave him presents in addition to the title of “shaykh of all shaykhs in the land of al-Quds.” At that time, Ibrahim and his brothers bought a house in the Ras al-‘Amud neighborhood of Jerusalem. 33 Manna noted that Abdulla Pasha, the successor of Sulayman in the province (1819–32), treated him in the same way, especially during the period of revolt that broke out in the Jerusalem region during the years 1824–26. Abdulla was forced to keep close ties with Ibrahim in order to allow his forces to pass safely to Jerusalem. 34
The historians Darwaza and Barguthi assert that the people of Abu Ghush, especially during the rule of Ibrahim and his brother Jabir, were not satisfied with control over the nahiya of the Bani Mailk. They succeeded in expanding their influence to nearby nahiya which aroused many conflicts, even at this early stage, with the Samhan family, who were the leaders of the Qaysi clan in the region. This family was named for its first leader Shaykh Samhan who was the shaykh of the Bani Harith nahiya. Nimr states that the Samhan family was one of the leading village families during the second half of the eighteenth century. It controlled the northern part of the Jerusalem mountains, and there were a few families under its protection. From the Ottoman decrees it appears that its name was always mentioned together with the Abu Ghush family. Manna also noted that the Samhan family was one of the leading village families in the second half of the eighteenth century. Like other strong families, they built a number of control centers in the villages under their protection. They built their large palace in the village of Ras Karkar which was known as Ras Ibn Samhan. Nimr writes that he visited this palace in the 1970s, and that it was strongly fortified. In its external walls a number of shooting embrasures were built in addition to courtyards, warehouses, stables for horses, and a large entrance over which the name of the family and the date of construction was engraved.

In summary, it may be said that the Abu Ghush family made a substantial contribution to escorting convoys of pilgrims who had arrived in the Holy Land, and the family collected security and guarding fees from those pilgrims. This was done with the consent of the authorities. Although the collection of the fee drew criticism from some of the immigrants, the family provided the immigrants with a great deal of security, and it seems that without the protection of the family it was difficult to make a safe pilgrimage. It may be said also that since the end of the eighteenth century, and during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the Abu Ghush family reached the peak of its power. This was thanks to the leadership of Shaykh Ibrahim. The aspirations of the family for expansion and control caused conflicts with their rivals in the Qaysi clan, and especially with the Samhan family. Apparently even the authorities, and especially...
the governors of Sidon, Sulayman and Abdulla Pasha, were interested in maintaining good relations with them. This situation changed completely with the beginning of Egyptian rule over Palestine.

The Family during Egyptian Rule, 1831–40: Shaykhs Ibrahim and Jabir Abu Ghush in the Eye of the Storm

It may be said that during the period of Egyptian rule (1831–40) a new period opened in the history of Palestine in general, and in the status of the Abu Ghush in particular. Although this rule did not last long, it caused the beginning of a change that gradually extended through time and continued even after the rule ended. In his desire to establish central rule, Ibrahim Pasha adopted a new policy which was expressed in a long series of steps and innovations – such as the collection of weapons, mandatory recruitment into the army, the imposition of forced labor, and direct collection of taxes – alongside many other changes in the administrative system, and allocation and status of the ruling families in the country.

With regard to the Abu Ghush family, after the entry of the forces of Ibrahim Pasha into Palestine, its leader, Ibrahim, accepted the new rulers and expressed his absolute loyalty to them. However, when the new Egyptian policy was carried out their relations changed for the worse. The Egyptians were interested in gaining the acquiescence of the European powers for their actions in Syria and Palestine, and presented their rule as one that gave equal rights to all the inhabitants and communities regardless of religious affiliation. One of the testing points was their attitude towards the members of the Jewish and Christian faith, especially in the holy city of Jerusalem.

As mentioned earlier, the charging of transit fees from pilgrims caused constant grievances among them and from the countries from which they came. The members of the Abu Ghush family were accused of taking advantage of the pilgrims, of charging fees above what was permitted, of exploitation and the like. The Egyptians forbade the charging of these fees and cancelled this practice entirely. These measures and others caused a growing resentment among the family members and their followers, which may help to explain why Shaykh Ibrahim and his brother Shaykh Jabir joined the revolt that broke out in 1834 against Egyptian rule.

Abu ‘Izz al-Din notes that the very fact that the Abu Ghush family was part of the coalition that opposed Egyptian rule and its decrees gave it a considerable degree of power. This was because the family was acclaimed for its daring, strength, and leadership throughout the region that extended between Jaffa and Jerusalem. Manna also referred to the bitter battles that the family conducted against the Egyptian forces, especially the battle against the cavalry forces under the command of Yusuf Agha during which the Egyptians lost fifty-two fighters in addition to a large number of wounded. As a result, and because of the need to leave the road to Jerusalem open, Ibrahim Pasha was
forced to lead a large force of about ten thousand fighters which set out from Jaffa in June 1834 on the way to Jerusalem. Only after much effort did he succeed in thrusting his way to the city and removing the siege that the rebels had laid on his forces in the citadel. Naturally, the Abu Ghush family had no chance against such a great general as Ibrahim, who eventually arrested the heads of the family, Ibrahim and Jabir.43

In spite of the Egyptian achievement in suppressing the revolt, they used the method of the stick and the carrot. In order to neutralize the Abu Ghush family, they came to an agreement with it, released the two shaykhs, and even granted them some benefits, including the appointment of Shaykh Jabir as the mutasalim of the Jerusalem district in the summer of 1834. The appointment of a village shaykh, however important he might be, to the position of governor of the Jerusalem district, was an important change in the status of the family, although short-lived. In 1835, after order had returned and the revolt in the rest of the country was suppressed, the Egyptians no longer needed the services of the family. It seems also that Jabir was evicted on 27 July 1835 because of dissatisfaction with his conduct.44 Jabir tried to regain his position and addressed a number of letters to Muhammad ‘Ali, the governor of Egypt, in which he noted that he was left without a source of livelihood, and that his economic situation had deteriorated. As a gesture of good will, the authorities granted him a monthly income with a commitment from him not to act against them.

The missionaries Edward Robinson and Eli Smith briefly referred to the family during the period of Egyptian rule when they were visiting Jerusalem in April 1838. After what they called their positive meeting with the mufti of the city, they met Shaykh Jabir, who was according to them already an older man.45

When the Egyptians withdrew from Palestine and the Ottoman army advanced in the year 1840, the family joined the forces that began to harass the retreating Egyptian army with the hope that the Ottomans would restore their former status. But at that time the elderly Shaykh Jabir was exhausted by wars and struggles and, with his death in 1842, leadership was transferred to another generation of the family led by Mustafa Abu Ghush, the son of Shaykh Ibrahim.

The Family during the Reform Period:
Mustafa Abu Ghush, the Last of the Strong Shaykhs

With the restoration of Ottoman rule in Palestine in 1840, the wave of changes and reforms continued to advance. The Ottomans wanted to take advantage of the new situation that had been created in order to strengthen their hold over the country. They acted in setting up more centralized rule, unlike their decentralized rule that had characterized the period before the Egyptian conquest.46 From now onwards, Jerusalem and its surroundings, as other parts of Palestine, entered into a period of significant transformation in various spheres, especially in those of administration and society. For example, the administrative structure that Ibrahim Pasha had erected was cancelled.47 In 1864 a provincial law was enacted that reinforced the process of centralization by the Ottoman regime in Palestine,
and changed once again its administrative divisions. Syria now contained only two provinces – Syria and Halab, and the district of Jerusalem became part of the province of Syria, which now had a new name, the “Province of Damascus.”

In 1872, the district of Jerusalem was separated from the province of Syria and became a mutasarifiya which included the subdistricts of Jerusalem, Gaza, Jaffa, and Hebron. Two years later, in 1874, the authorities decided to take an unprecedented step according to which Jerusalem and its district became directly subordinate to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul, in recognition of the increasing importance of the city.

As for the Abu Ghush family, immediately after the Egyptian withdrawal, it tried to regain the power status it previously held. This time, it was under the leadership of Mustafa Abu Ghush who headed it until his death in 1864. These attempts encountered the opposition of the authorities and aroused a fierce struggle between them and their rivals of long ago, the members of the Samhan family and the leaders of the Qaysi clan. The height of the struggle was reached in 1843 when two heads of the Samhan family were murdered by the men of Abu Ghush.

This serious incident and others aroused the anger of the authorities, and this time they were not prepared to agree to the restoration of the former status quo. In 1846 the Ottomans sent a large military force under the command of Muhammad Kubrusli Pasha to put an end to these struggles and to restore order to the districts of Jerusalem and Ramallah. Kubrusli arrested Mustafa Pasha together with other leaders of both rival clans, and exiled them for a short period to Cyprus, and later to Beirut. Only in 1953 were they permitted to return to their estates.

Ilan Pappe noted that Mustafa Abu Ghush requested the assistance of the Husaynis after the deterioration in their relations with the Samhan family, since the Husaynis also belonged to the Yemeni faction. Omar Effendi Husayni, the head of the Husayni family at that time, was afraid of close ties with him, but his son, Muhammad ‘Ali, who was charmed by Abu Ghush and his courage, tightened his ties with him even though the authorities were not pleased with this. According to Pappe, the Abu Ghush family both charmed and aroused a certain apprehension in the Husayni family.

An additional testimony to the signs of decline in the status of the family is given by the American naval officer, William Lynch, who headed a research expedition to the Dead Sea in 1848. While he was on his way from Jerusalem to Jaffa, he passed through the village and met the brother of Mustafa Abu Ghush. Lynch described what happened in the following words:

Wednesday, May 24 descended the ravine . . . by the village of Kuryet el-Enab. [W]hen passing the village, the Sheikh with the evident purpose of levying tribute, came out and forbade us to leave through his territory, but paid no attention to the terrible Abu Ghush (father of lies) he rode within forty or fifty yards of the interpreter . . . and called in an imperious tone ‘talon’ (interpreter, come here) . . . the sheikh at length went up to him and demanded by what right we attempted to pass through his territory, stating no one could do so without his permission, the firman was shown
to him. After reading it, he said that it mentioned nothing about surveying the road, and that one thousand armed men could not pass against his will. We told him that he had better consent then, for we had the sanction of his superiors and were not to be bullied . . . the sheikh is brother to the celebrated Abu Ghush . . . [who] was sent not long to Constantinople.\(^55\)

Finn referred in his book to the story of the American expedition and, according to him, Häj Yusuf Abu Ghush was the one who had wanted to charge a transit fee. Finn mentioned that Häj Yusuf was infuriated by the fact the Americans were assisted by a Bedouin as a guide and not by the members of the family.\(^56\)

Victor Guérin, who visited the village in 1889, referred more to the style of the buildings and described them in this way:

> The houses of the village look as though they were laid in rows above rows on the sides of the hill, most of them belonging to the many-branched Abu Ghush family that had once cast its terror over passersby. The head of the family today lives in a large residence built on the rock which is called al-Burj. His ruling powers were very restricted a few years ago, yet it still extends over a few villages . . . The road has now become safe, and ever since he was released from imprisonment he receives passing travelers in his territory with courtesy and respect in contrast to previous extortion.\(^57\)

This testimony by Guérin confirms what was said earlier about the decline in the status of the family during the second half of the nineteenth century. After the Crimean War, the Ottoman government conducted a policy of greater centralization and decided to entirely eliminate the rule of local powers. The reforms they carried out weakened those families even more. When, in 1864, Mustafa Abu Ghush, the last great leader of the family, passed away his death symbolized the closing of the circle of family activities in the strategic route between the port city of Jaffa and Jerusalem. A beautiful building built on his grave is visible to anyone who visits the village cemetery.\(^58\)

**Conclusion**

This article examined the status and role of the Abu Ghush family, a leading rural family in the Jerusalem region, during the period of Ottoman rule, especially the role of the family in escorting and securing convoys, and collecting transit fees from European pilgrims to the Holy City. From the discussion in the article, a number of main points can be listed.

The first point is that the case of the Abu Ghush family and its role in securing the important traffic route which leads to Jerusalem was not unique and exceptional. We saw that this was the accepted Ottoman practice that began to be applied immediately after the conquest of Sultan Selim I in the sixteenth century to other regions as well.
Such was the case of the Turabay families and the security of the main crossroads of the sea and land routes near Mount Tabor; of the ‘Asadi family and its location on the main road linking Acre and Safad in the Galilee; and of the Radwan family and its role in securing the traffic routes in the southern region from Gaza to Egypt. However, the Abu Ghush were more prominent than the other families in this role, and were mentioned repeatedly in a large number of sources because they controlled an important and central axis that led to the Holy City, and was especially important for European pilgrims.

The article showed that the family carried out its task of security in an active manner. This was accompanied by the charging of security and transit fees for European pilgrims and travelers in coordination with the heads of the various churches and monasteries in Jerusalem, which did not have much choice in the matter. However, in the course of time, and especially in the eighteenth century, this guardianship became a kind of exclusive monopoly over the road from Bab al-Wad to the west of the Jerusalem mountains up to the city walls. Whoever traveled along this way, whether European pilgrims or travelers, was charged a transit fee which the family insisted on calling ghafir, that is to say, security. It seems that this security was not always provided de facto by guards and attendants, but was carried out by the fact that all the villages in the Jerusalem region knew that this was the route and territory under the control of the Abu Ghush family, and that everyone who passed through it, especially pilgrims, were under their protection and must not be touched. This practice seemed to the pilgrims to be a kind of unjust extortion.

But it is important to mention that similar payments were also made to the Bedouin tribes in Jordan by the caravans of pilgrims to Mecca. The governors of the provinces of Damascus who accompanied the caravan of tens of thousands of pilgrims had no choice but to pay large sums to the leaders of these tribes in order to pass through their territory in safety. The money intended for this purpose was called the surra or the package money, and if the tribal leaders were not satisfied they would attack the pilgrims.

The third point is that the article showed how this situation changed with the beginning of Egyptian rule in 1831. The authorities decided to cancel the charging of transit fees, causing a harsh reaction from the Abu Ghush family which joined the revolt of 1834. However, this revolt was crushed with a heavy hand by Ibrahim Pasha and his forces. Egyptian rule, the revolt, the suppression, and the exile of the family heads constituted a turning point in its history. Even the Ottoman government, which returned to power in Palestine in 1840, was not prepared to restore the situation to its previous state. The beginnings of reforms forced them to make it clear to Abu Ghush that ensuring security and safety was the responsibility of the state. Although this was not an easy matter and did not end in one day, beginning with the late 1850s there are almost no reports about the charging of transit fees for travelers along the route, even for those passing through Qaryat al-‘Anab, the family stronghold. On the contrary, and as Glass and Guérin have noted, an interesting process began of land acquisition by Jews and Europeans particularly in the village area which had been a bastion for the rejection of foreigners. Christian groups bought land around the village. Christians regarded Qaryat al-‘Anab as associated with Kiryat Ye’arim, the place where the Ark of
the Covenant had been temporarily kept, and the place where Jesus had appeared after his resurrection. In the village today which lives peacefully with its surroundings there is a beautiful church and monastery, and the many pilgrims who visit it are received with warmth and without any charge.

Finally, it is important to note that the survival of the village of Abu Ghosh in the past and during the 1948 war was not coincidental. It seems that the village leaders knew how to maneuver in difficult times, and did not hesitate to negotiate and reach understandings with the Zionist forces during the 1948 war. In contrast, this war severely affected most of the villages in the area west of Jerusalem located along the road connecting Jaffa and Tel Aviv with Jerusalem.

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**Endnotes**

1 In Arabic, the valley is called Wadi ‘Ali, and its entrance is called Bab al-Wad ‘Ali (gate of the ravine of ‘Ali). It is a very narrow valley and, according to Victor Guérin, sufficient for “a handful of people of adamant decision to be capable of holding off an army.” See Victor Guérin, *Tior Giografi, Histori Viarkhiologi shel Erets Yisrael* [Geographical, Historical and Archaeological Description of Palestine], vol. 1: *Judaea* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1982), 44.


6 The area of the nahiyah parallels that of the subdistrict today, and according to the Ottoman administrative divisions, districts or sanjaks were divided into nahiyat.


12 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 129.
14 The version of the Abu Ghush family is mentioned twice in the website of the family and in the Abu Ghush local council, online at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghosh (accessed 20 May 2019).
15 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 209.
21 *Sijillat al-mahkama al-shariyya* [The Sijill of Jerusalem Shari’a Court], 262, 110 (25 February 1781).
24 This nahiya included twenty-three villages.
26 We do not have details about the size of the amounts that were charged, but Michael Ish Shalom notes, for example, that a Jerusalem Jew paid the amount of ten liras a year for the transit fee. Michael Ish Shalom, *Mas’ai Notsreem Li Erits Yisrael* [Travels of Christians to Eretz Israel] (Tel Aviv: Am Oven, 1965), 635.
29 Ben-Dov, *Abu Ghush*, 104.
30 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 141.
32 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 228.
35 Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza, al-’Arab wa al-’uruba fi hiqbat al-taghallub al-turki [The Arabs and Arabism in the Period of Turkish Domination] (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-‘Asri, 1981), vol. 2, 14; Bargouthi, *Tarikh Filastin*, 263–8. Among the families under their control or influence they note the Bani Hassan in Malha, the ‘Iraqat families in Abu Dis, the Kur’an in Birah, the Khatib in Bayt Iksa, the Badawna in Bayt Dabwan, and the Baytuni in Baytunia, and others.
40 For detail on the system of administration during the period of Egyptian rule, see Yitzhak Hoffman, “The Administration of Syria and Palestine Under Egyptian Rule (1831–1840),” in Moshe Ma’oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), 311–33.


50 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 341.


52 Rubin, *Siborim Shisibro*, 147. It is important to note that Pappe states that Mustafa returned to his village in 1851, while Finn says he returned only in 1853.


56 Finn, *Stirring Times*, 341.

57 Guérin, *Description of Palestine*, 47.


In this article I argue that all Christian traditions understand Jerusalem as a sacramental place because of its ability to serve as an instrument of God’s grace. But I want to go even further and maintain that those who write about the value of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem for a Christian tend to do so in the language usually reserved for the great sacraments. Therefore, a community’s explanation of why Jerusalem is a sacrament will differ depending upon whether they are Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant, and their justification of the pilgrimage will reflect the way their tradition understands and explains the great sacraments. Also, regarding the three aspects of pilgrimage (exegetical, tactile, and ritualistic), the three traditions will each put an emphasis on a particular aspect; so the Roman Catholics emphasize ritual, the Orthodox the tactile, and the Protestants the exegetical.

The Evolution of Pilgrimage to Jerusalem

Following the physical ascension of Jesus and His great commission to go into the world baptizing all nations in the name of the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, it appears that the special connection between Jerusalem and God is severed. When the temple is destroyed in 70 AD and then the city itself in 132–35 AD this seems to be a final confirmation that the place where Abraham sacrificed Isaac, David established the Tabernacle, and Solomon built the Temple is no longer God’s special home. The gospel story of the renting of the Temple Vail symbolizes this transformation within Christian thinking. Now Christ’s sacrifice on the
cross substitutes for the temple sacrifices and Christ’s sacrifice can be made present anywhere the Eucharist is celebrated. Christ is now to be found not only in Jerusalem or Bethlehem or Nazareth but wherever two or three are gathered in His name. Now Jesus is present through the scriptures and the breaking of bread as a spiritual but real presence that is not tied down to a particular geographic location. Christ, and therefore Christianity, is freed from its homeland and becomes simultaneously at home everywhere and nowhere.

But as the eschatological expectations of the early Christians recedes into an indefinite future, the Christian story as presented in scripture becomes an increasingly important means of “knowing” the Lord. Therefore, the need to correctly interpret the complex layers of that story becomes a major concern. This desire to more completely understand scripture recruits many skills for the task – literary, philosophic, and linguistic. It is only logical that one tool of interpretation to be used would be a visit to those places where the story took place in order to gain a clearer understanding of the text. As a result, one of the earliest types of journeys to Jerusalem by Christians for Christian purposes is the exegetical tour such as that taken by Origen or Melito of Sardis in the second century. So the first type of Christian pilgrimage seems to be the exegetical.

However, if the scholarly tour of the biblical sites is an attraction to the literary minded, most Christian believers in the ancient world were more interested in the sanctity bestowed upon a place by the glorious death of the martyrs. Around the graves of the martyrs, churches grew and communities felt empowered by the physical presence of the remains of saints. These were places of grace and that grace could be acquired by a visit and especially by touch. What has been called a tactile piety arose around these saints and their tombs. Constantine’s conversion and the establishment of the Constantinian Holy Sites in Jerusalem and Bethlehem meant these same acts of tactile piety could be engaged in at the very sites of Jesus’ birth, crucifixion, and resurrection. If a saint’s remains could bestow grace how much more potentially potent were the locations of the life of Jesus Himself. So to the exegetical type of pilgrimage must be added the tactile type.

By the visit of Egeria in the 380s AD, the exegetical and the tactile pilgrimages were conjoined so that at the various holy sites the appropriate scriptural passages were read as well as the opportunity of touching the “very spot” where a sacred event had occurred and accessing the power of grace it contained. Once Egeria was in Jerusalem, however, this pattern was given even greater structure by ritually reenacting the gospel events so that the visitor/pilgrim came to be an actual participant in the divine story. By doing this the scriptures were illuminated, the grace of the holy places acquired, and the presence of Christ “realized” – made present again or re-presented. It seems that this dramatic representational ritualism was constructed under the influence of Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 389 AD) “who devised a series of services, particularly for Holy Week, closely linked with the topography of the city where he presided as bishop.” This represents the development of a third type of pilgrimage, the ritualistic.

By the end of the fourth century, exegetical, tactile, and ritualistic pilgrimages had evolved and become, as in the case of Egeria, interconnected.
The Pilgrimage Theology of the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Traditions

While each pilgrim comes to Jerusalem with their own spiritual needs and expectations these are most often shaped by their own religious and cultural traditions. It is not strange, therefore, that the three major Christian denominational groups – Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant – would approach and view the pilgrimage enterprise in different ways. It is, however, my contention that these differences are primarily based upon their particular ways of understanding the sacraments. Also that each theological tradition will tend to emphasize one of the three major types of pilgrimage: the Orthodox the tactile; the Roman Catholics the ritualistic; and the Protestants the exegetical. This is not to claim that the other types of pilgrimage are not present, only that one type tends to dominate.

Orthodox Pilgrimage

The Orthodox emphasis upon the tactile component of pilgrimage arises from their belief that because it was at particular sites in Jerusalem that the Incarnate God was born, lived, died, and was resurrected these sites are themselves witnesses of the events and display the divine mystery to those who approach in faith. The holy sites are icons of the divine mysteries and, like all icons, are windows on the truth that lies behind them and doors into God’s grace that can be attained by pious prayers, touches, and kisses. Like the icons, however, the Church is responsible for shaping them so that their divine element is evident. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for the tomb of Christ to become an “icon encrusted shrine,” or Calvary to be covered with pious pictures and precious metals with only a hole to give access to the actual stone of Golgotha.

The Orthodox view of the Holy Sepulchre is expressed in this quote from Gary Vikan on the Byzantine perspective:

The Sepulchre itself [forms] a “living icon” of the Resurrection. For like an icon, they the [worshippers] by virtue of the iconographic verisimilitude, collectively joined that chain of imparted sanctity leading back to their archetype, to the biblical event itself. And in doing so they accomplished what Theodore the Studite said all artificial images achieved: “Every artificial image . . . exhibits in itself, by way of imitation, the form of its model . . . .” Thus these pilgrims did not merely touch the locus sanctus, they became, at least briefly, iconically one and the same with it, and with that sacred event which had made it holy.²

The sacramental theology that lies behind this view of the holy sites as well as the icons of Orthodoxy is the same as the Divine Liturgy – it brings heaven down to earth, the divine to the human, the transcendent to the immanent, and immortality to the mortal. The liturgy, the icons, and the holy places are not only windows into eternity,
but doors as well because one can pass over the threshold, and what one sees can also be participated in. That which is represented and symbolized is also, to the faithful, available because it is re-presented, made present.

It is this effectual nature of the holy sites as channels of grace that explains the desire of the Orthodox pilgrims to go to Jerusalem. They want to participate in the celebration and re-presentation of that victory over death on the very site where it happened, so that the victory can be theirs as well. This victory over death is what the Orthodox seek in all the sacraments – to be brought into the divine, eternal, heavenly Jerusalem. A journey to the earthly Jerusalem is therefore one of the sacramental doors into that heavenly Jerusalem, where one is freed from death and sin.

For the Orthodox, therefore, the Holy Land and Jerusalem in particular is sacramental because it was at these sites that the Incarnate God lived, preached, died, and was resurrected. These sites are witness to these events and are able to display the divine mystery; they become icons for viewing the holy mysteries and are also points of access to the grace of God.

**Roman Catholic View of Pilgrimage**

For Roman Catholics the primary way of speaking of Jerusalem from the Middle Ages up to the recent past is in terms of the plenary indulgences offered to those who journey there in faith and partake in the various rites performed at the Holy Sites. At first glance this might seem to make the Jerusalem pilgrimage a subset of penance. But the power of the place to awaken the hardened heart, to provide succor to those in grief, to grant an assurance of forgiveness to those alienated from God by sin, to return the pilgrim to the state of the newly baptized, to make Christ present in hearts and lives, to inspire the clergy with the sacredness of their vocation, and prepare the soul for death meant that Jerusalem was viewed as almost an all inclusive sacrament, intensifying and/or renewing the sacramental grace of the others.

The tendency in Roman Catholic sacramental theology from the early years was to adopt the

instrumental view which considered the liturgical acts as means used by God, acting through the mediation of the ordained minister, to give grace to people. In this perspective Christians come to the liturgy to receive sacraments, to be freed from their sins, to be blessed. This receptive approach to the role of the faithful coincided with the increasing exclusion from active participation in sacramental liturgy.³

When by the twelfth century attempts are made to define sacraments even more precisely there was a problem of fitting them all into one category. The one common element seemed to be the liturgical ceremony. So that ceremony “by itself was identified as the sacrament, and the focus of understanding Christian sacramentality became more limited.”⁴

This would help explain the importance in Roman Catholic pilgrimages of ritualistic
acts performed at the Holy Sites usually by ordained priests. This is evidenced by the
predominance of Roman Catholics who liturgically walk the Stations of the Cross with
clerical leaders or the crowds who follow the Franciscans in their peripatetic prayers
through the Holy Sepulchre. The format of these rituals tend to be a biblical reading
which mentions the site, prayers which express the theological significance of what
occurred at the site, followed by common prayers or antiphonal prayers which ask
God’s blessing on those present that they might be transformed by appropriating the
loving God revealed in the acts that took place on this spot.

Post-Vatican II sacramental theology has begun to reevaluate the “instrumental
view” and allows the sacraments to be seen in a more inclusive, multifaceted way.
Increasingly the emphasis is upon the ecclesial community created and nurtured by
the sacraments. Again a Jerusalem pilgrimage fits the criterion since creating a sense
of Christian identity and commitment is one of the most obvious results of a faithful
pilgrimage, especially if done in conjunction with members of the same ecclesial group.

The Protestant View of Pilgrimage

The Holy Land and Jerusalem as a sacrament is a concept held by many Protestant
pilgrims. At first glance this may seem to be an odd designation for these Protestants to
use but it is quickly evident that it is a very Protestant understanding of sacramentality.

For Protestants the primal sacrament is the Word of God. In Jesus we encounter the
Word of God made flesh and in the Bible we encounter the Word of God in narrative
form transformed into an encounter with Christ Himself through faith. In Jerusalem
the ability of the land, the places, to make the biblical narrative come alive and re-
present the story of Jesus gives it the power to transmit the narrative of the Bible
and therefore be a source of encountering the Word Himself – the living, resurrected
Christ – through faith. The Protestant sacramentality is to either see it as an effectual
memorial of God’s loving regard for the world (Zwingli, d. 1531) or to see it as a re-
presenting to the faithful the spirit of Christ (Calvin). Jerusalem can and does do both
in the eyes of the Protestant pilgrims. It is in this sense that Protestant pilgrimages are
primarily exegetical.

Because the Protestants are mainly interested in pilgrimage events which enlighten
them about the Bible – its history, customs, geography – they often find the traditional
sites too altered (they would often say polluted) from their original appearance and
therefore less able to serve their purpose to imaginatively bring them into the world
of the Bible. So they prefer the Garden Tomb, discovered by General Gordon, to the
Holy Sepulchre, the Mount of Olives to Golgatha.

The Jesus of the land rather than the sites was of the essence to these Protestant
pilgrims, as their accounts and even the titles of their books proclaimed. The “land”
seemed to serve for them two interconnected theological functions. First, in a very
important and also very Protestant way, it was a sacrament, and second, it was a way
of responding to the growing apprehension among the English literary classes that the
Bible might not be historically true.
This Protestant idea of the Holy Land as a sacrament is an idea mentioned by John Kelman in his book *The Holy Land*:

A journey through the Holy Land may reasonably be in some sort a sacramental event in a man’s life. Spiritual things are very near us, and we feel that we have a heritage in them; yet they constantly elude us, and need help from the senses to make them real and commanding. Such sacramental help must surely be given by anything that brings vividly to our realization those scenes and that life in the midst of which the Word was made flesh. The more clearly we can gain the impression of places and events in Syria, the more reasonable and convincing will Christian faith become.5

Later he explicates this thought more closely:

The sacramental quality of the Holy Land is of course felt most by those who seek especially for memoirs and realizations of Jesus Christ. Within the pale of Christianity there are several different ways of regarding the land as holy, and most of them lead to disappointment. The Greek and Roman Catholic churches vie with one another in their passion for sites and relics there, and seem to lose all sense of the distinction between sublime and grotesque in their eagerness for identifications. A Protestant counterpart to this mistaken zeal is that of the huntsman of the fields of prophecy . . . [those who try and read the signs of the end times]. Apart from either of these are others less orthodox but equally superstitious who have some vague notion of occult and magic qualities which differentiate this from other regions of the world . . . . It is wiser to abandon the attempt at forcing the supernatural to reveal itself, and to turn to the human side of things as the surest way of ultimately arriving at the divine.6

For this Protestant perspective the proper understanding of the sacrament is to understand its power to bring the Bible and its stories and characters alive, a dramatic way of impressing them more vividly on the memory and the imagination. In this sense the Holy Land is not just illustrative but makes Jesus and the Bible real in the same way that Jesus is real in the Lord’s Supper – a memory that re-presents Him to those who participate in faith. For most Protestant commentators on the Holy Land, this concept of the relationship to the land is related more to the sacramental theology of Calvin than to that of Zwingli. The re-presentation is more than just a memory (Zwingli); indeed it is a making of Jesus present once again, albeit in a spiritual manner (Calvin). Another phrase used to express this same idea is that the Holy Land is a fifth gospel or another Bible. J.M.P. Otts, an American but with an attitude very representative of the English Protestants, says of his book:
This is not a “book of travels,” though it never could have been written if the author had not travelled in Palestine; for it is the result of the careful reading of the Gospels in the lights and shades of the land where Jesus lived and taught. When so read it is found that the land of Jesus so harmonizes with the four written Gospels, and so unfolds and enlarges their meaning, that it forms around them a Fifth Gospel.7

Otts drew the term from the nineteenth century French biblical scholar Renan’s use of it in his Life of Jesus, but he gave it a very different meaning because, whereas Renan saw the Bible as a human story mistakenly made divine, Otts saw the Bible as a divine story made human and therefore fundamentally sacramental. Tweedie reiterates the common Protestant theme that the Holy Land can make Jesus come alive in the hearts and imaginations of those who approach in faith: “A visit to the Land of Promise, so long the land of grief and oppressions, furnishes a thousand proofs and confirmations of the Bible. It is indeed a second Bible, all responsive to the first.”8

To the extent that the Bible stands at the center of the Protestant faith as the primary vehicle of God’s communication to His people, then the Holy Land as a revealer of the Bible and its meaning is itself a form of revelation, making it a channel of grace – a sacrament. Not everyone can travel to the Holy Land, of course, and it is not necessary, in fact, because those who do so can communicate and preserve their experiences (just as the original disciples did) through books about the Holy Land and, eventually, photographic essays. Hence the plethora of Holy Land books produced in English in the nineteenth century. These testimonies allowed others to come to know the Jesus whom the Holy Land proclaims but whose true domain is in the hearts of believers.

**Conclusion**

Although the various Christian communities justify the sacramental nature of Jerusalem differently, and although each tradition is uncomfortable (although to different extents) with making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem seem obligatory, as the Haj in Islam, nevertheless the experience of many Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem – no matter what their denomination or theological orientation – is so transformative that they cannot describe it except in the terms of a sacrament. And so Jerusalem is both an historical site but also an access point to the heavenly Jerusalem where one can encounter Christ and therefore God, where God’s Kingdom has come eschatologically through faith.

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Endnotes


4 Cooke, Sacraments, 118.


As with many other researchers who became involved in the Oslo peace process, its failure to achieve an agreement over Jerusalem has led not only to disappointment but also critical reflection. Like others, I frequently ask what went wrong, what misleading assumptions were made, and how realistic had our expectations been? The current protracted impasse between Israel and Palestinian negotiators since the Annapolis Conference in 2006, and the U.S. repudiation of negotiations inherent in its decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Israel in 2018, have demonstrated the need for a re-think, for new ideas and new perspectives. During the past three years, I have been looking at other “holy” cities in Europe and Asia to see if they offer possibilities to researchers to reconfigure the study of Jerusalem and make policy recommendations which may assist a resolution of its conflicts. Based on this research, this article will focus on three of the cities studied: Banaras in northern India, Lhasa in Tibet, and George Town in Malaysia, and draw out some similarities and contrasts with Jerusalem. I will take the reader not only upon a geographical journey outside the Middle East, but also a methodological journey revealing how my thinking, perceptions and understandings changed during the course of the research.

A key question underpinning this research has been what features and characteristics are there in cities which lead to conflict, and, more importantly for this article, are there specific features of “holy” cities which lead to specific kinds of conflicts? All cities are arenas of contestation, but in trying to understand the conflicts in Jerusalem, we should also
be examining the extent to which Jerusalem is a holy city, not only to three religions, but also to the three oldest monotheistic religions whose traditions are derived and intertwined with each other. In commencing this research, I started with four features which could be said to delineate a city as a “holy” city and which share a potential for conflict. Clearly the presence of important holy sites in a city is a key feature. When they are claimed by one or more religious communities, they are also a cause of conflict between them. An additional component to this feature is the centrality of the holy site in the foundation myths, rites, and doctrines of the religion claiming the site. The more central the site, the greater the sense of threat any encroachment or change in its traditional use will be perceived. In Jerusalem, the conflict over the Haram al-Sharif is a constant example of how holy sites engender religious conflicts.

A second feature of holy cities is the presence of long established and powerful clerical hierarchies. Their status is such that they can resist attempts by the state to encroach on religious property and religious activities and they can mobilize large numbers of the faithful inside and outside the state in which they are located. A third significant feature of holy cities is the existence of revenue streams, derived from sources such as endowments, donations, and entry fees, which are independent of state control, and allow a religious community a degree of autonomy in providing welfare and educational services to their members. Equally important is the fourth feature which is the role of international connections which emerge not only from diasporic networks but also from the role of the holy sites and their custodians in the rite of pilgrimage. Again, the more central that pilgrimage site is to a religion, the greater number of pilgrims there will be, which, in many cases, will lead to more international support for the position of the religious leaders and the hosting religious community. In this way, pilgrimage is not only a religious rite but also has a political economy angle in that it draws in revenue and political solidarities. Although due to Israeli restrictions and the absence of a peace agreement, the Muslim community in Jerusalem has less opportunity to avail themselves of this pattern, the Christian and Jewish communities have been freer to exploit it.

Within this framework of four major features with which to examine the religious nature of conflicts in cities, I also found it necessary to identify triggers and catalysts of conflicts taking place “on the street.” These can be termed Flashpoints and there are three Flashpoints which offer a way of highlighting patterns of potential conflict. The first is Timing Flashpoints. The most obvious example of these are when there is a conjunction of festivals of the different religions, or anniversaries of the birthday or death of a founder or other significant personages on the same day or same period. In this situation, worshippers compete for priority on the streets or over access to public places where they can carry out their rituals. Such conjunctions can be coordinated between religious leaders and the city authorities but often disruptions occur and lead to heated responses and sometimes violence.

A good example is the management of crowds of worshippers in Jerusalem during particular festivities. During Ramadan, the Friday prayers in the Haram al-Sharif can attract up to 250,000 Muslim worshippers crowded into a very small space and with
highly congested points of entry and exit. During the Jewish “High Holy Days” of New Year and Tashlich, crowds of some thirty thousand Jews can file through the Old City towards the Wailing Wall. Similarly some fifty to sixty thousand Christian worshippers will flock to the courtyard in front of the church of the Holy Sepulchre over Easter. All these festivities make the Israeli security and police services jumpy. When they combine to fall upon the same days, the tendency has been to severely curtail them. 

Place Flashpoints are largely related to the use and access to holy sites. When a site is contested by different religious communities, conflicts occur at access points, with security personnel filtering and controlling the people wishing to enter. The possibility of a conflict is enhanced when those carrying out such checkpoints are not sanctioned by the religious custodians of the site. In addition, most religious sites are in older parts of a city with narrow twisting streets where the tension around these checkpoints can be aggravated by congestion. Groups of worshippers are slowed down by bag checks causing queues to back up along alleyways, blocking entrances and intersections.

Anyone familiar with Jerusalem’s Old City will recognize this phenomenon and how the jostling good humor can suddenly turn aggressive and angry when provoked by an Israeli checkpoint or settler activity. Other Place Flashpoints can be found in “transition” zones, that is, residential or retail areas straddling different religious or ethnic communities within a city through which worshippers must pass in order to reach their holy site. Access routes become areas of contestation as their use is dominated by one religious community or another depending on the day of workshop or feast day. The Maghrabi Ascent incident of 2007 is another example of a Place Flashpoint. While not a holy site, the controversy over how reconstruction should proceed exacerbated the conflict over the control of the Haram and the Old City. Over three thousand Israeli police and security officers – estimated to be between 100 and 150 percent larger than the routine number – were required to deal with the threat to public order it caused.

The third category is People Flashpoints. The presence and behavior of religious extremists and zealots can provoke an angry reaction against both their religious community and their property. This can take the form of deliberate anti-social behavior, such as immodest dress, noise, insults or damage to property such as breakage, theft, and graffiti. It can also take the form of the disruption of public order through demonstrations, the staging of public prayers in non-sanctioned areas, stone-throwing, and, in extremis, the planting of explosive devices, violent occupation, and hostage taking. In Jerusalem, we have seen recent examples of this in the way Israeli settlers have sought to pray as frequently and as regularly as possible on the Haram. As a result Palestinians have responded in the form of the murabitin and murabitat who follow the Jewish visitors round the enclosure en masse and harass them by constantly yelling Allahu Akbar directly in their faces.

Equipped with these rudimentary tools to discern the religious nature of conflicts in cities, I travelled to Banaras in Uttar Pradesh state in India. One of the holiest cities in India, Banaras (also known as Varanasi, or Kashi – the City of Light) clings to the edge of a broad sweep of the Ganges, where people ritually bathe to purify themselves or to cremate and send their deceased loved ones down the river to the sea. It is the city
of Shiva, one of the major gods of the Hindu pantheon, and a key “crossing point” or tirtha to the spiritual world. In a kind of cosmic short-cut, a person who dies in Banaras immediately attains salvation and will not be endlessly re-incarnated. As Barbara Eck, a leading scholar on Banaras, has written of Hindu perceptions of the city:

Kashi [Banaras] is the whole world they say. Everything on earth that is powerful and auspicious is here, in this microcosm. All of the sacred places of India and all of her sacred waters are here. All of the gods reside here, attracted by the brilliance of the City of Light.11

It is therefore a very great and ancient pilgrimage center. Tens of thousands of pilgrims daily complete sacred circumambulations of the city and its major temples and shrines which dot the landscape and line the bathing ghats along the riverbank. The city is replete with holy sites with the greatest meaning to Hinduism, with numerous clerical hierarchies supported by revenue streams derived from the control of religious property, and it has an international role which reverberates throughout the Hindu world.

At the same time, there is also a strong Muslim presence in Banaras. Over 30 percent of the population is Indian Muslim and the skyline is punctuated with tall elegant minarets mostly built in the Mughal period when northern India was ruled by Muslim emperors, kings, and dynasties. The Muslim community, predominantly Sunni, is the backbone of the critically important silk-weaving industry in the city. Banaras saris and brocades are internationally renowned for their high quality. Since Indian independence in 1947, the political status of the Muslims has been eroded by the rise of Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, which has called into question their status as equal citizens under the constitution. Militant Hindutva groups have also targeted many Muslim religious sites which were deemed to have been built on top of Hindu temples, a campaign which culminated in 1992 with the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and the attempt to replace it with a temple to Lord Ram, an avatar of Shiva.

Flashpoints in Banaras are many. Muslim and Hindu festivals constantly overlap, access routes to holy sites pass through residential areas of different religious communities – causing tensions when the processions of crowds are too large, too noisy or too slow – and religious zealots abound, encouraged by a federal and state governments pushing a Hindutva agenda. There have been many historical precedents for such conflicts but also a number of more contemporary occasions when religious festivities clashed in Banaras. In 1982 and 2006, Bengali Puja processions coincided with the Muslim Muharram and Eid al-Fitr.12 A particularly egregious Flashpoint is the Gyan Vapi mosque. This was constructed by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in the mid-seventeenth century on top of the main temple to Shiva in the city. In the decades following, Hindus built a replacement temple, the Vishweshwur, beside it. As a result, the mosque has been the target of Hindu militants and there is tight security in the narrow and congested alleyways around it.13 In 2006, an explosion carried out by an Islamic militant group at a popular nearby temple, the Sangkat Monchan, resulted in the deaths of over twenty people and severely threatened intercommunal relations.14
However, the good relations that existed between the chief priest of the temple and the mufti of the Muslim community in Banaras ensured that tempers were quickly cooled and reprisals were avoided, particularly with regard to attacks on the Gyan Vapi mosque. Joint public prayers took place and one particularly poignant event that reverberated throughout India featured hijab-clad young Muslim women giving a recital of the Hanuman Chalisa – a hymn to the temple’s deity – to demonstrate their commitment to communal harmony.\textsuperscript{15} The contrast with Jerusalem struck me. I began to look for reasons why this was the case and realized that simply searching for flashpoints was not necessarily the answer. Additional characteristics presented themselves as important issues to study. These included the extent to which the Indian state was a legitimate authority, economic interdependence between the two main communities, the highly fragmented pattern of property ownership, and demographic binaries which were in reality much less monolithic than they initially appeared.

Another stop on this journey is Lhasa in Tibet. Superficially, similarities between Lhasa and East Jerusalem are striking. Like East Jerusalem, Lhasa is under occupation and the role of religious sites, as well as the equally important role of the clergy that run these sites, has been central in both cases. Both cities serve as symbols of national identity and means of mobilizing resistance to occupation. Indeed, since the Chinese takeover of Lhasa and the expulsion of the Dalai Lama in 1959, Chinese authorities run all aspects of the city and, alongside comprehensive infrastructure projects, have incentivized the settling of large numbers of Han Chinese to the extent that they now comprise over half the population.\textsuperscript{16} Yet there is a major difference between the occupation of East Jerusalem and Lhasa: The Chinese government and the Han Chinese settler community in Lhasa do not claim prior possession or ownership of the major religious sites in Lhasa, such as, the Potala palace or the Jokhang temple. These sites are not contested in the same way as the Haram al-Sharif is in Jerusalem, or the Mezquita in Cordoba, and the Gyan Vapi mosque in Banaras. The conflict between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government-in-exile over the control of these sites is not because they are shared religious sites but because they are symbols of Tibetan independence. As Place Flashpoints they exist but the reasons for them are different.

As in Banaras, there are, nonetheless, similar Timing Flashpoints. Major festivals and also the birthday of the Dalai Lama are opportunities to celebrate Tibetan identity and its ancient culture and folklore when these expressions are normally strictly regulated by the Chinese authorities. People Flashpoints are less salient due largely to the removal of all senior clergy and the expulsion of many monks and nuns. The independence of the monasteries and convents has been completely compromised and the temples have been allowed to continue mainly as an exotic adjunct to the lucrative tourist trade.\textsuperscript{17} Of the two thousand five-hundred monasteries which were in existence in 1959, by 1962 only seventy remained.\textsuperscript{18} Some scholars have estimated that by the mid-1990’s over eleven thousand monks and nuns had been expelled, mostly for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama. In the main Lhasa monasteries approximately 20 percent of the population had been expelled.\textsuperscript{19}
Under this strict surveillance regime, sacred circumambulations of Tibetan Buddhist holy sites, known as *kora*, have taken on a new meaning. Performed by thousands of Tibetans in public spaces they assert a form of ethnic and religious identity and an appropriation of public space that the Chinese Communist Party have found difficult to control. They also provide platforms for political demonstrations. In 1987, a group of thirty monks from the Sera monastery used the *kora* of the Jokhang temple to stage a demonstration of loyalty to the Dalai Lama, chanting “Long Live His Holiness, the Dalai Lama,” and “Independence for Tibet.” In 1989, another large demonstration took place along the same *kora*, possibly the largest since the Chinese takeover in 1959, and in 2008 fifteen monks from the Sera monastery circumambulated the Jokhang temple and began to hand out leaflets shouting pro-independence slogans which led to large demonstrations and the imposition of martial law in Lhasa. It is clear that, denied the opportunity to express their political aspirations, Tibetans are utilizing the symbols and practices of religion to create space for agency. Indeed, in the absence of political institutions which can represent Tibetans, and in the light of the decapitation of the Tibetan Buddhist religious leadership, the “religious street” has become the arena for resistance both in terms of violent confrontations against the Chinese state but also in terms of daily acts of asserting difference and identity.

The final stop on this journey is George Town on the island of Penang in Malaysia. A former British colony, George Town is a relatively new city located at a strategic trading junction between India, China, the Indonesian archipelago, and Australasia. One result has been a highly heterogeneous and diverse range of religious communities which provides many points of possible friction between them – from religious sites lying adjacent to each other with possible conflicts over access, to religious festivities coinciding both spatially and temporally. In addition, the post-independence constitution privileges Malay-Muslim status over those of other communities and this constitutes a constant source of grievance for the Indian and Chinese communities.

As this project has discovered, one feature of divided cities is the lack of economic interdependence between the different sectors of the population which can lead to competition over resources and state allocations. George Town also displays such an absence of mutually supporting economic activities. Nevertheless, despite all these factors which seem to point to conflict, religious tension in George Town is, and has been for some time, minimal. Even during the serious Malay-Chinese riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969, George Town remained relatively peaceful. This was more than curious and it was for this reason that I decided to include the city in my study.

Understanding the components of this ostensibly harmonious situation might offer new insights to the conflict-strewn streets of Jerusalem, Banaras, and Lhasa. In fact, it was the contrasting example of George Town in this research which helped put into place some new components in understanding conflicts in holy cities.

In the first place, despite the large number of religious sites belonging to a wide range of faiths in George Town, these sites are not central to any of the major faiths. George Town as a traditional departure point for *haj* pilgrims, the location of the oldest church in southeast Asia, and the location of the largest reclining Buddha outside India.
is important to members of respective religious communities in Penang, but is not on a par with Jerusalem as the most important site in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, or with Banaras as the city of Shiva. This “peripheral” characteristic of its religious sites ensures that any disputes regarding religious sites do not resonate much beyond the city and can, therefore, be addressed by local religious leaders and politicians without external interference. Secondly, while religious and ethnic diversity provides ample scope for multiple points of friction, it also dilutes the flammability of those frictions. In effect, and in contrast to the other cities studied, there are no major binaries along ethnic or religious lines in George Town that would assist political mobilization around religious sites. Instead there is a weak “Us” and a weak “Them.” Thirdly, George Town is spared the presence of a powerful cadre of religious priests acting as a political force. The only clerical hierarchy that could possibly act in an assertive way is the Muslim hierarchy, but it is both fragmented by ethnicity and also has been absorbed into the federal and state government structures to the extent that it does not act independently of the state.

Fourthly, property ownership by religious communities in George Town is highly fragmented and does not drive residential or employment segregation along sectarian or ethnic lines. In Jerusalem, for example, property of the city owned by religious foundations of the three faiths and by the Israeli state has assisted in the maintenance of geographical areas in the city defined by the exclusive presence of one community at the expense of others. In George Town, the correlation between a fragmented pattern of landownership and the absence of communally-defined residential segregation is quite high. Fifthly, despite the existence of secessionist movements in Penang during the 1960s, and despite the demographic and political differences between George Town and the central federal government, the legitimacy of the Malaysian state itself is not contested in George Town. Where the legitimacy of the state is contested, religious sites become both symbols of community strength and also community assets that need to be protected against the encroachments of the state and the dominant community which supports it.

Finally, in some cities with religious conflicts, the interventions of external actors can be a mixed blessing. While they offer a measure of international scrutiny and protection, strong external interest can exacerbate and complicate tensions which without them could be resolved locally. The presence of the United Nations and of large cohorts of media and diplomatic personnel place an unwelcome spotlight on what are often minor disputes over access and behavior around religious sites. While George Town is striving to position itself as a regional city of some importance, the kinds of interventions from external actors it is receiving are unlikely to contribute to religious conflicts in the city.

Returning to the city of Jerusalem we can now see how some of the broader contextual factors play an important role to religious conflicts in addition to the key religious features and most egregious Flashpoints initially laid out in this article. Drawing comparisons with Banaras, Lhasa, and George Town we can see how a better understanding of the conflict in Jerusalem can be obtained when we also include questions regarding: the legitimacy of the authority of the Israeli state, the
spatial distribution of property ownership, the homogeneity or otherwise, economic segregation of the population, and the role of external actors. In this way, one can see that resolving such conflicts is multi-faceted and multi-leveled. A simple formula addressing Flashpoints will not be enough and, indeed, each city will have a particular and complex dynamic which needs to be closely read before any intervention can take place. Better coordination between the religious and political authorities over access routes to holy sites, for example, is not a solution to the religious conflicts in Jerusalem. It needs a much broader approach.

Ultimately, this research project has helped me see is that the search for peace in the city in the current context is a search for fool’s gold. Unless the tectonic plates of the current balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians shift dramatically, there can be little change in the ongoing low-level conflict situation. The trajectory of ongoing low-level conflict is based upon the contextual factors identified above. It is a trajectory in which Israel gradually encroaches upon non-Jewish holy sites and the Palestinian population is either gradually squeezed out of the eastern part of the city or absorbed into it as second-class residents. At the same time, the conflict will continue because while Israel can advance its position in East Jerusalem with relative impunity, it is not able to take any more far-reaching steps. It is not able to act as ruthlessly as the Chinese government has done in Lhasa, for example, where the Tibetan Buddhist leadership, the religious institutions, and holy sites are controlled by the state. Israel is not yet able to by dismantle the religious institutions which constitute the Islamic and Christian presence and thus the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem. The contrasting prospect of Israel returning property it has acquired in East Jerusalem and recognizing Palestinian sovereignty there is, however, very remote. Such an impasse means it is highly unlikely that there will be any semblance of a negotiated agreement over the city and the conflict will continue for the foreseeable future.

Endnotes

1 See Power, Piety, and People: The Politics of Holy Cities in the 21st Century; the Fellowship was for three years and comprised five case studies: Jerusalem, Cordoba, Banaras, Lhasa and George Town, online at socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/projects/powerpietyandpeople/ (accessed 24 May 2019).


4 Michael Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History, and the Future of the Holy City (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 231. The figure was supplied by an Israeli security advisor to the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality during discussions organized by the Canadian sponsored project, the Jerusalem Old City Initiative.

5 Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound, 116.


8 See Tom Najem, Michael J. Molloy, Michael Bell, and John Bell, eds. Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Old City Initiative (London: Routledge, 2017).


11 Diana L. Eck, Banaras: City of Light (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 23.


13 Williams, Everyday Peace?, 69; Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims since Independence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 301. Over the past twenty-five years, security has been
deployed around the Vishweshwur Temple and Gyan Vapi Mosque at an annual cost, estimated in 2009, of 10 million rupees.


18 Bradley Mayhew and Robert Kelly, Tibet (Singapore: Lonely Planet Publications, 2015), 262. The authors are referring to the TAR only. A study by the Tibetan government in exile reported on the destruction of 6,254 monasteries and nunneries in all Tibetan areas.


20 Robert Barnett, Lhasa: Streets with Memories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); and Mayhew and Kelly, Tibet, 262. See the recollections of a tulku, or reincarnated llama, Dr. Lobsang Tensing, who was present at the scene, in Mikel Dunham, Buddha’s Warriors: The Story of the CIA-backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 401–3.


23 J. Saravanamuttu, Conflict and Compromise in Inter-Religious Issues in Malaysia, Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution: 1, no. 1 (Spring 2009), online at pconf1.biu.ac.il/files/pconf1/shared/final_full_text_0.pdf#page=89 (accessed 24 May 2019).

In the opening passage of *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries*, a remarkable study of *maqamat* (“saint shrines”) in Palestine, Taufiq Canaan makes a curious observation. He laments the “destruction which has been the fate of forests in Palestine,” probably a reference to large-scale deforestation during the Ottoman period, and posits that trees that survived did so because of their sacredness. Sacred, Canaan writes, because of the association that many trees have with prophets, saints, and shaykhs – a kind of pantheon of holy men (and sometimes women) that was a dominant feature of Islam in premodern Palestine. Published in 1927, *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries* is a work that aims to find structures, typologies, and logics among the hundreds of shrines that once dotted the flourishing Palestinian village landscape. Although there may have been as many as eight hundred such shrines in Palestine at the time, Canaan reviews 348 of them in his study, 235 of which he professes to have visited personally.

In early 2019, I was given a small grant from the A. M. Qattan Foundation for a photography project based on *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries*. Spending the grant money on a cheap used car, I visited twenty-five of the shrines described in most detail by Canaan. My aim was to see what has happened to these shrines in the ninety-two years since the publication of this classic work of ethnology and folklore. Following the trail of Canaan’s visits, I rarely strayed far from villages around Jerusalem, where a disproportionately large number of the shrines he reviews are situated. There I found a variety of forms that these once sacred places have taken – shrines now
decomposing in cemeteries, shrines housed inside modern mosques, shrines cared for by Bedouin shepherds, shrines turned into children’s parks, shrines adopted by messianic Jews, shrines used as garbage dumps, and so on. Clearly, there is no simple, succinct way to summarize their afterlives as places formerly sacred for Muslims.

Very often I came across trees described by Canaan as belonging to saints. Canaan calculated that 60 percent of the shrines in his study were associated with holy trees. He surmised that the sanctity of the shrines frequently drew from the already existing reverence for these trees. That is to say, the trees preceded the saints and their shrines as relics of what Canaan called the “former forest glory of Palestine.”

I could not have chosen a better word than “glory” to describe the ancient oak tree of the female saint al-Badriyya in the Sharafat neighborhood of Jerusalem (Figure 1). Al-Badriyya was known to have a number of trees to her name – two olive trees, a lemon tree, and several oak trees dispersed throughout the Jerusalem area, including in al-Malha, where an Israeli shopping mall now stands, and as far away as al-Ram in the West Bank. Some are still known by locals. Of these, the most spectacular is the ancient oak tree near her shrine, still standing, which is believed to be over a thousand years old. Its branches spread like outstretched arms as it hovers over the edge of a hill, overlooking Jerusalem’s southwestern sprawl, and a modern house extension steadily closes in on one of its sides, compromising the symmetry of its grandeur. Canaan tells a story in which a Jerusalem notable asked villagers from Sharafat to cut off a dying branch from al-Badriyya’s oak tree. The villagers tried to discourage any such
Figure 2. Wild pomegrenate tree at Sultan Badr’s shrine, Dayr al-Shaykh. Photo by author.

Figure 3. Sufi saint Ibrahim al-Adhami’s oak tree, Bayt Hanina village. Photo by author.
thing, and the man had difficulty finding someone willing to perform this dubious task. The notable finally hired a Christian to saw down the branch, and the next day fell ill with rheumatism.

Al-Badriyya’s father, Sultan Badr, was himself a Sufi saint. He came to Palestine from the region of Khorasan, in present-day Iran and Afghanistan (or, in some versions, from Arabia). He is believed to have been a qutb, the Sufi concept of a perfect man, and spent a great part of his days roaming the wilderness around Jerusalem and meditating in caves. I found this wild pomegranate tree (Figure 2) at his shrine complex, still mostly intact, in Dayr al-Shaykh, whose villagers were expelled in 1948. It struck me as a very graceful tree; a young tree keeping a much older deceased pomegranate tree company. Sultan Badr, as Canaan tells us, was known to bring dead pomegranate trees to bear fruit.

Like Sultan Badr, the eighth-century Sufi saint Ibrahim al-Adhami came to Jerusalem from Khorasan and, like the Buddha, he was born a prince who renounced his royalty for an austere, spiritual life. He was known in particular for sleeping next to the foundation stone inside the Dome of the Rock. He wandered extensively throughout the Levant, and places were named after him wherever he went. In Bayt Hanina village, an ancient oak tree is said to belong to him. The village’s former muezzin (retired because the call to prayer is now zapped to the mosque’s loudspeaker directly from Ramallah, nullifying his services) told me that as a boy he used to sleep under the tree on hot days. In this photo, Ibrahim al-Adhami’s oak tree is to the upper right, and the modern Jerusalem neighborhood of Bayt Hanina is visible in the background (Figure 3). Once a ten-minute walk apart, the two Bayt Haninas are now divided by the separation barrier and perhaps two hours of travel.

Canaan does not mention the ancient olive tree in his discussion of the shrine of Abu Nujaym, who gives a Bethlehem-area village its name (Figure 4). I learned from a local politician, however, that there is “something strange” about the tree. When it gives fruit, he told me, the olives get eaten up as they fall to the earth. Is it Abu Nujaym who eats up these olives? In any case, the tree looked like it had not given fruit in centuries.

Shaykh Abu Yamin of Bayt ‘Anan was known to fly over his shrine at night with his band of musicians. His trees were a palm, a fig tree, and a pomegranate tree. Of these, the

Figure 4. Olive tree at the shrine of Abu Nujaym, Bethlehem.
palm and the fig tree still stand (Figure 5). In Palestine, the archetypal “tree of life” is the palm. Canaan was very interested in this in his other writings, noting that the palm tree was often illustrated on saint shrines (needless to say, such pigments have not survived). He recounts an Islamic myth in which God created the palm tree from clay leftover from the creation of Adam – the first man. This, I induce, would make the palm the first tree.

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Figure 5. At the shrine of Shaykh Abu Yamin, Bayt ‘Anan.
Why Do Palestinians Burn Jewish Holy Sites?
The Fraught History of Joseph’s Tomb
Alex Shams

On 16 October 2015, a large crowd of Palestinians near the northern West Bank city of Nablus surrounded the religious site of Joseph’s Tomb and forced their way past Palestinian security guards at the main gate. Once inside, they proceeded to set the shrine alight. Although the building was somewhat damaged, for the most part the shrine – a simple white structure furnished with only a small tomb – escaped unscathed.

The attack on the shrine elicited widespread outrage from commentators in the Israeli press, who condemned the attack on what many Israelis consider a Jewish shrine. Some pointed to the fact that the shrine was also targeted in the same way by Palestinian protesters in 2000, when the Israeli military first pulled out of the site and turned it over to Palestinian authorities. For Israelis, the attack seemed to indicate yet again that Palestinian violence is motivated by anti-Jewish hatred. Why would Palestinians attack a Jewish religious shrine if not because they hate Jews?

The reality, however, is far different than the Israeli narrative would seem to suggest. Built by Palestinians and located in the heart of a densely-populated Palestinian neighborhood, the history of Joseph’s Tomb belies Israeli claims about its identity as a “Jewish holy site.” The identity of Joseph’s Tomb – and the claim that it is a “Jewish” shrine – is instead caught up in the wider history of the appropriation of Palestinian religious sites in the Zionist narrative.

It is one of many shrines across historic Palestine – now split into Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza – that has been re-invented as exclusively Jewish, despite a long history of shared worship among Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Samaritans that...
goes back centuries. And the reason it has been attacked has almost nothing to do with religion, and much to do with how the Israeli military and settlement movements have used religion as a way to expand their control over Palestinian land and holy places.

**Shaykh Yusuf**

Joseph’s Tomb has been a site of pilgrimage for centuries, one of hundreds of such tombs across Palestine (and the region) that have spiritual significance for locals. Until 1967, it was commonly visited by local Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Samaritans, and it is one of a host of minor holy sites (*maqam* in Arabic) scattered around Nablus and its environs. Some say the site hosted a shrine closely associated with Samaritans (a small ancient Jewish sect that lives in Nablus and Holon) before the spread of Islam and Christianity in the area. This is a likely guess given that religious sites are often built atop other religious sites. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Church of the Nativity, and many other major Christian holy sites are thought to have been built atop former Roman temples, for example, in keeping with common practices in many parts of the world – and Palestine is no exception – that involve creation of religious sites to one’s own god atop the sites of the gods of vanquished religions. Many holy sites changed their names and features over time as they became important to new religious traditions, and the addition of adherents from different faiths was seen as complementing the importance of the shrine, not taking away from it. Thus a site like Joseph’s Tomb, which was previously holy to Samaritans, also became holy to local Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

One of the few things that almost everyone agrees on (including the Jewish Virtual Library) is that Joseph’s Tomb probably has nothing to do with the biblical Joseph. The site of the current tomb is mentioned nowhere in the Bible (only a note that it is near Nablus and not much more) and the existence of a tomb in the area is not accounted for until centuries after Christ. Throughout the centuries some visitors have suggested the biblical Joseph’s grave is in the area based on speculation, but no fixed claim or consensus regarding the tomb has ever existed. Various historians and travelers over the centuries mentioned possible locations for Joseph’s Tomb in the area of Nablus, while others asserted it was more likely closer to Hebron. It is unclear if the historical mentions of Joseph’s Tomb actually map on to the site today called Joseph’s Tomb. This is a quite common situation; throughout the region, one finds multiple sites dedicated to a single holy figure. Part of the confusion is due to the fact that many of the holy tombs and sites are actually graves of local holy figures, whether Sufi shaykhs, saints, or people whose identities have been forgotten. Their sacredness came not from a direct connection to a biblical figure but from locals’ perceptions of holiness embedded in the geography itself. This was often through the intercession of a local saint buried there, though sometimes all that was needed was a place with a scenic panorama and a geographical feature like a cave, spring or boulder which locals would visit to meditate and make vows. The local Palestinian belief today is that the tomb belongs to Shaykh
Yusuf (“Joseph”) Dwaykat, a Sufi holy man who died in the eighteenth century and was reportedly buried there.

In the 1800s, European travelers and scholars began journeying to the “Holy Land” to map the Bible onto the existing Palestinian landscape. Imagining a direct connection between the places they saw and the biblical stories of two thousand years ago, they often ignored local knowledge and attempted to translate pre-existing names into the tales of biblical legends. Despite the fact that there is little historical evidence that the biblical figure Joseph ever even existed, a tomb outside Nablus became directly linked to him in the European orientalist imagination.

The modern claim that Joseph’s Tomb is directly related to the biblical Joseph appears to have emerged as a result of claims by William Cooke Taylor in the 1830s. Cooke was an Irish journalist traveling in the area motivated by interest in biblical history but with no expertise in the field. Although in his writings he claims the site was believed be the tomb of the patriarch and that all the religions agreed as much, no other geographers who ventured into the area in the decades that followed reported anything of the sort. And it is unclear from his writings what local Palestinians, the people who were actually living in and around the shrine and worshipping there, believed about the shrine. British geographers subsequently took up Taylor’s claim, however, and over the years it was forgotten that it had been more or less made up based on conjecture.
But the claims of biblical archaeologists had a strong role in how the Zionist movement would come to understand and conceive of the landscape. As European Jews migrated to Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century, they drew upon biblical archeology’s claims. They adopted archeologists’ claims that Palestinian holy sites were directly linked to ancient biblical figures. In many cases, they focused on occupying those sites in order to legitimize the colonial endeavor by giving it a sense of deeper history. In many cases, this would mean evicting the Palestinians who actually frequented these holy sites.

When Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, religious Zionists began flocking to Joseph’s Tomb. The tomb, which was previously open to pilgrims of all faiths, began to fall under exclusively Jewish control. As growing numbers of armed Jewish settlers were escorted to the tomb under military escort, the area became increasingly viewed with apprehension by Palestinians living around the site. In 1975, the Israeli military banned Palestinians – that is, the Samaritans, Muslims, and Christians living around the site – from visiting, a ban that has remained in place until this day. When I visited in summer 2015, the tomb was shut closed, but a sympathetic guard allowed me and a friend to look around, under his close watch.

Unsurprisingly, the ban has ignited intense anger over the years. This is true particularly given that frequent visits by Jewish settlers to the shrine are accompanied by hundreds of Israeli soldiers, who enter the area and run atop the rooftops of local Palestinians to “secure” the tomb. As a result, Joseph’s Tomb has increasingly become associated with the Israeli military and settlement movement in the eyes of Palestinians. Its presence has become an excuse for frequent military incursions that provoke clashes and lead to arrests and many injuries in the neighborhood.

Some fear that Israelis will attempt to take over the shrine to build an Israeli settlement around it. This fear is not unfounded, given the fact that Israeli settlers have done exactly that all across the West Bank in places they believe are connected in some way to Jewish biblical history. The notoriously violent Jewish settlements in Hebron, for example, were built there due to the location of the Tomb of the Patriarchs in that southern West Bank town. Following the initial years of settlement, settlers even managed to convince Israeli authorities to physically divide the shrine – which is holy to local Palestinians – and turn the whole area into a heavily-militarized complex. Other shrines have become excuses for the Israeli military to build army bases inside Palestinian towns, like Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem – which is surrounded by twenty-foot high concrete walls on three sides to block Palestinian access. The village of Nabi Samwel near Jerusalem, meanwhile, was demolished in its entirety to provide Jewish settlers access to the tomb at its heart.

At Joseph’s Tomb, the nearby hilltop Israeli settlements of Bracha and Itamar were built in this way. Jewish settlers at both sites used biblical references to justify their theft of the land from local Palestinian villages. They are two of the most violent Israeli settlements in the northern West Bank, with nearby Palestinian communities facing frequent and recurring attacks, including the destruction of olive groves (some of which, ironically, actually date back to biblical times). Until 2000, a Jewish yeshiva built by Israeli settlers
even existed at Joseph’s Tomb, a fact remembered well by Palestinian locals who once had to contend with constant Israeli military presence around their homes.

The Israeli military only relinquished control over the site to the Palestinian Authority in 2000, after years of resistance by local Palestinians. As soon as the soldiers left, locals overran the tomb and set it ablaze. After decades of being used as a base for Israeli settlers and the military, it is no wonder that Palestinians saw Joseph’s Tomb as a symbol of Israeli control and not merely as a religious shrine. The history of the Israeli military’s use of Joseph’s Tomb to base itself in the heart of a Palestinian neighborhood in an area ostensibly under Palestinian Authority has inextricably tied the site to the Israeli occupation as a whole.

As a result of the appropriation of the tomb by the Zionist right and its conversion into an exclusive Jewish holy site, the long history of religious coexistence and the multiple histories that once flourished at the tomb have been erased from the public imagination. After decades of having buildings identified as Jewish religious sites used as inroads to create permanent Israeli military bases, it is no wonder that some Palestinians have attacked some of these sites. Israel’s occupation has indelibly tied places like Joseph’s Tomb to their rule over Palestinians, in the process fueling a shift in how the conflict is imagined: from being a political struggle for Palestinian self-determination in the face of a settler-colonial state to an all-out religious war. In the wake of the deaths of dozens of Palestinians at the hands of Israeli forces over the course of October 2015 and the shooting injuries of thousands more, it is not surprising the tomb became a target of Palestinian anger. Israeli authorities have no one but themselves to blame for the destruction in Nablus in 2015, as well as repeated clashes at the site since then.

The History of Shrines in Palestine

For Palestinians, the story of Joseph’s Tomb is only one chapter in the longer story of the destruction of Palestine and the mapping of Israel atop it. Prior to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, shrines across Palestine were open to all, and it was not uncommon to find more than one of the five main religious groups of the land – Muslims, Christians, Jews, Druze, and Samaritans – venerating the same site. In some cases, particularly around al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount, this shared veneration had to do with the fact that religious traditions overlapped geographically.

But the vast majority of the hundreds of shrines across Palestine are small domed buildings dedicated to local saints and figures, especially Sufi holy men and ascetics, and for the most part were not connected to events that occurred in holy texts. In a phenomenon common around the world, Palestinians built tombs for prominent spiritual figures and over time these became favorite sites of worship for all who lived in the nearby areas, of whatever religion.

As James Grehan notes, this was part of a religious culture shared among locals of many different faiths across the region. While contemporary scholars have often focused on text in order to understand religion in the past, Grehan notes that this
creates a distorted view of how religion was lived in societies like Palestine, where in the nineteenth century less than ten percent of the population was literate. He argues that understanding popular religious culture necessarily entails a focus on popular practices, and the hundreds of tombs – the vast majority of which are graves to local saints or holy figures – were at the heart of those practices shared by Palestinians of all religious affiliations.

Some of the most prominent of these shrines are located in the mountains of the central West Bank near Dayr Ghassana – home to the so-called Sufi Trail – but in almost every village in Palestine such shrines can be found. In addition to local worship, these shrines attracted pilgrims from far and wide, and many had festival days associated with them (and some still do). One of the largest of these festivals was Nabi Ruben, located just over a dozen kilometers south of Jaffa, which attracted thousands from across the region every year until 1948.

For Palestinian villagers, these shrines were a focal point of communal life, a phenomenon Salim Tamari richly describes in his book *Mountain against the Sea.* In general, these shrines provided a pleasant space for villagers to relax in an era before the concept of leisure was widespread, and the festivals associated with them allowed members of a largely agrarian society accustomed to strenuous farm work an extended chance to let loose. Nabi Ruben’s festival, which attracted upwards of thirty

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Figure 2. Joseph’s Tomb. Photo by author, November 2015.
thousand people throughout the 1930s and even more in the 1940s, was famous for its pleasure tents by the sea, where hashish, drinks, and dancing were on offer in addition to fortune-telling, bathing, and Sufi meditation. Women in particular were attracted to the shrines, and many of them – including Nabi Ruben, Rachel’s Tomb, and the Milk Grotto – were visited for their legendary power to increase fertility.

After 1948, when Zionist militias forcibly expelled 750,000 Palestinians from what became Israel, most of these shrines were destroyed and the festivals came to an end. Given the fact that the vast majority of Palestinians were displaced from their native land, spiritual practices rooted in specific sites and places could not continue post-Nakba, except in memory. Over time, even the majority of those sites where Palestinians still lived, especially in the West Bank, fell out of use. In line with global trends toward the literal reading of religious scripture – which in the Islamic context included the adoption of Salafi critiques of shrine worship by mainstream Sunni Muslims – many Palestinians stopped frequenting shrines devoted to specific local individuals that were not mentioned in religious texts. Some shrines – like al-Khadr near Bethlehem or Nabi Musa in Jericho – remained sites of pilgrimage but the vast majority fell out of use over time.

The Politicization of Palestinian Religious Sites

As the shrines became underused by Palestinians, however, religious Zionists in Israel began taking a renewed interest in them. For them, the goal of Israel was to redeem the land for the Jewish people, and a major part of the Zionist project necessarily involved finding the exact places where the Hebrews of the Bible lived. The problem was, however, that the Bible is not a map nor a history textbook, and as a result it was quite difficult to pinpoint the exact locations of much of what was mentioned therein.

As Nadia Abu El-Haj and Basem Ra’ad have highlighted, religious Zionists often relied upon texts drawn up under the British in the nineteenth century, when geographers carried out cartographic expeditions to “map” the Bible atop modern Palestine. These maps were less than precise, however, and involved a lot of guessing using the names of Palestinian villages and attempts to figure out if the Arabic words might be derived from Aramaic or Hebrew. The result was a hodgepodge of falsehoods that was, over time, accepted as truth.

Particularly after 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and large areas mentioned in the Old Testament fell under Israeli occupation (the coast has comparatively little Hebrew history), religious Zionists revived the British “Holy Land” maps to go on their own treasure hunts for Jewish remains. In many places, tombs that were historically shared by locals of different faiths were appropriated by the religious Zionist movement, which stressed their Jewish character for political purposes in order to convince the government to assert control. Today, this amalgam of guesses made by British travelers is repeated as truth in the Israeli media as well as the international media, which generally takes the Israeli narrative as fact. Even something as basic and commonly-used as Wikipedia pages for these sites are based on the guesses of British
travelers in the nineteenth century.

Palestinian narratives, meanwhile, are added as footnotes, if they are presented at all. Joseph’s Tomb, which should be an everlasting reminder of the richly-varied history of human religious, social, and cultural practice and the diversity of beliefs that can coexist in one humble little building, is today instead a flashpoint in a conflict that Israeli authorities are increasingly trying to frame as a religious struggle.

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4 James Grehan, Twilight of the Saints: Everyday Religion in Ottoman Syria and Palestine (Oxford University Press, 2014); and Andrew Petersen, Bones of Contention: Muslim Shrines in Palestine (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).


8 Seth Franzman and Doron Bar, “Mapping Muslim Sacred Tombs in Palestine during the Mandate Period,” Levant (2013), online at www.academia.edu/3534733/Mapping_Muslim_Sacred_Tombs_in_Palestine_During_the_Mandate_Period (accessed 9 April 2019).

9 Grehan, Twilight of the Saints.


14 Shams, “Palestinian Shared Worlds.”

15 Abu Haj, “Facts on the Ground.”

16 Ra‘ad, “Hidden Histories.”

Jean de Thévenot is satisfied. He has just been knighted as a chevalier in the Canons Regular of the Holy Sepulchre, who are the guardians of the Holy Places. This should help him on the journey back to “Christendom.” We are in April 1658, the Franco-Spanish War is still raging but, according to rumor, the Spanish do not imprison knights even if they are French. Now he is leaving the Holy Land, but his record does not include the traditional paper document certifying pilgrimage. Thévenot took care of this omission four days earlier; by “getting marks put upon our arms, as all pilgrims commonly do.”

The description he gives of how this operation is done – the first we have – leaves no doubt that indeed Jean de Thévenot had his arm tattooed (figure 1). By 1658, it was already more than two hundred years since western Christians had adopted the oriental tradition of being tattooed as proof of their pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

The first written record of a tattoo on the skin of a western Christian dates back to 1484. In the diary of his pilgrimage, Jan van Aest de Mâlines mentions a knight who has just died. Undressing the body in preparation for the burial revealed that it was tattooed with two complete circular shapes interspersed with palms and crosses, as was the custom of knights. One circular shape was on his torso, the other on his back; a cross on his left shoulder, a second on his right shoulder. Neither his first nor his second wife, or his father, or mother, nor anyone else, knew anything about it.

Translated from the original French by Carol Khoury.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, accounts by pilgrims mention this tradition. The “tattoo artists” who served the westerners were the dragomans (interpreters) of the Franciscans. According to Jean de Thévenot, they are themselves Latin, that is, Roman Catholic.²

The English Protestant Fynes Morisson explains how, in 1596, he cautiously avoided attending masses of the Latin, so as not to be tattooed and dubbed a Knight of the Holy Sepulchre. William Lithgow, who visited Jerusalem in 1612, also recounts that he refused chivalry because he was a Protestant, but he accepted to be tattooed like his travelling companions. This is how Lithgow relates the facts in his diary:

Meanwhile, the last day of our staying there, we went all of us Friars and Pilgrimes in againe to the Holy Grave, where we remained al night. Earely on the morrow there came a fellow to us, one Elias Areacheros, a Christian inhabitour at Beth-leem, and purveier for the Friers; who did engrave on our severall Armes upon Christs Sepulchre the name of Jesus, and the Holy Crosse; beeing our owne option, and desire: and heere is the Modell thereof. [figure 1] But I, decyphered, and subjoyned below mine, the four incorporate Crowns of King James, with this Inscription, in the lower circle of the Crowne, Vivat Jacobus Rex [meaning, long live King James]: returning to the fellow two Piasters for his reward [. . .]

Which when the Guardian understood, what I had done in memory of my Prince upon that Sacred Tombe, hee was greatly offended with me, that I should have polluted that Holy place, with the name of such an Arch-enemy to the Romane Church. But not knowing how to mend himselfe, and hearing me to recite of the Heroick Vertues of our matchlesse Monarch: who for Bounty, Wisedome, and Learning, was not paragonized among all the Princes of the earth: His fury fell; and begun to intreate me, to make it knowne to his Majesty.³

Is there a connection between the Franciscans and the tradition of “marking” among western pilgrims, especially the tradition of being “engraved” with the Jerusalem Cross? We know for sure that this cross was already part of the traits of the Franciscans of the Holy Land and that it was affixed on the mantles of pilgrims adorned as knights since 1480 and Jean de Pérusse.⁴

Figure 1. Lithgow’s model of his original tattoo, as detailed in his diary. The Totall Discourse of the Rare Adventures. Online at archive.org/details/totalldiscourseo00lithuoft/page/252 (accessed 12 May 2019).
Franciscan Benevolence?

It appears that “tattoo artists” were employees of the Custody.⁵ “But that does not mean that the Franciscans directly encouraged the practice. The ancient and medieval ecclesiastical institutions have never encouraged tattooing. Even among the Copts – the Christians who have used the practice the longest – the priests have issued admonitions against the practice of tattooing among Christians since the Byzantine period. In Nubia, Christian Abyssinia, where Christians tattooed themselves, tattooing has never been incorporated into the sacraments. The priest is never the one who tattoos. All of this is logical: the sacerdotal elite knew very well that tattooing was formally forbidden by the Old Testament. Christianity affirms the superiority of a different form of marking received at baptism: the sign of the cross made by the hand of the bishop. Saint Augustine explicitly says, in a sermon, that this mark is more durable than the tattoo that marked the Roman soldiers in his day: “An invisible and indelible mark which makes any form of body marking pointless.”⁶ Yet, it is folk religion and devotion that seem to have led Christians to be marked. This same proscription is also found in Islam.⁷

To Unite with the Sufferings of Christ

Although there is no formal proof, the pain caused when tattooed seems to fulfill a desire to identify with the sufferings of Christ: the seal of Jerusalem remaining in the skin of the pilgrim as the wounds of the Passion on the body of the risen Christ. This would also explain the special attraction for the tattooing of the Cross of Jerusalem among the Latin, and the benevolence of the Franciscans to see the faithful marked with the five crosses by which they identify with the five wounds of Christ, as well as with the stigmata of Saint Francis of Assisi, their founder, and the founder of the Custody of the Holy Land.

The Italian professor Guido Guerzoni writes that a tattoo performed during a Christian pilgrimage is “a small martyrdom – a public effusion of blood” of one’s faith.

Some pilgrims would like to put as many marks as possible on their bodies. Hence this particular Catholic, of which the Swedish theologian Michael Eneman speaks in 1711, reported that he had the twelve apostles tattooed on his body, reserving his posterior for Judas Iscariot. But the lack of the hygienic conditions of the time took this Catholic badly, resulting in a terrible fever, which drew him close to death. Moreover, as Count Francois de Volney writes about the procedure, it could be perilous: “I saw a pilgrim who had lost his arm because his ulnar nerve was injured.”⁸

The tattoo technique eventually took a better route. By the mid-nineteenth century, tattoo artists promised painless tattoos.
Demise of the Tradition among Westerners

For centuries, it had been certain that the tattoo would be the only memory that, on the way back, would not fall into the hands of the Ottoman authorities or thieves. Even in the case of sinking, at least this corporal mark would be saved. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the increase in pilgrimages, the safer roads, the development of the tourism industry, and religious souvenirs seemed about to put an end to the practice. Especially in Europe, the social meanings attached to tattooing evolved: beginning in the late eighteenth century, people perceived by many Christians to be of low moral virtue – sailors, bandits, prisoners, and prostitutes – increasingly adopted the use of tattoos, eventually resulting in Christians being discouraged from the practice.

The Example of the Princes Will Serve for Nothing

This is perhaps why Gabriel Charmes, in 1882, was not persuaded:

I was stopped, one day, in a street by a man with an attractive figure who wanted, at all costs, to make a tattoo on my arm to mark that I was a *hajj*, a pilgrim, and that I had been to Jerusalem. He showed me various models. I could choose between a Greek cross, a Latin cross, a *fleur-de-lis*, a *fer-de-Lance* [the iron of the lance or spearhead], a star, or a thousand other emblems. The operation will do no harm: I would not feel it; while being tattooed I would smoke a *narghile* and have a coffee while chatting with the operator’s wife and daughter, whom were addressing to me from a window the most seductive signs. The girl, I must say, was still young and had eyes of a charming glow. I realize that in the presence of such a fire coming out from her eyes, we could forget the pain of a little less metaphorical burn. Besides, the most prestigious persona had given themselves to the test that was proposed to me. There were twenty authentic certificates. But I knew how to resist such noble examples; I did not get tattooed, but I copied one of the certificates.

It shows very clearly that the Prince of Wales has been weaker than me and that he has let himself be taken by the beautiful eyes of the tattooist’s daughter. Here is the text; I think that no one will be sceptical enough to doubt its indisputable authenticity: “This is the certificate that Francis Souwan engraved the cross of Jerusalem on the arm of His Majesty the Prince of Wales. His Majesty’s satisfaction with this operation proves that it can be recommended. Signed: VANCE, courier of the suite of His Highness the Prince of Wales. Jerusalem, April 2, 1862.”
I do not know what the Prince of Wales has paid for, but mere mortals can obtain, for five or ten francs, the pleasure of wearing, on one arm or on any part of the body, a Jerusalem cross, a Greek cross, a fer-de-Lance, a fleur-de-lis, etc. It’s really for nothing.⁹

Will Fashion Revive Tradition?

The Prince of Wales, Albert Edward of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who ascended the throne as Edward VII, had the cross of Jerusalem tattooed on him. His son, Edward Windsor, future George V, did the same in 1882. It is he who reports in his letters: “I was tattooed by the same man who tattooed Papa.”¹⁰ At the end of the nineteenth century, they were among the last westerners to follow the tradition. During his visit to Jerusalem in 2018, Prince William, although the press reminded him of the tradition, did not fancy getting tattooed.

Abandoned during most of the twentieth century, the tradition has known an exceptional renewal since the publication of an article in 2012.¹¹ Tattooing is fashionable in the West. But even among refractory fashionable people, the “Seal of Jerusalem” has a special status. Pilgrims who for nothing in the world would have been tattooed, come to Jerusalem to receive this mark – not to follow fashion but to declare their love to the city, to its history, and to the One God who makes its holiness.

Of the Way of Making What Marks Men Please Upon Their Arms¹²

Here is de Thévenot’s explanation of the seventeenth-century tattooing procedure:

We spent all of Tuesday, the nine and twentieth of April [1658], in getting Marks put upon our arms, as commonly all pilgrims do; the Christians of Bethlehem (who are of the Latin Church) do that. They have several wooden moulds, of which you may choose that which pleases you best, then they will fill it with coal-dust, and apply it to your arm, so that they leave upon the same, the mark of what is cut in the mould. After that, with the left hand they take hold of your arm and stretch the skin of it, and in the right hand they have a small cane with two needles fastened in it, which from time to time they dip into ink, mingled with Ox’s gall, and prick your arm all along the lines that are marked by the wooden mould. This without doubt is painful, and commonly causes a slight fever, which is soon over; the arm in the mean time for two or three days, continues swelled three times as big as it ordinarily is. After they have pricked all along the said lines, they wash the arm, and observe if there be any thing...
wanting, then they begin again, and sometimes do it three times over. When they have done, they wrap up your arm very straight, and there grows a crust upon it, which falls off two or three days later. The marks remain blue and never wear out, because the blood mingling with that tincture of ink and ox’s gall, retains the mark under the skin.

Marie-Armelle Beaulieu is a journalist. Since 2015 she has been the editor-in-chief of Terre Sainte magazine (Holy Land Review) and the official website of the Franciscans of the Custody.
Endnotes

1 The word tattoo appeared in the eighteenth century, imported from the Polynesian word *tatau*, by the English traveller James Cook. The translator of Cook’s second voyage to Tahiti in 1772, Dr. Berchon, was the first to use the word tattoo. It first appeared in the dictionary of the French Academy in 1798. In 1858, the word, officially Frenchified as *tatouage*, appeared in the French language dictionary.


5 The Custody of the Holy Land is a custodial priory of the Franciscan order in Jerusalem, founded in 1217 by Saint Francis of Assisi, who also founded the Franciscan Order. Its mission is to guard “the grace of the Holy Places” of the Holy Land and the rest of the Middle East, as well as pilgrims visiting them, on behalf of the Catholic Church.

6 Private correspondence with Luc Renault, author of a 813-page thesis entitled *Marquage corporel et signation religieuse dans l’Antiquité* [Body Marking and Religious Sign in Antiquity].


9 “Voyage en Syrie,” 771.


11 Several pieces on the matter were published in *La Terre Sainte*, No. 621 appearing in September/October 2012, published semi-annually from Jerusalem by La Custodie franciscaine de Terre Sainte.

Jean-Michel de Tarragon, professor emeritus at the École Biblique et Archéologique Française de Jérusalem, discusses the unique photographic archive held by the École. The archive contains one of the most extensive and valuable collections of Holy Land pilgrimage photographs found anywhere in the world. De Tarragon goes on to describe the extensive digitization program the École has more recently embarked upon which is drawing together collections of pilgrimage photographs held by numerous other Christian organizations in Jerusalem and Palestine more broadly. The discussion is followed by a sample of sixteen historic photographs from the École holdings that depict pilgrimages of various religious faiths and traditions. These are accompanied by detailed descriptions of the images and their provenance.

The Treasures of the École Biblique Photo Archive

In 2019 the photo collection of the École Biblique / Dominican Saint Stephen monastery in Jerusalem comprises around thirty thousand high definition scans of old black & white photos. This is in addition to another collection, less used by researchers, that consists of thousands of color-slides, also scanned in high definition (4,000 dpi). The core of the black and white collection comes from the roughly twelve thousand glass negatives held by the École – the biggest private collection of glass negatives in Jerusalem. Those include 2,448 stereoscopic glass negatives. Then, we could add 1,003 stereoscopic glass positives, for projection
or 3D viewing through a viewing machine, not scanned because 95 percent are duplicates of negatives included among the bulk of the twelve thousand scans. The few positives without their negative counterpart have been scanned. Also, about four thousand positive square glass plates (non-stereoscopic) are held, some of them genuine American Colony from before the time of Eric Matson, and independent from the collection available in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. Those twelve thousand negatives are private, coming from the work of the Dominican Friars during a period spanning from 1890 to around 1952.

The École Biblique photographs were never intended to be distributed to the general public, unlike, for instance, the Bonfils collection, the Raad collection, or the American Colony Photographers collection. The photos of the École were for the research of the Friars, all of them scholars in the fields of biblical studies, Palestinian geographical studies, Palestinian ethnography, and, of course, archaeology. The photos were designed to illustrate the articles published in the École’s quarterly journal, the *Revue Biblique* (founded in 1892), as well as their books and monographs. We see that the themes of the collection are always connected to some research of the Friars, themes that we can still track one hundred years later, even if the projected book was never finished.

The two main photographers who produced this unique body of work for the École Biblique were Father Antonin Jaussen and Father Raphael Savignac. Jaussen specialized in stereoscopics views while Savignac only produced classical glass-negative photos. Their photographs date back to the earliest period of the École Biblique collection, roughly between 1900 and 1930, after which point Jaussen shifted to the École house in Cairo (d. 1962). Meanwhile, Savignac remained in Jerusalem up to his death in 1952. The other Dominicans who worked as photographers were Paul-Marie Séjourné, Raphael Tonneau, Bertrand Carrière, Pierre Benoit and Roland de Vaux.

The process of digitizing the École photographic collection began in 2001, starting with the glass plates. Following this, a set of 294 beautiful vintage paper prints, mainly Bonfils, with a few Zangaki or Beato, belonging to the École Biblique, were added to the database. From the previous Notre Dame de France monastery we received as a permanent deposit 1,630 old glass-negatives, among them about 610 of huge size, 24 x 30 cm. This compelled us to buy a new flat-bed scanner, with A3-size capacity (the previous largest negatives were 18 x 24 cm). Having exhausted this work, we took the decision to significantly broaden the scope of our work and begin searching outside the collections the École had inherited, and to scan old photographic collections of other Christian communities of Jerusalem and Palestine. We found that everybody was enthusiastic to take part and to agree to the terms of our work: we scan free of charge, of course giving back the originals and a DVD set, and in exchange we obtain a written official agreement for the Right of Use of those scans. In this way, we found 705 beautiful glass-negatives in the Convent of the White Fathers in Saint Anne church in the Old City, along with hundreds of vintage paper prints. The total number of scans from the Saint Anne collection is around 2,400. We also asked the Jesuit community in Jerusalem, with 100 glass plates from before World War I (although on Egypt, not the Holy Land), and hundreds of film negatives and prints, totaling a further 2,400. Then our
neighbor, the Schmidt School (official name, Paulus Haus) provided us with an album from 1907 to 1914 of 139 scans. Outside Jerusalem, we received two albums from the Salesian Friars of Bayt Jimal, and a few from their school in Nazareth, totaling 273 new photos. Two albums stolen in 1948 from the Raad Studio have been scanned (the albums subsequently perished in an accidental home fire), with 821 scans. Sadly, the photos were small paper prints, not so high quality (many were scratched), but many of them included English captions. Those 821 scans are the only reminder in the world of those two burned albums.

One of the most important collections we currently hold is from the Catholic Diocese, the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. For four years we have been scanning step-by-step their numerous albums (no negatives), the majority of them stemming from the Patriarchate’s former historian, Father Médebielle. So far, we have reached 2,553 scans with six further albums waiting on our table. Other collections include 51 paper photos (not yet scanned) from the Rosary Sisters, 66 prints from the Ecce Homo Sisters, and 643 paper prints from the Fathers of Betharram in Bethlehem (some from the same Pierre Médebielle). Furthermore, His Beatitude, the Apostolic Armenian Patriarch, gave us some glass plates to be scanned. The Trappists monks of Latrun also donated their complete collection of 784 scans.

Over time we expect to continue expanding our collections but certain holdings remain beyond our reach, mainly those in family hands. We are also unable to scan huge institutional collections, far bigger than our own, such as those of the Franciscan Friars, the Custodia and, most mysteriously, the Greek Patriarchate collection, about which we know virtually nothing.

Sadly, we do not yet have a website for all these 27,732 scans to be displayed, in low definition, with captions. We are looking forward to doing this, but first there are a series of technical and legal challenges to be overcome.

Fr. Jean-Michel de Tarragon, O.P., is a French Dominican priest from the École Biblique who has been in the Holy Land for forty-five years. He received his PhD in Paris IV-Sorbonne (1978), in ancient history and cuneiform Canaanite language. He is in charge of the École’s photo archive, which he began to scan in 2001; with the addition of other photo archives, the collection now includes over thirty thousand photos.

Endnotes
1 See Jean-Michel de Tarragon, “The World War I Photo Archive in St. Anne Monastery, Old City of Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Quarterly 70 (Summer 2017): 43–51.
PHOTOS FROM THE ÉCOLE BIBLIQUE ARCHIVE
Figures 1 and 2. Paper print of 26 x 39 cm, from the Stella Maris convent of the Carmelite fathers at the top of Mount Carmel, Haifa. Figure 1 shows the procession in honor of Saint Elijah, moving from the convent itself, in the background on the right of the photograph, to the statue of the Virgin Mary on its pedestal, in the center of the square between the large Stella Maris convent and the guest house, the former provisory convent, and the lighthouse. The photo is from the time of the British Mandate, around 1930. The procession of the Carmelite fathers, dressed in their white cloaks on brown robes, is preceded, just in front of the Virgin, by a police officer in tarbush hat, the cross holder and candlestick holders. It passes in front of a kind of platform for officials, at least a shelter from the sun. The statue of Saint Elijah wielding his sword is carried on the shoulders of volunteers, and can be seen under the tree against the convent wall, topped by a grid, in the center right of the photo. A crop of the following picture in the collection [figure 2] is complementary to it and illustrates well the carrying of this statue during the same ceremony. The crowd of pilgrims is mainly Palestinian; there are no Europeans. Saint Elijah was a very popular festival in Haifa, and mainly concerned the inhabitants of the city and the Galilean villages on the slopes of Mount Carmel. The picturesque also comes from the presence of the horse-driven carriages that led the pilgrims to the very top of the mountain. Strange detail: the base of the monument used as a base for the column bearing the statue of the Virgin is surrounded by some barbed wires, diagonally, probably to prevent people from climbing on it; this did not stop the two kids from sitting on one of the ledges, but hidden from the procession.
Figure 3. Paper print of 12 x 17 cm, photo of Studio Joseph Tumayan, from the album of the Salesian Fathers of Bayt Jimal, dedicated to the official visit of the Crown Prince of Italy, His Royal Highness Prince Humberto of Savoy, the only son of the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III. The album bears the Italian title “Visita del Principe Umberto di Savoia alla Filistina – 1928.” The date is precise: the Prince makes his official visit in the form of an explicitly religious and Catholic pilgrimage during Holy Week 1928, for Easter. The photograph shows the official reception of the Prince by the British Authorities at Jerusalem railway station on Sunday, 1 April 1928, Palm Sunday, at 10:30 a.m. The young prince (he was only 23 years old at the time) stood at attention at the hearing of the national anthems. Behind him, the British officers, then, in the center, small in size, in gilded uniform and with his sword, the Consul General of Italy in Jerusalem, then a member of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre, and on the right, the Vice Consul of Italy, also in uniform. Cars are waiting to lead the procession to the Jaffa Gate, where the religious authorities, led by the Latin Patriarch, will welcome H.R.H. Umberto of Savoy.
Another important event in the official visit of the Crown Prince of Italy. The pilgrimage having an obvious political dimension, H.R.H. also visits the Muslim authorities on the Esplanade of the Mosques. The photo shows him outside the Dome of the Rock, surrounded by the Awqaf chiefs. The great mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni is on his right; the British high ranking military on his left. Note that the distinguished guests did not have to take off their shoes to enter the mosque: they were put small slippers on their cavalry boots. The Crown Prince put on the sober version of his uniform: he did not wear the large cord and the full decorations of his arrival at the Jerusalem station.
Figure 5. Glass negative, 9 x12 cm, from the Salesians of Don Bosco College, Nazareth. Without any original legend, however, it is clear that this is the Palm Sunday procession. The crowd of pilgrims and faithful stretches along the path from Bayt Fagi, passing over the crest of the Mount of Olives and down into the Kidron Valley, before going up in a large double bend to the Old City of Jerusalem, reaching the Lions Gate, whose crenellated summit can be seen in the upper left corner. We know that the ceremony traditionally ends near this gate, inside the old City, at the Saint Anne Church of the White Fathers. The photographer wanted to capture the moment when the ecclesiastical authorities pass in front of the Gethsemane church. At the bottom of the photograph, almost cut off by the framing, we see H.B. Mgr. the Latin Patriarch, whose long ceremonial cloak stretches behind him, carried by seminarians. In front of him are the canons of the Patriarchate in overhang, carrying the branches, then the immense serpentine of the crowd. The interest of this cliché is to be the exact visual counterpart of the same type of crowd in the same place, but Muslim, during the great procession of the Nabi Musa. There is the same stretching of a large procession, the same assembly of the curious on the sides of the Muslim cemetery on the edge of the eastern City wall. The date is the end of the British Mandate, or the very beginning of the Jordanian era. On the horizon, in the sky, the tower of the Rockefeller [Palestine] Archaeological Museum (inaugurated in 1938).
Figure 6. Paper print, or contact, photographic paper glued on cardboard, from a lost 13 x 18 cm glass plate of the Assumptionist Fathers of the former Notre-Dame de France, now kept in the albums of St. Pierre en Gallicante, Jerusalem. Very rare if not unique photograph showing the piercing of the Jerusalem wall by the Ottoman municipality, in order to open what will be the future New Gate, on the northern front of the city. The photo is taken from the top of the building under construction, Notre-Dame de France. In the foreground, three Assumptionists; in the center, the pierced wall, the two ashlar pillars of the future door are already installed. Behind, two clearly recognizable buildings: on the right, the Collège des Frères, and at the far left, the Latin Patriarchate; in the sky, the small minaret of the Citadel, Jaffa Gate. The year is precisely 1897, the beginning of the work; it was completed in 1899.
Figure 7. Large format paper print, contact from a 24 x 30 cm lost glass plate, from the collection of the convent of Notre-Dame de France, Jerusalem, of the Assumptionist Fathers, now kept at St. Pierre en Gallicante. Photograph showing a rarely documented dimension of the piety of Catholic pilgrims: in addition to the ceremonies and devotions to the Holy Places, there was the need to exercise charity. As a result, the Assumptionist organizers had chosen to lead the groups on a charitable visit to the Jerusalem lepers. The latter were confined outside the city, in the Kidron Valley, south of Silwan village, near Bir Ayub. A large group of French people brought food. Most of the lepers are sitting on the floor in the front row. Among the pilgrims were the nuns of Saint Vincent de Paul, who knew how to care for lepers. The meal was in large wicker baskets, and cooking pots, which are clearly visible on the right side of the picture. Curiously, on the left, a lady holds a bottle of wine and a glass – the bottle probably contains something other than this drink forbidden to the sick, Muslims . . . . Most people look at the photographer, installed behind his heavy wooden camera for an extra-large format of 24 x 30 cm; as the label at the bottom of the picture indicates, the photographer is from Studio A. Gherardi, and the exact date is 8 June 1897.
Figure 8. Contact paper print, from a 24 x 30 cm glass plate, from the archives of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Rare photograph showing a Catholic mass celebrated in the middle of the First World War, in front of the Holy Sepulchre, on 2 September 1916. The many soldiers who attend are Austrian, and as such Catholic and not Lutheran, like most Germans also present in Jerusalem during the Great War. The particularities of the Status Quo that govern the celebrations to the Holy Sepulchre, between Orthodox Greeks, Armenians and Franciscans, mean that the Mass was not allowed to be celebrated inside the Basilica of the Resurrection, but outside, on the entrance square. The altar was placed on a large carpet against the door that had been condemned for centuries, with a hanging covering it. The service at the altar is provided by military male nurses, wearing the Red Cross armband on their left arm; two Franciscans are guarding the altar. Officers are allowed chairs on the left side. The military chaplain officiated, because the moment seized is the end of the ceremony, the beginning of the dispersion: the ladies in the center begin to leave. There is an important prelate, with many decorations, who is also moving away, preceded by two qawas. Behind him is Bishop Franz Fellinger, Rector of the Austrian Hospice in Jerusalem. Military music plays an air (lower right angle). Some officers of the Ottoman army stand aside, in the shade of the outer staircase leading to Golgotha. A throne for the departing prelate had been installed at the bottom of the stairs, also in the shade. This copy of the photo is dedicated in French, bottom right: “Hommage respectueux, [signature], Jerusalem, 1/XI.16.”
Figure 9. Glass negative, 9 x 12 cm, from the collection of the Church of Saint Anne of the White Fathers, Jerusalem. The coming back to Jerusalem of the Muslim procession of the Nabi Musa, Ottoman period. Three photos were taken at the same time from the same place, allowing to reconstruct the caravan of the return of the Muslim authorities, mounted on horses and surrounded by banners. The Ottoman army is on guard of honor. The great mufti is on the left, on a white horse, in a white covered tarbush. He is Mohammad Tahir al-Husayni, the photo being probably 7 May 1907, according to the dates of the other photographs accompanying this one. The procession, or mawsim, of the Nabi Musa, is coming up from the surroundings of Jericho, and is walking on the pass at the top of the Mount of Olives, at Ras al-ʽAmud. It dominates the village of Silwan, on the far left. Opposite, the little-built Ophel hill, then Mount Zion, with the Dormition Abbey in the sky. The large grounds of Saint Peter in Gallicante are completely surrounded by a long wall, but no building can yet be seen there; the excavated debris distinguish the archaeological excavations of the Assumptionist fathers. In the White Fathers collection, there are eight photographs of the Nabi Musa, different from the most well-known classics in the American Colony collection.
Figure 10. Paper print from a 24 x 30 cm plaque, from the collection of the Church of Saint Anne of the White Fathers, Jerusalem. It illustrates the good cooperation between Catholic religious institutions and the few Armenian photographic studios in Jerusalem. Indeed, this photo of Saint Anne is published in the small Assumptionist magazine Jerusalem (62, August 1909): 478, with the following caption: “Les marins du Jules-Michelet en route pour le mont des Oliviers,” with the credit: Photo Khalil Raad. At the bottom of the contact kept at Saint Anne, and reproduced here, it reads: “NCOs of the Jules Michelet in Jerusalem (6 July 1909).” It is a pre-World War I Raad cliché, published by the Assumptionists, and kept with the White Fathers. The picturesque scenery illustrates well how Ottoman Jerusalem was open to all kinds of pilgrimages, including explicitly military ones. These French sailors from the Jules Michelet ship are pleased to be perched on donkeys. In the last row in the center, an officer and two Assumptionist priests. It is almost certain that the group was staying at Notre-Dame de France. The Mount of Olives of course presents Gethsemane as it was before 1914, that is, without the Franciscan basilica of the Agony or the Nations. Among our 821 Raad photos, we did not find this one. Possibly it could be among the 3,000 Raad negatives in Beirut.
Figure 11. This – the 1,232nd scan of photographs from the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem – has the originality to show a group of Knights and a Dame . . . not from the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, which is almost always the case, but from the Order of Malta! The print is a contact of 22.3 x 28 cm, unfortunately without a legend and no date; however, the ladies’ hats take us back to the 1930s, British Mandate period. We can guess that the group posing is in Jerusalem in the premises of the Latin Patriarchate.
Figure 12. Print glued on cardboard, 22 x 27.7, necessarily from a glass negative of 24 x 30 cm, collection of the Assumptionists of Notre-Dame de France. At the bottom, a caption in ink reads, “Spanish Pilgrimage – May 8, 1912. Entrance to the Holy Sepulchre.” The group puts itself in order of procession outside the Jaffa Gate, before going to the Holy Sepulchre. The priests have donned the white surplice, and alternate colonial helmet and European black ecclesiastical hat. The three bishops are at the very end of the procession, the last characters being Assumptionists Friars, in black. We can guess that this group was staying at Notre-Dame de France, which is why the photograph was kept there. The precise date allows us to have a chronological reference point to study the facilities around the Jaffa Gate: coffee on the first floor, in full operation in 1912, etc. Onlookers gaze at the photographer, who, with his wooden camera for large format 24 x 30 cm, did not go unnoticed.
Figure 13. Large format paper print, from a 24 x 30 cm lost glass plate, from the collection of the convent of Notre-Dame de France, Jerusalem, of the Assumptionist Fathers, print now kept at Saint Pierre en Gallicante. In the upper part of the large Assumptionist property at Saint Pierre en Gallicante, at the top of Mount Siyun, a large round tent with twelve sides was erected not far from the northwest corner of the property wall, with Mount Siyun in the background. The tent, very large, is conical and carries a large French flag at the top of the mast. Assumptionist fathers walk in the garden. Photo published in August 1895 in Notre-Dame’s magazine, Échos de Notre-Dame. We learn that the tent was erected there for the feast of Pentecost 1895, as close as possible to the Upper Room, the Cenaculum. This makes it the oldest photograph presented in this article. The tent was first used in 1893, for the International Eucharistic Congress, on the unbuilt grounds of Notre-Dame de France. The tent is 20 meters in diameter; twelve seven-meter high masts support the dome in an inner circle; other, smaller masts support the outer walls.
Figure 14. Negative on panoramic glass, 8 x 18 cm, from the collection of the Assumptionists of Notre-Dame de France. The wide angle view shows the Muslim procession of Nabi Musa in the middle of the old city of Jerusalem, at the level of the Third Station, at the crossroads of Via Dolorosa and al-Wad Street. The photographer stands on the terrace of the Austrian Hospice. The cliché is from the Ottoman period, as the presence of the Ottoman army indicates. The scene captured is a moment of jubilation around a group that, in the center left, makes a circle around a man carried on shoulders, and all sing while brandishing their stick or cane. In the background, the heart of the procession approaches, walking from the Mosques to the city’s exit, Lions Gate, following the Via Dolorosa. The first banners can be seen in the narrow street, where all are massed, including five Turkish army riders, against the right wall. A second shot exists in the collection: the same panoramic view, but taken vertically, a few minutes before this one, and showing the same man carried on the shoulders of a strong one, people clapping their hands to accompany a song.
Figure 15. Negative on a 13 x 18 cm glass, by the White Fathers of Saint Anne, Jerusalem, without caption or date. A pilgrimage to Bethlehem, in front of the Basilica of the Nativity. The photographer, being mounted on a cornice, gets an interesting view from the top: a beautiful collection of motor cars, dating back to the 1930s, British period. The pilgrimage gives the impression of being interfaith, with Anglicans and Greek-Catholics. The clergy is in the foreground, the laity in the background, on the left of the photo, sheltering from the sun under umbrellas. Beyond the pilgrims, the first house on the square, on the left, has a large sign indicating a photographic studio, “J. Shameliyeh Bros.”
Figure 16. Paper print 26 x 38 cm [cropped in height at digital capture] of the Carmelite Fathers’ convent of Stella Maris, on Mount Carmel, above Haifa. A caption allows us to date this group photo: “7th American Pilgrimage U.S.A. visited Mt. Carmel. 26 April 1930.” On the back, in pencil, “Apr.-16/1930” and “7th American Pilgrimage. Rt Rev Patrick J. McGovern, Bishop of Cheyenne, Wyoming, U.S.A.” It is rare to have American groups in our collection, where the French predominate. We note that the ladies who display the big flag hold it reversed.
Puzzled, alarmed, and stirred to recall a past he faced with ambivalence, Yasin al-Jabi decided to write a letter. Two days earlier, on a Wednesday in mid-February, 1933, his friends had brought him a peculiar piece of news. During the First World War, al-Jabi had served as an Ottoman officer based at the imperial army’s Jerusalem headquarters and later in Damascus, where he was still living fifteen years later. Now, his friends told him, his name had surfaced in a sensational memoir of wartime espionage. What it described, however, differed markedly from al-Jabi’s own recollections. In his letter to the publisher, al-Jabi first begged pardon in case he had overlooked the author’s name. (It had not been printed.) Then he assailed the mysterious memoirist as an impostor (“...muntahalan sifat al-‘arif al-mutalli‘ ala bawatin al-umur”).

The work in question was a memoir later attributed – falsely – to a Turco-Ottoman intelligence operative named ‘Aziz Bey, and which the Beirut newspaper al-Ahrar published in serial, then book form in 1932 and 1933. Yasin al-Jabi was one of many Arabs – or, more accurately, Arabic-speaking Ottomans – both famous and ordinary, whose lives and loyalties were fiercely contested in the years following the war. The engagement of readers like him with ‘Aziz’s “memoir” offers a remarkable window onto the prolonged struggle over the Arab world’s Ottoman past and, consequently, its post-Ottoman future.

The fading of the old imperial order and the coming of a new one clouded an already complicated question: who was a patriot and who a traitor? The significance of this question for Arabs in the interwar period highlights the currency of buried
secrets belonging to an empire that had ceased to exist. After the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire in 1922, the League of Nations imposed British and French mandates
in the former Ottoman Arab provinces. That most of the region’s inhabitants saw
Mandate rule as a traumatic betrayal of wartime promises hardly needs elaboration;
it has haunted relations between Arabs and the Western powers for the last hundred
years. Yet with all the scrutiny placed on the diplomatic deceptions that cut this rift,
Western scholars have too often overlooked the conflicts that wartime intrigue wrought
among Arabs themselves. As the politics of loyalty shifted, the inhabitants of Mandate
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine embarked on their own critical reexamination of the
final decades of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The efforts they made to document
the recent past would shape the collective memory of the region for the next century.

Memory Wars

Arab writers in the postwar years were ambivalent toward the legacy of the vanquished
Ottomans. The Latakia-born scholar Yusuf al-Hakim, in his five-volume history of
modern Syria and Lebanon, addresses this ambivalence by invoking his own experience
as a judge and civil servant first in the Ottoman bureaucracy and then in Mandate Syria.
“We” have won the war, he writes, alongside the Allies; Turkey has become “foreign
to us like any foreign country.” But in each of the places he worked – Jerusalem,
Latakia, Jaffa, Mount Lebanon – he observed that the Ottoman government was “just
and equitable to all its people, without differentiating among races and beliefs.” “Do
we see greater justice than that,” he asks, “among the Europeans who are competing
for our affections and alliances?” Wartime memories of famine and public executions
were too fresh for most of Hakim’s generation to mourn the end of Ottoman rule, even
as resentment toward the French and British mounted. Yet in his question lingered a
challenge: were elements of a better future buried in this troubled past?

The reevaluation of this history took two forms: the publication of Arab memoirs,
like Hakim’s, and the “translation” of Turco-Ottoman archival documents and memoirs
into Arabic. Both were deeply personal. At the forefront of the latter endeavor was the
Beirut newspaper al-Ahrar (from 1934, Sawt al-Ahrar). Established in 1922, al-Ahrar
published at least five full-length memoirs in the 1930s that dealt with the First World
War in the Ottoman Arab provinces. Even more ambitious was the special magazine
it spawned, al-Asrar (“The Secrets”), of which at least twenty-five issues appeared in
1938 alone. In other words, the paper’s investment in recovering Ottoman war narratives
was considerable, as was – we can assume – popular demand for them.

One memoir aroused the dormant anger of Arab readers to an extraordinary degree:
Suriya wa Lubnan fi al-Harb al-‘Alamiyya: al-Istikhbarat wa al-Jasusiyya fi al-Dawla
al-‘Uthmaniyya [Syria and Lebanon in the World War: Intelligence and Espionage in the
Ottoman State], primarily an account of Ottoman counter-espionage around Damascus,
Beirut, and Jerusalem, and along the Mediterranean coast from Alexandria to Haifa and
Sidon. Many who feature in the book survived the war, and some became prominent
figures in the region’s anti-colonial nationalist movements. The stories it told were thus very personal to al-Ahrar’s readers. In fact, the paper’s editors received so many letters in response that they considered publishing them together in a separate volume. These letters, sometimes furious, sometimes elegiac, underscore how important it was to those whose names figured in this chapter of shared history to right the historical record.

The focus on espionage in Syria and Lebanon in the World War dredged up buried demons in a way other memoirs penned by Arab and Turkish officials did not. By writing about spying, it directly invoked treason. The rival narratives that emerge from ‘Aziz’s “memoir” and the responses to it thus illuminate the complex negotiations of loyalty that at turns forged and undermined social trust in the former Arab provinces. At the same time, the accusation of inauthenticity leveled by Yasin al-Jabi forces us beyond the fraught content of the text to examine the circumstances of its production. By considering not only the “secrets” recounted in Syria and Lebanon in the World War but also where translation, fabrication, and collaboration intersect in the making of collective memory, we can begin to unravel a story about both the afterlife of empire and the afterlife of memoir.

Loyal Police, Policing Loyalty

‘Aziz Bey’s “memoir,” as I will continue to call it for now, is set against a backdrop of dashed Arab hopes for both autonomy and Ottoman unity. Arabs had occupied an ambivalent place in the eyes of the post-Tanzimat imperial authorities. On one hand, as Ussama Makdisi has shown, the Arab lands were understood to be “proving grounds for Ottoman modernism,” home to subjects who had the potential to be made modern. They were still, however, in the eyes of officials in Istanbul, stuck in the past. Arab elites, such as those who figure prominently in ‘Aziz’s memoir, were often partners in the mission civilisatrice directed at their less urban and less educated compatriots. But in the final few years before the outbreak of war, these elites surprised their non-Arab counterparts by increasingly asserting themselves as not only the foot soldiers of an Ottoman modernity dictated from Istanbul but as independent agents of it.

When the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came to power in Istanbul in 1908, many Arab officials and intellectuals cheered its rise. Most favored increased linguistic, educational, and administrative autonomy for the Arab provinces within an Ottoman framework, and believed that the CUP would advance policies to this end. The period between 1908 and 1914 thus saw the emergence of political associations such as the Decentralization Party (Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya), which was legally registered with Ottoman authorities and popular among the Arab intelligentsia. But the CUP fell far short of Arab aspirations, and a rift widened between Arabs and Turks within the first few years of its administration. In the 1912–13 Balkan Wars, the empire lost its last foothold in southeastern Europe, and turned its attention to its remaining territory in the Arab East. Even as Arabs came to differentiate themselves in this last hour from Turkish Ottomans, the primary fault line remained not ethnic or racial but political.
Mistrust festered over the course of World War One, when the heavy-handed tactics of Cemal Pasha extinguished Arab subjects’ lingering hopes for a shared future with the Turks. The decisive break in Arab-Turkish relations came in 1915–16, when Cemal carried out mass executions of dozens of local notables accused of Arab separatism in Beirut and Damascus. Many within the Ottoman bureaucracy doubted the wisdom of his approach, including much of the CUP leadership and even the head of the very court martial that imposed the death sentences. Regardless, compounded by the Arab Revolt in Hijaz the same year, the executions made it impossible for the leading Arab families to reconcile themselves to the possibility of continued Ottoman rule. The extreme nature of Cemal’s hanging of Arab notables ultimately eclipsed the nuances of loyalty that had existed in the Arab provinces before the war. It was easy, or perhaps necessary, to forget that one could be a committed Ottoman yet despise the methods of Cemal Pasha’s administration.

*Syria and Lebanon in the World War* promises to give readers a view from within the command of Cemal Pasha’s Fourth Army, at the events that shaped Ottoman fears of betrayal and at surveillance activities that ultimately led to the notorious hangings. In doing so, the author positions himself both as a mirror for Cemal Pasha’s growing suspicion of Arab subjects and a dedicated critic of the internal factionalism that was rife within the Ottoman leadership. He disdains Cemal Pasha’s dream of his own Syrian khedivate, writing, “Each captain of the Ottoman ship had individual ambitions that were not in accordance with the public good and the service of the Ottoman nation.”

The zealous policing of Arab loyalties thus may have had as much to do with the competition among the CUP leadership as it did with Arab subjects themselves. Yet this hardly translated to sympathy for Arab political ambitions. “This Arab idea,” ‘Aziz writes, echoing Cemal, “which increased after Ottoman freedom [1908], has come to threaten us with dangers greater than the Armenian dangers.” He intends to draw a parallel between Armenian and Arab nationalisms, recounting at length a diplomatic trip to Paris made by the intelligence officer Mahmud Bey and an Armenian, Aram Bey. The French minister accused Mahmud of espionage, claiming that Aram had divulged their

Figure 1. Portrait of Hüseyin ‘Aziz Akyürek, the purported author of *Syria and Lebanon in the World War* (1933), from the book’s frontispiece.
true intentions. “Your colleague has already told us everything and he is Turkish, too,” the Frenchman said. “No, he is Armenian,” Mahmud protested. “Because a Turk does not betray his country.” It is worth remembering that the memoir appeared after the empire’s collapse, at the zenith of Turkish nationalism, and that this language reflects sentiments of that time. Nevertheless, analogies with the Armenian case are significant because it was this very fear of Armenian disloyalty that CUP leaders used to justify their mass killings of Armenians in eastern Anatolia.

As Ottoman fortunes shifted, it became more and more difficult for Cemal and his associates to police loyalty from within Arab cities, encircled by possible defectors. The increasingly paranoid commander came to see everyone as a potential traitor. As his resources diminished, however, he had no choice but to rely on informants from among the local population. When former allies turned to foes, the Ottoman command sought to explain why. Its arguments appeared in a book-length report published originally in Turkish under the auspices of the Fourth Army court-martial that executed Arab notables. “First and foremost,” it reads, the issue under investigation “is not a matter of nationalism (kavmiyet). It is a matter of treason (hiyanet).” Rather than the “inaccurate” terms “Arabism” (Araplık) and “Arab uprising” (Arap ihtilali), the report instructs, the unrest instigated by a few self-interested leaders should be referred to as “treason against the government, in general, and against the Arab people in particular.”

‘Aziz’s memoir endorses this characterization of Cemal’s, belittling the very notion of Arab patriotism as an ideological construct. He represents infidelity to the empire as something motivated wholly by crass opportunism – greed, professional ambition, and personal grudges.

“I wonder,” ‘Aziz says he asked himself in 1915, “is it possible for this country to be independent?” He answers with “what the Arabs say,” quoting the tenth-century poet al-Mutanabbi:

Lofty honor does not come from suffering;  
Until blood is shed on all sides.

“But have the men of this country sacrificed their blood for their country?” ‘Aziz asks, rhetorically. He delivers his own searing reply: “Kalla.” No. The Arabs of Greater Syria could think only of saving themselves from conscription, “preferring death from hunger to serving their country on the battlefield.”

Though the Fourth Army’s spymasters were initially preoccupied with averting Arab betrayal, Jewish spies and counterspies come to occupy a prominent place. After the Ottoman discovery of the famous NILI spy ring at the agricultural field station of Atlit, south of Haifa, and the suicide of its leader Sarah Aaronsohn in October 1917, ‘Aziz describes, zealous officers began a frenzied sweep of Palestine to root out spies who, like the Aaronsohn siblings, might have changed allegiances. Ottoman authorities interrogated a string of Jews on espionage charges including, most famously, Naaman Belkind and Yosef Lishansky, who were executed in December 1917. The interrogations yielded so many names, according to ‘Aziz, that the Damascus governor Tahsin Bey complained of there being no room left in his city’s prison for Jews arrested in Palestine.
“Every train coming from Haifa [is packed] with them,” he warned his superiors.20

Though Sarah Aaronsohn dominated later writing on Jewish spying – more often depicted as heroine than as traitor—another mysterious woman looms large for ‘Aziz: Natalya Davidovich. An informant in Alexandria, ‘Aziz says, first described a tall blonde woman, “full-bodied” and with amber eyes, who had surreptitiously made her way from Egypt to Palestine and was in contact with British forces.21 She then arrived in Beirut, where Ottoman officers fell hard for her. Was the “beautiful spy” a villain or a damsel in distress? Was she at the center of a vast conspiracy or simply a red herring?

‘Aziz claims he sensed danger from the start. Sneaking into Davidovich’s hotel room, he discovered among her papers the key to a cipher.22 Soon after, in a meeting ‘Aziz says he orchestrated in the hotel restaurant, Cemal confronted the woman. Trembling, she confessed to spying – against her will. She was an Istanbulite, she explained, a loyal subject who had traveled to Egypt only to be detained there on charges of spying for the Ottoman state. Given no alternative but to sign on with Allied intelligence, she had been sent to Beirut not to spy on Ottoman military plans, as it appeared, but in fact to make contact with the French director of the Ottoman Bank there and, with him, establish a back channel of communication between the Ottoman general and French authorities. Cemal shocked ‘Aziz by thanking Davidovich for the information, expelling the bank director from Beirut, executing two of Davidovich’s associates, and dispatching the woman to collect intelligence for him in Jerusalem in the company of his aide Fu’ad Salim.23

Natalya Davidovich the wealthy Istanbulite Jew fades from the story, but the figure of the “beautiful spy” – the deceptive Jew who dazzles secrets out of faithful soldiers – reappears in the person of a “Miss Simone.” ‘Aziz relays a report from Cevat Rıfat Bey, head of the First Branch’s intelligence operations, noting that Miss Simone had ingratiated herself at the officers’ barracks first in Jerusalem and now in Damascus. The men had already fallen in love with her. More alarming, she knew everything, even who would be sent to the front before the privates themselves did.24 ‘Aziz instructed Cevat Rıfat to find out more. When he warned the young Arab officer Yasin al-Jabi, who would many years later read ‘Aziz’s memoir, against socializing with Simone, al-Jabi reportedly retorted, “Once in our lifetime we should seize the opportunity to live a happy life – tomorrow
Ultimately, Cevat Rıfat decided to confront Simone directly. As he dutifully reported to ‘Aziz, he came to her home in the Bab Tuma neighborhood of Damascus, and plied her with arak and love songs. Drunk on the anise liquor she began to weep. She was an orphan, she told the officer, adopted by the prominent Rabinovitch family in Jerusalem. When they decamped to Beirut, they had enlisted her to remain and spy for Britain. She was a hapless woman with little passion for politics, she claimed. Cevat questioned her further, digging for details that might incriminate his own men: how much had Yasin al-Jabi told her? How intimately did she know him? Although she should have been sent to the Divan-ı Harb, the military tribunal, ‘Aziz says, Ottoman authorities determined that she could be useful to keep around.

The NILI spies exemplified Ottoman authorities’ greatest fear, a fear echoed in the lesser known legends of Natalya Davidovich and Miss Simone: spies in their barracks, in their bedrooms, sharing across hundreds of miles a common bond the forces of counterintelligence were only beginning to understand. The discovery of the NILI ring was significant because it turned Cemal completely against the Jews, whom initially he had identified as potential allies. But most of the actors in ‘Aziz’s narrative were not, and never became, public figures. They were ordinary people, plagued by locusts and famine, who were forced to make difficult choices when faced with an increasingly uncertain future. Al-Ahrar’s string of publications in the 1930s briefly revived many of these minor figures who had played dramatic wartime roles yet had gone on to unremarkable lives. Long after secret ties were broken and shared geographies lost to separate futures, their stories, too, became the stuff of legend, difficult to verify and prone to embellishment in the service of politics or simply entertainment.

The Enigma of ‘Aziz Bey

‘Aziz Bey’s memoir is one of the most commonly cited sources on Ottoman intelligence operations in the Levant during the First World War. But a comparison of the biography of the supposed author with the contents of his books reveals inconsistencies so puzzling as to strongly suggest that the author was not the man he claimed to be. Who was he?

Inside the cover of Syria and Lebanon in the World War is a single photograph of a mustachioed ‘Aziz, no fez, in a checkered Western suit with silk tie and handkerchief. This photo did not originally appear with the work when it was serialized in al-Ahrar. Readers had pressed the editors to reveal the author’s identity, however, and eventually they complied.

Fu’ad Maydani, who was billed as the translator of the work from Turkish to Arabic, provides only one biographical detail about its author in his brief introduction – that he assumed the head of the Ottoman General Security Directorate in late 1917. This information, paired with the photo, establishes the memoirist as a man who would come to be known, after the passage of Turkey’s Surname Law in 1934, as Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek.
According to his Interior Ministry personnel file, Hüseyin Aziz was born in 1881 in Trabzon, where his father was a mid-level bureaucrat. He entered the Ottoman civil service in January 1903 at the age of 21 and by summer 1914 had been appointed to the General Security Directorate. He served first as deputy director and then was promoted, in 1916 (not 1917, as Maydani says) to the post of director. Polat Safi and others have placed Hüseyin Aziz simultaneously in the upper echelons of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (“Special Organization”), a secretive, officially sanctioned but often rogue department that emerged from the Italo-Turkish War in Libya (1911–12) and the Balkan Wars (1912–13), and which specialized in guerrilla operations on the imperial frontier as well as in espionage.

After the 1918 Mudros Armistice, Hüseyin Aziz was rounded up with other operatives of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and its successor from 1915, the Department of Eastern Affairs, and tried by Ottoman authorities, under heavy pressure from the Allies, for the departments’ involvement in the Armenian genocide. Hüseyin Aziz, as director of the General Security Directorate, was convicted of destroying a stash of incriminating documents from the Ministry of Interior. But hampered by both CUP stalwarts and the ascendant Kemalists, the tribunal’s damning verdicts were not enforced. Hüseyin Aziz, now Akyürek, went on to serve in civil posts in Manisa and Izmir before launching a long career as a member of parliament from Erzurum, and died in 1951.

The beginning of the memoir is roughly compatible with the known details of Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek’s life. The narrative opens on 15 April 1909, when Nazım Bey, then a senior officer in the newly established government of the Committee of Union and Progress, supposedly dispatched him to Abdülhamid II’s Yıldız Palace to sniff out the details of a countercoup underway against the newly empowered CUP. This Nazım would later be involved in the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. The author does not name the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, but rather suggests that he arrived in Damascus as an aide-de-camp to Cemal Pasha’s Fourth Army in November 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War.

While certain chapters are strikingly impersonal, others suggest detailed knowledge of the Ottoman spy apparatus in the Arab provinces. For instance, ‘Aziz the author reels off the numbers, locations, and salaries of paid informants throughout the Levant: eighteen in Beirut, five in Acre and Haifa, three in Nablus, twenty-two in Mount Lebanon, sixty-two in Damascus, eighteen in Aleppo, and so on, he says, each receiving between 150 and 500 Ottoman lira a month. Jerusalem was a special case. There, he asserts, Cemal employed twenty-two Arab spies and ten Jews, but paid the Jews twice as much because he distrusted them more. This mention of the commander’s special preoccupation with the loyalties of non-Muslim populations leads to what ‘Aziz claims was his primary responsibility. By his account, Cemal installed him as chief of a special Beirut-based intelligence branch charged with monitoring religious orders. Of twenty-eight men under his supervision, ‘Aziz maintains, a full ten spied day and night on the Maronite Patriarchate and its flock. The agents’ identities were kept secret from each other, and so ‘Aziz spent his time collecting and synthesizing a steady stream of intelligence. Cemal, he notes, prized his work and demanded daily reports. ‘He was
always saying to me,” writes ‘Aziz, “I want to know every move these guys make, even in their bedrooms.”

But not everyone who read the memoir was persuaded by the author’s claim that he had had a front seat to the intrigue. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nusuli, who in the early 1930s was a prominent Beiruti businessman, wrote a lengthy letter to the editors of al-Ahrar, before the author’s name was released, questioning his legitimacy. “The author of these memoirs was not for a day director of intelligence in the headquarters of the Fourth Army,” he insisted. How was he so sure? He was himself, he said, employed in the intelligence bureau of the Eighth Corps, active in Syria and Palestine under the direction of an Ahmet Durmuş, then in a similar position in the Fourth Army under a certain Şemsi Bey, whom he identified as the head of the War College in Istanbul at the time of writing. We have already seen that Yasin al-Jabi shared al-Nusuli’s incredulity. He was another young officer of whom the memoir’s author claimed intimate knowledge. But al-Jabi, like al-Nusuli, could not remember any official with the title of head of intelligence for the Fourth Army. If the memoirist was not an impostor, al-Jabi concluded, his deceit and dishonesty (al-khadda’ wa al-tadliil) were intentional. This struck Yasin al-Jabi, as it might well strike readers today, as bizarre, since there was no shortage of men still living who could contest basic elements of the narrative.

Ottoman Interior Ministry records from the period, though incomplete, give credence to al-Nusuli and al-Jabi’s doubts. There is no evidence that the man whose portrait sits behind the book’s title page was in Syria at all, much less in 1914 or 1915. In November 1914, when Cemal Pasha was bound for Damascus, Hüseyin Aziz was shuttling back and forth between Istanbul and Edirne, near the present-day border between Greece and Turkey. And in December of that year, he traveled to Vienna with another security official. By July 1915, foreign diplomats reported that Hüseyin Aziz was comfortably ensconced in a security role in Istanbul.

Casting further doubt on the provenance of Aziz’s memoir is the fact that the “original” Turkish version is not extant; scholars have always cited its Arabic translation. The authenticity of another book in the series published by Fu’ad Maydani is also questionable: There is no trace in Turkish of the memoir of the Mersinli Mehmed (“Küçük”) Cemal Pasha, which appeared in Arabic in 1932. Since Mersinli Cemal was among the top commanders in the Ottoman army at the end of the war, it is unlikely that he would have written a hitherto undiscovered book. Perhaps most damning of all, the postwar writings of several officers with whom the author of ‘Aziz’s work claims to have had regular interaction omit any mention of someone by his name. Even Cemal Pasha, in a self-exculpatory memoir penned on the eve of his 1922 assassination in Tblisi, fails to make note of his supposed right-hand man.

Another figure who is prominent in ‘Aziz’s memoir but did not return the favor is Cevat Rıfat, the officer who became entangled with the beguiling Jerusalemite “Simi Simone.” This encounter apparently scarred Cevat Rıfat for the rest of his life: He went on to become a prolific anti-Semitic author, penning more than seventy books about Jewish and Masonic conspiracies well into the 1960s. His account of Jewish spying on
the Palestine front, and particularly of the “Syrian Matahari” whose story also appeared in ‘Aziz’s memoir, had an afterlife of its own. First appearing in Turkish around 1933, Cevat Rıfat (now Cevat Rıfat Atılhan)’s work was immediately translated and released in Germany, where anti-Semitic circles devoured it with enthusiasm.\(^\text{47}\) Cevat Rıfat’s melodramatic retelling differs in certain details from ‘Aziz’s version but is, in substance, the same.\(^\text{48}\) The former’s work appeared in Turkish markets in 1933, making it contemporaneous with the later serial installments of \textit{Suriya wa-Lubnan fi al-Harb al-ʻAlamiyya} in \textit{al-Ahrar}. ‘Aziz’s “memoir” appears to have drawn heavily from it.\(^\text{49}\)

Throughout his book, Atılhan footnotes appearances of individuals who were still alive and active in the public sphere at the time of writing; he even gives the positions they then held. Given that Aziz Akyürek had been a high-ranking security official and worked his way back into officialdom after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, his omission is striking. But while Cevat Rıfat was certainly where and who he said he was, too, was accused of blatant fabrication of parts of his story. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nusuli, the same Arab intelligence officer who disputed ‘Aziz’s very existence, explained that while he had found Cevat Rıfat “bright, enthusiastic, and cultured” when they worked together during the war, he had to conclude that most of his reports now seemed to be “derived from his fertile imagination.” It was true, he agreed, that Simone – or Simi Basmach, as she was known to “all the families of Jerusalem” – had ingratiated herself with the top officers in Jerusalem, and that she was consequently sent to Damascus, where she could be kept under closer watch. She was no foundling child, however: vain and boastful of her Spanish origins, she had lived with her mother and sister on Mahane Yehuda Street in Jerusalem. After the war, she married a British officer and moved with him to Cairo. There was nothing she loved but money, al-Nusuli claimed, and while still at home in Jerusalem Simi was a renowned \textit{simsara}, or broker, wringing local families for money in exchange for securing extra rations or cushy posts for their conscripted sons.\(^\text{50}\)

Even more important to al-Nusuli than Simi’s story was correcting Yasin al-Jabi’s part in it. Contrary to ‘Aziz’s description, he insisted, al-Jabi was hardly a guileless slave to passion: as the man who held the key to the army’s numeric telegraph cipher, he was carefully watched, and eschewed altogether the hard-drinking culture of his fellow officers. As a testament to his steely disposition, he noted, Yasin once rode his horse from Jerusalem to the army camp at Bir Sab’a (Beersheba) in the Negev while fasting, demonstrating a piety that drew guffaws from his comrades and admonishment from his commander. Had the young officer’s lips been as loose as they were portrayed, al-Nusuli reminds us, he would hardly have been kept in a position of authority; instead he was promoted.\(^\text{51}\)

Digging for “truth” in the incongruous details of al-Nusuli, Cevat Rıfat, and ‘Aziz’s narratives may well be a futile exercise. More important is that the inconsistencies inspired a debate among readers nearly two decades later – a debate that undertook to establish what had actually taken place, yes, but also wrestled with the broader problem of authenticating voices that by their very nature traded in secrets.
The discrepancies demand an explanation from the translator, Fu’ad Maydani – about whom, unfortunately, almost nothing is known. Did Hüseyin Aziz make a secret sojourn in Syria, so brief that colleagues failed to take note, and covertly dispatch an account of it to a Lebanese journalist many years later? This seems improbable. Or did someone less prominent than Hüseyin Aziz or Mersinli Cemal Pasha author their books and pass them off to al-‘Ahrar as the work of leading officers? This seems risky given that both men were alive and, in Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek’s case, still active in the public sphere in Turkey in the 1930s. Or could parts of the book, perhaps those that describe prewar intelligence operations, genuinely belong to Hüseyin Aziz, while others were appended to them to create a (mostly) coherent story? Most likely, Fu’ad Maydani constructed the narrative based on officials’ memoirs and, perhaps, documentary sources abandoned by the retreating Ottoman army.

As noted, certain parts of ‘Aziz’s account resemble other officials’ published works – notably that of Cevat Rıfat Atılhan. Five years later, when Fu’ad Maydani published the substantively very different but similarly titled al-Istikhbarat wa al-Jasusiyya fi Lubnān wa Filastin wa Suriya khilal al-Harb al-‘Alamiyya [Intelligence and Espionage in Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria during the World War], with which the work attributed to ‘Aziz is often conflated, he was both more and less opaque about its source material. On one hand, no single author’s name was attached to it, though Maydani still christened himself its translator (mu’arrib). On the other hand, the work explicitly mentions both published memoirs and unpublished archival material on which it drew. One long passage, for example, explicitly reprises Falih Rıfkı Atay’s Zeytindağı [Mount of Olives] (1932). It is even noted, in an aside from the mu’arrib, that Atay, once top aide to Cemal Pasha in Palestine, was at the time of publication a renowned member of the Turkish Parliament in Ankara.52 Other source notes are even more intriguing. “In the documents that were found in the warehouses of the Ottoman Interior Ministry,” one chapter begins, “are important reports” related to the secret surveillance of Arab political parties on the eve of the war.53 Another section claims to quote verbatim a series of secret communiqués of which a zincograph copy – a notably specific detail – remained with the “Ottoman intelligence service” (da’irat al-istikhbarat al-‘uthmaniyya).54 It is not always evident where a cited passage or document ends or begins, or how these disparate sources were assembled. Further complicating the question of authorship in the case of this later text is the fact that it is laced with commentary describing the oppression of Arab populations, something that almost certainly does not derive from a Turkish Ottoman source.55 What is clear, however, is that Maydani was well aware of the reservoir of Turkish sources available at the time and had a certain aptitude for weaving them together.

Whether Maydani himself employed broad artistic license in constructing the “memoir” of ‘Aziz Bey or was fed a forgery by another party, hints in other works in the series suggest that Maydani and al-‘Ahrar’s editors knew the material they were publishing would be incendiary. Beyond entertaining readers, it seems, they wanted to provoke a public dialogue. They realized that kindling the archival vestiges of a collapsed state with human voices would stir their audience to action – and sell papers. Indeed, criticism of ‘Aziz’s memoir did not stop Maydani from churning out similar copy throughout the 1930s.
More clues as to the authorship of this work may be hidden in the corpus of espionage narratives whose publication Maydani oversaw in the 1930s, including the short-lived journal *al-Asrar*. But we must first pose a basic question: Why does it matter who wrote *Syria and Lebanon in the World War: Intelligence and Espionage in the Ottoman State*? And to whom?

**The Afterlives of Traitors and Saviors**

By the time *al-Ahrar* began publishing war memoirs in the early 1930s, Syria and Lebanon had been under French Mandate for a decade and Palestine under British Mandate for slightly longer. Several of the key actors who figure in ‘Aziz’s account had turned to fight against the latest occupying power. Overshadowed by this new reality, the war receded into a space filled with both moral gray zones and sharp passions.

The newspaper’s publication of the ‘Aziz Bey memoir revived accusations of treachery buried fifteen years in the past. It marked, like the memoir itself, an effort to police the loyalties of fellow citizens. The editors certainly did not set out to promote ‘Aziz’s characterization of Arab defectors as traitors, but neither did they set out to invert ‘Aziz’s narrative by making heroes of the men whose reputations the writer had impugned. Instead they repurposed the narrative in order to call attention to – and indirectly condemn – fellow Arabs who had collaborated with the Ottomans during the war.

The introduction to the purported memoir of Mersinli Mehmed Cemal Pasha, published just before that of ‘Aziz, gives us an idea of what the editors had in mind for the series of Ottoman war stories. It appears in the form of a letter from a friend and colleague of Fu’ad Maydani, Butrus Mu’awwad, who marvels bitterly at how quickly readers have forgotten the dark days when Ahmed Cemal marched Arab leaders to the gallows. Many of his countrymen, he exclaims, were “still walking about in elegant robes by virtue of the bodies hidden inside them, [and] still [wore] on their faces the look of innocence.” Those who cooperated with Cemal’s forces, he suggests, betrayed their own people and deserved a different, grimmer fate: they should have been publicly shamed, not appointed to high office.

There was also another motive behind the publication of the memoirs: the desire to construct an authoritative narrative of the war from an Arab perspective. For Mu’awwad, and presumably Maydani as well, it was to posterity if not necessarily to the law that collaborators should be held accountable. Many readers, he admitted, would “look askance at these books . . . because they contain things that hurt them, that bring a painful sting to their numb consciences.” But their descendants would surely rely on *al-Ahrar*’s publications to pass fair judgment on the events of the war. In this light, the memoir series appears not only as an exercise in finger-pointing, but also an attempt at writing self-critical history.

Yet this history was subject to revision in keeping with current events. When Fu’ad Maydani published *Intelligence and Espionage in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine during*...
World War in 1937, he included an introduction to the work whose politics were far more explicit than Mu‘awwad’s. Maydani prefaces the 1937 work by heaping praise on contemporary politicians: Lebanese President Émile Eddé and Prime Minister Khayreddin al-Ahdab, Syrian President Hashim al-Atasi and Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, as well as various ministers. He saw fit, he explains, to publish the series of Ottoman spy memoirs at this moment, the “end” of the Mandate period (though in fact it would last another decade) because it was then that the people of Lebanon and Syria, under the inspired leadership of Eddé and the others, were finally reclaiming their own destiny after many long years of subjugation. Maydani goes on to claim a direct, if imprecise, link between these new national heroes and the martyrs of the First World War – the victims of Cemal’s tyranny. It is by recording those past sacrifices made in the face of oppression, he says, that society will come to evaluate the present era of liberty and constitutionalism “with the justice and righteousness it deserves.”

Looking beyond the loud, if banal, rhetoric of the 1937 introduction, it is clear that what was taking place was the fine-tuning of a narrative, nascent at the end of the war and still under construction in the early 1930s. Shaped by local political developments under the Mandate governments, it involved the search for and incorporation of new documents to tell a more complete story of how the Arab states were born of a dissolving empire.

Supported by personal accounts as well as Ottoman archival sources, a narrative of espionage, collaboration, and martyrdom coalesced between the early 1930s and the end of the decade. For Fu’ad Maydani, Butrus Mu‘awwad, and the editors of al-Ahrar, writing history entailed coming to terms with its darker dimensions. In shedding light on the injustices inflicted by those in power, they saw it as inevitable that they would implicate some of their own. Some readers, however, thought it was too soon. Al-Ahrar was attuned, it seems, to the sensitivity of the subject it had taken on. When they released ‘Aziz’s memoir in 1932, editors invited the paper’s readers to weigh in with their own version of events, either to corroborate ‘Aziz’s story or to contest it. Six of the letters they received in response, including those of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nusuli and Yasin al-Jabi, were printed in the published book. And, though the project apparently proved too expensive, the editors even floated the idea of issuing a separate volume to accommodate the rest.

In their letters several readers, as well as Maydani, turned to other memoirs, especially that of Cemal Pasha, to cross-reference their disputes with ‘Aziz. Paradoxically, they found themselves both employing and arguing against a historical record that was dictated largely by the losers of the war – by an empire that no longer existed. These letters give us a vivid, if incomplete, view of the fault lines that animated the politics of loyalty in the early 1930s. Mu‘awwad’s explicit reference to the hangings of 1915–16 makes clear that his animus was directed first and foremost at those who collaborated with Cemal Pasha, “the Butcher.” But not everyone who survived the war and followed Maydani’s series in al-Ahrar rushed to deny involvement with Cemal. There were many shades of treachery. Which was worse: collaboration with Cemal, the brutal but
dead symbol of a collapsed empire? Or collaboration with France and Britain, empires still very much alive?

To the authorial ‘Aziz, the worst traitor was one who turned to the French or British for help in undermining the Ottoman war effort. During the Balkan Wars, he says, he was deployed to lurk outside the French embassy in Istanbul, taking down the names of visitors. A handful of prominent Arabs, he explains, were using the embassy’s mailbox to send seditious correspondence abroad, beyond the purview of Ottoman censors. Intercepting one of the posted letters, he uncovered the activities of a secret Arabist society.62 Thereafter he worked zealously to uncover Western attempts to infiltrate the empire through personal contacts, educational institutions, the press, and cloak-and-dagger espionage. One target was the prominent Lebanese newspaper *Lisan al-Hal*, whom he accused of a Christian, anti-Muslim bias.63 What is explicit in ‘Aziz’s attacks on *Lisan* and several other presses, but only implicit in the paper’s angry response, is that this meant French patronage.

The stain of collaboration with the French looms silently behind the controversy between ‘Aziz and his critics. ‘Aziz excoriates the Arabs for looking to Europe for salvation. And while Mandate-era readers were hesitant to broach this subject directly, it is very likely that Maydani was gingerly using ‘Aziz’s voice to treat a subject that was even more delicate in the postwar era than it had been during the war itself. He hoped to remind readers of the perils of collaboration with occupying powers whether they came from near or far.

The sharpest critic of the ‘Aziz Bey memoir was Amir Shakib Arslan (1869–1946), a prominent Druze politician and intellectual who served as the unofficial representative of Lebanon and Syria at the League of Nations in Geneva in the 1920s.64 Arslan feuded with Maydani over the publication of the book because it portrayed him as a collaborator with Ottoman authorities at the expense of the Lebanese population. This was a profound accusation at a time when the statesman was traveling the world as a champion of his people against colonial oppression.

Arslan enters ‘Aziz’s narrative even before Cemal Pasha’s arrival in Damascus. Ahead of Cemal’s deployment, Ottoman officials assembled Syrian advisors to ensure a smooth transition for the new commander: Arslan, As‘ad al-Shuqayri of Acre, and ‘Abd al-Rahman Pasha Yusuf of Damascus.65 Cemal feared their lingering allegiance to his rival Enver Pasha, perhaps justifiably so. ‘Aziz writes:
Amir Shakib Arslan was at the forefront of individuals upon whom Enver Pasha relied to bring the Druze and some of the Arab tribes into the Ottoman fold. . . After his encounter with Enver Pasha in Istanbul, Shakib Arslan announced his complete readiness to do whatever else he ordered, and he is the one who made clear to Enver the necessity of seizing the opportunity to destroy Lebanon’s independence and adjoin her to the Ottoman state.66

(He was referring to Mount Lebanon’s special administrative status.) The lingering accusation is thus not that Arslan, in contrast to al-Shuqayri, was a direct accessory to the hanging of his compatriots, but that he was obsequious, willing to compromise Arab interests if it was politically expedient.

‘Aziz underscores this point in the final pages of the memoir, pointedly denouncing Arslan as an apologist for German imperialism. For at just the moment that Cemal Pasha decorated the Druze leader for his bravery and leadership of a volunteer brigade in the 1915 Suez Campaign, the German government awarded him its own Iron Cross. The states were allies, yes, but not friends. How, then, ‘Aziz asks, could Arslan’s crusade against foreign imperial powers possibly be sincere? Having berated his countrymen for fighting alongside the enemy, Arslan proceeded to write a series of articles beginning in 1915 absolving Germany of responsibility for the war. This was, in ‘Aziz’s view, blatant hypocrisy; the Germans coveted the Middle East even more hungrily than the French and British.67

Unfortunately, as Arslan’s outraged letter to the editor was not appended to the book, we have only the portions of it that Maydani reprinted in order to counter them. However, in his own autobiography, published in 1936, he attempted to underscore his principal loyalty to the people of Syria by depicting himself in a heroic confrontation with Cemal Pasha at the Damascus Hotel Victoria.68

The conflict between Maydani and Arslan hinged on five points. First, Arslan sought to discredit ‘Aziz’s facts, calling the work an unreviewed “mess” (khalat), while Maydani defended the scrupulousness of the author. ‘Aziz, he said, had supplied scores of names and dates and offered a balanced perspective, praising good deeds and maligning bad ones on all sides of the conflict. Moreover, he said, Arslan’s cooperation with Ottoman authorities was corroborated by the memoirs of Mersinli Mehmed Cemal Pasha and ‘Ali Fu’ad (a leading Ottoman general on the Sinai-Palestine front), and by Ahmed Cemal Pasha’s own.69 Finally, Maydani extolled his own neutrality: he was too young to have participated in the war, he said, and therefore had no stake in incriminating Arslan or anyone else.70

Maydani then dared Arslan to reconcile his account with that of ‘Aziz and of Cemal Pasha himself. Echoing ‘Aziz, he accused the amir of “working to consolidate the influence of Ahmed Cemal Pasha, helping him to abolish Lebanon’s privileges.” Arslan wielded influence over Cemal Pasha, he continued, only because his brother was a postal employee in Beirut and had agreed to read and report on the mail of his countrymen. “So what,” he challenged, “does the amir think about that?”71
Whether Arslan replied we do not know. But the different shades of meaning attributed to the amir’s dealings with the Ottoman regime in Syria point to a larger problem. Because so many Arabs served in the Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially in the army, what constituted collaboration was an ambiguous matter. The letter writers walked a careful line, unwilling to condemn themselves or their compatriots simply for doing their job. Yasin al-Jabi, for instance, acknowledged the “malice” (naqma) of Turkish Ottoman officers toward their Arab underlings while simultaneously underscoring how faithfully and with what dignity Arab soldiers performed throughout the war.72

If it was difficult in the postwar years for those who survived the conflict to construct perfectly coherent narratives about their role in the final hours of the Ottoman occupation and the first hours of the Mandate period, it was, of course, even harder for those who were dead. Dr. ‘Izzat al-Jundi of Homs was one such casualty. The controversy over the nature of his death that played out on the pages of al-Ahrar illustrates the frustrations of family members who could fight memories only with other memories.

In April 1915, a woman named Farida wrote to Ottoman authorities pleading for information about the whereabouts of ‘Izzat, her husband, who had disappeared after being summoned to meet with Cemal Pasha in Damascus.73 Recounting the episode in his memoirs, the commander wrote that he arrived in Damascus in December 1914 with documents in hand proving that al-Jundi was a dangerous and immoral character (“meşhur ahlaksızlardan”) who had used British and Italian funds to foment provincial rebellions against the Ottoman state.74 To get ‘Izzat out of the way, Cemal says, he called him to Damascus and, without letting on that he knew he was a double agent, dispatched him to the restive Arabian emirate of Asir with a stipend and a letter for the rebellious local leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Idrisi.

Al-Jundi was never heard from again. Cemal claimed no knowledge of his disappearance, while the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa operative Eşref Kuşçubaşı proposed, improbably, that he had been carried off by Bedouins.75 ‘Aziz largely corroborated Cemal’s account, but added himself to the story. He met ‘Izzat at his hotel when he arrived in Damascus, he says, and ‘Izzat (perhaps expecting an interrogation) assured him that he was loyal to the Ottoman state. The next day, Cemal asked ‘Aziz to stay

Figure 4. ‘Izzat al-Jundi, pictured in Fuad Maydani’s later project al-Asrar (9 December 1938).
in the room during their meeting, wanting a witness. The day after the meeting, he says, ‘Izzat went to Beirut, where immediately he boarded a Spanish or Italian ship and steamed off toward Suez, then on to Arabia.’

‘Aziz also claimed not to know whether or not Izzat executed his mission. But to Muhammad Munib al-Jundi, ‘Izzat’ son, there was no doubt that Aziz’s account was full of holes. Al-Jundi was one of the readers who wrote to al-Ahrar’s editors to contest the authenticity of the memoir. Seeking information about his missing father, Muhammad explained, he had personally met with ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, a prominent Damascus notable, to discuss his father’s death. Shahbandar, by then a Syrian nationalist activist, told him that Cemal had ‘Izzat killed in the Damascus Palace Hotel; any story of a Spanish steamer was nonsense.

Did ‘Aziz leave out these truths because he was ashamed of their barbarity (hamajiyya)? Muhammad wondered. Accusing Aziz Bey of “false propaganda” (al-da’aya al-batila) and “distorted truth” (al-haqiqa al-mushawwasha), Muhammad begged the reader to decide for himself which story to believe. ‘Izzat’s death was only a footnote to the mass deaths of the war years, but his son’s determination to correct the record reflects a broader concern with who would have the right to narrate history.

The challenge that Muhammad Munib al-Jundi, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nusuli, and Yasin al-Jabi launched against ‘Aziz’s depiction of historical fact was nested within the doubt these men harbored as to the legitimate identity of the author. Even as they insisted that he could not be the man he claimed, they declined to dismiss his narrative out of hand. Perhaps there remained a crumb of uncertainty as to whether such a person had existed, holding secrets to which they were not privy. More important, though, was that the facts still mattered – regardless of who had written the memoir. That it mattered then is why it matters today, even if we are never certain how the works in the prolific Fu’ad Maydani’s series were produced. Al-Ahrar’s readers were aware implicitly of a gap between authenticity and truth: They might well tear down an inauthentic document without supplanting the narrative it advanced with a truer one. Consequently they undertook the dual task of contesting the authorship of ‘Aziz’s memoir, which had the potential to cast suspicion on its overarching narrative, while still working toward the more definite and concrete task of correcting individual fragments of his story.

Conclusion

Arab writers who reflected on their own actions at the twilight of Ottoman control found themselves navigating profound moral ambiguities. While it might have been patriotic to decry the Ottoman as well as the British and French occupations, resentment was tempered with the reality that most Arabs who were in a position to publish memoirs in the interwar period had worked under both the Ottoman and Mandate regimes. When confined to the limited choices that historical circumstance allowed, what then did it mean to take a moral position? This question underlay the vigorous debates surrounding ‘Izzat al-Jundi and Shakib Arslan that animated the pages of al-Ahrar in
the mid-1930s and, more broadly, the retrospective efforts to narrate and interpret the transformative period of the First World War as it was experienced in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. The fraught matter of treason around which their disputes revolved was further complicated by the dubious authenticity of ‘Aziz’s memoir. Yet real or not, true or not, it brings to light the old schisms festering beneath the surface of a society preoccupied with a new struggle against European colonialism.

Such “memoirs” also serve another function, that of exposing the dilemmas inherent in the democratization of historical writing following World War One. In this, the work attributed to ‘Aziz is not an isolated case. In 2012, a rancorous public debate broke out in Turkey around Sarkis Torossian, an Armenian who claimed to have fought heroically with Ottoman forces at Gallipoli and to have received a letter of commendation directly from Enver Pasha. In 1947, in Boston, where he then was living, Torossian published a book recounting his wartime exploits. A Turkish translation sixty-five years later inflamed the already explosive discourse on Armenian (dis)loyalty and the CUP-engineered genocide of 1915, inspiring dozens of newspaper columns, television debates, and academic journal articles. In addition to discrepancies in the text itself, new documents surfaced during the controversy that were shown to be forgeries. But in the absence of proof of when, where, and by whom they were forged, Torossian’s defenders continued to argue that the fake papers did not fundamentally disprove his story. They insisted that the memoir poked an irreparable hole in the prevalent Turkish nationalist narrative depicting Armenians as a treacherous fifth column; the rival camp, meanwhile, categorically rejected Torossian’s viability as a credible historical source. A third group worried that championing the Torossian memoir would harm the very cause it sought to bolster: “The genocide of the Armenians is a historical fact that does not need to be supported by Torossian’s dubious account,” wrote historian Edhem Eldem. Those who downplayed the genocide, he warned, would use the credulity of Torossian partisans to cast suspicion on other, legitimate sources that exposed injustices inflicted on the Ottoman Armenian population.

Torossian’s work belonged to a refugee population decimated by the war, while the memoir of the Ottoman spymaster claimed to offer readers a peek into the annals of power. One wrote from within the state; the other wrote envisioning memoir as a counterbalance to the archives of the state. Despite this asymmetry, both reveal how the fracturing of empire fractured historical narrative. Torossian’s memoir, despite its resonance in the Armenian-American community, was unknown in Turkey until 2012; ‘Aziz’s memoir is only now, in 2019, appearing in Turkish. Confusion surrounding the authors’ legitimacy was possible only because the texts remained sequestered for a surprisingly long time within Armenian and Arab communities, respectively. As the shared histories these memoirs recount are slowly knit back together after one hundred years, we must reconsider how to read them. If we persist in thinking of the work attributed to ‘Aziz as a memoir – mudhakkirat, as Fu’ad Maydani says – we should adjust our expectations. Instead of attempting to prove or disprove authenticity, we should read as Arab readers of the 1930s did: not expecting forgery, and certainly not accepting of it, but hungry for new voices to narrate history and willing to engage, at least, with works that promise this.
In his introduction to ‘Aziz Bey’s memoir, Fu’ad Maydani remarks on how eagerly his countrymen had devoured the preceding volumes in the series – as well as on how many of them had published their own accounts of the First World War. In doing so, he points to the crucial role that memoir would play in constructing an authoritative narrative of an era in which the world as his readers knew it was wholly reconfigured. In the years after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, archival documents were not available to the inhabitants of the former Arab provinces in a systematic way. Cemal Pasha and his associates had left Damascus in a rush of defeat, burning documents as they ran. And under Turkey’s new republican government, the Ottoman State Archives in Istanbul were undergoing reorganization. The consequent turn to memoir blurred the lines between the actors in the drama and those who sought to document it. Yet it was a process that would be repeated throughout the twentieth century as post-independence Arab states closed off their own archives. In staking a claim to memoir as a valid, if contestable form of truth-telling, interwar Arabs thus set the stage to circumvent the state’s monopoly on history.

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Endnotes

The author would like to thank Salim Tamari, Polat Safi, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful reading, and Tom Suarez for assistance in the UK National Archives.


2 I use modified modern Turkish orthography for the names of primarily Turkish-speaking individuals and transliterated Arabic orthography for those who were primarily Arabic-speaking. Hence Fourth Army Commander Cemal Pasha, not Jamal Basha. I use ‘Aziz Bey for the author of Suriya wa-Lubnan, but Hüseyin Aziz (Akyürek) for the official he claimed to be.

3 On how Ottoman-era relationships and social structures continued to shape the politics of the former Arab provinces well into the 1940s, see Michael Provence’s The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).


6 Al-Ahrar was a daily established in Beirut in 1922 by Jibran Tawini, Khalil Kasib, and Musa Nimur. In 1934 it changed its name to Sawt al-Ahrar. Yusuf As’ad Daghir, Qamus al-sihafa al-Lubnaniyya, 1858-1974:

7 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, n.p. [frontmatter].


9 Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).


12 Talha Çiçek argues that even the term “Triumvirate,” commonly used for Talaat, Enver, and Cemal Pasha, is misleading. Not only were the leaders often working at cross-purposes, but there were other, conflicting factions that at times wielded significant power. See Çiçek, “Myth of the Unionist Triumvirate: The Formation of the CUP Factions and Their Impact in Syria during the Great War,” in Syria in World War I: Politics, Economy, and Society, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (London: Routledge, 2015), 10.


14 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 25. He applies various terms to Arab aspirations throughout the book, most often “the Arab idea” (al-fikra al-‘Arabiyya), but occasionally “Arab independence” (al-istiqlal al-‘Arabi).

15 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 162.


17 One prominent example is the case of ‘Aziz Ali al-Misri (also al-Masri), whose arrest in Istanbul in 1914 ‘Aziz Bey (the author) claims he orchestrated (‘Aziz Bek, 28–29). Al-Misri had served alongside Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal in Libya, but shifted loyalties. Cemal Pasha intervened on al-Misri’s behalf in the dispute that precipitated his trial and near execution in 1914, recording the incident in Hatrat: 1913–1922 (Istanbul, 1922), 48–53.

18 “La yaslamu al-sharafu al-rafi’u min al-adha/Hata yuraqa ‘ala jawanibi al-dammu.” ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 181. This could be Maydani ventriloquizing ‘Aziz in the hope that such an insult would stir Arab readers’ patriotism in the struggle against Mandate rule.

19 The name NILI is a Hebrew acronym for Netzach Yisrael Lo Yeshaker, or “The eternity of Israel will not deceive.” The spy ring’s story has been retold many times, including in Fu’ad Maydani’s 1937 Intelligence and Espionage, which gives an account more extensive and less garbled than that of the 1932 work. Hired by Cemal Pasha to assist with locust eradication, the Zionist agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn shifted loyalties in mid-1915 and used the detailed knowledge of the Syro-Palestinian landscape that his position afforded him to construct a network of spies who would go on to feed intelligence to British agents. On dynamics between Cemal Pasha and the Zionists, see Hilmar Kaiser, “The Ottoman Government and the Zionist Movement during the First Months of World War I,” in Syria in World War I, ed. M. Talha Çiçek (London: Routledge, 2015): 107–129.


21 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 166.

22 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 169.


25 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 322.

26 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 347–53. In Atılhan’s version, there is no attempt to intimate disloyalty on the part of al-Jabi. To the contrary, Atılhan throughout the book deploys Arabs’ positive relations with Turks as a foil to the treachery of Jews. (Cevat Rıfat Atılhan, Filistin Cephesinde Yahudi Casuslar: Suriye’nin Mataharisi Simi Simon
In “From Young Turks to Modern Turkey: The Story of Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek (Aziz Bey), the Last Director of the Ottoman General Security Service,” which appeared as this was going to press, Eliezer Tauber acknowledges in passing that Fu’ad Maydani may have ghostwritten the work, though he does not probe further into the implications of such a challenge to the work’s authorship, nor does he doubt that the text reflects the experience of the man who was to become chief of the Directorate of General Security; Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 1 (2019): 33–43, online at tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263206.2018.1493994 (accessed 27 March 2019). Yet the acknowledgment of doubt marks an important departure from Tauber’s “Some New Facts on Ottoman Counterespionage in the Levant during World War I,” Scripta Hierosolymitana 35 (1994): 193-208, on which the 2018 piece draws heavily. I wish to thank Tom Suarez for working to track down the British archival sources cited in these two articles.

‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, ii.

“Hüseyin Aziz Bey; 1298 Trabzon’dan, Mehmed Midhat Efendi’nin oğlu,” [Hüseyin Aziz Bey; born Trabzon, 1298, son of Edirne Treasurer Mehmed Midhat Efendi] 29 Zi’l-hicce 1298 [22 November 1881], Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA) DH.SAİDD 113/385.


“Tayin; Aziz Bey (Emniyet-i Umumiye Mütürü)” [Appointment; Aziz Bey (Director of General Security)], 21 Cemaziye’l-ahir 1334 [25 April 1916], BOA I.DUIT 39/54.


Dadrian and Akçam, Judgment at Istanbul, 1–8.

‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 3. This is April 2 in our text because of a discrepancy between the Rumi and Gregorian calendars. The event, known as the 31 March Incident, began on April 13 according to the Gregorian calendar.

‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 79.


‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 103. Such information does not appear in Cemal Pasha’s memoirs.


“Edirne’ye gidip gelen Mütür Muavini Aziz Bey’in harcrahımı itası!” [Per diem for Assistant Director Aziz Bey’s round-trip to Edirne], 10 Muharrem 1333 [28 November 1914], BOA DH.EUM.MH 93/63.

“. . . Emniyet-i Umumiye Mütür Muavini Aziz Bey’le Birinci Şube Mütür Mahmud
Bey’in Viyan’a’ya gönderildiği” [General Security Directorate Assistant Director Aziz Bey and First Branch Director Mahmud Bey’s dispatch to Vienna], 28 December 1914, BOA HR.SYS 2109/2. The arrival of Hüseyin Aziz and Mahmud Bey by train to Vienna was reported back to Foreign Ministry headquarters by telegram on December 22.

44 Tauber, who maintains that Hüseyin Aziz was in Syria with Cemal’s forces, acknowledges that he could not have remained longer than seven months. Cemal Pasha arrived in Syria in November 1914, and by July 1915, this Aziz had a significant portfolio as a political officer in the Emniyet-i Umumiye headquarters in Istanbul. (W. Gust, ed., The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915–1916 (New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2014), 250, 310, 360, cited in Eliezer Tauber, “From Young Turks to Modern Turkey, 4.)

45 No mention is made of this text, for instance, in the heavily footnoted biography of Mersinli Cemal Pasha produced by the Turkish government-affiliated Atatürk Research Center. See Dursun Gök, “Mersinli Cemal Paşa,” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı, online at www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-34/mersinli-cemal-pasa (accessed 11 September 2018).

46 Cemal Pasha, Hatırat: 1913–1922 (Istanbul, 1922). The memoir was first published following the commander’s death. It was translated immediately into English as Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919 (New York: George H. Doran, 1922).


As this article was going to press, Polat Safi identified several passages of ‘Aziz’s text which were drawn directly from Cevat Rifat’s writings.

49 Though Mu’awwad does not name names, he could well have meant individuals such as the Syrian literary scholar Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali or As’ad al-Shuqayri of Acre. Shuqayri led a delegation of thirty-three scholars and journalists from Syria and Palestine to Istanbul in the immediate aftermath of Cemal’s executions to assure the Ottoman leadership that all was well in the Arab provinces. M. Talha Çiček, War and State Formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha’s Governorate during World War I, 1914–17 (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2014), 48.
65 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 63.
66 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 63.
67 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa-Lubnan, 63.
68 Shakib Arslan, Sira Dhathiyya, 179–83.
73 “Humuslu Dr. İzzet el-Cündi’nin 4. Ordu Kumandanlığının talebi üzerine Şam’a gittiğinden beri hakkında bir haber alamayan ve hayatından endişe eden eşi Feride Hanım’ın bu konuda kendisine malumat verilmemiş talebi” [Request for information from Mrs. Farida, the wife of Dr. Izzat al-Jundi of Homs, who has received no word from him since he traveled to Damascus at the order of the Fourth Army Command and is worried for his life], 23 Cemaziye’l-Ahir 1333 [8 May 1915], BOA DH.EUM.4.Şb 1/51.
74 Cemal Pasha, Hattrat, 165–71.
76 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa Lubnan, 110.
77 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa Lubnan.
82 The first Turkish translation of Suriya wa-Lubnan fi al-Harb al-‘Alamiyya is set to appear in the summer of 2019 as Hüseyin Aziz Akyürek, İstihbarat Savaşları: Birinci Dünya Savaşı ‘nda Suriye ve Lübnan’da Casusluk Faaliyetleri, ed. Polat Safi (Istanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019). Safi corroborates the falsified origins of the text and has identified a number of works from which Fu’ad Maydani apparently borrowed extensively.
83 ‘Aziz Bek, Suriya wa Lubnan, n.p. [frontmatter].
Is Jerusalem an Ordinary City?


Review by Helga Baumgarten

The work presented by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire and the thirty-five scholar contributors in *Ordinary Jerusalem* is fascinating and a pleasure to read. The result of a research project, funded by the European Research Council under the title “Opening Jerusalem Archives: For a Connected History of ‘Citadinité’ in the Holy City, 1840–1940,” and directed by Vincent Lemire, no one interested in Jerusalem will, in the future, be able to do without this impressive book.

The three major contributions of the book are contained in the title of this project. First, the authors look at Jerusalem through the perspective of *citadinité* (urban citizenry) with a focus on interconnectedness, instead of fragmentation. Secondly, they base their work on material from new archives, used in many instances for the first time. Last, but not least, they attempt to present a history from below, focusing on the lives of ordinary people, rather than the lives of the political and economic elite, as well as a history from within, and not a history of Jerusalem through the lens of European political and economic (and religious) interests.

The book is divided into four parts: “Opening the Archives, Revealing the City,” introduced by Gudrun Kraemer (Free University of Berlin); “Imperial Allegiances and Local Authorities,” introduced by Beshara Doumani (Brown University); “Cultural Networks, Public Knowledge,” introduced by Edhem Eldem (Bogazici University); and “Sharing the City: Contacts, Claims and Conflicts,” introduced by Gadi Algazi (Tel Aviv University).

Most of the articles are written by young scholars, who were able to access
the archives relevant for this history of ordinary Jerusalem, be it in terms of language (Greek, Russian, French, English, Armenian, Ottoman Turkish, Hebrew, and, of course, Arabic) or the physical location of the archives. Obviously, only a huge collaborative effort could produce such an ambitious work.

The book covers a period of one hundred years, with 1840 as the editors’ starting point. In their introduction, the editors present a “new timeline” which focuses on historical continuities instead of the usual turning points such as 1917 when Ottoman rule ended and the British Mandate or, more precisely, British colonial rule over Palestine began. The editors stress that this method is “in itself a historiographical novelty” (2).

For Dalachanis and Lemire, the period is delineated by the “arrival of the first European consulates in the 1840s . . . and the rise of intercommunity conflict in the late 1930s.” Based on this reading of history, the period 1840 to 1940 “becomes a seamless historical sequence.” They argue that this very period “saw the birth, maturity and ruin of a certain model of citadinité, understood here as the way in which city dwellers share urban space, in varying degrees of harmony and conflict” (2).

Continuity can be observed, they further argue, not least on the level of institutional structures, like “municipalities, the patriarchates (Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Latin), the Muslim awqaf, the Sephardic kotelis, the Islamic courts and the Franciscan Custody” (3). By putting this “institutional resilience” at the center of their analysis, the usual “key years” in the history of Jerusalem, not only 1917, but also 1947 and 1967 (although both dates are outside the period covered in the book!), become in their view “partly meaningless” (3).

One might expect that many readers and subsequent analyses will argue with this reading of Jerusalem’s history. It would seem to neglect an additional, very crucial marker of the history not only of Jerusalem, but of Palestine as a whole, that is, the beginning of Zionist immigration into Palestine with the First Aliyah in 1882. Alexander Scholch, for his part, chose the period 1856 to 1882 as the focus of his unsurpassed study “Palestine in Transformation,” with the intention to put Palestine first. Obviously, this was and is also the intention of the editors and contributors to this volume, to put Jerusalem in the center of the study, not the geopolitical approach which in the past has dominated far too many studies.

Another aspect of the reading of the history of Jerusalem that will surely be taken up by subsequent research is intercommunal life and conflict in the city. It would seem to be quite problematic to discuss and analyze the historical (and ongoing) struggle between the Zionist movement and the indigenous people as simply one example of “intercommunity conflict” (2).

The approach of the book and the intention of both editors and individual contributors results in a new narrative which is based on “privileging connection over fragmentation” and therefore tries to “create links between the city’s usually fragmented historical narratives” (6).

The “look for citadinité” (6) is another central aspect of the new narrative developed in the book. The editors and most of the authors search for “identity-forming ties which . . . link residents to their city, its history, patrimony, monuments, landscapes
and eminent historical figures” (7). They argue that this very notion of citadinité is “crucial to the study of mixed, imperial and divided cities” (7), especially when the fundamental question to be asked is: “In the face of religious barriers and projections of national identities, how do residents [why do the editors not use the term citizens in this context?] proceed to ‘make a city’ anyway?” (7).

Again, many readers and analyses will argue with this approach and with these new intriguing narratives. And it is hoped that the result will be further discussions and new arguments. We can only wholeheartedly agree with Gadi Algazi, when he concludes in his introduction to part four of the book (“Sharing the City: Contacts, Claims and Conflicts”) that “Jerusalem is a difficult place to think with/in” (402). The questions he puts forward in his small but extremely helpful and relevant introduction (401–2) are a program for myriad new studies: Can citadinité be used as a “common frame of reference”? Are we dealing with the same actors? “What methodologies are available?” Which archival collection is relevant and is the use of one single collection enough for a study of the city and the connections between its inhabitants/residents/citizens?

Before moving on to individual contributions in the book, the main questions the book raises, on which the editors base their programmatic summary, need to be put into focus.

Dalachanis and Lemire start their introduction with the simple, but extremely challenging question, namely: “Is Jerusalem an ordinary city?” Their answer is clear: “Jerusalem is an extraordinary city that can be understood only with the greatest possible use of the most ordinary tools of social, political and cultural historical research” (1).

The second question asked refers to the approach, “local or global” (1). Again, their answer is unequivocal: “Jerusalem’s local history can only be reconstructed by reference to archives often located in faraway places” (1).

The programmatic summary the editors arrive at is equally clear cut: “In transforming this double contradiction [that is, ordinary versus extraordinary and local versus global] into a creative analytical tension . . . [we] . . . revisit the ordinary history of a ‘global city’ from 1840 to 1940 . . .” (1).

In his article “Arab-Zionist Conversations in the Late Ottoman Jerusalem: Sa’id al-Husayni, Ruhi al-Khalidi and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda” (305–29), Jonathan Marc Gribetz (Princeton University) tries to give examples (sometimes successful, sometimes rather problematic) of urban interconnectedness and possibly even citadinité when presenting in great detail and with a deep analysis the “conversations” between two leading Jerusalem notables and a Zionist immigrant, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. At the time of the interviews, 1909, Ben-Yehuda was still very much focused on getting a positive response from the Muslim elite in Jerusalem to the immigration of Jews to Palestine and their settlement there. He published the conversations in the Zionist Hebrew language newspaper Ha-Tsevi, which he founded and edited.

Interestingly enough, Ben-Yehuda is focusing on the work of the newly elected parliament after the Young Turk Revolution. Al-Husayni proudly tells him that a budget was approved and that parliament “instituted many good laws in all areas of internal governance” (316). At the same time, he cautions Ben-Yehuda about too
many expectations after such a short time of parliamentary activity. Al-Khalidi makes the same point in his conversation with Ben-Yehuda, namely that after one year of parliamentary work one could not expect too much and that reforms would take time both to pass in parliament and later on to implement in political life.

Al-Husayni and al-Khalidi both agree with the assessment of Ben-Yehuda that after the revolution they were now all living in a free country in which many groups and nations could freely coexist. Already a year earlier, directly after the revolution, Ben-Yehuda had made another interview with al-Khalidi in which al-Khalidi presented himself as a political liberal. His understanding of Islam was in the same vein: “Despotism is not Islamic . . . . On the contrary, the law of Islam leans towards liberalism” (320). The conversation with the two notables, who represented Jerusalem in parliament in Istanbul, turned difficult when Ben-Yehuda started to ask his interview-partners about the Jews, their relation with the Arabs, and, in particular, when he directly brought up the question of Jewish (Zionist) immigration to Palestine.

Al-Khalidi was quite clear and even blunt when giving his assessment. While openly accepting the individual immigration of Jews to Palestine – “for individual Jews, the gates of the land must certainly be open, without interference” (323), he objected to mass-immigration and to the establishment of Jewish colonies. In particular, he pointed out that the financial ability of Jewish immigrants to buy land would lead to disaster for the indigenous Arab population: “The Jews . . . are able to buy much land and evict the Arabs from their land and the inheritance of their ancestors” (324). Gribetz rightly stresses that al-Khalidi saw and understood the danger for Arabs through economic changes, through the buying of land which in turn would serve as the basis for the eviction of Arabs and (in the end, obviously not foreseen by al-Khalidi at the time) for the establishment of a new state without Arabs and not for Arabs.

Interestingly, al-Khalidi is very harsh in his criticism of Ashkenazi Jews. While he stresses the “brotherhood and closeness between Jews and Arabs” as something “most natural and most desired,” he does not see any readiness on the part of Ashkenazi Jews, and one might be more precise here, Zionist immigrants from Europe, “to come closer to us” (323). They are “an entirely different world and they do not come in contact with us” (323). Gribetz points out that, in the opinion of al-Khalidi, “Ashkenazi Jews were keeping the communities apart and squandering the possibilities of Jewish integration and acculturation among the Arabs” (323).

In a nutshell, we do encounter here the problems of interconnectedness, integration, and citadinité, in particular between indigenous Jerusalemites and Zionist immigrants, that is, the newcomers. Gribetz stresses the importance of the simple “possibility of ‘speaking together’,” of learning about the neighbor and revising one’s perspective, and is very positive about the “potential in citadinité” (328), as witnessed in the conversations he analyzes in his article. Still, he is quite aware of the limits of this potential when he points out that “al-Khalidi was concerned with long-term rights and obligations based in history,” while in contrast “Ben-Yehuda focused on contemporary mundane economics” when stressing that Jewish immigration could and would improve living conditions of the peasant population (328).
While Gribetz, following the approach of Vincent Lemire (“living together” as the “hallmark of all urban culture”) (328), does diagnose at least the potential of citadinité in Jerusalem after the Young Turk Revolution, another contributor to this volume, Louis Fishman (Brooklyn College, CUNY) is much more skeptical and focuses on the limitations of citadinité in the same period (510–29). In contrast to Gribetz, he concludes his article on a very sober and pessimistic note: “There was no shared, horizontal sense of equality and brotherhood” (529).

Fishman’s focus is the process of the establishment of separate national communities, obviously, first and foremost, the Jewish community. He argues that this process happened separately and did not lead to the development of “a sense of a mutual homeland” (529). “Despite good relations between Arabs and Jews within certain neighborhoods, and despite participation in joint government ceremonies, which can be interpreted as concrete examples of citadinité, both communities were being coopted into new national groupings” (529).

This focus on national groupings is taken up in the contribution by Jens Hanssen (University of Toronto) in “Municipal Jerusalem in the Age of Urban Democracy: On the Difference between What Happened and What is Said to Have Happened” (262–80).

Hanssen agrees with Gribetz, that “in the Ottoman empire, the capital of Palestine was a site of urban experiments in democracy” (263). In contrast to both Gribetz and even more so Fishman, he includes the role of European colonialism and “the structures of occupation and Zionist supremacy” (263) in his analysis. His question at the beginning of his article is programmatic: Can these experiments in democracy in Ottoman Jerusalem, in the end, lead to a new reality, in which “Palestinian and Israeli cities become models of coexistence” (263). His answer obviously must leave future developments open, and he builds this interpretation on the work of Paul Ricoeur (“the unfulfilled future of the past forms perhaps the richest part of tradition”) and even more so Walter Benjamin (“the forgotten promise of this history today… carries a hidden inventory by which it points to redemption”) (263).

Hanssen argues that the Open Jerusalem project needs to try and end the “long-standing empirical silencing of Palestinians” (265) and instead “write the Palestinian struggle into history” (264). At the basis of this endeavor, or so he continues his argument, the project needs to be aware of the four-stage silencing “in the process of historical production” (264): first, “when actors enter the historical record (silences in the creation of fact)”; second, “when historical facts are assembled (silences produced by the archive)”; third, “when data is retrieved (silences produced in historical narratives)”; and fourth, “the silences produced by particular theoretical choices” (264).

In the second part of his chapter, Hanssen raises the question of urban democracy with a wealth of fascinating and often quite surprising new information, not least based on his work on Beirut, Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital.1 He shows how intellectuals in al-Mashreq started to discuss “the meanings and applications of democracy (al-dimukratīyya), freedom (al-ḥurrīyya), equality (al-musawāt), and voting rights (haqq al-intikhāb).” He focuses in particular on the Beirutite Butrus Bustani who wrote that “‘in this day and age, we can say that democracy is rule
based on elections governed by laws . . . . As for the [recent Ottoman] elections, they are expressions of public opinion’ [al-rayy al-'amm],’ although he noted that Bustani was “still skeptical that ‘democracy had ever existed, or will ever rule except on paper’ some ten years after the first municipal elections.”

It will be the task of future researchers to look at similar discussions and ideas in Ottoman Jerusalem. Without doubt, Ruhi al-Khalidi – about whom we learn a great deal in the chapter written by Gribetz – would be one of the first to study. We can also return to the work done by the late Alexander Scholch on Ruhi’s uncle Yusuf Diya’ al-Din al-Khalidi, based on papers located in al-Khalidi library in Jerusalem.2

I should like to add a note of caution concerning the attempt to focus too much on the view from below. After all, elite families and notables continued to determine politics: for example, “of the sixteen Jerusalem mayors between 1863 and 1910, only four were not from the Khalidi, ‘Alami, and Husayni families” (280). After all, Hanssen himself makes us aware of the fact that we do not witness universal suffrage or mass participation in Ottoman cities, and certainly not in Ottoman Jerusalem, before 1908 (and also after, we should add). Municipal elections “were severely circumscribed by class, gender, and urban residence biases” (269). Still, it is necessary, as postulated by Janssen, for “urban historians today to move beyond the politics of notables” (270). At least in Beirut (obviously different from Jerusalem, or so it would seem) “municipal coalitions coalesced across lines of kinship and sectarianism. Instead, economic interests (merchants versus landowners), educational background (Muslim, missionary, state schools), and professional affiliations played a role” (271).

Another note of caution is in place, when Janssen harbors “disappointment at the lack of radical politics in and around municipal councils, compared to the Mediterranean anarchists whom Ilham Khouri-Makdisi resurrected for us, or compared to the municipal socialism that William Cohen spotted in France” (273). Only additional research, in other cities of the region, will enable us to give further answers.

Returning to look at the complete volume under review, without doubt readers today, but above all future researchers, will find a wealth of information, new materials from newly investigated archives, new and sometimes surprising and at the same time fascinating new analyses – and above all new questions. Suffice it to mention the following articles: Maria Chiari Rioli’s research on “Visiting Cards” in Jerusalem (29–49); “Collective Petitions” as a new source for “Jerusalem’s Networks of Citadinité” by Yasemin Avci, Vincent Lemire, and Ömür Yazıcı Özdemir (161–85); “Epidemiology” and the health sector in Jerusalem by Philippe Bourmaud (440–56); and the “The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem, 1908–1914” by Sotirios Dimitriadis (475–89) with its focus on “the abortive modernization of a late Ottoman City” (475).

What surprises a reviewer with a German background is the fact that Gustav Dalman’s work is neither referred to in the bibliography, nor in any of the contributions in the book. Missing also are in-depth new studies, with a new approach, of the Schneller School, Talitha Kumi School, and Schmidt’s Girls College in Jerusalem and the way “ordinary Jerusalemites” interacted with these institutions and how these institutions impacted the life of ordinary Palestinians for generations to come.
It is to be hoped that young Palestinian scholars will take up their own studies and research based on the invaluable contributions of the book presented here. Much still needs to be done and the volume under review is just a start, albeit a fulminant one.

Students of Jerusalem can also find a tremendous wealth of material for their own studies at the website of the Open Jerusalem Project (www.openjerusalem.org). Hopefully, the website will eventually include links to other websites with archival materials on Jerusalem in particular, and Palestine in general.

Students of Jerusalem should continue to follow the collaborative approach taken by the editors of this volume. I would argue that only in this way can we do justice to the lives – increasingly difficult and hard – of ordinary citizens in this extraordinary city of Jerusalem.

Helga Baumgarten is a political scientist affiliated with Birzeit University, where she taught for many years. She has published (in German, English, French, and Arabic) on the Middle East conflict, on Palestinian nationalism, on political Islam and on the problem of transformations in the Arab region. Her major books are Palaestina. Befreiung in den Staat (1991) [Palestine. Liberation into the State], and Kampf um Palaestina: Was wollen Hamas und Fatah? (2014). Among her many articles are “The Oslo System” (in German in INAMO 79, 2014, available in English on academia.edu).

Endnotes
Facts and Figures
Main Indicators for Hotel Activities in the West Bank by Year (1996-2017)
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

Editor’s Note:
*JQ* thanks PCBS for providing this key document to *JQ* readers.
More data on the tourism sector in Palestine can be found online at www.pcbs.gov.ps.

The following represents a comparative look at the main indicators for hotel activities in the West Bank from 1996 to 2017.

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<th>No. of rooms(^2)</th>
<th>No. of beds(^3)</th>
<th>No. of guests(^4)</th>
<th>No. of guest nights(^5)</th>
<th>Room occupancy %(^6)</th>
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1. **Hotel**: an accommodation establishment providing overnight lodging for visitors in a room or unit. It should hold a number of persons exceeding that of an average single family. The establishment must be under one management, and should provide various facilities and services to visitors.

2. **Available hotel rooms**: referring to the furnished rooms for the use of guests. Such rooms might be single, double, triple, or quadruple. Rooms closed for maintenance or repairs are excluded.

3. **Available beds**: referring to beds which are ready for use during the reference period.

4. **Guests**: referring to visitors staying at the hotels and using their facilities. Records of new guests are based on the number of visits and the number of unique visitors.

5. **Number of guest nights**: number of beds booked for hotel guests. Such beds are considered as occupied whether they were actually used or not. The unit of measure is ‘guest night.’

6. **Percentage of occupancy of (rooms, beds) in hotels (indicator)**: indicator measures the percentage of occupancy of (rooms, beds) in hotels during a specific period of time.
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Social Responsibility