JERUSALEM QUARTERLY

Policing, Imprisonment, and Securitization in Palestine

INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM STUDIES

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Design and Printing: Al Nasher

Jerusalem Quarterly

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Cover photo: British Mandate military and police carry out a search of Palestinians for arms at Damascus Gate, 9 September 1938. Photo by an American Colony (Jerusalem) Photography Department photographer, from the G. Eric and Edith Matson Photograph Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Editorial

De-Fetishizing Law and Order

Roberto Mazza and

Alex Winder

When humans began to gather in villages and then to towns and cities, the necessity to keep order and guarantee the safety of the inhabitants became paramount. The word *police* is obviously linked to the Greek word *polis* (city), suggesting a link between city and order. A city without any form of policing was likely doomed to suffer chaos and possibly destruction; yet policing as we know it today was only codified in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Greeks relied on slaves to provide order, while the Romans trusted the army; the Chinese appointed prefects for centuries. Jerusalem's long history indicates that a variety of police forces were empowered by various rulers, and policies directing the tasks of these forces were designed according to the needs of the day.

Obviously, at any stage in history, a police force was not just tasked with keeping order and possibly preventing crime, but was also used as a tool to surveil and control city dwellers. Since a police force is embedded among the inhabitants of a city, it is not a surprise that these inhabitants often viewed policing with some suspicion. On the one hand, communities may have needed police to keep order or to offer protection; on the other hand, they may have been targeted for any number of reasons, including social status, religion, race or ethnicity, and whether or not they were migrants. The mechanisms regulating the relationship between city dwellers and police have been the object of many studies – perhaps most prominently, Michel Foucault dedicated a number of his works to the idea and practice of police – showing their complexities and the politicization of these relations.

In recent times we have witnessed what some call the fetishization of "law and order," a process that can be described as having two components. The first, common in the United

States, is the idea to substitute the rule of law with a brutal image of order. Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona, is the quintessential example of the transformation of police into an authoritarian agency dedicated to the dehumanization of suspects and offenders. This aspect of the fetishization of law and order is based on the normalization of abuse of power. A second aspect of this fetishization that has emerged in the last two decades is represented by the equation of more police with more safety. In other words, citizens – mainly belonging to the middle and upper classes – have given the police a new meaning and new powers to address all manner of social problems: rather than focusing on education and prevention, this new trend focuses on repression and punishment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of studies and statistics suggest that this approach has its limits when the same approach is applied to those social classes that support it. Essentially, the middle and upper classes approve of applying a violent form of law and order to the lower classes, migrants, and "undesirable" communities, but not to themselves.

Thus, the fetishization of law and order is characterized by changes to both the character of policing, pushing it to become increasingly punitive, brutal, and dehumanizing, and its scope, supporting both the expansion of the police and the expansion of the kinds of issues that the dominant powers in society understand as rightfully falling under its purview. This trend is observed in the United States and some European countries, but it seems also to be common to Israel, where the difference between the police (*mishtara*), including its quasi-military border police branch (*magav*), and the army (*tzahal*) is often blurred, as are their duties. The police in Jerusalem, in concert with the fetishization of law and order, have thus emerged as a force and symbol of occupation. Though the Israeli police do indeed provide certain services to Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, current events tell us that, for the most part, this force is for the benefit of the Jewish population. A similar trend can be observed in the United States, where it is possible to state that the police serve the white population, at the expense of black, immigrant, and other marginalized communities. Meanwhile, the presence of Arab police officers in Israel and black police officers in the United States illuminates the complexity of the police as an institution, in which service provision, repression, and claims to liberal notions of justice and governance are intertwined.

In this special issue of the *Jerusalem Quarterly* dedicated to policing and its impact, Casey LaFrance develops the comparison between policing in the United States and in Israel within the context of global shifts in public administration. LaFrance unpacks blanket calls for police reform and accountability, noting four general kinds of accountability – bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political – which may conflict with each other. Moreover, the application of new techniques of public administration to the police cannot achieve meaningful change without taking into consideration the structural racism that has shaped their emergence in the United States and Israel: "Much may be said about the need for organizational agility, adaptation, and learning in the twenty-first century, but the real challenge presents itself in the need to *unlearn* beliefs and behavioral patterns." And though calls for greater representation of historically marginalized communities can

result in certain progress toward improving police-community relations, the legal and institutional frameworks remain those created by social elites.

> In essence, representative bureaucracy and broader community engagement efforts serve merely as invitations to participate in a game whose rules marginalized or oppressed groups still have very little say in creating or enforcing. Short of large-scale changes, this is likely to remain a concern for those seeking full integration of police and community perspectives.

As LaFrance compares the report prepared by U.S. president Barack Obama's Task Force on Policing in the Twenty-First Century, with its "six pillars" of twenty-first-century policing, with the "nine principles of law enforcement" proposed in 1829 by Robert Peel, widely considered the father of modern policing, it becomes apparent that resolving problems of policing may have less to do with rethinking the fundamental goals of policework than with adhering to them.

Peel was not only influential in the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, but, as chief secretary of Ireland, oversaw the implementation of the Peace Preservation Act of 1814, which introduced the first British-organized police force in Ireland. Scholars of British colonial policing thus often trace its origins back to Ireland, identifying the Royal Irish Constabulary (formed in 1822) as a model for forces throughout the empire, including the Palestine Police established by the British Mandate administration. In his comprehensive and compelling genealogy of scholarship on the Palestine Police, "Bridging Imperial, National, and Local Historiographies," Yoav Alon illuminates how developments in the study of colonial policing and those in the scholarship on Mandate Palestine have converged to shape this small but rapidly growing field. In the context of Mandate Palestine, Alon emphasizes the significant influence of "relational history," which "does not negate the centrality of a national conflict between Jews and Arabs, but . . . does not view these categories or the conflict as static, but as dynamic, reconfigured through the interactions between and within these groups, as well as with other forces, such as the British." Alon sees study of the Palestine Police – a force comprised of British, Arab, and Jewish policemen and involved in the suppression, negotiation, and sometimes even the resolution of quotidian and political conflicts – as particularly well suited to histories employing or influenced by the relational model.

Studies of the Palestine Police in an empire-wide context have also served to put Palestine's history, and its legacy, in conversation with other British colonial territories, particularly in Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean. In this issue of *JQ*, for example, Richard Cahill draws attention to the role of Sir Charles Tegart, an Irishman who rose to the top of the ranks of the British colonial police in Calcutta, India, in the British effort to crush the 1936–39 Arab Revolt in Palestine. Having successfully carried out a plan "to move police stations from inferior rented buildings into permanent, purpose-built police stations" in West Bengal, Tegart applied a similar logic to establish heavily fortified police stations, which became popularly known as "Tegart forts," in Palestine.

These forts remained significant sites of security infrastructure in the wake of the British Mandate (a legacy discussed by Yasid El Rifai, Dima Yaser, and Adele Jarrar in *JQ* 69), and this – as well as the fact that major outlay of funding for their construction took place *after* the revolt's suppression, Britain's entrance into World War II, and the introduction of partition as the prevailing "solution" to the "Palestine problem" – leads Cahill to question the long-term strategic logic of their geographic placement. Cahill's study is thus in keeping with another recent development described by Alon, in which scholars, "undoubtedly spurred by the type of transnational approach that is currently in vogue," have focused on colonial policing in efforts "to reexamine or reevaluate global phenomena, such as decolonization and the Cold War, while other efforts in this vein have placed the legal and tactical aspects of the U.S.-led 'global war on terror' in a longer genealogy of imperial counterinsurgency."

More recent global circuits of security expertise and technological transfer are the subject of Shimrit Lee's "Simulating the Contact Zone: Corporate Mediations of (Less-Lethal) Violence in Israel, Palestine, and Beyond." Lee examines the marketing of Israeli-branded "non-lethal" or "less-lethal" weapons – including tear gas, stun grenades, electronic stun technologies, kinetic impact weapons, and the malodorous liquid called Skunk, among others – at international weapons expositions, online, and elsewhere, where they "gain particular meaning and mobility through their incorporation into visual and performative marketing narratives." These narratives cast these weapons as hi-tech, adaptable, even environmentally friendly. Corporations emphasize their weapons' global appeal and applicability by "placing them within a hyperreality which is depoliticized and deliberately ambiguous." This hyperreality conjures abstracted threats, most commonly presented as "a masked male who embodies the role of rioter, terrorist, and common criminal all at once" – an "individualized threat that blurs internal dissent with criminality."

The abstracted terrorist/criminal produced by corporations as part of a "fear prototype" to sell "security," is, needless to say, a distortion of the individuals and communities who are the actual targets of these weapons, and Lee suggests a practice of "critical seeing" to unravel a "reductive culture of fear that tells us little about agency or the courage and creativity at the heart of resistance." One element of this agency, courage, and creativity is addressed by Malaka Mohammed Shwaikh in her article on Palestinian hunger strikers, "Dynamics of Prison Resistance." Shwaikh shows how Palestinian prisoners – the ultimate subjects of policing, both in the sense of their imprisonment being the final outcome of policing and in the sense of prison being a site within which all actions are regulated, constrained, and policed – manage to find ways of making demands and asserting their humanity. Shwaikh draws on Banu Bargu's concept of "necroresistance," through which those who resist are capable of "seiz[ing] the power of life and death from the state, thus establishing an active counter to sovereign power." By refusing sustenance, hunger strikers make themselves physically weak, "thereby creating particular conditions of possibility to mobilize strength elsewhere" and thus participate in "a mode of actively doing politics that expands repertoires of protest and asserts agency and ownership of one's body." Israeli prison authorities devise various methods to undermine hunger strikes, including

force-feeding – which is then spun by these authorities as a "humanitarian" measure – but the persistence of Palestinian hunger strikers in recent years indicate that people willing to put their lives on the line cannot be rendered completely powerless.

The centrality of the body to questions of policing and resistance is affirmed also by Sarah Ihmoud in "Policing the Intimate." Ihmoud uses the concept of "social policing" to explore the way individuals and organizations outside of the state – though often working in concert with or with the tacit approval of state bodies – enforce norms. In this case, Ihmoud examines the anti-miscegenation movement in Israel, which seeks to prevent and punish romantic relationships between Arabs and Jews, in particular those between Arab men and Jewish women. This movement takes various forms, from vigilante violence against Palestinian men to "educational" presentations in public schools. Ihmoud connects this "social policing" of gender and racial boundaries to the broader project of Jewish Israeli nationalism, "which construct[s] Jewish men (and women) as heteropatriarchal and hypermasculine protectors of the Jewish body and, hence, the Jewish nation." The campaign against Jewish-Arab relationships is thus not only about maintaining national boundaries, but about maintaining national hierarchies: "By inflicting pain on the Palestinian body, the Jewish subject seeks to feminize Palestinian masculinity, and in doing so perform a gendered sense of racial superiority."

Yad L'Achim and Lehava, two of the groups that Ihmoud describes in her article, are part of a rising populist Right in Israel, a trend found not only in civil society, but also in elected office. Shir Hever, in "Securing the Occupation," addresses the impact of this political shift on Israeli security policy, where a traditional security elite (predominantly secular and Ashkenazi) advocates "a 'rational' approach to the occupation, operating behind the scenes by relying on intelligence gathering, recruiting collaborators, and sowing divisions among Palestinian factions," and a populist Right ("anchored in Mizrahi politics and religious discourse") presses for "a direct show of force" against Palestinians. Hever points to a number of instances – including the summer 2017 efforts to install metal detectors at the entrances to al-Haram al-Sharif and subsequent Palestinian protests, Israeli soldier Elor Azaria's execution of 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sharif in Hebron and the popular support he received in Israel, and Israel's decision to purchase submarines from Germany – that have illuminated the growing tensions between these two camps.

This discord is particularly apparent in Jerusalem, to which the populist Right attaches enormous symbolic significance and where it is thus more aggressive in its defiance of the traditional security elite. The result, Hever argues, is that especially since 2014, "cracks in the Israeli security apparatus . . . have expanded and created a space for Palestinian residents of the city to resist and, occasionally, to achieve symbolic victories." Foremost among these was the success of the 2017 protests in having metal detectors removed from al-Haram al-Sharif. Hever's long-term prognosis, however, is not triumphalist:

> The growing tension between the different elite groups in Israel shows that the decline of the Israeli security elite may not reduce settler-colonial violence toward the native Palestinians, but likely heralds the privatization

and decentralization of this violence, now increasingly expressed in the form of individualistic religious and political violence, and decreasingly expressed as organized violence executed according to orders through the chain of command.

The privatization and decentralization that Hever predicts – as well as the way rivalries within Israeli institutions shape the daily struggles of Palestinians – echo dynamics described by Yael Berda in her recent book on Israel's permit regime, *Living Emergency*, reviewed in this issue of *JQ* by Alex Winder. Berda's examination of the "effective inefficiency" of this system highlights its opacity and unpredictability, characterized by the personalization of decision-making and the rise of an informal economy of permits driven by Israeli middlemen. Coming full circle, *Living Emergency* makes for an interesting read in combination with LaFrance's article. Israel's permit regime may defy all standards of efficient and accountable public administration, yet, as Berda writes, its "bureaucratic cruelty . . . , the disorganized mayhem that caused such suffering and despair, was incredibly efficient for achieving institutional and legal segregation between Jews and Palestinians, creating disorientation and atomization that turned life in the West Bank into a daily struggle within a perpetual emergency." Both Berda in her book and Winder in his review close with calls for the kinds of "large-scale changes" that LaFrance, too, sees as necessary to produce real change. "Where legal solutions are insufficient," Winder writes, "political solutions point the way forward. This entails recognizing that labor rights, freedom of movement, and transparent governance are intertwined, and that all must be defended rigorously from the justification of 'security' that seeks to undermine them."

This of course raises questions about how to translate scholarship into political change. In July of this year, while receiving an award from the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi delivered a poignant speech on the state of Middle East studies in the twenty-first century. He suggested a need for more master's and doctoral students to enter the policy, non-governmental organization, and media spheres. What if (an inevitable and possibly a rhetorical question) more academically trained experts were actively engaged in shaping police policy and practice in Israel, Palestine, and around the world? Perhaps it is naïve to think that things would be better and that the police could be a body made of the people and for the people, yet it could be a step forward and an improvement.

Finally, this issue of *JQ* is rounded out by the memoirs of two prominent Palestinian figures, Tarif Khalidi and Taufiq Canaan, continued from previous issues. In these, Khalidi, the prominent historian long based at the American University of Beirut, and Canaan, the physician and influential ethnographer of Palestinian society, detail the influences on their intellectual and professional lives and stand as models for the kind of scholarship

that the *Jerusalem Quarterly* aspires to support – scholarship that is alive and vibrant, unafraid to explore new ideas, and rooted in a sensitivity to experiences of Palestinians from all walks of life.

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Corrigenda (corrected online):

In *Jerusalem Quarterly* 74, endnote 5 (page 55) of Rona Sela's article "Ali Za'rur and Early Palestinian Photojournalism: The Archive of Occupation and the Return of Palestinian Material to Its Owners" misstated the time period of Za'rur's tourism photography. It was from 1956 to 1972, and not 1956 to 2000.

The editorial in *Jerusalem Quarterly* 73 misstated the publication source of "The Fall of Lydda, 1948: Impressions and Reminisces" by Reja-e Busailah (page 6). It was published originally in English in *Arab Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (1981), and not in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*.

Announcing the 2019 Round

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Ibrahim Dakkak Award for Outstanding Essay on Jerusalem will be awarded to an outstanding essay that addresses either contemporary or historical issues relating to Jerusalem. The winning submission will receive a prize of U.S. $1,000 and will be published in the *Jerusalem Quarterly*.

Essays submitted for consideration should be 4,000 to 5,000 words in length (including footnotes), should be based on original research, and must not have been previously published elsewhere. Preference will be given to young/junior/aspiring/emerging/early career researchers and students.

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Any images should be submitted as separate files with resolution of at least 600 dpi if possible. Submitted images must have copyright clearance from owners.

The deadline for submissions is extended to 30 November 2018. A committee selected by Jerusalem Quarterly will determine the winning essay.

Reading Obama's Policing Task Force Report in Jerusalem

History, Accountability, and the New Geo-Governance in U.S. and Israeli Policing

Casey LaFrance

The origin of policing as a legitimate government function can be traced to a sort of global acquiescence to the fact that order, premised on rule of law, was a requirement for the establishment of society. In exchange for the validation and enforcement of private property rights (broadly construed as "order"), residents in nascent civilizations were willing to give up some of their individual liberty, namely their ability to make autonomous decisions without fear of consequence. This commonly accepted narrative, however, overlooks a central premise inherent in the social contract: those who own the most property receive the largest benefit. Laws have generally been crafted and enforced to serve the interest of elites. This problem continues to plague policing well into the twenty-first century.

Across the globe, public administration is in the midst of a significant shift. Traditional bureaucratic hierarchy and centralization have given way to lateral networks that seek to optimize service provision and provide the flexibility to respond to contextual and regional demands.[1] Government agencies, including police agencies, are forced to share information and formulate strategy with other agencies from multiple levels of government in multiple jurisdictions. Neat, orderly boundaries have become fuzzy and responsibility for successful policy implementation is contingent on interdependent, coordinated action from fluid participants in a network of governance. Simultaneously, governments face unprecedented problems (from combatting terrorism and limiting the international drug market to regulating internet commerce) for which typical approaches are wholly inadequate, wasteful, or hopeless. Routine approaches premised on incremental decision-making oriented to the status quo are becoming

less viable. Given its prominence in the public eye, policing is an area of public administration in which these attempts to adapt are particularly observable. In this essay, I offer an assessment of the readiness of U.S. and Israeli police agencies to operate in this new environment. I then leverage literature from criminal justice, political science, public administration, organization theory, and area studies to share some general considerations that policing agencies might make in planning to adapt to their new reality.

Economics and Race in U.S. Policing

Much has been written to suggest that the U.S. criminal justice system is an extension of the eighteenth-century sociopolitical power dynamics that gave rise to the U.S. Constitution as supreme law of the land. Some scholars, such as Charles Beard, argue that the chief purpose of the Constitution was, and continues to be, the protection of the economic interests of elites.[2] This view is substantiated when one considers that the multiple flaws of the Articles of Confederation were largely allowed to continue unabated until an uprising by debtor farmers threatened to destroy debt records to free themselves from the control of elites.[3] While of the first ten amendments to the Constitution at least five directly relate to the rights of accused criminals (the right to avoid testifying against oneself, the right to a speedy and public trial by a jury of one's peers, the right not to be cruelly or unusually punished, and so on), exercising these rights has often been contingent on access to financial resources and formal education. Of course, elite status in the United States is not only linked to wealth and education, but deeply intertwined with race. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution, most African Americans were enslaved and were not eligible for citizenship.[4] Further, policing in the early United States grew out of a tradition of "protecting the property" of slave owners, that is, of coercing and disciplining the enslaved.[5]

After the U.S. Civil War, three additional constitutional amendments were added to abolish slavery and grant citizenship and voting rights to formerly enslaved African Americans and their descendants. The realization of full citizenship and voting rights, especially in the South of the United States, was blocked for a century, from 1865 to 1965, by a series of discriminatory laws and regulations collectively known as Jim Crow laws.[6] These included selective poll taxes, "grandfather clauses" that granted the vote only to citizens whose grandfathers were free, and all but impossible "literacy" tests that forced respondents to memorize entire portions of several governing documents. Formal and informal codes enforced public segregation, denied African Americans access to various rights and services, and restricted their travel, among other injustices.[7] A full century after the end of the Civil War, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 became law, but discriminatory practices continue, especially in the South, where attempts to limit access to voting persist.[8]

Even after the passage of civil rights legislation, critical theorists such as Michelle Alexander point to a disconcerting series of practices that they collectively label the

"New Jim Crow."[9] The New Jim Crow thesis argues that felon disenfranchisement, a common U.S. practice, disproportionately affects African American males, the largest demographic group in the nation's prisons despite the fact that they account for less than 7 percent of the nation's population.[10] Proponents of this thesis contend that the Reagan-era "War on Drugs," along with mandatory minimum sentencing for convicted offenders, have silenced the political voice of African American males. Concerns go beyond voting rights, however, and include other dimensions of citizenship. While the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a fair trial by a jury of one's peers, convicted felons are unable to sit on juries. Moreover, because jurors are often called from voter registration lists and driver's license records, juries reflect these groups' demographic skewing toward the affluent and the white.[11] Thus, African American criminal defendants are less likely to enjoy this right than, say, white male defendants.[12]

These practices also serve to undermine the potential for a representative bureaucracy.[13] Due to hiring restrictions, these factors have limited the ability of police departments and other government institutions to be descriptively representative.[14] This hampers the ability of police and the communities in which they serve to engage in constructive interactions based on shared experiences, understandings, and language,[15] and may help account for some of the miscommunication central to police relations with African American residents and communities.[16]

Shared Problems of U.S. and Israeli Policing

Policing in Israel also occurs against a bloody backdrop of apartheid, immediately salient for Palestinian residents.[17] Colonial occupation of Palestine has been the norm for the past century, but the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 introduced a new legal order that privileged citizenship rights for Jews, including those displaced from elsewhere who made their way to the new nation, despite territorial and political claims of native Palestinian residents.[18] Palestinians live, in many respects, as second-class citizens if they are considered citizens at all.[19] Israeli police units are rarely representative in their demographic make-up, and Palestinian protests are common.[20] Abuses by Israeli police against Palestinians are reported daily and include allegations of teargassing infants, using unjustified force on mentally ill women, and provoking violent reactions for merely displaying a Palestinian flag in Jerusalem.[21]

As in the United States, more than one demographic group is likely to experience oppression at the hands of the police.[22] In the United States, Hispanic migrants and citizens have been targeted by law enforcement for unjust policing tactics, while Ethiopian Israelis and others have made claims of abuse against Israeli police.[23] According to journalist Yonah Jeremy Bob, "many U.S. and Israeli cases of over-policing, cover-ups, and weak prosecution of police involve elements of police racism."[24]

Further, both the United States and Israel share a dubious record when it comes to the detention of, and use of force against, minors.[25] In Israel, the focal point of this phenomenon

is the detention of Palestinian children. According to Defense for Children International, Israeli forces detain approximately 500 to 700 Palestinian youths aged 12 to 17 years old annually. Between 2008 and 2017, the average number of children detained per month ranged from 192 to 375, most of them detained for throwing stones. More disconcertingly, 1,800 children have been subjected to deadly force in occupied Palestine since 2000.[26] In the United States, youth detention has drawn scrutiny from scholars, politicians, and activists. Most recently, the detention of undocumented immigrant children by U.S. federal agencies, in cooperation with local law enforcement agents, garnered widespread attention.[27] Ongoing research suggests that children in these detention facilities do not have access to adequate healthcare or post-detention casework services.[28] Human Rights Watch asserts that conditions in the detention facilities, such as exposure to dangerous levels of cold, rob these detainees of dignity.[29] The use of detention facilities for children with U.S. citizenship, especially the emergence of private, for-profit corporations as agents of incarceration, have also raised concerns.[30] In 2015, a Florida grand jury ruled that the Highlands Youth Academy, run by security firm G4S, exposed youths to appallingly unsafe and unsanitary conditions to bolster their four-million-dollar profit margin.[31] Other agents of law enforcement and criminal justice, particularly judges, have been mired in scandal for sentencing youths to incarceration in for-profit detention centers.[32] Police use of force against children is also a concern in the United States. The shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice by Cleveland, Ohio, police officers in 2014, for example, raised a number of questions about police use of force against minors.[33]

Racial and socioeconomic dimensions are also important in order to understand police – and, more broadly, criminal justice and carceral – engagements with children in both the United States and Israel.[34] The childhood experience of undignified detention and excessive force may likely implant in children a pessimistic view of police as agents of the public trust, an impression that could continue as they age into adulthood and begin to consider their role as citizens in holding government actors accountable. This erosion of trust only exacerbates tensions between police and the communities they serve, especially communities that have historical experience of oppression and marginalization.

Nuances in Accountability

Frustration with individual police officers as well as the abstract aggregate "police" are often couched in terms of an equally abstract term: accountability. This term is often used, colloquially and in scholarly research, as a dichotomous phenomenon whose presence is panacea and absence is poison. In practice, accountability is an incredibly fluid concept whose form changes with the respective lenses of observers.[35] Primarily, the perception of accountability is about the relationship of any decision or behavior to the expectations of an observer, which, given that expectations vary from person to person, and especially considering covariation in demands and roles, cannot be taken as objective or universal.[36] Romzek and Dubnick's matrix of accountability streams proposes

four general kinds of accountability: (1) accountability to organizational rules and orders from supervisors (bureaucratic accountability); (2) accountability to existing case law and court decisions (legal accountability); (3) accountability to expertise-based training and expectations of one's profession (professional accountability); and (4) accountability to the demands of political oversight and residents in a service provision jurisdiction (political accountability).[37]

These considerations (bureaucratic, legal, professional, and political) may likely conflict with each another; more significantly, conflicts often occur *within* each stream. Political accountability is often the most complex. In any setting, the goals and values of elected officials are rarely congruent with the goals and values of appointed or merit-based bureaucrats. Time horizons, beliefs about resources adequate for a given task, and (especially) specific outcomes desired tend to vary between each set of actors.[38] Moreover, promises made during an electoral campaign and even after reaching office can often be so grandiose and imprecise that even the most willing bureaucrat would have difficulty fulfilling them.[39] Policing is no stranger to this dilemma, as the elimination of crime – a common political campaign promise, whether explicit or implicit – will never be achieved. Professional training, rules, and laws also temper the ambition of politically-minded police officers due to the fact that the profession itself is the police officer's livelihood. Many feel that the twentieth century's emphasis on bureaucratic and professional accountability came at the expense of political accountability and the responsiveness of police and other public officers to their service community's expectations and demands.[40]

The historical-institutional and political contexts of particular enforcement areas can often be immediately salient to a police officer, shaping the particular forms of accountability to which he or she feels beholden.[41] In the United States and Israel, these contexts can help understand current concerns with policing. A recent example of the powder-keg nature of political accountability is the accusation that Major General Yoram Halevy, police commander of the Jerusalem District, held private conversations with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu without the knowledge of his superior, Commissioner Roni Alscheich.[42] While Halevy denied that these conversations took place, the accusations alone are believed to have created internal friction between Halevy and Alscheich, diverting attention from the many accountability concerns emerging each day in Jerusalem.

Unlearning as a Learning Strategy

The Jerusalem District Police (JDP) is one of the oldest police departments in Israel. With this longevity comes hallmarks of bureaucratic persistence: iron-clad policies, institutional memory and records to guide decisions, and integration into the service community. Despite the advantages of such long-standing institutional fixtures, there are also some very real consequences. In particular, long-standing agencies have a tendency to look backward in making decisions about current problems.[43] This can, in a more benign

consequence, lead to the commitment of resources to ineffective implementation efforts. In more serious cases, this rearview-mirror tendency can cause an organization to be wholly unprepared for unforeseen or non-routine problems, resulting in the application of routine solutions that are not only wasteful but also have the potential to make problems worse.[44]

This point is especially relevant when an agency has been inculcated with negative affect toward a particular demographic group in its jurisdiction. Philip Zimbardo's famous Stanford Prison Experiment was shocking because of the relatively short amount of time in which those in authoritative positions (guards) began to engage in the systematic dehumanization of those in subordinate positions (prisoners).[45] Palestinians have lived in prisonlike apartheid conditions, subject to consistent dehumanization for seven decades; one can only imagine how tightly this negative affect is knotted in the JDP's informal organization. This point is important in considering that police-community interactions that result in negative outcomes or the unnecessary use of deadly force are often blamed on "bad apples" who have somehow slid undetected through an agency's evaluative system. Thus, the problem is cast as the result of one rogue, unprincipled individual whose termination will rid an otherwise effective and efficient organization of excessive force or bias. Zimbardo, citing his famous Stanford Prison Experiment and the more recent cases of prisoner abuse by United States soldiers at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq, suggests that the problem is much deeper. Zimbardo suggests that the evils we see are not the result of bad apples (individuals) or even bad barrels (organizations), but result from the fact that the overall system in which enforcement agents operate is tainted. These systemic elements have the potential to turn moral everyday people into agents of evil, a process that Zimbardo refers to as "the Lucifer Effect."[46]

Much may be said about the need for organizational agility, adaptation, and learning in the twenty-first century, but the real challenge presents itself in the need to *unlearn* beliefs and behavioral patterns. This need has catalyzed discussion in the United States regarding the disproportionate incarceration of African American males and discriminatory treatment of Hispanic citizens and residents.[47] Another global concern, of particular relevance in the United States and Israel, is the trend toward militarization of local police agencies and their officers. Scholars such as Seth Stoughton argue that the ubiquitous use of military-style uniforms, weapons, and tactics by local police has fundamentally altered these units' organizational cultures and values, causing them to see themselves as warriors in a battle against the residents in the areas in which they work.[48] As a testament to concerns about this trend, the Durham, North Carolina, city government recently banned any joint training efforts with Israeli police agencies due to the militarism found in Israeli police agency training materials.[49]

Increasing militarism stands in stark contrast to the views of Robert Peel, considered by many to be the father of modern professional policing. Peel reminded police officers and their supervisors of nine key principles to guide decisions and behaviors.[50] Peel describes the very existence and basic function of local police as "an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force." He goes on to propose that the primary base of legitimacy for police agencies is rooted in "*public approval* of police existence,

actions, behavior, and the ability of the police to secure and maintain *public respect*." This, he argues, can lead to greater cooperation from the public and negate the need to use "physical force and compulsion in achieving police objectives." Peel urges police officials to engage in fair and equitable service provision without favoritism and, with almost incredible prescience, suggests that individual police officers should prioritize "ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of society without regard to their race or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humor." Perhaps most powerfully, Peel encourages police officers to

> at all times . . . maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that *the police are the public* and that *the public are the police*; the police are the only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the intent of the community welfare.[51]

While revisiting Peel's principles from 1829 may seem counterintuitive, they might serve as a catalyst for reinventing twenty-first-century police practices and help agencies become active learning organisms whose adaptation to unforeseen global and local challenges will lead to greater success. This sentiment is at the heart of the report issued by the President's Task Force on Policing in the Twenty-First Century, commissioned by former U.S. president Barack Obama. The task force, comprised of police executives, legal scholars, and social activists, offered recommendations in the form of six imperatives, described as "pillars" in the report.[52] First among these pillars is the need to develop trust and legitimacy among service recipients in a police force area. Here, legitimacy is derived from community perceptions of fair and just service provision and adoption of a "guardian – rather than a warrior – mindset."[53] The task force encourages police departments to focus on "procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with rank and file officers and the citizens they serve."[54]

The purpose of seeking legitimacy from those an agency serves is ultimately the establishment of trust. This trust will enhance the social capital of police, which can, in turn, lead to open discussions with members of the public and information sharing.[55] Thus, the second pillar of twenty-first-century policing deals with policy and oversight. Specifically, the task force encourages police agencies to design policies "reflective of community values and not lead to practices that result in disparate impacts on various segments of the community."[56] These policies, the task force proposes, will come to light through collaborative discussions and greater community involvement. This pillar, too, suggests that the "us versus them" mentality that accompanies a militaristic mindset be replaced by an organizational ethos premised on greater transparency and cooperation between law enforcement agencies and their respective service communities. The third pillar discusses the leveraging of technology and social media to aid in community engagement or outreach efforts.

Pillar four expresses a desire for law enforcement agencies to allow community members to "co-produce" public safety by incorporating them into planning as well as implementation efforts. Here, values and priorities may be expressed and ultimately become goals and objectives for strategic planning initiatives. The task force goes on to suggest that:

> Communities should support a culture and practice of policing that reflects the values of protection and promotion of the dignity of all – especially the most vulnerable, such as children and youth most at risk for crime or violence. Law enforcement agencies should avoid using law enforcement tactics that unnecessarily stigmatize youth.[57]

The Israeli police could take this pillar to heart in their efforts to "co-produce" public safety and engage in law enforcement efforts that do not stigmatize vulnerable groups, and youth in particular.

The fifth task force pillar reinforces the need for training, especially training that can be offered by experts in one's service jurisdiction who are capable of preparing officers to deal with specific contextual nuances and features of the police force area.[58] Finally, the sixth pillar encourages frequent evaluation of officer wellness and safety so that officers get the support they need and the "bad apple" problem may be eliminated.

Promise and Pitfalls with Representative Bureaucracy

While developed largely in isolation from broader public administration literature, the task force report shares ideas and normative demands that many public administration scholars have advocated for all service provision areas.[59] Namely, the report emphasizes the benefits of viewing service recipients as citizens, rather than as cases or customers. Here, in addition to coproduction of policing services, considering the views of citizens might remind all parties involved who, in fact, pays for policing and to whom police officials are ultimately accountable.[60] This change in perception may also serve to create more inclusive policing approaches that do not simply favor the interests of social elites.

Recent research on elected law enforcement officers in the United States and the United Kingdom suggests that these officials are more likely than their appointed counterparts to describe those they serve as citizens rather than customers and to make appeals based on voter preferences.[61] In essence, elections serve to shift the dominant form of accountability toward political accountability rather than bureaucratic or professional accountability. Emphasis on bureaucratic and professional accountability served broadly to displace the overarching goals and missions of many public agencies, encouraging adherence to professional expectations or organizational rules and orders for their own sake.[62] This can lead to an even greater chasm between law enforcement practices and their perceived political legitimacy, especially among oppressed or historically underrepresented groups.[63]

The task force's logic of community engagement in decision-making seeks to reverse this trend.

Moreover, the report's recommendations can be more fully realized when paired with imperatives to forge a more demographically representative bureaucracy and to give social values a role equal to traditional bureaucratic values such as efficiency or economy in guiding public administrators' decisions.[64] In the wake of many questionable uses of force, particularly deadly force, law enforcement agencies such as the Ferguson, Missouri, Police Department have been admonished for the lack of minority representation in their ranks. Many, Ferguson included, have responded with programs in an attempt to attract, recruit, and retain officers from diverse backgrounds.[65] While these efforts are in their nascent stages, evidence suggests that the ability of a minority officer to understand the "subject positions," or life experiences and challenges, of a minority service recipient can lead more rapidly to the development of consensus between police and residents.[66] More promising, such mutual understanding and agreement on desirable outcomes has the potential to minimize the use of force, especially deadly force, in police-citizen interactions.

While a more representative bureaucracy may help deescalate police-community tensions, we must not expect this alone to suffice. Even a bureaucratic agency whose employees mirror the service population in key demographic characteristics was likely created by legislation written and codified by social elites. In essence, representative bureaucracy and broader community engagement efforts serve merely as invitations to participate in a game whose rules marginalized or oppressed groups still have very little say in creating or enforcing. Short of large-scale changes, this is likely to remain a concern for those seeking full integration of police and community perspectives.

The ubiquity of confirmation bias, a process by which the lens of current experience is filtered to produce an expected image of a situation regardless of the facts, among bureaucratic actors remains another barrier to unlearning and adaptation.[67] Confirmation of prior beliefs and attitudes goes hand in hand with the incremental, rearward-looking decision-making tendencies common to policy making and implementation. In short, bureaucracies are designed to engage in routine decision making, where present problems are treated with past medicine. Facilitating and ensuring a successful transition to a forward-looking process of developing non-routine solutions to non-routine problems is the central puzzle of public administration scholarship and practice in the twenty-first century.

Finally, in discussing barriers to police reform and reorganization efforts, a note regarding the controversial practice of police discretion is in order.[68] Those who practice discretionary decision making often explain that they are compelled to do so because even the most precise rules and orders are not sufficient in guiding decisions in certain ambiguous situations.[69] Lawmakers and top managers in police organizations may not have the time or ability to focus on specific situational nuances inherent in the day-to-day work of frontline officers.[70] Still, unchecked discretion serves to nullify rules and provide street-level bureaucrats such as police officers with so much latitude in interpreting laws that they come to occupy the role of legislators in their own right.[71] These competing problem

areas are like the ghosts of twentieth-century public administration that haunt scholars, elected officials, and managers into the twenty-first century.

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Simulating the Contact Zone

Corporate Mediations of (Less-Lethal) Violence in Israel, Palestine, and Beyond

Shimrit Lee

In 2014, as photos emerged of armed police with combat uniforms, assault rifles, and armored vehicles on the streets of Ferguson, Missouri – where demonstrations had ignited over the deadly shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, at the hands of Darren Wilson, a white police officer – many Palestinian Twitter users expressed solidarity with the demonstrators and offered advice on how to deal with tear gas. Palestinian photographer Hamde Abu Rahme shared a photo of himself on Facebook holding a sign that read, "The Palestinian people know what it means to be shot while unarmed because of your ethnicity. #Ferguson, #Justice." Activist Mariam Barghouti wrote on Twitter: "Solidarity with #Ferguson. Remember to not touch your face when tear-gassed or put water on it."[1] Many pointed out that the U.S. company that supplies the Israeli army with tear gas – Combined Systems, Inc. (CSI)[2] – is the same company that supplies the police in Ferguson.

By now, these stories are familiar. Over the past few years, journalists and scholars have cited the ways in which the occupied West Bank serves as a "laboratory" for certain types of technologies, whereby CSI tear gas, for example, is first "tested" on Palestinians so that American companies can market its "proven effectiveness."[3] Israeli authorities and security forces have consistently used non-lethal weapons as a feature of population and territorial control on both sides of the Green Line,[4] most visibly to suppress resistance in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Much of the popular weekly demonstrations in the West Bank are structured locally around villages, cities, and refugee camps, a result of the fragmentation of Palestinians into camps and enclaves.[5] For example, since 2005, there

have been weekly unarmed demonstrations organized by a local popular committee in the village of Bil'in against the Israeli separation wall and the confiscation of lands. Demonstrations also take place regularly in the villages of Ni'lin, Budrus, al-Nabi Salih, al-Walaja, Burin, and other areas threatened by demolitions or land confiscation. These demonstrations, effectively banned under Israeli military order, generally follow a particular performative order, in which protesters march from the village to the site of the wall, where Israeli forces intervene with a barrage of rubber bullets, tear gas, and Skunk – a foul-smelling liquid fired from truck-mounted water cannons.

As Neve Gordon argues, the ability to "test" these products not only allows Israeli and other companies to improve their goods through trial and error, but also enables the companies to "establish or demonstrate some 'truth' about their products and services, which both 'certifies' them and provides them with credit."[6] These critiques also draw attention to Israeli involvement in the training of U.S. police personnel, such as those organized by the Anti-Defamation League, where police get "strategies and best practices in fighting terror" from "Israeli experts."[7] This results in a particular "Israelization" of the American police force, marked by the increased use of deadly force, military weapons, and munitions, as well as military armored vehicles and military tactics and techniques.[8]

These "laboratory" critiques are essential to an understanding of the rise of Israel's security industry, but they often take for granted the privilege given to a uniquely Israeli position of authority, which is written about as a natural outgrowth of the country's militarism or experience with warfare and occupation. Following Rhys Machold's call to pay attention to the "kinds of ongoing *work*" that are involved in staging Israel as a global exemplary on such matters,[9] this article investigates the labor of marketing Israeli-branded "non-lethal" or "less-lethal" weapons to global audiences. Often referred to as "crowd control technology" or "anti-riot equipment," the family of non-lethal weapons includes tear gas, electrical stun technologies, kinetic impact weapons such as bean-bag rounds, and rubber bullets. Newer and less well-known non-lethal weapons include Skunk; the "Scream," an acoustic system that "creates sound levels that are unbearable to humans at distances up to 100 meters";[10] and the stun grenade, labeled as the "Tactical Mini Bang" on the CSI website, which "emits a wave of heat, light and sound intense enough to cause temporary blindness and deafness within a five-foot radius."[11] Although these technologies are labeled as "non-lethal" or "less-lethal," they have proven to be capable of inflicting serious injury and death.[12]

I argue that these weapons gain particular meaning and mobility through their incorporation into visual and performative marketing narratives. Following the turn to visuality in the field of critical security studies,[13] I look at representational strategies used to market Israeli-branded crowd control technologies to global audiences. To do so I investigate plot lines and symbols that continuously appear in web-based promotional material from Israeli companies that specialize in non-lethal products, as well as from U.S.-based companies such as CSI that provide these weapons to the Israeli government. I also draw upon my observations from security expositions

attended over the past three years, paying particular attention to staged simulations in which companies demonstrate product reliability and superiority by embedding their non-lethal technologies into a range of security scenarios.

Instead of emphasizing a distinct brand of Israeli exceptionalism, I find that Israeli companies prefer to market non-lethal weapons by placing them within a hyperreality which is depoliticized and deliberately ambiguous. By doing so, they transform techniques of statecraft into global commodities which can then circulate easily within a variety of global contexts. Crowd control marketing performances work by classifying and redefining who or what embodies a threat, who can claim vulnerability, and above all, what constitutes a solution.

Constructing the Fear Prototype

Marketing videos for non-lethal weapons constitute a distinct genre of visual securitization. They generally begin with vignettes of aggressive mobs that seem not intended to generate actual anxiety, but rather to form a generic "fear prototype" devoid of all political meaning, that can be packaged and commodified within the industry. This genre is reflected in Combined System's marketing video for VENOM, a "lightweight, high capacity, non-lethal grenade launcher," used to disperse crowds with "non-lethal flash and sound, smoke obscuration, irritant, and blunt trauma effects."[14] Scenes of unrest, uncertainty and destruction are carefully curated, to be closely followed by a technological solution. The clip begins with a montage of footage of hooded protesters dressed in black throwing tires into fire, a bus engulfed in flames, and a bird's-eye view of a protest in what looks like Ukraine on a winter's day.[15] A deep voice-over narrates the scene as if it were a trailer of an epic movie: "Civil unrest, disorder, military confrontation, asymmetric warfare environment. Today's forces need solutions they can depend on to disperse crowds, deny areas, determine violent intent, restore order and increase force response." The video then switches to a close-up of the VENOM launcher, the camera circling it from all angles atop a tank.

Marketers of non-lethal weapons are what Frank Furedi calls "fear entrepreneurs" who "exploit fear in order to gain some direct benefit."[16] Under this assumption, rather than being something natural or purely psychological, fear is a social construct. The dual threat–solution combination in this marketing video, and many others like it, acts as a visual securitizing device whereby security is constituted through an "if–then" sequence. Following J. L. Austin's speech act theory, by uttering the word "security" in reference to a particular issue, political elites transform it into an existential threat which requires "emergency measures and justifying actors outside the normal bounds of political procedure."[17] An analysis of marketing materials produced by the security industry, such as the CSI riot control video, can demonstrate how a speech act can be used by the private, profit-making sector to make claims about security, and offer solutions to insecurity. Further, this analysis goes beyond the speech act as a purely

linguistic move to consider the ways in which risk is produced through images, video, and simulation.

Accompanying texts often reiterate depictions of violent and irrational crowds. For example, the Israeli company ISPRA, a leading manufacturer of "non-lethal devices for riot control," describe how their non-lethal products are meant to cause "confusion" and "disorientation" and "suppress [a crowd's] high motivation and extreme aggression capabilities."[18] On the product pages, they repeatedly identify their targets as "a group of aggressors."[19] A securitizing "if–then" sequence similarly plays out in marketing material produced by Israel's TAR Ideal Concepts, an Israeli defense contracting company whose "One Stop Shop" offers equipment and training in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), law enforcement, high tech surveillance, and intelligence. TAR's Law Enforcement section warns, "Riots can ignite without warning. TAR helps you to prepare yourself, build your forces, and disperse riots quickly and effectively using non-lethal ammunition to minimize loss of life."[20]

In many cases, marketing images blur the line between real and performative: footage of actual protests from Palestine, France, Germany, and Ukraine is interspersed with simulated demonstrations at arms expositions by paid actors. This blurring between reality and simulated contact zones forms what Jean Baudrillard terms "hyperreality," a

Figures 1–4. Screenshots from CSI VENOM marketing video, posted 29 September 2014. Source: CTS Less Lethal YouTube Channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

representation of a sign without an original referent.[21] For example, a video produced by TAR to spotlight Skunk technology begins with a mash-up of footage from protests and riots around the world, though the video's producers provide no indication of when, where, or why they took place.[22] The intended sensation that is manufactured is a global and pervasive instability. As menacing music plays, protesters burn tires, smash windows, and push up against the police. Vigilant viewers may ascertain a brief clip's location as the West Bank from a barely-visible Palestinian flag in the hands of one protester, running down a hill away from the stream of putrid Skunk liquid.

Figures 5–8. Screenshots from TAR Ideal Concepts Ltd. marketing video for riot control weapons, posted 6 November 2013. Source: TAR Ideal YouTube Channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

In another context, this scene could be framed as a visualization of Palestinian resistance, meant to draw attention to "the specific conditions of life under Israeli occupation and segregation policies."[23] In this video, its specificity is warped by its incorporation into an ambiguous generalization of crowds, presented as a universal threat, and is further diminished when the video transitions into a simulated fiction – a theatrical demonstration of riot control products at an arms expo. The original event dissipates into a hyperreal stock image. Here, the critique from the left that "security strategies developed in Palestine/Israel can be moved seamlessly across transnational space" opportunistically becomes a key selling point for TAR, as the company strategically markets their products by leveraging a visual collapse of local specificity.[24]

Figures 9–10. Screenshots from TAR Ideal Concepts Ltd. marketing video depicting Skunk used on a West Bank protest, posted 6 November 2013. Source: TAR Ideal YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

A photograph published in a press release by the media organization Israel Homeland Security (iHLS) to announce the purchase of Israeli Skunk by U.S. police falls into the

same genre.[25] The photo captures what is often concealed from globalized Israeli brand imagery: a settlement with iconic red roofs, the separation wall, and a Palestinian protester. Yet the accompanying text tells us nothing about the original context in which this image was produced; instead, it focuses on the marketability of the stream of foul-smelling water that shoots across its center, explaining: "The Skunk has attracted the interest of law-enforcement agencies in America, who are looking for better ways to scatter rioters without risking injuries or death after the riots in Ferguson and Baltimore."[26]

Figure 11. Israel Homeland Security (iHLS) announces the purchase of Israeli Skunk by U.S. police, posted 28 June 2015. Source: iHLS website (accessed 30 April 2018).

The security industry effectively transforms the potential resistance photograph into a stock image, a prototype which can be used repeatedly across industry platforms. The original event dissipates into what Mark Nunes describes as a "culture of noise," which allows the industry to thrive through communicating ambiguously.[27] Writing on the production of stock images, media theorist Christopher Grant Ward argues that "'cultures of noise' reveal how certain 'asignifying poetics' might be productive and generative for . . . communication goals."[28] While the commercial stock image is intentionally produced as undefined raw material lacking a final determination, the security industry actively absorbs the image of resistance into a clutter of semantic ambiguity. By repeating the same frame of an aggressive, unruly mob – depicted not only visually, but also through foreboding music and accompanying text – the industry effectively collapses all events into a singular model for pacification. The village of Ni'lin becomes Occupy Wall Street becomes Paris becomes Ukraine.

This loss of specificity occurs in Israeli marketing material on a broader scale. iHLS introduces Israeli company Odortec's Skunk as providing a creative solution to a global

problem: "unrest on a massive scale, especially stormy protests," which "tend to deteriorate towards violence and clashes with law enforcement officers, damage to property and even grand larceny."[29] This text is accompanied by a stock image of a protest facing off a row of police officers with a bizarrely placed skunk lurking in the foreground. Although there is a direct reference to "Israeli experience" within the text, the issue is globalized by using broad descriptions and stock imagery.[30]

Figure 12. Protesters flee the Skunk jet in al-Nabi Salih, January 2012. Source: Oren Ziv/Activestills.

In other marketing materials, reality and fiction blur into one. Israeli defense company Rafael's video for its Samson Non-Lethal Remote Weapon Station, which allows in-vehicle operation of a range of non-lethal weapons, begins by zooming in on a generic picture of the earth, bringing the viewer into an unnamed urban

Figure 13. iHLS marketing image for Odortec's Skunk Technology, posted 25 March 2015. Source: iHLS website (accessed 30 April 2018).

location consumed in unrest.[31] Silhouettes of police officers roam the fiery streets and a text on the screen reads, "Riot Control: A Major Challenge for Current Law Enforcement." The video then becomes a messy montage of actual footage of protests around the globe. The screen splits into four simultaneous clips of police swarming into crowds, and devolves into a "culture of noise" where it is impossible to pay attention to one event, let alone decipher the original meaning and location of such events.

The second half of the video is filmed from inside the vehicle, as it drives through a landscape of burning tires and masked protesters throwing stones. The vehicle operator demonstrates all of the non-lethal devices one can attach to the vehicle: acoustic

Figure 14. Screenshot from Rafael's marketing video of the Samson Non-Lethal Remote Weapon Station, posted 13 November 2013. Source: Rafael YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

device, tear gas, and an optical dazzler to temporarily blind people. Reaching a crescendo, the driver pinpoints a particular protester on his screen and flicks his joystick. We hear the sound of a rubber bullet firing before the scene cuts out. These elements are realistically styled and displayed, but the steadiness of the camera and the calm, controlled movements of the vehicle operator betray the scenario to be a marketing performance.

By denying the original, the hyperreal denies the authenticity and lawfulness of any political gathering, while simultaneously legitimizing the use of force across global contexts. The potency of the visual lies in its reliability, in its ability to capture an ever-present moment. It gains its realist authority from what Ernst Bloch called "the cult of the immediately ascertainable fact."[32] Yet in industry simulations, the opposite is true: "a cult of ambiguity" allows hyperreality to legitimate the use of force.

Collapsing Threats

Simulations at the Parisian Eurosatory security exposition always start the same way: armored vehicles drive up and down the tarmac, drones buzz overhead, and the presenter lists the names of featured companies. This time, however, a man runs into the audience and grabs the woman in front of me, dragging her by the ponytail as she cries out. My first thought is that this is an anti-war protest against the exposition, the

Figures 15–18. Screenshots from Rafael's marketing video of the Samson Non-Lethal Remote Weapon Station, posted 13 November 2013. Source: Rafael YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

largest international defense and security industry trade show in the world. Other protesters flood the stage as audience members scream. The announcer instructs everyone to calm down, as the police have everything under control. It soon becomes clear that this is just another industry presentation, featuring Israeli-produced riot control equipment. James Bond music continues throughout. The rowdy "activists" are taken off stage but soon start

throwing stones at the police. A riot control vehicle emerges, and the police form a line; a few begin to throw the protesters onto the ground, beating them with batons. The activists, some with scarves reminiscent of Palestinian *kufiya*s wrapped around their necks, some wearing balaclavas, continue to throw stones in a cloud of fake tear gas. But they are no match for the technologies that the announcer continues to list, his upbeat voice booming as if advertising laundry detergent.

Figure 19. Still from video recording of crowd control simulation, Eurosatory 2016, posted 17 June 2016. Source: TacticalBlackCats YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

A similar scenario was staged two years earlier, at Eurosatory 2014, in which the French company Alsatex simulated the use of tear gas to disperse protesters. The presenter once again narrated the "potential riot situation on our hands" as masked actors burned tires and smashed baseball bats against garbage cans. The fake tear gas was so out of control that it became hard to see what was happening. The presenter announced that the equipment demonstrated had been previously "tested during combat in Iraq, Kosovo, and the Ivory Coast; in extreme conditions during riots in Ulster, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and El Salvador"; and "in major sporting events such as the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa." The same tear gas had also showed up in Bahrain, used by security officers against people protesting the government between 2011 and 2013 and later in February 2015.[33]

Figures 20–23. Stills from video recording of crowd control simulation, Eurosatory 2014, posted 21 June 2014. Source: TacticalBlackCats YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

While crowd control weapons on display in the Eurosatory simulations in 2014 and 2016 are not all Israeli-produced, their marketing fits within a larger trend in which Israel plays a leading role: the portrayal of internal dissent as insurgency or terrorism. Particularly since 2011, "teargas, and the wide array of projectiles that 'weaponise' it, make up just one part of [a] vast counter-uprising economy."[34] The counter-terrorism industry has actively cultivated this expanding market, and an ad for the Israeli company MGM, for example, explicitly depicts the dual usage of their riot gear for military and law enforcement. While Israeli security companies frame their founding history as one based upon an experience with terrorism and warfare, in crowd control marketing, explicit references to Israeli national involvement with terrorism are somewhat rare. Instead, companies tend to favor ambiguous imagery and symbols, creating a threat which can occur anywhere

Figure 24. Ad for Israel's MGM Import and Export riot gear company. Source: 2015 ISDEF catalogue, collected by author.

across the globe under a variety of circumstances, while simultaneously depoliticizing their own management of such threats. The tension that emerges between the specificity of the "Israeli experience" and the need to generalize this experience for a global audience is thus partly resolved by presenting an individualized threat that blurs internal dissent with criminality.

To this end, the security industry crafts an image of "the world's most common criminal," a masked male who embodies the role of rioter, terrorist, and common criminal all at once. This conflation allows the industry to explicitly market their crowd control technologies and expertise toward a global community increasingly invested in the militarization of law enforcement. For example, numerous SWAT demonstrations at the 2015 Israeli Defense Exposition (ISDEF) in Tel Aviv showed crowd control weapons such as stun grenades used to pacify terrorist or drug-related threats, embodied by individual criminals. One demonstration began with three SWAT team members creeping across "enemy territory" in an unnamed Arab country: an empty house on a sand-scattered landscape, complete with a beaten-up car and illegible Arabic graffiti. In this sandy corner of the convention hall, the presenter explained the mission of the Israeli Police Counter-Terrorism Unit (YAMAM): "[We] must clear the house. We have a suspect, a drug dealer. We are also afraid that he is carrying explosives." As three men broke down the door of the enemy's house, the presenter narrated the scene, name-dropping companies producing the featured products: respiratory systems from Avon, a jammer from Netline, a grenade trigger pouch from Advanced Combat Solutions (ACS), and a stun grenade from CSI. "Boom!" he yelled, imitating the sound of the grenade. After removing the suspect, the SWAT team patted him down, bringing him safely to the police car

in the vicinity. The arrest was quick, sterile, and smooth. Representatives of the Los Angeles Police Department stood by, vigorously taking notes. The audience erupted in applause.

The demonstration of crowd control weapons (in this case, the stun grenade) to pacify a possible drug lord/terrorist reflects an ever-increasing dissolution of boundaries within the category of "threat" that in turn justifies militarized responses to demonstrators. As Tyler Wall argues, the "war on terrorism" increasingly slides into other perpetual security projects, such as the "war on crime" and "war on drugs," bringing together techniques of military and police power while ensuring a constant market demand for commodities aimed at pacification.[35] These blurred lines reflect a wider trend of militarized policing, wherein equipment is not simply transferred from the military to the police, but is increasingly "researched and designed to simultaneously counter protest crowds, drug cartels, and combat forces."[36]

The CSI stun grenade showcased in this simulation has been used to disperse Palestinian activists attempting to set up a camp near the West Bank village of Burin in protest of Israeli settlement expansion.[37] In 2014, it was reportedly used on protesters in Ferguson. A journalist at the scene tweeted a photo of a flash bang shrapnel injury and described how after the fiery hot canister singed his leg, a nearby protester's shirt caught fire.[38] Despite such usage against civilian protesters, the ISDEF simulation legitimizes the use of the stun grenade by placing it in the context of a terrorist and/or drug-related threat, embodied by an individual criminal. Although Israeli security companies explicitly brand themselves by emphasizing the country's profound knowledge and experience of terrorism,[39] Israeli security experience also has to be retrofitted to a wide variety of contexts, and, according to anthropologist Erella Grassiani, "this is mostly done by collapsing

Figures 25–26. The ISDEF Live Demonstration and Display Area, as described on the ISDEF website, features "68 sq. meters of space divided and designed to realistically replicate various combat zones, from a sandy desert or leafy terrain to an abandoned car or empty building, providing exhibitors with an excellent forum to recreate choreographed combat scenarios." Source: ISDEF Expo YouTube channel (accessed 9 July 2018).

the terrorist threat with a criminal threat, thus showing how the same security methods can be used for both instances, something which is debatable."[40]

This collapse of technological function, which allows for the smooth migration of weapons from counter-terrorism to crowd control, shows up in other security companies' sales narratives. ISPRA introduces their Protectojet Model 5 tear gas ejector as "originally developed as an anti-terror weapon for hostage situations, and later adopted for defensive and offensive riot control use."[41] Similarly, Israeli company ACS proudly recounts how their trigger pouch, featured in the ISDEF demonstration above, was developed from lessons learned during the second intifada.[42]

The imaginary geography of risk materialized in the sandy model home in the ISDEF simulation, and which exists on an even larger scale in sites like the Tze'elim Urban Warfare Training Center known as Baladia City,[43] represents a world of low-tech barbarism, waiting to be defeated by the high-tech "civilization" embodied in the world of the security expo that surrounds it on all sides. Placing the threat inside a house scrawled with Arabic graffiti in the middle of what looks like a Middle Eastern desert town performs a "topographical reductionism," in which the visual motif of the desert "serves as essential decor of Arab history."[44] The "architecture of enmity" needs no real population to inhabit its empty refugee camps. The securitized Other is merely implied. Of course, the ISDEF simulation does not claim a literal relationship to the real. It takes place in a controlled environment, mediated by an animated presenter and surrounded by an audience of flashing cameras. This is a "performative genre," which gains its authority "not from documenting an external reality, but through the productive force of the visual articulation itself: it does not transmit a situation, but acts on and into it."[45] It is this productive force of the visual and performative that allows for a single individual, or even an empty, disembodied space, to stand in for a collective and globalized whole.

Constructing Vulnerability

Furedi writes that the "autonomisation of fear has important implications for identity," not only in terms of who or what constitutes a threat, but also regarding who is considered "at risk."[46] Increasingly, those placed within this category of risk are "seen to exist in a permanent condition of vulnerability," or the state in which "communities lack the emotional or psychological resources necessary to deal with change, to make choices, or to deal with adversity."[47] Weekly Palestinian demonstrations against displacement and ongoing violence may be seen as an expression of vulnerability *as part of* resistance.[48] However, just as images and symbols of activism have been appropriated and alienated from their original contexts in the service of security industry consumerism, so too has the industry appropriated the category of vulnerability. In its visual marketing of combat uniforms, armored vehicles, and shields, the industry in effect claims vulnerability for the police, military, and those rationalizing the subjugation of those without power.

This type of vulnerability is at odds with the image of strength and machismo projected by the global rise of what journalist Radley Balko terms the "warrior cop," present in images of militarized law enforcement patrolling the streets of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina or dispersing protesters in Ferguson.[49] The "warrior cop" roams

the streets of Israel, too.[50] In May 2015, *Ha'aretz* reported with alarm on mounted Israeli police officers using stun grenades, tear gas, Skunk, and water cannons to disperse crowds of young Ethiopian-Israelis: "The images out of Israel this Sunday looked like they could have been filmed in downtown Baltimore."[51]

Despite the ubiquity of the "warrior cop" discourse, which celebrates traits of physical toughness and aggressiveness, in my analysis of industry marketing material, I find what Anna Feigenbaum and Daniel Weissmann call the "rise of the vulnerable warrior."[52] Even with the steady decrease in fatalities among police officers in the United States since the 1970s, officers' vulnerability to attack has become a central justificatory discourse for an ever-expanding arsenal of military-grade equipment.[53] Israeli crowd control industries also market an "understanding that police officers (or military personnel) are at a high enough risk of death that they must be heavily armed and allowed to cause violence to protect themselves."[54] In advertisements for riot control equipment, bodies of law enforcement are covered head to toe in militarized protective gear, their faces barely (and rarely) visible. TAR's "Law Enforcement" catalogue is full of these images, marketing riot suits that cover every inch of skin, all the way down to hand protection. The catalogue also contains pages devoted to types of helmets, gas masks, and shields, the latter containing shields that double as non-lethal weapons by providing electric shocks of 50,000 volts. In all cases, the warrior is represented with the image of a man, the implicit message being the need to protect the male body and masculinity.

Figures 27–30. The "vulnerable warrior" for sale. Source: TAR Ideal's "One Stop Shop" catalogue, collected by the author at ISDEF 2015.

Early images of cultural militarism in Israel are embodied in the status symbols of the Sabra fighters: the stocking cap, machine gun and the open vehicle, expressing the "freedom, machismo, and power" of the "cowboy of the Israeli wilderness."[55] Yet the Israeli security industry today is centered around a vulnerable masculine body that is a hybrid of machine and organism. He inhabits paradoxical identities, "as perpetual victims of civilian violence and [as] strong warriors who should be feared."[56] In denationalizing this body and cross-marketing its needs to both police and military, the industry creates an untouchable cyborg ripe for global circulability.

Figures 31–32. The "disembodied warrior" for sale. Source: TAR Ideal YouTube channel (accessed 30 April 2018).

The intense focus on officer protection runs through marketing videos for riot control. In TAR's riot control marketing video, after a montage of riots flashes across the screen, the camera zooms in on the vulnerable warrior preparing for battle, lingering on the officer tightening the knee pads on his riot suit and adjusting his helmet before taking on the threat outside. Later in the same video, the human disappears completely with only his equipment and outfit displayed.

The security industry not only appropriates vulnerability by granting it to those with power, but also by bestowing it upon the non-human. In almost all marketing videos, the "fear prototype" of the unruly crowd is accompanied by the burning of tires and the smashing of windows. In an image of a city intended to market the products of Israeli company Mifram, ranging from perimeter and border defense to crowd control and vehicle barriers, urban space is transformed into a battlefield in which protesters in the upper left-hand corner are the only visible threats.[57] On the company's website, products are sorted by "Protection Subject," where consumers can choose from city, bank, airport, harbor, perimeter/border, and VIP defense. In the cityscape, the protesters are placed next to a bank and an embassy, effectively framing them as threats to these capitalist and nationalist structures. In this model, the structures themselves are subjects of vulnerability that need protection.

Figure 33. Mifram displays their range of security products. Source: Mifram website (accessed 30 April 2018).

The cooperation between the Israeli state and industry in protecting the separation wall during demonstrations in the West Bank parallel the use of tear gas and stun grenades in "protecting" the Maracana Stadium from anti–World Cup protesters in Brazil last year,[58] or the barrage of crowd control weapons unleashed on indigenous protesters in North Dakota in an effort to "protect" the construction of the destructive Dakota Access pipeline.[59] By placing property at the center of the "fear prototype," the Israeli crowd control industry effectively caters to a neoliberal logic that favors a marketable and militarized approach to the maintenance of the status quo, not only in its own backyard but on a global scale.

Constructing Solutions

Finally, industry marketing performances revolve around an "industry savior complex," in which prototypes of controlled risk or vulnerability are swiftly followed by a range of technological solutions. The technology itself is the protagonist, doing its job with clean professionalism. Such techno-spectacle often works by turning the weapon into an object of beauty.[60] In the CSI video marketing for VENOM, for example, the camera circles the launcher multiple times, almost lovingly. Rafael's video for its Non-Lethal Remote Weapon State emphasizes the comfortable and safe interior of the vehicle, bringing the viewer in line with the perspective of the technology.

Other times, riot equipment is framed through discourses of corporate creativity and future-oriented innovation. Shrouding violent weapons in a discourse of consumerability follows from a longer history of integrated military, corporate, and leisure interests. Logics and technologies of the battlefield have expanded into civilian life.[61] Yet the opposite is also true: technologies of war are increasingly

framed in civilizing language, and celebrated through the positive affects of hope, opportunity, and belonging. Technologies' usability is emphasized by placing them in the same framework as everyday mobile media technologies. Many of these weapons and the systems that enable their use are marketed through promoting their additional features, including "GPS wireless transmission capabilities, 3G/4G cellular support, and WiFi."[62]

The focus on "smart," WiFi-equipped weapons represents what I call the "iPhonization" of violent technologies. For example, Beit Alfa Technologies, a private company owned by kibbutz Beit Alfa that specializes in water cannon riot control vehicles, uses the language of adaptability and customizability to market its products.[63] A major selling point of the vehicle is that it is "flexible, adaptable, modular, and tailor made to match customer's precise requirements."[64] This customizability allows for different modes of water streams which can all be injected with tear gas, pepper spray, or dye. It also boasts ease of usability as the operator can aim and shoot using "one simple-to-operate joystick type control." The marketing video for ISPRA's cyclone riot control unit emphasizes its camera system that allows "real time control of dynamic riot situations" and "smart solutions for crowd control."[65] These technologies are also advertised as comfortable, light, and flexible. ISPRA's Trx Riot Suit promises to "deliver the highest protection from blunt force trauma without sacrificing comfort and mobility."[66] Mifram boasts that their products offer "portability, modularity," "ergonomic features," and "smart designs, adapted to the client's needs [and] field and local conditions." CSI's[67] VENOM is celebrated as "combat[-ready], lightweight, and portable," with "truly unprecedented versatility and flexibility."[68]

The framing of technologies of violence in civilizing language is also reflected in "green marketing," in which companies frame their weapons as environmentally friendly. The greening of crowd control is not necessarily only about Israel's distinct brand of environmentalism.[69] Rather, it ensures the circulability of its companies' products on a global stage that increasingly requires "ethical" forms of pacification. ISPRA, for example, has an "Environment" tab on their website which describes their goal of replacing dangerous materials with those that are "user and environment, friendly." Skunk too, is constantly flaunted as an eco-friendly solution. On its website, Odortec describes itself as a "green company," whose ingredients are "100% safe for people, animals and plants, as well as harmless to the natural environment."[70] Yet while the company boasts that its Skunk offers a humanitarian "alternative to rubber bullets and tear gas," the use of the Skunk and other sensorial non-lethal weapons still represent a form of atmospheric policing and collective punishment.[71] Despite its purported organic nature, Skunk turns "the square, the march, the public assembly into a toxic space, taking away what is so often the last communication channel people have left to use."[72] As Feigenbaum writes, "If the right to gather, to speak out, is to mean anything, then we must also have the right to do so in air we can breathe."[73]

Figure 34. A "dynamic word map" used to advertise the Skunk. Source: iHLS website, posted 22 March 2015, online at i-hls.com/archives/59556 (accessed 30 April 2018).

Even the classification of "non-lethal" allows these products to fit within what Adi Ophir terms "moral technologies," a complex humanitarian assemblage used to exercise contemporary violence and govern the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted.[74] While the use of tear gas originated in colonial contexts that saw native populations as inferior and in need of management,[75] the contemporary proliferation of such weapons is tied to the growth of a global, corporate PR industry, and the perception that modern forms of policing and occupation must be lawful and benevolent. The Israeli riot control marketplace explicitly caters to that need. In an interview, British non-lethal weapons expert Malcolm Davies spoke about how the "Scream," an acoustic weapon used to disperse demonstrations in the West Bank, is meticulously tested so as not to cross the line into lethality.[76] While it "could be dialed up for lethal effects," tests have determined the precise number of feet necessary to keep between the system and demonstrators to ensure its non-lethality.[77] Beit Alfa's high-pressure water control system similarly specifies that it be kept "131 feet" from "an average-sized human."[78]

Such information is often to be found in user manuals provided by companies in an attempt to regulate the operation of their weapons on the ground. The ISPRA manual depicts two triangles, representing "common results" and "optimal results" respectively, the latter equally balancing three points: public safety, compliance, and police force safety.[79] The manual goes on to describe different stages of force escalation, introducing new products with each step: first there is pepper spray, followed by tear gas, then rubber pellets, and so on. Similarly, the CSI catalogue features DEFCON: Degree of Force – Consequence, an "escalation of force model" for end-users, beginning with physical presence and moving into verbalization, soft pain compliance, intermediate control technique, suppress and degrade technique, and, finally, lethal force.[80] Each step is represented by a colored icon that corresponds to a different line of associated weaponry.

Figure 35. Illustration of ISPRA's CEFC Controlled Escalation of Force Concept, Source: ISPRA 2017 Catalogue, 3 (accessed 30 April 2018).

These manuals provide military and law enforcement a safe script with which to properly use their products on the ground, while offering consumers a different product for every occasion. They also work to flatten and equate all contexts in which such products will be used, once again invoking a gentle "stock solution" that can circulate internationally under a variety of circumstances. Like the demonstrations enacted at ISDEF and Eurosatory, each scenario ends with applause and the targets of violence walk away unscathed.

Conclusion

The Israeli security industry has achieved international recognition in large part through effective branding. It is precisely its use of ambiguous global imagery that grants it circulability. Whether by transforming a West Bank protest into a stock image, using discourses of vulnerability to market a global need, or framing products as ethical or environmental, the industry mediates violence through a sellable script that can be replicated (but also subverted) in protest battlegrounds around the world. In analyzing corporate performances of violence, however, it is crucial to exercise what W. J. T. Mitchell terms a "comparative gaze," an act of double vision that brings together two different scenes.[81] Critical seeing is always an act of double vision: "Either one looks and then looks again at what was hidden or forgotten, or one looks at a view while remembering another view."[82] If industry marketing constitutes an act of ambiguity and erasure, a critical seeing summons the very real and violent effects of crowd control weapons. A critical way of seeing is thus key to understanding how "shared

justificatory discourses" of government, military, and corporation operate smoothly on a global scale, and more importantly, how they can be undone.[83]

Just as the riot control industry obscures symbols and images of resistance by making them into stock marketing material, Palestinians have appropriated objects of control into artistic or memorializing practices.[84] While the industry markets their products for global "events," using the language of "event preparedness," the ubiquity of tear gas canisters and rubber bullets in Palestinian art and memorials delinks them from singular instances and instead declares them as part of an everyday experience of structural oppression. These platforms are essential for unraveling a reductive culture of fear that tells us little about agency or the courage and creativity at the heart of resistance.

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Endnotes

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84 In Bethlehem, CSI tear gas canisters have been repurposed as Christmas ornaments to send a holiday message to the United States about the role of its tear gas and arms manufacturers in the violence of the occupied territories. Palestinian artist Ibrahim Bornat creates art out of his collection of the ammunition (comprised of thousands of rubber-coated and live bullets, tear gas canisters, and sound grenades, among other forms of munitions) that Israeli soldiers fire at Friday demonstrators in Bil'in, effectively "[creating] life out of their instruments of death." Also in Bil'in is a garden of flowers planted in used tear gas canisters that memorializes Bassem Abu Rahmah, who was killed in 2009 after being hit with a high-velocity tear gas grenade fired by Israeli soldiers. See "Tear Gas Ornaments from Bethlehem," YouTube video, 1:00, posted by AJ+, 30 December 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QGWTuYkDCg (accessed 30 April 2018); Hazem Jamjoum, "Ramallah Commemorates the Ongoing Nakbah," *Electronic Intifada*, 28 May 2008, online at electronicintifada.net/content/ramallah-commemorates-ongoing-nakba/7532 (accessed 30 April 2018); and Elias Nawawieh, "PHOTOS: What the Press Missed in Bil'in Tear Gas Flower Garden," *+972 Magazine*, 8 October 2013, online at 972mag.com/photos-what-the-press-missed-in-bilin-tear-gas-flower-garden/80129/ (accessed 30 April 2018).

The Tegart Police Fortresses in British Mandate Palestine

A Reconsideration of Their Strategic Location and Purpose

Richard Cahill

During the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–39), the British government sent Sir Charles Tegart to Palestine to assess the security situation, make recommendations for reforming the Palestine Police, and restore "law and order." Tegart, an Irishman, served in the British colonial police force in Calcutta, India, from 1901 to 1931. During these years, he rose in the ranks, becoming commissioner of police in 1923 and commanding over 5,000 men.[1] In British colonial eyes, he was highly "successful" in crushing "unrest" and "terrorism." One reason for his "success" was his reorganization of the Calcutta police force, creating a flexible structure that allowed portions of the force to act as offensive mobile units during times of "unrest." Another reason was his ambitious plan to move police stations from inferior rented buildings into permanent, purpose-built police stations. He successfully carried out this building project from 1925 to 1930.[2] Although he avoided the press and publicity, several attempts on his life, as well as rumors of him going out in disguise, gave him a certain amount of notoriety. When he retired from the colonial police, he was invited to join the Council of India in London, which advised the British government on Indian affairs, where he served until 1937.

During two extended visits to Palestine during the revolt, Tegart made a series of recommendations for reforming the police, many of which were put into place. Among these, he proposed building seventy-seven fortified police stations or fortresses throughout the country and energetically pushed for their construction even after he returned to England. In the early 1940s, after the revolt was put down and when Britain desperately required all its financial resources to fight the Germans in World War II, over two million pounds were expended to construct

fifty-five of Tegart's police fortresses. Why did the British approve of and pay for fifty-five new police fortresses in Palestine in the early 1940s, given that they had already brutally suppressed the Arab Revolt and killed, exiled, caused to flee, or imprisoned virtually all Palestinian Arab leaders? And why did Tegart continue to advocate for this massive building project, well beyond his contracted period of service in Palestine?

Tegart Comes to Palestine

After the first phase of the Arab Revolt (April–November 1936), when some twenty thousand British troops were sent in to crush the uprising, the Colonial Office sent a commission to investigate its causes. The Peel Commission arrived in Palestine in November 1936 and interviewed various leaders. The commission's report, published in July 1937, suggested that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a remnant British Mandate. The Palestinian Arabs rejected this proposal. On 26 September 1937, the British district commissioner for the Galilee, Lewis Andrews, and a British constable were killed in Nazareth. Andrews was the highest-ranking British official to be killed in the revolt up to that point and it rocked the British leadership in Palestine and London. British troops increased their brutal "searches" of Palestinian Arab villages.[3] On 8 October, the Colonial Office – exploring all means to quell Arab resistance in Palestine – asked Tegart to consider taking over the position of inspector-general of police in Palestine.[4] However, Tegart declined the invitation and instead insisted that he go to Palestine as an advisor and that the matter remain private.[5] The Colonial Office agreed and he was soon meeting with Mandate officials, including in London.[6] By the time Tegart arrived in Palestine in December 1937, he entered upon a rapidly changing administrative scene: Archibald Wavell had replaced John Dill as general officer commanding (GOC), and by April 1938 Wavell himself would be replaced by Robert Haining; Alan Saunders had replaced Roy Spicer as inspector-general of police; and the plan was set to replace High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope with Harold MacMichael in the near future. Haining, MacMichael, Saunders, and Tegart, arguably the four most powerful Britons in Palestine in the spring of 1938, were all viewed by the Zionist leadership as friends and allies, and eager to suppress Arab resistance.[7] In April 1938, a commission led by Sir John Woodhead, whom Tegart knew from India when Woodhead had been acting governor of Bengal, arrived in Palestine to consider options for partition.[8]

Figure 1. Inspector-General Alan Saunders with Sir Charles Tegart (right) upon his arrival in Palestine, December 1937[9]

Tegart worked quickly, visiting various police outposts throughout the country and meeting with British members of the Palestine Police and other officials. In late January 1938, he submitted his formal report, consisting of twenty-eight recommendations.[10] These included: overhauling the Criminal Investigation Department (CID); establishing a rural mounted police force with a "tough type of man, not necessarily literate";[11] and putting in place frontier protection – police posts, roads, and a fence on the northern border.[12] Several recommendations focused on the cohesion and *esprit de corps* of the police, calling for better "compensation for the families of police officers killed in the execution of their duty"; better housing for police; and "the abolition of small police posts," which Tegart viewed as vulnerable to attacks.[13] As Gad Kroizer has observed, Tegart's strategic vision for the Palestine Police was a militarized but flexible force in which men could shift quickly from conventional police work to counter-insurgency as the situation demanded.[14]

Many of Tegart's recommendations were implemented, some immediately, though the substantial capital investment of the two recommended construction projects, the northern border barrier and police housing, required approval of the Foreign Office. Tegart pushed for the rapid construction of the border barrier, later known as Tegart's Wall, and it was approved and completed by August 1938. Though several British officials pointed out that the barrier, made largely of wire, was easily cut, the British establishment, in typical colonial delusion, celebrated it as a success.[15] The construction of a "wall" as well as many of Tegart's other recommendations were echoes of tactics that Tegart had used or shown to be useful during his many years leading the colonial police in Calcutta, and Laleh Khalili correctly points out how imperial counterinsurgency "best practices" moved in "horizontal currents" between colonies and beyond.[16]

After submitting his report, Tegart continued to advise the Mandate government, in particular the police and the military. Tegart met almost daily in a "security" meeting with the GOC, the inspector-general of police, and chief secretary to discuss the ongoing, and still widespread, Arab Revolt. In April 1938, Tegart laid out plans for punishing villages suspected of cooperating with the rebels in any way.[17] By early May he and his "security" meeting colleagues received a detailed intelligence report (including hand-drawn area maps) identifying the names of villages and names of "gangsters" in each village, and the names of villagers known to be supportive of the revolt.[18] In late May, the British military, police, and civil administration began a large-scale occupation of these villages in the Galilee, Haifa, and Samaria districts.[19] Tegart and the high commissioner's chief secretary, William Denis Battershill, toured the Galilee during the last three days of the operation, narrowly escaping a rebel attack in Tiberias.[20]

Tegart's Return

Tegart's contracted tour of service in Palestine came to an end in June 1938. His recommendation for "police housing" had yet to be acted upon. Despite the British decimation of the Palestinian Arab leadership through arrests, exile, and imprisonment, the

Arab Revolt was still widespread. In August 1938, rebel forces killed the British assistant district commissioner in Jenin, W. S. S. Moffat.[21] "Tegart's Wall" had been completed by this point, but obviously was not having the effect that the British had hoped. The British press carried news of rebel actions, embarrassing officials for their inability to control the situation. That same August, the Colonial Office called upon Tegart to return to Palestine. The situation was deemed so urgent that Tegart was flown to Palestine, rather than traveling by boat, as he had on his first tour.

Tegart arrived back in Palestine mid-September 1938 and met with GOC Haining to assess the situation.[22] The British had lost control of most of Palestine, except for a few cities, to the Palestinian Arab rebels. By early October, the rebels had even taken control of the Old City of Jerusalem. After four days, however, the British stormed the Old City and slowly regained control. Meanwhile, the British prime minister signed the Munich Agreement recognizing Nazi Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia, hoping to appease the Germans. With the imminent threat of war with Germany gone, the British felt they could send more troops to Palestine. The British opted at this point for a two-pronged approach to quell the Arab Revolt: more troops and increased military suppression of the revolt; and an international conference in London (the St. James Conference), to which Palestinian Arabs and Jews would be invited to try to reach a mutually acceptable compromise – a highly improbable outcome, as the British privately recognized.[23]

As the British continued their brutal suppression of the revolt in November 1938, Tegart turned his attention back to the subject of police housing and police stations. The rebels had successfully attacked several police stations during the preceding months: In August, they had captured the police station in Hebron. In September, the British shut down several police stations and posts due to continued rebel attacks.[24] In October, after taking over the Old City of Jerusalem, the rebels burned down the police station.[25] In November, the high commissioner appointed a committee, chaired by Tegart, to study the question of future police infrastructure in Palestine.

In the previous spring, eager to get his proposed border barrier built as soon as possible, Tegart had managed to bypass the normal process of working through the Mandate's Public Works Department (PWD). Instead, he employed the contracting company of the Federation of Jewish Labor, Solel Boneh. Now, Tegart again called on its chairman, David HaCohen, to inquire as to the possibility of Solel Boneh lending one million pounds for the massive construction project of new police stations.[26] HaCohen offered a forty-year loan at 4 percent interest; alternatively, HaCohen proposed a rent-to-buy scenario whereby Solel Boneh would build the stations at their own expense if Britain agreed to rent the buildings for twenty years, after which they would be signed over to Britain.[27] Tegart's attempt to bypass the PWD and contract with Solel Boneh ultimately failed, as the government insisted on using its own people. Tegart pressed the PWD for a cost estimate, but the PWD needed more specific details and site locations. Tegart was becoming impatient.[28]

From the winter of 1938 into the spring of 1939, Tegart sought examples of police

structures capable of withstanding formidable attack and met with his "housing committee" almost weekly.[29] He requested aerial photos of the police outpost in Wadi Rum, Transjordan,[30] and received recommendations for Haifa and Kiryat Haim.[31] The district commissioner of Galilee and Acre reported on the price of land and provided his view on each station's housing requirements.[32] Tegart and his committee collected a loan offer from Barclays bank, a description of a building block north of Tel Aviv, and materials lists.[33] Tegart himself worked on proposals for the police headquarters in Jerusalem. Between housing committee meetings, Tegart continued to visit police stations around the country. In late December 1938, he toured the north and, as his convoy returned to Jerusalem, survived an ambush that took the life of a colleague. In late January 1939, the chief secretary and Tegart visited the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area: Masada, Kalya, the potash works at Jabal al-Sudum, Jericho, and Allenby Bridge.[34]

Figure 2. Sir Charles Tegart (center) inspecting a police post south of the Dead Sea. Chief Secretary Battershill stands just behind the car.[35]

By late March 1939, Tegart and his police housing committee finished their report. It called for seventy-seven new purpose-built fortress-like police buildings, with garages, stables, and food and water storage vaults.[36] The basic idea was that the buildings could house both the offices and the residence of the police and be strong enough to withstand a prolonged siege. Some buildings would also be able to house additional government offices, so that in the event of "unrest" the British administration could continue its work. Tegart provided a cost analysis for renting the buildings and claimed that a capital investment upfront would pay for itself within five to ten years (depending on the final

costs of the building project).[37] In a lengthy cover letter, Tegart emphasized the need to act quickly, citing a plan to build a relatively small new police station in Palestine's north that took five years to move through the approval process. By the time it was approved, the land for the proposed station had been sold to another buyer.

If we now pause and zoom out to survey the larger context, two questions arise. One has to do with the locations of the seventy-seven proposed police fortress and the other has to do with the cost and timing of the entire project.

Location

Given the context of the Arab Revolt, during which Tegart made his recommendation to secure and improve police stations and police housing, one might think that the majority of suggested locations would be in or near where the revolt against the British raged most intensely, in predominantly Arab cities, towns, or villages. The British officials in London were led to believe this to be the case. At the Colonial Office in London, an official wrote:

> I do feel that it is most important that the work on the Tegart police building scheme should be equitably distributed between the two communities, if this can be achieved. The Arabs are hardly likely to be enthusiastic about the scheme, which is primarily directed against them, and it will create the worst possible feeling if *these stations, which are mostly in Arab rural areas*, are constructed not only by Jewish contractors but by Jewish labour.[38]

But these stations were not "mostly in Arab rural areas." In fact, the opposite was true. Most of the police fortresses were to be in or near Jewish populations. Of the seventy-seven proposed sites, thirty-one were in Jewish colonies or areas immediately adjacent to Jewish settlements. The report called for fortresses in Rishon le-Zion (south of Jaffa), Ramat Gan (east of Tel Aviv), Hatikva (east of Jaffa), Hadera (on the Mediterranean coast midway between Tel Aviv and Haifa), Rehovot (southwest of Ramla), and other Zionist settlements. They form almost a ring around Jaffa. "Mixed towns" such as Haifa and Tiberias were also slated to receive a Tegart fort. Arab towns, such as Nablus or ShifaʿAmr were also on the list, but in oddly low proportion. The places where the Arab Revolt had seen some of the heaviest fighting, such as within the triangle between Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm, were not to receive a police fortress.

Taking into the consideration the context of 1938, when the Woodhead Commission had been drawing up partition maps, and the fact that the Jewish Agency Executive had produced its own partition proposal (with the intent to influence the Woodhead Commission),[39] the suggested locations for the Tegart forts become more interesting. The Woodhead Commission, though it concluded that the partition of Palestine was impracticable, devised three partition plans (A, B, and C). The majority of the commission

favored plan C, which called for a very small Jewish state in the coastal strip from Tel Aviv north to Tantura (about twenty kilometers south of Haifa); an Arab (Palestinian) state consisting of the coast around Gaza plus the hill country and part of the Jordan Valley (Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, and Jenin); and a continued British Mandate over the Galilee and the northern frontier, a "Jerusalem enclave" (including Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Lydda), and the Negev (including Beersheba and Rafah on the Egyptian border). Plotting the seventy-seven proposed Tegart forts onto the plan C map allocates forty forts to the territory retained by the British Mandate, twenty-one to the proposed Jewish state, and fifteen to the proposed Arab state (figure 3).

Figure 3. Map of the Woodhead Commission's Partition Plan C, 1938, with shading and approximate Tegart fort locations added by the author.

The Jewish Agency Executive's partition plan of 1938, meanwhile, envisioned a Jewish state in all of the north and the Galilee, contiguous with the coastal plain down to Tel Aviv, plus the area on the coast south of Jaffa to just north of al-Majdal, with a finger including the western part of Jerusalem. The British would continue their mandate over East Jerusalem (the Old City and some surrounding Arab neighborhoods), Bethlehem, Hebron, and Ramallah, with a finger extending to Lydda, plus Jericho, the Dead Sea area, and the Negev, including the entire length of the border with Egypt. The proposed Arab state would consist of three separate enclaves, one in the south (comprising Gaza, Beersheba, and Bayt Jibrin), one in the northern highlands (from Jenin to Bir Zeit, including Tulkarm), and the port city of Jaffa.[40] Plotting the suggested locations for the Tegart Forts onto this map, the British would retain control over only nine forts, twelve would fall within the proposed Arab state, and an overwhelming fifty-six would be in the proposed Jewish state (figure 4).

The location of the proposed police fortresses clearly favored Jewish population centers and historical Zionist settlements in Palestine. Their placement does not seem at all related to preparing for another Arab Revolt. Further, the construction of the initial

fifty-five fortresses took place during dire times for the British in World War II.

Timing and Cost

During the months that Tegart was energetically working on the police housing proposal (January through April 1939), the British were putting down the last remnants of the Arab Revolt. In late March 1939, the British killed one of the few remaining rebel leaders, 'Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad. (Tegart put a photo of the dead man in his photo album.)[41] In mid-April, Tegart believed that the British had almost completely put down the Arab Revolt, not through politics but through force, and that the remaining rebels were ready to lay down their arms if offered amnesty.[42]

Tegart was also well aware of the St. James Conference taking

Figure 4. Map of the Jewish Agency Executive's Partition Plan, 1938, with shading and approximate locations of the proposed Tegart forts added by the author.

place in London during these same months, and he followed news and rumors about it. He understood the parameters: that if the Zionists and the Arabs could not reach a workable compromise, the British would be at liberty to do as they saw fit in Palestine. Perhaps the continuation of such a building project at this time is evidence that the British used the St. James Conference as a ploy to help deflate the Palestinian Arabs' rebellion against British rule. Perhaps it shows that the British had every intent to continue to rule Palestine.

Tegart returned to England in May 1939, just as the British government announced its new policy on Palestine: limiting Jewish immigration and projecting an independent Palestine within ten years, to be arranged in coordination with both Arabs and Jews. If, after ten years, British efforts were unsuccessful, they announced that they would commit the matter to the League of Nations.[43] Zionists saw this as a betrayal. Palestinian Arabs demanded an independent state immediately. But Britain had clearly indicated that it was on the road to giving up Palestine. Internationally, the British prime minister and others in the government had believed that they had averted a war with Germany with

the Munich Agreement, but when on 7 May 1939 Hitler entered into a military alliance with Mussolini, war again seemed likely. On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. The exhaustion of the revolt, Britain's waning interest in remaining in Palestine, and the amplification of tensions and eventual outbreak of war in Europe would all seem logically to undermine any significant expenditure of money and resources on police buildings in Palestine.

Yet, upon returning to England, with his second contracted period of service completed, Tegart continued to advocate for funding and construction of the police fortress. He visited contacts in the Colonial Office, the War Office, and the Foreign Office. He wrote the inspector-general of police and the chief secretary back in Palestine to keep them informed of his progress. In March 1940, Tegart's building plan was approved by the British government.[44] In October 1941, the high commissioner for Palestine wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies:

> It will be recalled that report of the Tegart Committee dealt with accommodation in both rural and urban areas and envisaged the construction of 79 [sic] buildings, of which the approved rural scheme provided for 54 new buildings and included accommodation for departments other than Police in 13 of these buildings. The 54 buildings have now been completed and are in use. The approved estimated cost of the rural scheme was £P2,200,000; the actual cost cannot yet be stated . . . however, the Director [of Public Works] does not expect that the approved provision of £P2,200,000 will be materially exceeded.[45]

A copy of the dispatch was sent to Tegart four months later, with a note that read, in part: "The completion of the work in the face of many difficulties of supply created by the war was a notable achievement."[46] During the nearly year-and-a-half that it took to build fifty-four police fortresses in Palestine (March 1940–October 1941), Nazi Germany had attacked England in the Battle of Britain, making the outlay of £2.2 million on concrete police buildings in Palestine even more remarkable. Though Palestine became a significant base for the British military during World War II, at the time of Tegart's proposal and energetic follow-up efforts and the government's final approval (January 1938 through 9 September 1939), the war was a European war. It would be another year before Italy and Japan joined Germany, turning it into a "world war." Other factors, including Tegart's personal support for the Zionist movement, are thus worthy of consideration.

Tegart, the Zionist Leadership, and a "Good Stick"

Tegart had a particularly noteworthy relationship with Chaim Weizmann, president of the Zionist Organization. It is clear that Tegart respected Weizmann and grew quite close to him. Tegart described Weizmann to an official in the War Office as someone who

Figure 5. The Tegart fortress at Salha, north of Safad.[47]

"tempers his particular brand of Zionism with realism and an innate feeling of loyalty toward H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] and particularly, as I know, towards the P[rime] M[inister]."[48] In May 1938, when Tegart returned from Palestine to London, he met with Weizmann even before meeting with the Colonial Office. Tegart was concerned by Weizmann's gloomy mood about the future, given the emerging British policy. While attending parliamentary debates on Palestine, Tegart sat next to Weizmann.[49] Tegart wrote to Weizmann in August 1938, expressing his concern that the British would put down the "outrages" and gain the upper hand before the Woodhead Commission published its report.[50]

Tegart and his wife also had a warm personal friendship with Chaim Weizmann and his wife. Tegart enjoyed visiting Weizmann's palatial home in Rehovot and swimming in Weizmann's pool, stocked with goldfish.[51] On one visit, Tegart had too much to drink and ended up spending the night rather than driving back to Jerusalem. After Tegart survived the December 1938 ambush on his motorcade in Palestine, Weizmann congratulated him by telegram, to which Tegart responded with a handwritten thank-you note.[52] After Tegart's second and final term of service in Palestine, he continued his friendship with the Weizmanns, occasionally joining them for dinner in London, where they discussed the political situation in Palestine. Tegart updated Weizmann on his home improvement projects, which he claimed to be inspired by Weizmann's house in Rehovot.[53]

During Tegart's time in Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency also sent the deputy director of its political department and legal advisor Bernard Joseph to visit him on several

occasions. While there is no evidence of these meetings in Tegart's papers, Joseph's detailed reports to the executive committee of the Jewish Agency provide a glimpse into the relationship and the dynamic. On 18 March 1939, Joseph had a lengthy meeting with Tegart. Tegart began the meeting with a discussion of the current political situation, "as is his wont."[54] Tegart stated his confidence that the Arab Revolt was thoroughly put down, telling Joseph, "the situation would never get out of hand again, and if such a band [of Arab rebels] came in [to Palestine] they would just be mowed down as they were the other day in Transjordan. They would not have a chance."[55] Tegart brought up the St. James Conference, taking place at that time, and wanted to know if Joseph thought that Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald's approach (namely, "a scheme whereby the Jews would be dependent on the Arabs to get the immigration they wanted whilst the Arabs would be dependent on the Jews to get the Independent State that they wanted") was a clever one. Joseph explained why he thought it was an unfair approach and suggested that the British would have had greater success if it used partition as a threat. Tegart "appeared to be rather taken by the suggestion and said, 'You mean partition would be a good stick with which to beat both parties into agreeing?'" Joseph noted that Tegart "evidently felt that the idea was a good one."[56] Tegart was unaware that Joseph chaired the Jewish Agency Executive's "Boundaries Committee," which had mapped out the agency's partition plan.[57]

Was Tegart influenced by Zionist leaders concerning the locations for the police fortresses? If so, this would follow a pattern that Gideon Biger has pointed out from the early years of the Mandate: "British and Jewish development of Palestine amounted to a 'joint structure,' whereby the British would 'lay the infrastructure' and the Jews 'depend on it for the success of their settlement endeavours.'"[58]

Concluding Thoughts

The sole in-depth study of Tegart's work in Palestine, and the fortresses that became his legacy, was written by Gad Kroizer as a PhD dissertation for the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It is based on archival sources, mainly in Britain, but also in Israel. Faithfully if perhaps uncritically following the British archival testimony, Kroizer found that "Tegart positioned fortresses in strategic locations: along major longitudinal and latitudinal transportation arteries and railways; at central junctions; in cities and villages that had been problematic during the revolt, primarily in Arab areas."[59] One could argue about the strategic importance of the sites, but, as I have shown above, the majority of proposed fortresses were *not* in areas that had been problematic during the Arab Revolt, and they were *not* "primarily in Arab areas." In fact, the proposed fortresses were mostly in or near Jewish areas and mix Jewish-Arab towns. Moreover, if either the British or the Zionist partition plan had become a political reality by the time the first fifty-five fortresses were completed in October 1941, less than 20 percent of the fortresses would have been in the proposed Arab state.

My research so far has found no explicit evidence that the Zionist leadership influenced Tegart's decision about the location of the proposed fortresses. However, Tegart's close relationship with Chaim Weizmann, the central advocate for partition among the Zionist leaders of that time, is notable. Among the locations proposed for a fortress was Rehovot, the small Zionist settlement south of Tel Aviv where Weizmann owned a beautiful home and Tegart liked to visit. Rehovot had remained mostly quiet during the Arab Revolt.

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Endnotes

1 The Calcutta police force had 5,346 men in 1923 and 5,750 in 1929. University of Cambridge, Center for Asian Studies Archive (hereafter CASA), Tegart Papers, Box 4, file 14, "Annual Report 1923," 1; and box 4, file 16, "Annual Report 1929," 1.

2 CASA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 16, "Annual Report 1929," 5–6.

3 The killing of Andrews is widely held as the beginning of the second, more violent stage of the Arab Revolt. However, Kelly points out that the uptick in Arab violence toward the British started after two weeks of increased brutal British collective punishments, euphemistically called "village searches." Matthew K. Kelly, *The Crime of Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 109.

4 University of Oxford, St. Anthony's College, Middle East Center Archive (hereafter MECA), Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2a, folio 2.

5 Little time was wasted. In London on 26 October 1937, Tegart met over lunch with the high commissioner of Palestine, Arthur Wauchope, and the newly appointed inspector-general of the Palestine Police, Alan Saunders, together with Cosmo Parkinson, the permanent under-secretary of the Colonial Office. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2a, folia 3–4.

6 University of Oxford, Rhodes House, Bodleian Archive, Brit. Emp. s. 467, Correspondence and Papers of Sir William Denis Battershill (hereafter Battershill), box 10, file 4, folio 32b.

7 They clearly saw the Arab Revolt through a British *crimino-national* lens. Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*. For multiple examples of what Cohen calls the Zionists' "deep intelligence penetration," see Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

8 MECA, MacGillivray Papers, GB165-0193.

9 MECA, Saunders-Alb11-016 (3767-3769).

10 The National Archive (UK) (hereafter TNA), Colonial Office (hereafter CO), 733/383/1, folia 66*ff*.

11 TNA CO 733/383/1, folio 66.

12 On frontier protection, see Richard Cahill, "Sir Charles Tegart: The 'Counterterrorism Expert' in Palestine," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 74 (Summer 2018): 57–66.

13 TNA CO 733/383/1, folia 66*ff*.

14 Gad Kroizer, "From Dowbiggin to Tegart: Revolutionary Change in the Colonial Police in Palestine during the 1930s," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 2 (May 2004): 115–33.

15 See Cahill, "Sir Charles Tegart," which includes a photo of a farewell dinner for Tegart held at the King David Hotel. Testifying to this British view of the world, the centerpiece of the long dining table was a small barbed wire "Tegart's wall" complete with a miniature "pillboxes."

16 Laleh Khalili, "The Location of Palestine in Global Counterinsurgencies," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (August 2010): 413–33.

17 See Tegart's memo "Collective Responsibility of Villages," dated 4 April 1938, in MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 82–83. Here Tegart notes that villages in the vicinity of a "railroad, road, telephone and telegraph lines and also pipelines and also Rutenberg's [electrical] grid" will be collectively held responsible for the protection of these items and punitive measures taken against those that did not do so. On 3 May 1938, Tegart recommended that the British

occupy "bad" villages, and on 10 May he met with the GOC, the inspector general of police, the chief secretary, and other military officials to plan the occupation of "enemy villages." On British brutality against Palestinian Arab civilians, see Matthew Hughes, "From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain's Suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 6–22.

18 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 104–13. The vast majority of these villages were in areas east of Tulkarm and around Jenin and Nablus – areas that were later slated to have few police fortresses.

19 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 114–50.

20 The last night of their short tour of the "defenses," Tegart and Battershill dined at a seafront restaurant in Tiberias, lingering over drinks before retiring for the night. Only the next morning did they learn that rebels had entered Tiberias during the night and shot up the place. Battershill, box 4, folio 31b.

21 Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 126.

22 MECA, MacGillivray's Diary, GB165-0193

23 Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 142.

24 Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 133n62.

25 Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 144.

26 David HaCohen was also deeply involved in intelligence gathering for the Haganah; it is unclear if Tegart was aware of this at the time. See Cohen, *Army of Shadows*, 83–84, 114, 124–26, 183, 213–14.

27 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 1–2.

28 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 90–96.

29 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 4–6.

30 On 29 November, the pilot sent him a photo of the square, high-walled fortress with a note that he thought it could accommodate twenty men and would cost about £P1,500 to build. In his reply, Tegart mentions to the pilot that he is now getting detailed information from Amman. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 3, 7.

31 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 60–67.

32 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 82–85. On 24 February 1939, the chief secretary sent letters for all district and division commissioners, with more specific instructions for what they were to provide to Tegart and housing committee. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 86–89.

33 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 74, 49–51, 48.

34 Battershill, box 12, folio 51b.

35 Battershill, Brit. Emp. t. 8 (4/5/3). The date written on the back of the photo reads "1938," but Battershill's diary clearly places the visit in January 1939.

36 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 101–9, 123–140, 141–46.

37 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 141–46.

38 S. E. V. Luke, 19 April 1940, in TNA CO 733/416/14, folia 23 (emphasis added).

39 It should be noted that Zionist leadership was divided over whether they should even entertain the idea of partition. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Organization, was a strong supporter. David Ben Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine somewhat reluctantly did as well. However, both Weizmann and Ben Gurion viewed it as merely a jumping off place, from which they would eventually obtain more territory.

40 *Palestine Partition Commission Report* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), 316.

41 CASA, K1C, folio 289.

42 Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA), Z4/32152.

43 J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, Volume 2, British French Supremacy, 1914–1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), 532–38.

44 MECA, Tegart Papers, Box 4, file 4, folia 34–39.

45 High Commissioner of Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 October 1941, in MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 121. On 9 September 1939 the Colonial Office received approval from the Treasury to spend up to £P2,500,000. TNA CO 733/389/17, folio 21. Interestingly, the *Survey of Palestine* puts the actual expenditure at £P1,441,000 between 1940 and 1944. See *A Survey of Palestine Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), vol. 2, 538.

46 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 120.

47 MECA, Saunders-Alb12-058. Several forts were built along the northern frontier and completed prior to the 55 "rural" forts mentioned above.

48 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 4, folio 62.

49 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 4, folio 35

50 CZA Z4/32153.

51 Tegart and his wife were hosted by the Weizman's for dinner in mid-July 1938, for example. CZA Z4/32153. Battershill

describes the house as palatial and mentions the goldfish in the pool. Battershill, box 12 and box 15, file 5.

52 See Weizmann's telegram, MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2b, folio 30; and Tegart's reply, CZA Z4/32153.

53 Tegart to Weizmann, 22 August 1938, CZA Z4/32153.

54 This phrase indicates that Joseph must have met with Tegart at least several and perhaps many times before, since he describes a pattern that he had observed in Tegart. CZA Z4/32152.

55 CZA Z4/32152.

56 CZA Z4/32152.

57 Yossi Katz, *Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan in the Mandate Era* (London: Routledge, 1998), 22.

58 Gideon Biger, *An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917–1929* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 244, 274, as cited in Kelly, *Crime of Nationalism*, 16.

59 Gad Kroizer, "Sir Charles Tegart beEretz Yisra'el: 'itsuv mediniyot bitahon hapenim haBritit vehamishtarah hakoloniyalit beEretz Yisra'el, 1937–1942" [Sir Charles Tegart in Palestine: The Design of British Internal Security Policy and the Colonial Police in Palestine, 1937–1942] (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002), v; Kroizer's 2011 book, *Ha-Tegartim: hakamat metsudot ha-mishtarah ha-Britit be-Eretz Yisra'el, 1938–1943* [The Tegarts: The Establishment of the British Police Fortifications in Palestine, 1938–1943] (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Yehuda Dekel, 2011), is based on his dissertation.

Bridging Imperial, National, and Local Historiographies

Britons, Arabs, and Jews in the Mandate Palestine Police

Yoav Alon

Throughout their vast empire, the British formed local police forces that were staffed by indigenous rank and file and commanded by British officers. This practice was dictated by the need to maintain an empire "on the cheap" and was underpinned by a philosophy of indirect rule, which dominated British colonial thinking between the two world wars. It was the police that enforced the law that upheld colonial authority, as "the colonial state's first line of contact with the majority of the populace."[1] As such, the police was the most visible public manifestation of colonial rule everywhere. It also manifested the British Empire's heavy investment in maintaining the collaboration of specific indigenous elites and ethnic groups, often by integrating them as employees of various state apparatuses and institutions.[2] In this regard, the Palestine Police resembled other such police forces in the empire, though it evolved over time so that, by the end of British rule in 1948, mostly British policemen staffed the force.

In the context of British Mandate Palestine, the Palestine Police was a unique colonial institution that brought together British, Arab, and Jewish servicemen. It fulfilled mundane civil police duties, but also stood at the frontline of the colonial state's efforts to secure its rule. In doing so, the Palestine Police played a crucial role in the history of the evolving conflict in Palestine. Palestine's particular security challenges also led its police force to become one of the most important and influential colonial forces in the entire British Empire.

This article explores the historiography of the Palestine Police. Despite its multifaceted historical importance, for years the Palestine Police generated only marginal interest

among scholars. The main source of information about the force had long been a semiofficial account written by one of its veterans. The last decade or so, however, has seen renewed interest in the topic, with a number of studies published that enrich the academic understanding of the force. This reflects a number of academic trends, most significantly a closing of the gap between the two fields of knowledge production – colonial policing and the history of Palestine – in which most previous studies of the Palestine Police had been carried out. This new research remains in its budding phase – presently, not a single academic book devoted to the Palestine Police has been published and there is room for much more historical inquiry. This article will thus trace these two arenas of knowledge production on the Palestine Police, surveying and evaluating the available literature, and identify remaining lacunae while suggesting new lines of inquiry. Before doing so, a brief introduction of the police and its historical significance is in order.

The Palestine Police and Its Historical Significance

The Palestine Police in the Mandate era was a semimilitary force. Its chief duty was to preserve law and order, quell disturbances, and patrol the borders. It carried out daily police work such as crime prevention and detection and traffic regulation. Its Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was responsible for intelligence collection. Established in 1920 as a small force consisting mainly of Arabs and some Jews under British command, the police underwent several reforms in subsequent years. Following its failure to control incidents of intercommunal violence in 1920 and 1921, and due to the participation of several Arab policemen in the riots, the British formed a 500-strong locally-recruited gendarmerie and, in 1922, brought some 700 former policemen from Ireland to create a separate British section of the gendarmerie. In 1926, the gendarmerie was disbanded and some of its men were absorbed into the newly established "British section" of the police, which operated alongside the larger "Palestinian section." The latter included local Jews and Arabs as well as small numbers of Armenians, Circassians, and other local groups who were neither Arab nor Jewish. Subsequent reforms following outbursts of violence such as the "Wailing Wall disturbances" (known in Arabic as *thawrat al-Buraq* and *Meoraot Tarpat* in Hebrew) led to the gradual reenlargement of the British component of the police. By the end of the Arab Revolt in 1939, the British made up 55 percent of the force, Arabs 35 percent, and Jews 10 percent – although the number of Jews and, to a lesser extent, Arabs were much higher if one includes the various auxiliary police bodies (Jewish Settlement Police, Temporary Additional Police, and Supernumerary Police). In the last years of the Mandate, it was Jewish insurgency that preoccupied the police and prompted the formation of special anti-insurgency units and further reinforcement from Britain: by 1947, the police's strength reached nine thousand, of whom 62 percent were British.[3]

An examination of the police presents a unique opportunity to consider the interaction between Arabs, Jews, and Britons in Mandate Palestine. Against the background of the emerging national struggle in Palestine, the force allowed for cooperation between individuals from communities in conflict. But – like other police forces elsewhere in the British Empire – the Palestine Police did not develop in insulation from the surrounding political environment. Its activities were both affected by and shaped events: indigenous rank and file often trod a fine line between professional commitment and loyalty to their comrades, on the one hand, and communal and national allegiances, on the other.

The Palestine Police deserves scholarly attention for other reasons as well. First, after the withdrawal of British troops in 1921, it became the main mechanism of colonial control and remained so until the 1936–39 revolt. Therefore, no full examination of British rule in Palestine and its interaction with local society can ignore the police. Second, the study of the police can shed light on a number of interrelated issues, such as patterns and perceptions of crime and lawbreaking, prison administration and the experience of imprisonment, and the criminal justice system and legal structures of the Mandate in general – all understudied in the context of Palestine. Third, the Palestine Police had a major impact on police forces and counterinsurgency methods around the British Empire. From the mid-1930s, Palestine served as the training grounds for British policemen and officers who then were stationed in many corners of the British Empire. In fact, the "Palestine Model" of policing was implemented in diverse countries such as Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya, and to some extent even in the United Kingdom.[4] Fourth, for the Jewish community of Palestine, the institution of the police force served as an important instrument in the preparations for statehood and fed the creation of the post-mandate Israel Police, whose nucleus in 1948 was formed by 700 former members of the Palestine Police. As such, the study of the Mandate's police can contribute significantly to the understanding of Israel's state-formation process.

Edward Horne's *A Job Well Done* (1982), however, remains the only book exclusively dedicated to the Palestine Police.[5] This quasi-official history records the force's evolution, its structure, methods of training, recruitment, investigation, and intelligence-gathering abilities. Despite its admiring and somewhat nostalgic tone, this book remains a standard work of reference for the study of the Palestine Police. Horne himself contributed to the study of the police as the longtime chair of the Palestine Police Old Comrades Association. In 2002, Horne donated the entire archives of the association – a rich source that includes publications (primarily the association's long-running newsletter) and internal correspondence – to the Middle East Center Archive (MECA) at St. Antony's College, Oxford, where they are available to researchers. Academic studies on the Palestine Police force began in the mid-1970s, and were conducted within the frameworks of two separate fields: colonial policing on the one hand, and the history of Mandate Palestine, on the other. There was limited interface between these two areas of scholarship, and the respective developments within them shaped the study of the Palestine Police.

Imperial Policing

The literature on colonial policing developed from Charles Jeffries's pioneering attempt to examine British colonial policing as a whole.[6] Jeffries, a former Colonial Office senior official, wrote his book when colonial policing was an ongoing reality and his own experience is clearly reflected in the book's narrative. With the end of empire, however, an academic field began to emerge and the late 1970s and 1980s saw the publication of histories of particular forces, exploring the colonial state's notions of crime and punishment and how it imposed them on indigenous populations to maintain social and political order.[7]

The early 1990s saw the evolution of colonial policing into a distinct field of scholarship. David Anderson and David Killingray's coedited volumes *Policing the Empire* (1991) and *Policing and Decolonisation* (1992) represent the first concentrated effort to critically reexamine assumptions about colonial police forces; in the second volume, the Palestine Police and its role suppressing the 1936–39 revolt constitute one of the case studies.[8] By offering a comparative approach, the studies demonstrate how illuminating the investigation of colonial police forces can be to the understanding of colonialism and decolonization, ethnic conflict and racial relations, and state and society dynamics. Anderson and Killingray start off by casting doubt on Jeffries's influential thesis that the Irish police served as the model for British colonial policing elsewhere. A number of colonial police forces, they indicated, differed widely from this alleged model.

Instead of a common point of origin in Ireland, Anderson and Killingray define colonial policing according to several common patterns in its development. For one, colonial policing was characterized by the inherent tension between the semimilitary mission of the police and the aspiration toward civil policing. The failure to make the police more "civil" was partly the result of the poor standing of European policemen vis-à-vis local society. Qualified volunteers were hard to come by and personnel rarely reached the standards set by the Colonial Office. A particular problem was the recruitment of reliable local rank and file, as many colonized subjects opposed the colonial state and did not want to serve it. Many forces were demoralized, undisciplined, and suffered difficult conditions including low wages and the hostility of the societies they policed. Race, too, was a critical element in every aspect of policing. Officers were for the most part white and local rank and file had only limited prospects of advancement into the officer corps. The British tended to look down upon their indigenous recruits, and never fully trusted their loyalty to the force.

Of particular relevance to the study of the Palestine Police is this literature's emphasis on decolonization as a turning point in the history of the police. After World War II, colonial police forces were tasked with executing the process of decolonization, which was rarely peaceful. Emergency measures instituted to help "keep the peace" gave the police enhanced powers that some individuals exploited and abused. The emergence of anti-colonial movements further complicated the lives

of local policemen: servicemen often sympathized with the national struggle and were reluctant to act against their brethren; meanwhile, many anti-colonial movements deliberately targeted policemen, who were seen as collaborators. Colonial powers therefore had to evaluate the strength of their local policemen's loyalties and calculate how far indigenous forces could be trusted. Where they could not, colonial powers called in the military, though by doing so they further damaged the legitimacy of their rule. In Palestine, too, from the 1936 Arab Revolt through the Jewish insurgency of the 1940s, the police was caught in this uncertain colonial dynamic that oscillated between domination and retreat.[9]

Over the last decade or so, interest in the field of colonial policing has grown in ways that are reflected in more recent studies of the Palestine Police. Scholars have used the police as a lens to consider the imperial histories of specific colonies,[10] while a more recent development, undoubtedly spurred by the type of transnational approach that is currently in vogue, examines colonial policing in a global context and offers a comparative look across empires. This literature has set out to reexamine or reevaluate global phenomena, such as decolonization and the Cold War, while other efforts in this vein have placed the legal and tactical aspects of the U.S.-led "global war on terror" in a longer genealogy of imperial counterinsurgency.[11] In the recent edited volume *Colonial Policing and the Transnational Legacy*, for example, scholars of policing in different empires join historians of the Portuguese Empire to offer comparative observations.[12]

Despite this growing body of literature on colonial policing, the topic is still by and large confined to institutional and political histories that engage the perspectives of colonial authorities. Thus, British, French, or Portuguese designs, motivations, attitudes, limitations, actions, and impact constitute the focus of inquiry. As Robert Bickers asserts, though historians of colonialism have more recently turned their attention to non-elite colonialists, "we still have very few studies of the British or any other nation's 'servants of empire' . . . the other ranks of empire work are obscurer still."[13] In studies of policing in the British Empire, senior officers rather than constables dominate. If locally recruited policemen earn attention at all, it is only through British eyes and based on British documents. With rare exceptions – Bickers's work prominent among them – what is still largely missing is an attempt to reconstruct the experience of the rank and file, both indigenous and European, in order to fully come to grips with the experience of serving in the colonial police.[14]

Until the 2000s, relatively few scholars interested in colonial policing took the Palestine Police as their case study – perhaps because it, like other Middle Eastern territories, was a relatively late addition to the British Empire, and then only as a League of Nations Mandate.[15] Scholars such as Tom Bowden, David Clark, Charles Townshend, and Charles Smith focused on the political and military aspects of policing.[16] Their main subjects of inquiry are the British policemen, and their commanders and superiors in Jerusalem and London. They based their research exclusively on British sources. In the early 2000s, Gad Kroizer drew attention to police

reforms that reshaped the Palestine Police in the 1930s, and in particular the system of fortified police stations – an effort recommended by and named after Charles Tegart, a British official with long experience in the colonial police in India.[17]

More recently, Georgina Sinclair's work has contributed significantly to the field of colonial policing and decolonization, as well as to the study of the Palestine Police. Sinclair analyzes colonial policing as a general phenomenon, substantiating her arguments with reference to specific forces, and argues that from the mid-1940s on, the Palestine Police served as a model for other forces dealing with mounting colonial crises.[18] Despite its many virtues, however, Sinclair's study is limited to the British sector of the police and all her sources are in English; Arab and Jewish policemen remain largely absent from the analysis. What is also notable is that Sinclair adopts and adapts Jeffries's "Irish thesis" – Palestine received the torch of colonial policing and became the new model after World War II.

Thus, despite challenges from Anderson and Killingray and more recently from Seán William Gannon,[19] the "Irish model" thesis remains, in a modified form, in much of the literature on the Palestine Police.[20] This is in no small part due to the large Irish contingent in the Palestine Police, and especially the recruitment of former members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and its auxiliary forces into the Palestine Gendarmerie, beginning in the early 1920s. Gannon and Richard Cahill, in particular, have examined the role and conduct of the Irish contingent in the force from its arrival in Palestine until the disbanding of the gendarmerie in 1926 (in the case of Gannon) or the end of the Mandate (in the case of Cahill).[21]

Matthew Hughes is among the most active and productive scholars in the broader field of colonial policing, including counterinsurgency operations. Significantly, he consults Arabic and Hebrew sources side by side with English ones, and draws on a number of oral and written testimonies from rank-and-file servicemen as well as those of Palestinians at the receiving end of British enforcement. In doing so, Hughes paints a revealing picture (and at times an unsettling and shocking one) of the day to day routine of colonial policing, with an emphasis on the human fallibility of the policemen – their heavy drinking habits, racist attitudes toward the locals, brutal behavior, and abuse of their positions.[22] His work unveils cases of torture and killing, behavior partly facilitated and legitimized, sometimes even encouraged, by practices of collective punishment instituted by the British in the 1920s, draconian emergency regulations instituted in the late 1930s, and senior officials' tendency to turn a blind eye throughout the Mandate period. These findings are in keeping with recent studies on British colonial policing, most notably in Kenya, that exposed hitherto unknown (or more accurately undocumented) British atrocities.[23] This conduct, Hughes claims, was also adopted by the Israeli state in its relations with its Arab population after 1948.[24] The continuity of British counterinsurgency in Palestine with its practices in other territories, as well as with Israeli methods, is a subject also elaborated by Laleh Khalili, who identifies Palestine as "a crucial node" in the networks that transmitted colonial policing practices across time and space.[25]

History of the Mandate

Meanwhile, until recently, historians of British Mandate Palestine tended to overlook the role of the police. The literature on British Palestine or the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) refers to the police only in passing, usually when dealing with outbursts of violence in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1936–39, and 1946–48. Martin Kolinsky was the first historian of the Palestine Mandate to examine closely the role of the police in enforcing law and order. However, his book deals with only the first years of the Mandate, ending on the eve of the Arab Revolt, the main challenge for the force.[26] Muhsin Muhammad Salih's book is the only work in Arabic to explore the role of the police (as well as the military) in implementing and enforcing British policy in Palestine. Based on British archives compounded by press reports and memoirs in Arabic, Salih focuses mainly on operational aspects and especially on the suppression of the Arab Revolt.[27]

A number of works address the role of the police during the Jewish insurgency pre-1948, whether in contributing to or attempting to suppress militant Zionist activities. In the twilight days of the Mandate, as both Jewish insurgency and British counterinsurgency intensified, David Cesarani describes how members of the newly established "special squads" abused their authority and murdered a member of the Lehi (Stern Gang), a case later covered up by the British authorities.[28] Similarly, Bruce Hofmann details the British authorities' struggle with the radical Jewish organizations Irgun and Lehi in the last decade of the Mandate, putting special emphasis on the counterinsurgency operations of the police as well as the army and the work of the CID in gathering intelligence on what the British saw as a terrorist movement.[29] Eldad Harouvi, having uncovered the CID's hitherto unknown files at the Haganah archive in Tel Aviv, uses these to detail the history of the CID, focusing especially on its pursuit of Jewish insurgents in the 1940s.[30] Yoav Gelber and Joshua Caspi, meanwhile, show how Jewish policemen collected intelligence for the Haganah and Caspi also examines the transformation from the Mandate police to Israel's police force.[31]

More recent histories of Mandate Palestine's police are also in keeping with a broader shift away from diplomatic history of the Mandate and its high politics, with its related emphasis on the geopolitics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and toward histories that examine specific institutions, groups, and individuals to shed light on broader social and cultural dynamics. These social and cultural histories have tended to do away with the "dual society" model that had for many years dominated the study of Palestine.[32] This approach assumed limited interaction between Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, mainly in the context of the national conflict, and regarded communal identities as natural and fixed, rather than constructed within a complex set of relations, forces, and circumstances. An alternative methodology borrows from Perry Anderson's concept of "relational history."[33] Questioning the somewhat simplistic Arab-Jewish binary juxtaposition, scholars used relational history to explore interactions between national communities, as well as within each group, taking into account factors such as religion, class, gender, and ethnic identity or country of origin in the formation of complex webs of identification.[34] The

relational model does not negate the centrality of a national conflict between Jews and Arabs, but it does not view these categories or the conflict as static, but as dynamic, reconfigured through interactions between and within these groups, as well as with other forces, such as the British. This approach has been influential even for works that do not explicitly employ the relational model, but nevertheless seek to move away from national narratives.[35] Study of the Palestine Police – an institution that allowed for a considerable degree of cooperation between British, Arabs, and Jews – is well suited to this growing tendency among historians of Palestine.

Perhaps the most significant development for those interested in studying the Palestine Police from a cultural or social history perspective came with the initiative of Eugene Rogan, director of the Middle East Center at St. Antony's College, to make MECA a major source of material on the subject. Shortly after receiving the records of the Palestine Police Old Comrades Association, MECA also negotiated access to thousands of personnel files of Palestine policemen that had previously been kept by the British National Archives in a remote warehouse. No less significant, Professor Rogan initiated and coordinated the Palestine Police Oral History Project carried out in Britain, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Israel.[36] Four research teams contacted and interviewed veterans – British, Arab, and Jewish – and the recordings of these interviews were placed with MECA. The preliminary findings were presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA) in 2007 in a panel dedicated to the Palestine Police. Subsequently, a number of Palestine Police veterans donated their private papers to MECA. As a result, for the first time there is a central archive that hosts a vast array of sources relating to the Palestine Police.

Anthropologist Efrat Ben-Ze'ev was perhaps the first to publish material from the Oral History project. Studying memories of the 1948 war and the events leading up to it, she examines the testimonies of British policemen, which she then compares to those of Palestinian Arab villagers forced from their homes and Jewish-Israeli veterans who fought in the war.[37] In doing so, she puts a human face on the policemen, allowing them to explain the way they saw their service in Palestine – even if, by comparison with Hughes's research, for example, their views are largely nostalgic, omitting the violence that he documents. Hagit Krik also dedicates a large part of her recent doctoral dissertation to British policemen and their everyday experiences in Mandate Palestine. Her socio-cultural analysis focuses on the rank and file and emphasizes class and race to expose the policemen's low position in the British colonial hierarchy, their habits and routines, the conditions of their accommodation, and attitude toward the communities they policed. These works' attention to the (British) rank and file is a welcome development.[38]

Also drawing on the MECA collection, as well as other newly available British sources, John L. Knight offers a fresh look at the police, its development during the Mandate, and its performance. He takes issue with earlier literature that stressed the police's failure to protect the Jewish community in Palestine, emphasizing (though perhaps pushing the argument too far and downplaying other considerations) that the security policy was

consistent with the government's facilitation of the Jewish National Home policy and protecting the Jewish community.[39] He convincingly demonstrates the contribution of this policy to the Zionist state-building project, especially during the Arab Revolt. More recently, Knight used police charge registers from Haifa and Petah Tikvah to examine the interactions of Jewish and Arab communities with Jewish and Arab policemen. In doing so, he shows that post-1929 police reforms, though they may not have resulted in lasting improvement in the force's legitimacy, had a real impact on perceptions of the police with regard to the resolution of quotidian issues.[40]

A number of recent works address the role of Jewish policemen in particular. Rivka Itzhak-Harel explores the connection between the Jewish Agency and the police following the Arab Revolt, offering a social analysis of Jewish policemen in the force.[41] Lior Yohanani, meanwhile, examines relations between Jewish and British members of the force based on oral testimonies of Israeli veterans together with documents from the Israel archives. As he rightly acknowledges, his portrayal of the nature of British-Zionist collaboration in the police awaits substantiation through comparing his evidence with that gleaned from British and Arab sources.[42]

Although relatively few works shed light on the Arab members of the Palestine Police compared to scholarship on the British and even Jewish components of the force, even in this respect one can see positive developments. The late Adel Yahya, who oversaw the collection of oral histories with policemen in the West Bank, published initial findings from these accounts.[43] Mansour Nasasra, in a chapter of his book about the relations between state and tribe in the Naqab/Negev in addition to several articles, analyzes how the police operated in the desert of Palestine. Nasasra compares oral history he collected among former Bedouin police with the testimony of the British assistant district officer who served there, in addition to written evidence held in state archives. These different perspectives allow him to stress the limitation of British control and the large degree of tribal autonomy in Palestine's periphery.[44]

Alex Winder's recent doctoral dissertation fills a major lacuna in the literature on the Palestine Police given its detailed analysis of Arab servicemen, not to mention several other neglected aspects.[45] His study explores the police's role in enforcing law and order among Arab communities of Palestine, focusing on the daily interaction between the police and colonized society not only during the Arab Revolt, as in most previous literature, but throughout the Mandate years. He examines British understandings and misunderstandings of local Arab society and the way these translated into policies and practices on the ground. His pioneering close examination of Arab recruits, a much neglected topic, is especially welcome. By tracing the career paths of several policemen who served in the Ottoman police, Winder succeeds in establishing certain continuities with the Ottoman period, something that has not been done before in the context of the Palestine Police. He shows that beyond personnel, the structures and practices of informal justice – based on shari'a and tribal customary law – common under the Ottomans continued well into the Mandate, though often in modified forms.

The paucity of research on the Arab policemen is not surprising and corresponds neatly

to a more general problem pertinent to the study of the Mandate period. Whereas English and Hebrew sources are abundant and readily available, Arabic sources are generally limited to the press, memoirs, private family collections, and oral histories. The absence of an Arab state in some part of historic Palestine means that there is hardly any archival material preserved by a central institution. Ongoing Palestinian statelessness also means limited institutional support for local Palestinian researchers. Although serious attempts to study Palestinian history and to find new methodologies that overcome the lack of official archives have increased significantly since the mid-1990s, these have not thus far chosen to investigate the Palestine Police or its Arab policemen.

Toward a Fuller Investigation of the Palestine Police

The study of the Palestine Police has advanced considerably in the last decade or so, especially as those working within the colonial policing paradigm and those working in the history of Mandate Palestine have increasingly converged. The accumulation of literature allows us to begin talking about an emerging field of knowledge, with its own particular discourse. Scholars are now engaged with others working in the same field in debates on, for example, the validity of the Irish model of policing in the case of Palestine, the level of brutality of British forces, the contribution of the police as compared to the military to the system of British colonial control, or the police's contribution to escalating communal conflict and the outcome of this conflict. Scholars of the Palestine Police can and do engage with historians of colonial policing in general and British colonial policing in particular, in addition to those working on various aspects of Mandate Palestine.

That said, many interesting aspects of the Palestine Police remain underdeveloped or ignored. A number of lacunae and potential lines of inquiry present themselves. We know very little about the police in Palestine during late Ottoman times.[46] The Palestine Police inherited much of the late Ottoman police personnel, functions, and methods. It was also tasked with enforcing many aspects of Ottoman law that continued into the Mandate period – the Ottoman Penal Code, with modifications, remained in effect until the promulgation of the 1937 Criminal Code Ordinance. This leads to the conclusion that it is essential to learn more about the Ottoman law enforcement apparatus that preceded the British police force in the Mandate. Only then will it be possible to assess the level of continuity between the two forces and the extent to which the British adopted Ottoman methods of policing or introduced new concepts and practices. On the other side of the Mandate period, the Palestine Police's legacy also awaits further scholarly inquiry. Only Caspi has examined continuities between the Mandatory force and the Israel Police. And although Ilana Feldman has written on policing in Gaza under Egyptian rule, the West Bank under Jordanian rule is still terra incognita in this respect.[47]

As far as Palestine Police per se is concerned, much more inquiry into the non-Britons in the force is required. Most urgently, we need more research on the Arab policemen: their social makeup, status among their compatriots, relations with the British superiors

and Jewish colleagues, attitudes toward the communities they policed and vice versa. We would also benefit from studies on policemen's contribution to the Palestinian national cause, as well as the reasons why some kept local nationalism at a distance. At the same time, though Jewish policemen have served as the subject of some scholarly inquiries, the available literature leaves much to be accomplished. In particular, recent Hebrew-language investigations of Jewish policemen would be of greater use if they could reach a wider English-speaking audience. Whatever their ethnic or national background, it would be valuable to learn more about individual servicemen in general. Individual, social, or collective biographies of policemen, officers and rank and file alike can help disaggregate the abstract notion of "police" into human actors with specific interests, motivations, aspirations, and constraints. Bickers has offered an appropriate model for this line of research.

Integrative studies, however, are particularly essential for a better understanding of the Palestine Police, being that its composition was multiethnic in character. British-Jewish-Arab relations should be at the heart of such inquiry and race, class, ethnicity, and national identity should be important components of analyzing the interaction and working relationships of the various groups. The tension between professionalism and comradeship, on the one hand, and national or communal allegiance, on the other, might prove an interesting theme. At the same time, and in line with the understanding of the "relational history," national identity should not be the exclusive focus of inquiry. Nor should the British, Arab, and Jewish components of the police be presented as unified and monolithic. By definition, this kind of inquiry requires facility in English, Arabic, and Hebrew sources.

Whereas almost all studies on the Palestine Police have treated it as a semimilitary force upholding British colonial control, its civil role has hardly been examined. Police methods of investigation and crime detection, daily enforcement of law and order, and service provision to those in need are all unexplored aspects of policing in Mandate Palestine. The police also regulated traffic as cars became commonplace in Palestine and dealt with smugglers – a modern phenomenon shaped by the establishment of new borders and new legal and economic regimes in the Middle East.[48] All these mundane functions might be interesting in and of themselves, but they can also shed light on more general themes such as state-society relations, the strength of the colonial state, the acceptance or enforcement of social norms and values, and questions of modernity, science, and technology.

Prisons and imprisonment in Mandate Palestine have also received scant scholarly attention. The Palestine Police ran prisons and internment camps in times of crisis, and recent scholarship has demonstrated the potential of such research.[49] Historians, sociologists, and criminologists have explored different aspects of imprisonment from the moment of arrest, through daily life in prison and relations between prisoners and staff, to the moment of release, the return home, the process of reintegration into society, and the lasting effects of imprisonment.[50] Historians of colonialism have also examined prison as a colonial control tool as well as a breeding ground for anti-colonial movements.[51] All

these themes are relevant to Mandate Palestine and promise to generate much interest.

The Palestine Police constitutes a promising subject of scholarly investigation, both with regard to the broader field of colonial policing and with regard to the social and cultural history of Palestine under the British Mandate. It is hoped that the present interest in the topic will continue and new studies will enrich our understanding of this unique force. Perhaps this article will be a modest contribution to this budding tendency.

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Endnotes

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Dynamics of Prison Resistance

Hunger Strikes by Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli Prisons

Malaka Mohammed Shwaikh

A box of stone

where the living and dead move in the dry clay

like bees captive in a honeycomb of a hive

and each time the siege tightens

they go on a flower hunger strike

and ask the sea to indicate the emergency exit

> – Mahmud Darwish, "Mural" (1999)[1]

In addition to the loss of land and the pain of dispossession, the great Palestinian poet Mahmud Darwish evoked the loss of freedom of those locked behind Israeli bars. In his poem "Mural," he beautifully represents power and resistance, giving poetic expression to Michel Foucault's contention that "where there is power, there is resistance."[2] While the oppressor can capture or tighten the siege on the living as well as the dead, the oppressed – like bees in a honeycomb – resist, not by stinging but by going on "a flower hunger strike." They tactically diffuse (to use Doug McAdam's language)[3] their methods of resistance, appealing to the sea, a symbol of freedom and contact with the wider world, or those free from domination.

A hunger strike is a powerful means of prison resistance. Prisons and detention centers are places of power, but also resistance, and hunger strikers seek to use the authorities' apparent strength against them. Deciding to embark on such a strike is one step in a lengthy process of struggle to make changes in the prisoners' lives and conditions. Ultimately, the prisoners' willingness to deprive their own bodies of food and to put their lives on the line exemplifies Bargu's concept of necroresistance,[4] put simply in the slogan "death or freedom."

Not even a full year after Israel's military

conquest of the remainder of Palestine in June 1967, Palestinians in Israeli prisons embarked on their first hunger strike. On 18 February 1968, prisoners in Ramleh prison demanded that their imprisonment conditions improve and, most importantly, that their dignity be respected. In particular, they demanded that they should no longer be forced to address Israeli prison officials with *ya sidi* ("my lord" in Arabic). Since then, Palestinian prisoners have embarked on a large number of collective and individual hunger strikes.[5] Using interviews with hunger strikers,[6] analysis of media documents, and a nuanced review of hunger strikes by Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons between 1968 and 2018, this article explores the dynamics within which the process of hunger strikes operates. It starts by introducing the concepts and theories used in the article, before moving on to examine means of prison-based resistance. It then provides insights into the type of repression used by the colonial authorities to stop hunger strikes, with a specific focus on force-feeding. The strategies and effectiveness of hunger strike protests inside prisons are not shaped in a vacuum. Apart from the oppressive responses of prison authorities that are the immediate context, protest actions are heavily impacted by sociopolitical events happening in the broader community.

Hunger Strikes in Theory and Practice

While hunger strikes as a form of protest have occurred throughout history, they are a feature of activism that became widespread during the last century. The typical location of these protests is a prison, a "place of power," where the absolute power of the authorities can be challenged, but only in certain ways.[7] Michel Foucault and later Magnus Hörnqvist argue that power relations are complex, unstable, contentious, and unequal, and therefore subject to disruptions and resistance.[8] These power relations are also subject to the political opportunity structure, with respect to how prison conditions affect the prisoners' potential to mobilize effectively. The political opportunity structure in prison shapes the possibilities for resistance in highly constrained environment. (Thus, for example, first-time prisoners are generally unfamiliar with such opportunities, making their resistance more difficult or less likely.) The provision and acceptance of food, however, is one arena in which power and resistance have the opportunity to play out in prison.

Consideration of the political opportunity structure of prisons can also help challenge the common conceptualization of hunger strikes as a form of principled nonviolence and passive resistance.[9] Hunger strikes are pragmatic forms of resistance. They, arguably, are not chosen as a method based on protestors' morals and ethics guiding them toward nonviolence; rather, hunger strikes are chosen in order to bring about results in an arena in which the opportunities to achieve change are severely limited.[10] Furthermore, the binary reduction of protest into violent or nonviolent action has its roots in the colonial narrative and fails to recognize the agency of protestors: when violence is equated with barbarism and nonviolence is equated with passivity on the part of the oppressed, the participants are implicitly dehumanized.[11]

Hunger strikers' willingness to die before submitting to a life without dignity, what Banu Bargu terms necroresistance, can sustain a movement and lead to change. Necroresistance transforms the body from a site of subjection to a site of insurgency, which "by self-destruction presents death as a counterconduct to the administration of life."[12] Necroresistance seizes the power of life and death from the state, thus establishing an active counter to sovereign power. It also brings the concept of sovereignty to a human and personal level, focusing on the administration of people's lives as the object of power, but noting that the power structure can be inverted in the protesters' favor.

Still, there is a difference between deliberate acts of resistance and the kind of refusal that hunger strikers perform. Hunger strikers place themselves in a position where physical weakness reduces the ability to act and think, depending on the distributed effect of the strike to spur other participants and supporters to action. In other words, becoming weak as an individual, and thereby creating particular conditions of possibility to mobilize strength elsewhere, is a mode of actively doing politics that expands repertoires of protest and asserts agency and ownership of one's body. This is not the mere refusal to consume food; hunger strikes are not effective if divorced from a larger strategy that aims at winning demands and invoking a response from the target.[13]

Palestinians imprisoned by Israeli authorities have learned from protests elsewhere a range of often effective methods to challenge the prison systems and motivate for improved conditions. In an interview, hunger striker Mahmoud Sarsak said that prior to embarking on hunger strikes, prisoners held awareness sessions to examine strikes in Northern Ireland and other countries.[14] Likewise, other struggles looked toward Palestinian hunger strikes. For example, in 1981, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) contacted a Palestinian prisoner who had survived a hunger and thirst strike for a long period. The IRA began to study the process of hunger strike more carefully and tried to put the Palestinian strikers' experience to use.[15] This communication took place before the major IRA hunger strike in 1981, during which ten men died, and which brought significant national and international attention and sympathy to the movement for a united Ireland.[16] Similarly, the Palestinian experience inspired the Kurdish hunger strikers in the 1980s and 1990s. The Kurdish hunger striker Suna Purlak, imprisoned in Turkish prisons between 1993 and 2000, told me that in the 1980s, the Kurdish hunger strikers were inspired by the Irish as well as Palestinian strikes.[17] When the Kurdish prisoners embarked on further hunger strikes in the 1990s, she added, it was the Palestinian hunger strikes that inspired them the most.

Unlike revolts and riots, hunger strikes can be a prolonged and open-ended form of prison-based resistance. The prisoners' power is embodied in their choice of action, and their ability to start and end it whenever they want. Through their strikes, the prisoners claim the ownership of their own bodies and even lives. Although authorities have greater power to establish the narrative outside the prison, labeling prisoners "terrorists" and "militants" who deserve to die in prisons, through their actions strikers send a message to the outside world, emphasizing that they are victims and subject to oppression.

The strikers' power is not merely quantitative in terms of (re)claiming ownership of

their bodies for a particular period of time. It is also qualitative in terms of the type of achievements they secure. In Israeli prisons, Palestinians have achieved key demands through hunger strikes. One prisoner put it:

> Everything inside the prison has a story of resistance behind it. So, as I said, everything you find in prison, the blanket, the cup, the pens, the paper, the books in the library, the food. There is a story of the struggle behind this. And one day it was one of the prisoners' demands in their hunger strikes.[18]

Achievements go beyond basic necessities to winning agency, dignity, and power. A leader of the collective hunger strike of 1992 said that Israeli prison guards "doffed their hats for me." She added that they "would count twice before they would speak to any prisoners without our [prisoners' leadership] permission."[19]

Repertoires of Prison Mobilization

In Israeli prisons, prisoners tend to create their own opportunities. Through the practice of *sumud*, roughly translated as "steadfastness," they refuse to confess and comply, and continue on with their resistance, not only to their daily treatment or imprisonment conditions but also to their imprisonment in the first place, whatever the charges (if any). Through *sumud*, prisoners destabilize colonial order and its power relations.[20] This is once again an emphasis on the reality of prisons, as places of power and resistance, in which the prisoners fight domination and subjection, and try to use these spaces and their dynamics for their own benefits.

Heather Ann Thompson argues that state officials in the U.S. context "fail to recognize that prisoners are human beings and that, as such, they will always resist being treated like animals."[21] Palestinian prisoners are also dealt with as subhumans, consistently dehumanized, degraded and deprived of their basic rights, referred to by numbers and without names.[22] Hunger striking is a means to bring about changes to the conditions of imprisonment, including inadequate portions and quality of food, the use of torture and mistreatment, inadequate medical care, and denial or restrictions of family visits and access to lawyers. Prisoners may employ temporary hunger strikes of set duration or open-ended hunger strikes, with no set end date. The open-ended hunger strike shows a willingness to go as far as death to press demands.

Since 1967, 216 Palestinian prisoners have been killed in Israeli prisons.[23] The two predominant causes of death are medical negligence and torture.[24] Both reasons are themselves major motives to embark on hunger strikes. However, hunger strikes themselves can be life-threatening, especially if open-ended in time frames. Thus, before embarking on a strike, prisoners tend to try other less high-stakes means of resistance to free themselves, whether for freedom in its physical meaning, or freedom from abuse and mistreatment.

Palestinian prisoners have tried to physically escape prison on numerous occasions. This is perhaps the definitive act of resistance for those incarcerated, though it is often sensationalized by the media or romanticized by Hollywood.[25] The reality of physical escape from prison is markedly different, of course. With advances in security technology, prison structures and conditions became more repressive and physical prison escape became almost impossible. On 17 May 1987, an escape from Israel's al-Saraya prison in Gaza was successful.[26] In the process, six prisoners managed to escape. Even if successful, escape attempts are rarely documented as Israeli authorities do not want to publicize their failures or the success of prisoners' resistance.

When physical escape is impossible, other less risky means of resistance are more likely. This may include noncompliance with the prison authorities' daily search routine orders, as in regular prison cell inspection. By communicating with lawyers, family members, or media networks regarding conditions of confinement, prisoners are also able to embarrass or put pressure on prison authorities. The Israeli legal system, although hardly trusted by prisoners, can also be used in an attempt to defend prisoners' rights. Another form of resistance is seen when prisoners educate each other about politics, holding reading groups and informal meetings to discuss resistance. Political education and consciousness-raising in prisons cannot be underestimated; it is an important way to instigate other forms of resistance, as part and parcel of organizing and uniting prisoners. Among these forms of daily prison resistance, we can also include one-day hunger strikes or other hunger strikes of limited duration. However, all of these methods are subject to repression by Israeli prison authorities. Prisoners who were interviewed spoke of Israeli attempts to prohibit communication with the outside world, forbid lawyers' and families' visits, and disallow writing materials into the prison facilities.

If these types of resistance failed to achieve results, prisoners turned to methods of last resort in an attempt to meet their needs and to protest the intransigence of the military court system and imprisonment of Palestinians without fair trial. Hunger strikes usually take significant time – up to several years – and effort to organize and prepare.[27] Although records are incomplete, Palestinian prisoners have conducted hunger strikes at least since 1968. Influenced by external events, hunger strikes have been launched in waves over the decades, and met by authorities with evolving strategies to impede or prohibit them. Most of the early strikes, up to the twenty-first century, were collective protests involving many prisoners and various prison facilities simultaneously, which included the establishment of prisoners' committees and standard procedures for negotiation. While prisoners were released as a result of internationally brokered agreements, the gains from these collective actions diminished over time. The more recent pattern has seen multiple individual hunger strikes conducted mainly in the hope of securing release from prison. In practically all cases, Israeli authorities' agreements to meet strikers' demands were reversed at a later stage. However, protest actions, collective and individual, continue in an effort expose the inhumane conditions of imprisonment and attract support from overseas

organizations. All of this is important to the greater cause of liberation.

To disrupt these efforts, authorities isolate leaders in solitary confinement, prevent communication between prisoners, and cut off their contacts with the world outside. As in the case of prison escapes, there is evidence of the Israeli authorities failing to document or let others document hunger strikes. The same authorities try to diminish or undermine hunger strikes and to redefine what counts as an open-ended hunger strike. The debate about what constitutes an open-ended hunger strike is ongoing and contentious, as Palestinian prisoners attempt to establish control over their bodies and Israeli authorities seek to diminish the political impact of hunger strikes by claiming that they were not "true" hunger strikes. For example, Khader Adnan, on hunger strike for 66 days, considers an open-ended hunger strike to be the refusal of any nourishment other than water and salt, without any intravenous vitamin intake. Samer Issawi was on hunger strike for 277 days.[28] This may have been possible because of the vitamin "cocktail" administered intravenously, which kept him alive even though he was not eating.

Palestinian prisoners who embark on open-ended hunger strikes place themselves at considerable risk to their health and safety. Mahmoud Sarsak noted that, on the eighteenth day of his hunger strike, he fainted several times, and each time he was left on the prison hospital's floor until he resumed consciousness.[29] Although his health condition was critical, and loss of consciousness could easily have led to a coma, prison medics did not interfere to provide medical support. This indicates that Israeli authorities not only fail to provide for prisoners' needs, but, as noted by Thompson, degrade and dehumanize them, even if it means leaving them to die.

In relation to hunger strike, the question of medical care is particularly fraught, as it was often used to undermine or break the strike. For example, intravenous treatment is typically forced on strikers and then used to diminish the credibility of the scale of their strike. In an interview with Issawi's sister Shireen, she said Samer was compelled to take sustenance intravenously "only when he lost consciousness and was in the recovery room." Furthermore, it was forced on him without his consent. Shireen added that the Israeli authorities used the intravenous treatment in an attempt to diminish the impact of his strike. Beyond intravenous treatment, Palestinian prisoners have also been subject to force-feeding. This is the focus of the next section.

Force-feeding

As soon as a hunger strike begins, Israeli methods of repression escalate. Hunger strikers are put in solitary confinement to separate them from nonstriking prisoners, refused visits from their families and lawyers, and their belongings are confiscated.[30] They may also be force-fed. Force-feeding as a method of breaking hunger strikes was documented as early as 1897 in the case of the British suffragettes' movement. A letter to the *Manchester Guardian* on 27 June 1912 stated that the suffragettes were not

striking against their imprisonment but against the government's refusal to acknowledge the crimes for which they were being held as political acts.[31] The length of their hunger strikes varied – the first woman to hunger strike, Marion Wallace Dunlop, did so for 91 hours before being released.[32] It is not clear how many women were on strike or for how long,[33] but the British government refused to release most of those on strike.[34] To stop their action, the British government used force-feeding, through either a stomach pump or a nasal tube, to end the suffragettes' action against their will. The so-called Cat and Mouse Act of 1913 allowed for the temporary release of hunger strikers who become ill, allowing them to regain their health only to be re-arrested once they were well enough to complete their sentences.[35] Later, in 1917, Irish hunger striker Thomas Ashe died due to complications from force-feeding.[36]

Since the 1970s until 2015, forced feeding was conducted arbitrarily and without regulation in Israeli prisons.[37] Forced feeding was conducted primarily as a form of physical and physiological torture, to stop prisoners' peaceful protests demanding their rights; it was conducted not to save strikers' lives, but to degrade and dehumanize them.[38] Moussa Sheikh, a hunger striker, who was force-fed in 1970, explained the process as follows:

> The prisoner enters the room handcuffed and legs shackled. There are two police officers on either side of the prisoner, who terrorize him physically and mentally. They poke him harshly in the ribs and on the back of the neck, talking the whole time in a way that is meant to break the prisoner's spirit, saying things like "You are practically dead now." The prisoner is tied to a chair so that he [cannot] move. The doctor then sticks the tube up the nose of the prisoner in a very harsh way… When it was done to me, I felt my lungs close as the tube reached my stomach… I almost suffocated. They poured milk down the tube, which felt like fire to me. It was boiling. I could not stay still and danced from the pain.[39]

'Abd al-Qadir Abu al-Fahm, who joined Sheikh in the 1970 hunger strike in Ashkelon prison, died as a result of force-feeding on 11 May 1970, one of four documented cases of hunger strikers who died during or after being force-fed.[40] Rasim Halawa and 'Ali al-Ja'fari were killed in July 1980, when the Israeli authorities inserted feeding tubes into their lungs instead of their stomachs. The fourth to die was Ishaq Maragha, who passed away in Beersheba prison in 1983, three years after being force-fed. Although it is not clear whether force-feeding caused his death, his health had been seriously compromised from having been force-fed.

These four deaths negate Israeli claims that force-feeding is used as a last resort to save hunger strikers' lives – a justification put forward, for example, by Yoel Hadar, legal advisor to the Israeli Ministry of Public Security, in 2015.[41] A thorough investigation into the details of the conditions under which these hunger strikers were force-fed show they were in the initial stages of their hunger strikes when they were

force-fed, and not on the verge of death. For instance, Abu al-Fahm was in the third day of a hunger strike when force-fed, and his health was good enough not to require such extreme intervention.[42]

The death of hunger strikers in 1980 led to political unrest, as the Palestinian public protested, demonstrated, and clashed with the Israeli forces in several parts of Palestine.[43] Force-feeding was subsequently stopped by an order from the Israeli High Court.[44] This highlights the importance of political unrest in exerting pressure on colonial authorities; although Israel is the hegemonic power, any unrest that affects its security is a red line for its calculated actions. The High Court's decision to halt force-feeding did not last for long – it was disregarded by prison authorities. Force-feeding continued, without a constitutional law. In an interview, Mahmoud Sarsak revealed that Israeli authorities attempted to force-feed him and another hunger striker in 2012. This was done in the prison's medical clinic and not in the ordinary cell, as hunger strikers are moved to the clinic once their condition deteriorates. In this instance, the attempted force-feeding was stopped by the intervention of other prisoners, who "started shouting and kicking the doors in protest."[45] Sarsak added that Israeli authorities used force-feeding via tubes as a threat to coerce him and other prisoners to accept vitamin cocktails intravenously, adding that Israeli authorities customarily view either intravenous injection or force-feeding (or both) as the equivalent to breaking the strike.[46] This interpretation is also clear in the case of Samer Issawi, whose intravenous "feeding" was subsequently used by Israeli authorities to try to diminish his strike.

In response to increasing numbers of individual and collective hunger strikes, and with attempts to force-feed prisoners combatted by prisoners' persistence and noncompliance, Israel sought to legalize force-feeding. A bill doing so was officially introduced in 2014, and passed on 30 July 2015.[47] In Israeli interior minister Gilad Erdan's words, force-feeding is a means to "prevent" prisoners from "applying pressure on the state."[48] Qaddoura Fares, head of the Palestinian Society Prisoner's Club (*Nadi al-asir al-Filastini*), affirmed this interpretation, and added that Israel is using force-feeding to stop future hunger strikes,[49] given how much they had energized broad support for the prisoners' cause, and the Palestinian cause more generally, throughout the years. Though force-feeding had been used before, Israel wanted to make it harder for human rights organizations to oppose them. Sahar Francis, director of Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, stated in an interview with *al-Jazeera* that the intention of the law is that Israel "can use force-feeding as a tool, legalized by a law, and then it will be very hard for us as lawyers and human rights organizations to oppose and face such systems."[50]

Israeli authorities also claim the bill aims to avoid irreversible damage to prisoners. However, the legislation allows considerable latitude for authorities to act without medical consultation chosen or trusted by the prisoners to judge their health. Rather it allows for force-feeding upon request by the Israel Prison Service, following approval by either the attorney general or district attorney of Israel, submitted to the president of an Israeli district court or to an attorney.[51]

The 2015 law lists three elements to be assessed before force-feeding: state security, public safety, and the person's threat to themselves. Taking the first two into account, and in accordance with article 19 of the Patients' Rights Act that guarantees "medical confidentiality," court hearings on force-feeding can be based on "secret evidence" and held in closed sessions, without prisoners or their attorneys knowing, or being able to challenge, the evidence or justifications. The use of secret evidence is, ironically, the very reason for some administrative detainees embarking on hunger strikes.[52] The use of nonnegotiable secret evidence is a political intervention aimed to preclude any defense.

The third element assessed when force-feeding is taken as a measure – the prisoner's threat to themselves – is cast as an attempt to preserve the lives of hunger strikers. But, as noted earlier, force-feeding has political, more than medical, objectives. Revealingly, the bill was passed in the Knesset and supported by the political apparatus of the state, despite determined opposition from medical and legal organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.[53] Israeli doctors refused to back the proposal, and later the legislation, with the nation's leading clinicians' association, the Israel Medical Association, branding it as "torture."[54] Israeli doctors declared that they would not follow the law for ethical and medical reasons, including the need for informed consent from hunger strikers. Informed consent is particularly important because hunger strikers are not normal patients, but people who have, to achieve a demand, willingly placed themselves in a situation that may end their lives. Moreover, doctors refused to allow medical decisions to be dictated by politicians. This was affirmed by Yoel Donchin, a member of the Israel Medical Association and of Physicians for Human Rights, who said:

> I don't have prisoners. I have patients. I'm not going to do any harm to the patient against his will, and I am not going to rape him under the law. I am not going to insert a tube if he refuses. If the patient is in a grave condition and he's going to die in my department, I have to consider it between my own ethical values and the patient's values and the family response, not by any law that politicians who get thirty votes or forty votes decided for me what to do to my patient… This [force-feeding law] is beyond and above any medical issue. It has nothing to do with the Hippocratic oath and nothing to do with my values as a physician facing a patient.[55]

Israel's claim that the objective of force-feeding is to save prisoners' lives – and its broader attempt to portray itself as interested in the health of Palestinian prisoners – is disingenuous. A review of medical history in Israeli prisons clearly shows the type of medical negligence and torture to which prisoners are subjected. The Palestinian Society Prisoner's Club and the Prisoners' Commission documented 72 deaths due to torture since 1967.[56] Prisoners who suffer from serious ailments are often freed once

their health condition is irreversible, but they are then generally refused permission to travel abroad to seek treatment.[57]

Despite the Israeli authorities' attempts to portray force-feeding as a humanitarian action, it is more realistically a short-cut to stop prisoners from hunger striking and, at the same time, ignore their demands. Most importantly, it allows Israel to avoid deaths of hunger strikers, which might spark uprisings and further instability in Palestine, as in the 1970s and 1980s. This was emphasized by Yoel Adar, a legal advisor to the Ministry of Public Security, who, when asked whether a hunger striker could harm the public, responded: "If he [the hunger striker] dies in prison, it causes riots – in prison, in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], in Palestinian territories. This has a definite implication on Israel."[58] The death of hunger strikers and the subsequent unrest inside and outside of prisons remain red lines for Israel's security.

Despite medical, legal, and human rights efforts in opposition to force-feeding, there were no attempts to change or repeal the law, and it seems that Israeli authorities have not felt much pressure to acquiesce to Palestinian prisoners' demands or discuss the potential for a law against force-feeding. This suggests that Palestinian hunger strikers continue to be under threat of force-feeding.

Conclusion

This article has sought to contextualize hunger strikes within a broader range of Palestinian prison resistance. Further, it has focused on the role of force-feeding in the struggle between Palestinian prisoners and Israeli authorities over the very basic control over the bodies and dignity of the imprisoned. Although Israeli authorities have claimed that force-feeding is a humanitarian tool – a means of securing the lives of Palestinians intent on doing harm to themselves – all evidence points to its political, not medical, motivations. First, force-feeding has been a way of inflicting violence against prisoners, leading in the 1970s and 1980s to the deaths of four hunger strikers, including 'Abd al-Qadir Abu al-Fahm, who was force-fed on the third day of his strike, when he was in no medical danger and strong enough to continue his strike. Further, Israeli authorities' supposed interest in the health and well-being of prisoners is undermined by the numbers of Palestinians killed in Israeli prisons through torture and medical negligence. Finally, when in 2015 the Israeli Knesset voted to legalize the force-feeding of hunger strikers, this was done despite the Israel Medical Association's serious opposition. It becomes clear, therefore, that the aim of such life-threatening tactics is to punish hunger strikers and forcibly put an end to their strikes or to frighten other Palestinian prisoners who may think of embarking on a strike into abandoning the last resort to achieving their demands. Yet, as the history of prison hunger strikes in Palestine and elsewhere indicates, it is unlikely to succeed.

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Endnotes

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2   Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 95.

3   Doug McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (Dec. 1983): 735–754.

4   Banu Bargu, *Starve and Immolate: The Politics of Human Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

5   I use "detainees" and "prisoners" to refer to Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. "Detainees" refers to those held without charge or of unknown status, and "prisoners" to those who have been charged and/or sentenced. When it is not known whether an individual is a prisoner or a detainee, I use "political prisoner," because all administrative detainees are imprisoned for political reasons. In other words, all administrative detainees are political prisoners but not all political prisoners are administratively detained. Also, when the word "prisoners" is used to refer to Palestinian prisoners, it refers to "political prisoners." Israel perceives them as "criminals" and "terrorists," but Palestinians tend to see most of them as political prisoners, held for resisting a brutal occupation that violates international law. This understanding is based partly on the interviews conducted with former hunger strikers, noted below, as well as on the writings of Nahla Abdo, *Palestinian Women's Anti-Colonial Struggle within the Israeli Prison System* (London: Pluto Press, 2014); and Esmail Nashif, *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

6   All interviews were conducted by the author between March 2016 and July 2018. Interviewees are: Ahmed al-Faleet (from Gaza, in April–July 2018), Fahed Abu al-Haj (from Jerusalem, in January and May 2018), Hana Shalabi (from Jenin, currently residing in Gaza, on 13–14 April 2017 and 19 July 2018), Hani Issawi (from Jerusalem, on 20–21 July 2018), Mahmoud Sarsak (from Gaza, currently residing in London, on 25 May 2018), Mazen Malasa (from Amman, in March 2016), Shireen Issawi (from Jerusalem, in July 2018), Suad Ghanem (from Furaydis, south of Haifa, currently residing in Exeter, on 20 September 2017), all of whom were at one time incarcerated in Israeli prisons; Suna Purlak (currently living in the United Kingdom,

on 10 June 2018), a Kurdish woman previously incarcerated in Turkish prison; and June Purvis, emerita professor of women's and gender history at the University of Portsmouth (via email, 14 July 2018).

7   Bargu, *Starve and Immolate*.

8   Magnus Hörnqvist, *Risk, Power, and the State: After Foucault* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4–5; Michel Foucault, "The Subject of Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 777–795.

9   Lauren Wilcox, *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 26, 65; Stephen Scanlan, Kimberly Lamm, and Laurie Copper Stoll, "Starving for Change: The Hunger Strike and Nonviolent Action, 1906–2004," in *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, ed. Patrick G. Coy (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2008), 283–84.

10 Scanlan, Lamm, and Stoll, "Starving for Change," 283–84.

11 Banu Bargu, "The Silent Exception: Hunger Striking and Lip Sewing," *Law, Culture, and the Humanities* (24 May 2017), online at journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1743872117709684 (accessed 25 July 2018).

12 Bargu, *Starve and Immolate*, 85. See also: Abdo, *Palestinian Women's Anti-Colonial Struggle*.

13 Carl Sebastian Abrahamsson and Endre Danyi, "Becoming Stronger by Becoming Weaker: The Hunger Strike as a Mode of Doing Politics," *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2018): 23–24.

14 In 1917, following the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish War of Independence, a rash of hunger strikes erupted, initially in response to violent treatment of prisoners at a Dublin jail. Strikers also refused to wear prison uniforms and do prison work. The leaders of the strike, including Thomas Ashe, the former president of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a forerunner of the Irish Republican Army, died during the strike. Ashe was force-fed by British authorities. The most recent Irish hunger strike was in 1981, during which ten strikers died. See: Peter Barberis, John McHugh, and Mike Tyldesley, *Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political Organizations: Parties, Groups, and Movements of the 20th Century* (New York: Continuum, 2000), 777; and David Beresford, *Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 17. Earlier precedents included the 1909 hunger strike undertaken by British suffragettes. See Elizabeth Crawford, *The Women's Suffrage*

Movement: A Reference Guide, 1866–1928 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2003), 306. More recently, prisoners at the U.S. detention camp at Guantanamo Bay embarked on several hunger strikes. The first of these ended in 2005, when prison authorities agreed to provide prisoners better access to books and bottled drinking water. See: Audrey Gillan, "Hunger Strikers Pledge to Die in Guantánamo," *Guardian*, 8 September 2005, online at www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/09/uk.guantanamo (accessed 25 July 2018); Stefan Simanowitz, "Rapper's Hunger Strike Shows Power of Ancient Form of Protest," *HuffPost*, 22 October 2015 (updated 22 October 2016), online at www.huffingtonpost.com/stefan-simanowitz/rappers-hunger-strike_b_8332524.html (accessed 25 July 2018); and Basil Farraj, "How Palestinian Hunger Strikes Counter Israel's Monopoly on Violence," *al-Shabaka*, 12 May 2016, online at al-shabaka.org/commentaries/palestinian-hunger-strikes-counter-israels-monopoly-violence/ (accessed 25 July 2018).

15 Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA: A History* (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1993), 377. Shannon Scott writes, for example, "This preparation and experience helps to explain why Bobby Sands became concerned at one point that a toothache would develop into something serious enough to force him off of his strike." Shannon Scott, "The Once and Future Bobby Sands: A Critique of the Material Rhetorical Appeal of the 1981 Hunger Strike in Long Kesh Prison" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2004), 166.

16 See, for example, Beresford, *Ten Men Dead*; Scott, "Once and Future Bobby Sands," 166; McAdam, "Tactical Innovation"; Coogan, *IRA*, 377.

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Policing the Intimate

Israel's Anti-Miscegenation Movement

Sarah Ihmoud

On the evening of 16 August 2012, Jamal Julani, a seventeen-year-old Palestinian boy from the Ras al-'Amud neighborhood of occupied East Jerusalem, was beaten unconscious in Zion Square, a large public area just past the Green Line's invisible borders marking East from West Jerusalem. A group of about fifty Jewish Israeli teenagers had marched through the streets chanting "Death to Arabs," and seemed, one witness recalled, to be "hunting for Arab victims."[1] When they came upon Julani and his three cousins, the boys tried to flee, but the attackers blocked them. Hundreds watched, but no one intervened, as the group of Jewish Israeli youth beat Jamal nearly to death. While it was initially treated as a "brawl," Israeli police later referred to the attack as a "lynching."

Days later, during a police investigation, one of the attackers' brothers, who had also been present at the scene, told court reporters it was the four Arab youths who had provoked passersby by "making passes at Jewish girls." He added: "Why should an Arab make passes at my sister? *They shouldn't be here, it's our area*. For what reason would they come here if not to make passes at Jewish girls?"[2] While Julani still lay in critical condition, wavering between life and death in a nearby hospital, a fifteen-year-old Jewish youth involved said outside the courthouse, "For all I care, let him die. He's an Arab . . . If it was up to me, I'd have murdered him."[3]

In the aftermath of the so-called Jerusalem lynching, a poster in Hebrew and Arabic was distributed in the streets of East and West Jerusalem and circulated on Facebook, gaining hundreds of "likes" and "shares."[4] It read:

> Dear Arab guy: We don't want you to get hurt! Our daughters are valuable to us, and just as you

would not want a Jew to date your sister, we are also unwilling for an Arab to date a girl from among our people. Just as you would do anything to stop a Jew from dating your sister – so do we! If you are thinking of visiting Jerusalem malls or the pedestrian street [*midrechov*] with the intention of dating Jewish girls – this isn't the place for you. You may walk around in your own village freely and find girlfriends there, not here! Last week an Arab who thought he might find Jewish girls got hurt. We don't wish for you to get hurt, So respect our daughters' honor, as we mind it dearly![5]

The poster, distributed by Lehava (the Hebrew acronym for Preventing Assimilation in the Holy Land) mobilizes a discourse of protecting Jewish women from Palestinian men as part of a movement to prevent intermarriage or intimate relationships between Palestinians and Jews. Benzi Gopstein, director of Lehava and a follower of Meir Kahane,[6] praised the "lynching" of Julani and his cousins in its immediate aftermath and condemned the police investigation:

It seems that here the youth raised Jewish pride off the floor and did what the police should have done. They did justice with the Arab criminals harassing Jewish girls . . . An Arab guy that wants to find a girl should look in his own village . . . he shouldn't come to us here in Jerusalem.[7]

Gopstein's words, along with those of Julani's attackers and the materials distributed by Lehava, evoke the production of a racialized boundary between Palestinian and Jewish subjects drawn not only on the space of the Israeli-Palestinian borderlands – in which the city of Jerusalem is imagined as a Jewish space, with Arab life relegated to "villages" – but also on the intimate geographies of the body. Here, the Arab body is a criminal body, a sexually lascivious predator on Jewish women; the Jewish female body, conversely, is an endangered body, one whose pride and honor demands protection.

In this article, I examine the discourses of what I term an anti-miscegenation movement that appeals to foundational Zionist logics about the gendered relationship between the individual and the nation. These logics are tied, as in other historical contexts, to a larger project that seeks to demarcate and police social and geographic boundaries and national belonging: in this context, the boundary between who belongs to the Jewish nation and who does not – a distinction whose significance is made all the clearer with the recent passage of the so-called nation-state law. I argue that the erection of racialized boundaries between Palestinian and Jewish subjects are energized by a gendered discourse that constructs Palestinian masculinity as a hypersexualized threat to Jewish women, and thus, the Jewish nation. I term this "policing the intimate." Jewish women emerge, within this context, as symbolic "border guards" whose bodies and sexualities must be controlled and protected.[8] I understand these logics as part of a gendered nationalism that not only works to justify violence against Palestinian masculinities, and Palestinian communities more generally, but also helps produce the Jewish self as dominant, enabling both Jewish

men and women to achieve a sense of gendered racial superiority. The practices of the anti-miscegenation movement are a form of "social policing" a concept that highlights the role of Israeli civil society in policing the boundaries of the nation, pointing to the viscerally embodied political imaginary and practices shared by the state and its settler subjects.

Policing the Intimate

State surveillance and control over geographies of the intimate have played central roles in consolidating gendered-racial colonial power in historical instances as varied as Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, and the Jim Crow United States. Racial laws that politicized private life were passed in each of these instances both as a technology of governance and as a means to protect the material benefits of "whiteness as property."[9] The surveillance of black or racially "othered" bodies arose in response to anxieties over a feared loss of white bodily integrity, an endangerment of the material benefits of whiteness.[10]

Intensified surveillance of the private and intimate sites of everyday life has been recognized as a "trope of colonial rule," as those invested in the maintenance of colonialism's racial regimes concerned themselves with the governance of the most intimate details of everyday life, from management of the domestic sphere to sexual relationships to "sentiment" itself – what Ann Stoler has termed the "education of desire."[11] Scholars who have probed the embodied and gendered aspects of colonialism share an attunement to the nontransparent, often elusive, sites of colonial power embedded in the social fabric of the everyday.[12] In the intimate management of race – the governance of the domestic, familial, and sexual lives of those living in the liminal spaces created by the colonial situation – power is both reproduced and contested.

As in other colonial contexts, Israeli policies have attempted to police the intimate spheres of both Palestinian and Jewish life in order to demarcate who belongs and who does not belong to the Jewish nation.[13] The presence of Palestinian bodies inside the still-expanding boundaries of the Israeli polity propels state violence, securitization, and suspension of civil liberties, using a variety of juridical-spatial strategies of segregation (including discriminatory laws, dividing walls, and checkpoints). These surveillance strategies are complemented by informal mechanisms of civil society control of the most intimate relations – what I call social policing. Social policing describes the processes by which some groups of Israel's citizenry engage in practices of surveillance and social control that extend the panoptic gaze of the state.[14]

In the following section, I highlight some of the discourses and practices of the emergent Israeli anti-miscegenation movement. I then analyze the anxiety around sexual relations between Jewish women and Arab men. This anxiety, I contend, is premised on foundational Zionist logics that seek to reform and purify the Jewish body and/as the Jewish nation, a force that animates a range of racial schema between colonizer and colonized.

Dangerous Arab Men and Endangered Jewish Women

On 20 July 2010, in a now infamous case, an Israeli court convicted Saber Kushour of "rape by deception" and sentenced him to eighteen months in prison. An Israeli woman with whom Kushour had engaged in consensual sex discovered that he was not Jewish, as she had thought, but Palestinian, and pressed charges. In the verdict, Jerusalem district court judge Tzvi Segal wrote that although this was not "a classical rape by force" and the sex was consensual, the consent itself was obtained through deception and under false pretenses. "The court is obliged to protect the public interest from sophisticated, smooth-tongued criminals who can deceive innocent victims at an unbearable price – the sanctity of their bodies and souls," Segal added.[15]

The court's ruling, which included a "new definition of rape" frames Palestinian Arabs as "criminal elements" who are a threat to the Jewish "public interest" in their ability to invade the "sanctity of [women's] bodies and souls."[16] Although no explicit law preventing sexual relations between Palestinians and Jews

Demonstrators in Zion Square, West Jerusalem, hold aloft the Israeli flag and an image of Meir Kahane. The demonstrators also wear and present for the camera stickers produced by Lehava, warning Arab men in Hebrew and Arabic: "Don't even dare to think about Jewish women!" (14 July 2014. Photos courtesy of Sarah Ihmoud.)

currently exists, the sentiment of the judicial ruling is to be found not only in the public statements of some Israeli officials, but also among the practices of a complex array of state and civil society actors.[17]

In a video shown in the public school system of Kiryat Gat, a city thirty-five miles south of Tel Aviv in the Southern District of Israel, high school girls are warned about how to protect themselves from being lured into romantic relationships with local Bedouin Arabs. The video, *Sleeping with the Enemy*, is part of a program launched in 2008 to prevent Jewish girls from becoming sexually involved with the "Arab minority," an initiative backed by the local government and police and led by Kiryat Gat's welfare representative.[18] *Sleeping with the Enemy* "features a local police officer and a woman from the Anti-Assimilation Department, a wing of the religious organization Yad L'Achim, which works to prevent Jewish girls from dating Muslim men."[19] The video quotes from the Qur'an in an attempt to demonstrate that Islam condones the mistreatment of women. (The conflation of Arabs and Muslims speaks not only to the Islamophobia of the anti-miscegenation movement, but to its broader religio-nationalist framing.) Further, a Yad L'Achim representative discusses the deceit with which Arabs begin their flirtations with Jewish women:

> The affair begins as superficial love which appears to be authentic. Many times the girl doesn't even know she's going with someone who is a minority. He introduces himself with a Hebrew name and speaks Hebrew fluently.[20]

In a lecture preceding the video, a representative of the town welfare services department states:

> Like they warn you to be careful while driving or when they warn you to be careful when swimming in the sea and there's a black flag and a red flag – when it's allowed and when it's forbidden – the same thing we're doing to warn [Jewish] girls of this unnatural phenomenon . . . The girls, in their innocence, hook up with Bedouin Arabs who exploit them. She sleeps with the enemy without realizing it.[21]

The discourse of the video and the welfare representative echoes that of Judge Segal in the Jerusalem case, where Arab men are portrayed as hypersexualized, dangerous, and deceptive, and Jewish women are portrayed as needing protection.

The fact that the video is shown with the support of local government and administered by the welfare services department points to the perception of Arab-Jewish sexual relations as a social problem requiring state intervention. In another instance, local authorities in Petah Tikva, a city near Tel Aviv, established a team of youth counselors and psychologists whose duty it is to identify young Jewish women dating Palestinian men in order to "rescue" them. The municipality also sponsors a telephone hotline where friends and family members can call in to "inform" on Jewish girls who date Palestinian men.

Yad L'Achim, an orthodox Jewish nonprofit organization founded in Israel in 1950 with the expressed goal of helping immigrants adjust to the newly founded state and

adopt Judaism, has emerged as an active player on the frontlines of what it terms "non-conventional warfare" – "saving Jewish souls" through preventing "intermarriage" between Jewish women and Arab men. Its Anti-Assimilation Department engages solely in the prevention of interracial dating between Jewish women and Palestinian men, the "rescue" of Jewish women and their children from Arab villages (again, denying Palestinians' presence in urban areas as anything other than interlopers), and treatment of "survivors" of Jewish-Arab marriages.[22] As the organization describes it:

> People must understand that Jewish-Arab marriages are part of the larger Israeli-Arab conflict. These girls are in distress, they are wandering the streets and the Arabs take advantage of them. They see it as their goal to marry them and ensure that their children aren't raised as Jews. This is their revenge against the Jewish people. They feel that if they can't defeat us in war, they can wipe us out this way. We must fight this threat as well; it's a matter of national security.[23]

In the discourse of this civil society organization, the Jewish female body emerges as symbolic of the nation state, the protection of which merits militarized intervention as a matter of national security. The organization claims to receive one thousand calls per year reporting cases of sexual relationships between Jewish women and Palestinian men. As the website states:

> Our Anti-Assimilation department responds to all such calls. In some cases, this means launching military-like rescues from hostile Arab villages and setting the women up in "safe" houses around the country, where they can build new lives for themselves.[24]

The discourse of "saving Jewish souls" displayed prominently as one of Yad L'Achim's priorities is tied to preserving the sanctity of the Jewish woman's body as symbol of the Jewish nation. Being romantically involved or married to a Palestinian man is pathologized and treated as a multifaceted danger to the Jewish nation – a security threat that merits intervention in the form of military rescue, and a disease whose victims require psychological rehabilitation. Moreover, the group draws on culturally essentialist portrayals of Islam and Muslim culture to stake its claims that Jewish women need saving. Muslim men are portrayed as inherently violent predators, and Jewish women are warned that "the Koran relates to a husband's treatment of his wife very differently from Western norms. What a Western woman would regard as a breach of her rights, Muslim women find perfectly acceptable."[25]

Like Yad L'Achim, in recent years Lehava has launched multiple campaigns to prevent "assimilation" between Palestinians and Jews. Notably, the organization has targeted public spaces of potential Palestinian-Jewish sociability and corporeal proximity. In one campaign, the organization targeted workplaces, urging Jewish employers not to employ

Palestinians, and urging Jewish patrons, both religious and secular, to boycott those stores not hiring exclusively Jewish labor. As part of their campaign, the group began providing certificates to stores that were "clean of Arabs" and employed only "Jewish labor." The primary justification throughout the campaign was that Palestinian laborers endangered Jewish women workers, who were apt to become ensnared in romantic relationships with Palestinian coworkers. In 2010, a Jewish supermarket chain was targeted with posters around Jerusalem's ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods. The posters read: "Do you want your grandson to be named Ahmed ben Sarah?"[26] In another campaign, the organization created a "coast guard" aimed at "protecting" Jewish women from Palestinian men who supposedly pass as Jews and sexually harass them at public beaches. Discussing the campaign, Gopstein stated: "Last year we discovered that there are many gentiles [non-Jews] arriving at the beaches, but not in search of the sun or water."[27]

In December 2010, Lehava published a letter signed by dozens of rabbis' wives calling on young Jewish women not to engage in personal relationships with Arab men. The letter stated:

> There are more than a few Arab laborers who call themselves by Hebrew names. Yusuf becomes Itai, Samir becomes Sammy, and Abed becomes Ami. They try to get close to you. They try to make you like them and heap all the attention in the world on you. . . . But this behavior is only temporary. Once they've got you in their hands, in their village, under their control – everything changes. . . . Your life won't be the same again, and the attention you craved will be replaced by curses, beatings, and humiliation. . . . Do not date gentiles, do not work in places where there are gentiles, and do not perform National Service together with gentiles.[28]

What compels the anti-miscegenation movement to draw upon discourses of dangerous Arab masculinity in its array of discourses, programming, and practices? Why is it that Jewish women, rather than men, are the targets of such discourses and practices? Why is control over Jewish women's sexual choices deserving of state and/or nonstate intervention? In the following section, I delve into the politics of reproduction as a way of opening up these questions and investigating the racialized body politics of the Jewish state.

Reproducing the Jewish Body

Understanding the gendered discourse of the anti-miscegenation movement requires understanding the relationship between the gendered body and the nation within Zionism and the Jewish national project. Women's bodies have been constructed as a symbolic national periphery in a variety of contexts, as "biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities" and "reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national

groups."[29] As "symbolic border guards," women embody the nation's boundaries; their bodies thus become contested geographies.[30] Establishing a settler colonial society has been intimately tied to the "political and ideological pressures to define and reproduce the national collectivity in Israel," a form of biopolitical management that constitutes Jewish Israeli women as its "national reproducers."[31] Jewish Israeli women "have been 'recruited' in the 'demographic war' to bear more children as their national duty to the Jewish people in general and in the Israeli Jewish people in particular."[32] As Nira Yuval-Davis highlights, the issue of national reproduction, "both in terms of its ideological boundaries and in terms of the reproduction of its membership," has been at the center of Zionist discourse. Israeli demographic policies have historically had two primary goals: to "maintain and . . . increase Jewish domination in Israel"; and to "reproduce and enlarge 'the Jewish people' all over the world" in response to the Nazi Holocaust and what Israel refers to as the "'Demographic Holocaust' and assimilation."[33]

The Zionist project conceptualized the survival of Israel as a "demographic race" early on, as its leadership believed that sovereignty could not be achieved without a Jewish demographic majority. While Jewish immigration (*aliya*) and settlement was considered the quickest and most efficient method of increasing the Jewish presence in Palestine, the Zionist leadership's preoccupation with the "need" to establish a Jewish demographic advantage was not limited to such efforts to bring Jews to Palestine. Within Palestine itself, "Jewish family size became an issue of security and a sacred national mission. Natality (having large families) was tantamount to patriotism."[34]

Expanding the Jewish birth rate thus became a matter of national policy, and women were encouraged to have more children as part of their "national duty." In the 1950s, Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion implemented a financial reward for "heroine mothers" who had ten children or more.[35] The prize was quietly discontinued some ten years later, when it was revealed the majority of recipients were Palestinian women.[36] Israel moved to adopt and implement a formal "demographic policy" designed "to create an atmosphere that allows for the encouragement of natality, considering its critical role in the future of the Jewish people."[37] The government program called for "ongoing pro-natal promotional campaigns and the removal of economic and social barriers and to offer relief in areas of education, housing, insurance, etc., with the goal of encouraging families to increase the number of their children."

The state's attempts to encourage population growth was accompanied by tightened restrictions on birth control and abortion. The tightening of abortion regulations in the 1970s was accompanied by an

> emotive call to the Jewish mothers to do their national duty and replace the Jewish children killed by the Nazis. An extreme example of this ideology was a suggestion, narrowly defeated, of the Advisor of the Minister of Health at the time, Haim Sdan, to force every woman considering an abortion to watch a slide show which would include, in addition to horrors

of dead fetuses in rubbish bins, the pictures of dead children in Nazi concentration camps.[38]

Pro-natal policies were subsequently passed in the Israeli Knesset, including the 1983 "Law on Families Blessed with Children," which provided a range of subsidies to Jewish families with more than three children.[39] Such demographic calculations remained a priority for subsequent Israeli administrations. Pro-natal policies continue today through a variety of reproductive technologies and practices that enable the production of the Jewish body and the disappearance of the Palestinian body. These practices go beyond pronatalism, bordering on a form of racial eugenics tied to the white nationalist character of the state.[40] Beyond encouraging birth and expanding Jewish families to fight in the "demographic war," pronatalist policies worked to "purify" the Jewish race and maintain exclusivity of the "chosen people." While Israel encouraged demographic growth among its Jewish population, it discouraged such growth among Palestinians with policies aimed at "containing Palestinians and their fertility."[41] Palestinian women's bodies and sexualities have been constructed as the vessel of a "demographic threat" that should be controlled and eliminated, making them a site of continuous political violence.[42] The anti-miscegenation movement's focus on protection of Jewish women and their bodies, and attempts to exercise control over their sexual choices, thus stems from the Zionist construction of women as reproducers of the Jewish nation, and a discourse framing Palestinians as a demographic threat to the security of the nation.

A "Hierarchy of Bodies": Race and Miscegenation

At the same time that women's bodies became the vessel for national reproduction, an emphasis was placed on the importance of Jewish motherhood in producing the "New Jew," a process of rehabilitating the denigrated Jewish body that lay at the heart of regenerating the Jewish nation. Indeed, as Meira Weiss highlights, Zionism has a "unique bodily aspect," which, stemming from the denigration of the Jewish body throughout Europe for centuries, sought to rehabilitate the Jewish body and especially Jewish masculinity.[43]

Rather than challenging the Orientalist images that excluded and subjugated Jews in Europe, Zionism "internalized and reproduced them."

> Zionism modeled the "new Jew" on white European values and culture
> in purposeful opposition to Eastern cultural markers carried by Middle
> Eastern Jews and certainly by Muslim and Christian Arabs. As a derivative
> of Enlightenment Europe, Zionism reproduced the polarized binaries of
> the superior, enlightened West and the inferior, primitive East. It claimed
> that Jews as a national entity belonged to the superior, enlightened West

despite their geographical origins in the East and sought to enlighten (read: colonize) its primitive peoples.[44]

Thus, Israel's European founders reified European supremacy in ascribing new value onto Jewish subjectivity and nationality in relation to the racialized Arab Other.

The "rehabilitation" of the Oriental Jew by making him European was a decidedly gendered endeavor. As Weiss's work explains, the construction of this "new Jew" as a sacralized "chosen body" is the attempt of the diaspora Jew as Other to reinvent himself by embodying the hegemonic European body, resting on the collective construction of a healthy masculine body in service of the Jewish nation.[45] The Hebrew man, whose reconstructed body symbolizes this national recovery, thus energizes a racialized "hierarchy of bodies" in Israel.

While the rehabilitation of Jewish masculinity is largely absent in contemporary Zionist discourse, it is performed through the anti-miscegenation movement's discourses and practices of social policing, which construct Jewish men (and women) as heteropatriarchal and hypermasculine protectors of the Jewish body and, hence, the Jewish nation. The construction of Palestinian masculinity as violent and threatening, and the infliction of violence against Palestinian subjects perceived as dangerous and violating the sanctity of the Jewish body, is a continuation of this sexualized logic. Thus, I argue that by inflicting pain on the Palestinian body, the Jewish subject seeks to feminize Palestinian masculinity, and in doing so perform a gendered sense of racial superiority. The politics of the anti-miscegenation movement lie between a fear of Palestinian hypermasculinity and its power to "contaminate" and erase the "purity of the race" and feminizing Palestinian masculinity as a pathological deviation from proper manhood.

The mobilization of such Orientalist discourses can be understood as part of a broader trend in displacing racial discourse with that of culture. In this instance, the language of cultural difference stands in for race. As Kamala Visweswaran argues, while the culture concept "is characteristically meant to displace race . . . culture has turned out to be a way of continuing rather than repudiating racial thought."[46] Cultural discourse framing Palestinians as sexual predators of Jewish women reveals, as I have previously argued, the "extent to which a gendered and sexualized Orientalist ideology saturates the Israeli settler colonial imaginary."[47]

The desire for racial and sexual "legibility," tied to the settler desire for land and predicated on a project of native erasure, propels the policing of intimacy and identity. At times, such policing is performed by the Israeli state. The Kushour case, for example, warns Palestinian men and Israeli publics in general against sexual relationships across racial lines. Such transgressions confound and destabilize the categories of difference that enable the functioning and maintenance of state power and Jewish hegemony as racial whiteness. In other moments, policing is taken on by Jewish Israeli publics themselves – the nonprofit organization and the vigilante mob infiltrate spaces that are generally beyond the reach of a state seeking to maintain the fantasy of multicultural democracy.

Conclusion

In this article, I have analyzed the anti-miscegenation movement's discourse of needing to protect Jewish women and their bodies from dangerous Arab men, by highlighting the historical roots of such discourse in the Zionist history of gendered nationalism. What has been elided in analyses of Israel's racial character has not been its Orientalist tropes,[48] but the extent to which such tropes are gendered and sexualized. Israel's pronatalist policy, which positions Jewish women and their sexuality as symbolic border guards for the boundaries of the national collective, coupled with its attempt to restrict and restrain Palestinian "demographic growth" as an element of forced removal, is a reflection of the settler colonial regime. From a feminist perspective, it is the reproductive role of women and their bodies that animate the Zionist regime and its racial schema, a form of intimate state violence. Zionist colonial techno-scientific interventions work to discipline women's bodies and sexualities of both colonizer and colonized.

Such policies go beyond Foucault's well-rehearsed analysis of biopolitics, as Israel aims not merely to manage various populations, but to "rehabilitate" the Jewish body in the image of European masculinity. Beyond such rehabilitation, it is using the Jewish body, its "sacredness" and "purity," to energize the settler colonial regime. This bio-engineering orchestrates an ontological choreography of the body, where settler heteropatriarchy stakes its claims to the feminized Oriental land and body as an inherent aspect of its civilizing mission. The geography of the New Jewish body invades, occupies, and replaces the body of the native Other at the same time that it racially demarcates and segregates. Violence committed against native masculinities instills a gendered sense of racial superiority in the settler.

Yet the sacralized need to protect Jewish women's bodies and sexualities stems not only from construction of women's bodies as symbolic peripheries of the Jewish nation, but also a profound anxiety over policing the social, geographical, and racial boundaries between the Jewish people and the Palestinian "Other." A focus on policing of the intimate sphere reveals the concerns, anxieties, and fears that undergird the Israeli state's aspirations to a pure national bloodline and brings into central focus the relationship between space, race, and the body.[49] These practices of social policing, which mobilize religious discourse of the sacred duty to protect Jewish women and their bodies from dangerous Arab men, are used to justify racial segregation between the Palestinian and Jewish populations throughout the still-expanding and contested boundaries of the settler state, limiting interaction in employment, housing, education, and other aspects of social and political life, and purifying the racial boundaries of the Jewish nation.

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Endnotes

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Securing the Occupation in East Jerusalem

Divisions in Israeli Policy

Shir Hever

After the invasion of Gaza in the summer of 2014 and especially between September 2015 and October 2016, Jerusalem became the center of the so-called individuals' intifada (*intifadat al-afrad*), a series of attacks, many of them by teenagers, often from East Jerusalem, armed with nothing more than scissors or a screwdriver.[1] The Israeli response was disproportionate violence which took two forms. The first was the encouragement of Jewish Israeli individuals to carry weapons and use them at the first sign of suspicion (a privatization of the production of security);[2] and the second was a campaign of preemptive arrests based on algorithms that surveil social media (the automatization of security).[3] Nevertheless, the uprising demonstrated that Israeli security policies and technologies are only barely capable of producing a sense of security for the Israeli public, and that Palestinian resistance may disrupt Israeli control at any time.

Jerusalem has been the subject of decades of intensified securitization by the Israeli authorities, including through invasive surveillance and punitive law enforcement. Jerusalem remains firmly under Israeli control, and the Israeli authorities continue to implement punitive policies, segregation, and the illegal expansion of colonies into East Jerusalem.[4] However, despite the intensification of efforts and increase in budgets directed at securitizing and controlling East Jerusalem, starting in 2014 cracks in the Israeli security apparatus, in the form of disagreements between two factions within the Israeli government, have expanded and created a space for Palestinian residents of the city to resist and, occasionally, to achieve symbolic victories. A closer look at Israeli security policies in Jerusalem reveal the Israeli grip over the city becoming slippery.

It increasingly relies on the application of brute force,[5] and this brute force fails to discourage Palestinian resistance.

The cracks in the Israeli security apparatus emerge from growing tensions between the Israeli populist right-wing political elite and the Israeli security elite. The former seeks symbolic victories to cement the idea of Jewish supremacy over Palestinians, refuses to differentiate between different kinds of Palestinian resistance and calls for the application of overwhelming force to keep Palestinians meek and subservient. The latter calls for a rational policy of the use of force in order to maintain long-term control over Palestinians and their territory, and for the use of a wide array of policies to sow divisions among Palestinians and create incentives for Palestinians to cooperate with Israeli authorities. The Israeli security elite, however, is quickly losing its hold over the Israeli political system. This does not, however, imply that violence toward Palestinians has, or will be, abated; rather, understanding this ongoing shift is key to making sense of the changing forms of violence to which Palestinians are subjected.

Jerusalem as the Securitized City

The Israeli media published dozens of articles in 2012–14 predicting that the next intifada will erupt in Jerusalem. Critical and leftist journalists pointed to the social crisis in East Jerusalem as a pressure point, which could take the shape of a widespread uprising.[6] This social crisis is manifested in the 76 percent poverty rate as of 2017; inadequate public services such as health, education, and sanitation; and steady bureaucratic pressure by the Israeli authorities intended to push Palestinians out of the city.[7] Military strategists and right-wing journalists refused this explanation, because it places the blame on the Israeli authorities.[8] Many of them, however, accept the prediction identifying Jerusalem as the center for the next Palestinian uprising, drawing on other explanations, such as Jerusalem's religious significance.[9]

Jerusalem became a focal point for Israeli security measures implemented to intercept and suppress Palestinian resistance at its earliest stages of the latest crisis. Indeed, much of the infrastructure in this regard had already been put in place during and after the second intifada. In the early 2000s, for example, the Old City was covered with an interlocking network of surveillance cameras sending their feeds into one central room, covered in screens showing every part of the Old City.[10] It was an effort to apply Bentham's "Panopticon" on a city-wide level, allowing a single security guard to observe the entire Old City. Of course, no individual can pay attention to so many details at the same time, but the knowledge that the system exists leads every person in the Old City to feel that, at any moment, they may be under observation, and to act accordingly. The purpose of a visible network of cameras is to prevent any kind of subversive act before it is undertaken, causing the subjects to internalize the disciplinary power of the Israeli authorities.[11]

Jerusalem has become a prime example of the logic of securitization, by which policymakers recast social and political problems as security problems, to be addressed

by security tools rather than social or political policies.[12] Securitization is a process of reclassifying the role of government. Public services such as education, health and transportation are reclassified as tools to prevent threats to security (see, for example, the "Prevent" system in the UK, which converts educational institutions into enforcement agencies),[13] and the jurisdiction of security organizations is reclassified so that it expands into the private sphere (such as Indian prime minister Narendra Modi's justification of a currency reform that removed large denomination notes from circulation as an "anti-terror" policy).[14]

In the case of Jerusalem, decades of neglect in social services to East Jerusalem,[15] institutionalized discrimination of the Palestinian residents,[16] and efforts by extreme-right groups like Ateret Cohanim or Ir David Foundation to exploit East Jerusalem's poverty to expand illegal colonization,[17] have all contributed to the creation of a socioeconomic powder keg. Rather than dealing with the root causes and working to reduce economic gaps between the Jewish and Palestinian populations, the Israeli authorities implemented mechanisms of control and surveillance, deployed private security companies alongside police and military forces, and used other coercive means to keep the Palestinian population under control.[18] This policy of securitization has its roots in the earliest years of the occupation of East Jerusalem. Jerusalem's then mayor Teddy Kollek initially attempted to implement "enlightened occupation" policies (absorbing East Jerusalem Palestinians into the system of trade and municipal service), but this policy was overruled by senior security decision makers, and eventually Kollek himself implemented securitization policies, alienating East Jerusalem's population.[19]

Perhaps the most blatant example of securitization was the use of checkpoints operated by the Border Police (a unit situated between the military and the police) to stop drivers on the streets of East Jerusalem. Drivers' personal data was cross-referenced in a database to check for unpaid taxes; if they had payments pending, their car was confiscated. Only in the case of Palestinians did the Israeli authorities choose to entrust a matter of economic enforcement in the hands of heavily armed and uniformed Border Police, thereby addressing a socioeconomic issue as a security issue. This policy was halted in June 2004 after the state prosecutor wrote a legal opinion against it.[20]

Cracks in the Security Apparatus

"Security" is, of course, a social construct. Security organizations and companies do not strive to reduce the actual chance of an individual being harmed in an attack, but rather strive to produce a sense of security. This sense of security must remain temporary and fragile, lest the public lose interest in the production of security, but it nevertheless must be successful enough to create confidence, measured by people's willingness to spend leisure time in public spaces.[21] In *The Cost of Occupation*, Shlomo Swirski argued that there is a tradeoff between the social priorities and the security priorities in the Israeli political sphere. Governments use the production of a sense of security as justification for leaving

socioeconomic problems unaddressed and for cuts in welfare budgets.[22] Securitization thereby seeps into the political discourse, as allocation of funds for basic public services is constantly compared with the urgent need to develop security mechanisms against ever-expanding perceived threats. Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu's February 2015 tweet summarizes this approach: "We're talking about housing prices and cost of living. I do not forget about life itself, living. The greatest challenge standing before us and our lives as Israeli citizens and of this state is the threat of Iran being armed with a nuclear weapon."[23]

As tensions rose in Jerusalem, senior politicians called on Israelis to carry arms and defend themselves rather than rely on the security forces.[24] Both senior politicians and soldiers on the ground expressed hatred toward Palestinians involved (even indirectly) with the attacks with such vehemence and aggressiveness that the profound impact of these attacks on the Israeli public debate was unavoidable.[25] As commercial centers in Jerusalem stood almost empty of customers, little doubt remained regarding the inability of the Israeli security forces to provide a sense of security to Israeli citizens, even if the actual number of attacks and casualties remained lower than in previous rounds of violence.[26]

The crisis in the Israeli security apparatus is also reflected in the gradual replacement of "humint" (human intelligence) by "sigint" (signal intelligence) as the focus of the Israeli intelligence practice.[27] The Israeli police and military increasingly rely on sophisticated digital technology in their efforts to enforce Israeli law and confront Palestinian resistance. There is a steep decline in the number of Israeli security personnel who can speak Arabic (even if Arabic is studied only as the "language of the enemy").[28] In this technological conflict, the roles of the Israeli forces and of Palestinian resistance have changed. Instead of Israeli forces introducing new security innovations – such as drones, checkpoints, the separation wall, and so on – to cement their control over Palestinians, it is now Palestinians who are introducing new modes of resistance – homemade rockets, tunnels, incendiary kites and balloons, and the introduction of various tactics to attract media attention to video recordings of nonviolent protests – and the Israeli security forces that scramble to develop technologies to contain them.

In the past months, several events beyond the limits of Jerusalem began with the application of Israeli security mechanisms and ended with Israeli authorities losing control of their media coverage. Israeli forces arrested the poet Darin Tatour over a poem published on Facebook;[29] the seventeen-year-old Ahed Tamimi for standing up to soldiers who entered her home in al-Nabi Salih;[30] and a man whose post of "good morning" on Facebook was mistranslated as "attack them" by the algorithm deployed by the Israeli police to preempt Palestinian attackers.[31] Each of these stories, just three out of many, exposes the weakness of the Israeli dependency on sigint. Each of the arrests has boosted the global support for the Palestinian struggle and provoked rage against the Israeli colonial policies. In Jerusalem, however, this tendency is even more prevalent. The government's willingness to invest resources to pacify the city is directly correlated to statements expressing fear of losing control over the city through the use of coercive mechanisms.[32]

Al-Aqsa Mosque Protests

In July 2017, an attack by three Palestinians from Umm al-Fahm near al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem claimed the lives of two Israeli police officers and the three shooters, and sparked a new round of violence.[33] The Israeli government used the attack as an opportunity to change the fragile status quo around the mosque and to encroach on the autonomy of the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf. Security cameras were installed around the mosque and gates with metal detectors were placed at the entrance, so that every person coming to pray at the mosque would be controlled and surveilled by Israeli security forces.[34]

An international uproar ensued against the Israeli decision and several heads of state appealed to the Israeli government to remove the cameras and metal detectors.[35] Palestinians organized mass protests across the West Bank and Gaza and did not relent even after three protesters were killed by Israeli forces and hundreds were injured and arrested.[36] Three Israelis were killed by Palestinians during this period as well. Most importantly, however, was the strike organized by Palestinian Muslims who refused to pray at the mosque and instead organized mass prayers around the mosques.[37] This last act of protest proved especially effective and the Israeli government eventually ordered the cameras and metal detectors removed, restoring the status quo in what was celebrated as a major Palestinian victory.[38]

The outcome of this confrontation can be analyzed from a perspective that focuses on the conditions that enabled an effective, large-scale, and well-coordinated nonviolent protest by Palestinians, or from a perspective – as I wish to do here – that considers how, despite superior force, economic power, and international political legitimacy, the Israeli government failed to come up with an effective strategy and follow through on it. From the very beginning of the crisis, Israeli authorities were divided into two factions. The old security elite, represented in the high command of the military, the police, and the General Security Service (GSS, also known as Shin Bet), advocated a "rational" approach and suggested that the Israeli government remove the cameras and metal detectors quickly and restore the status quo in order to preserve the overarching Israeli interests of maintaining control over the city of Jerusalem and over the occupied Palestinian territories as a whole.[39] Their voices were drowned out, however, by the populist right wing. Presenting the conflict as a form of religious war, Israeli politicians framed any Israeli concession to Palestinian demands as a form of humiliation.[40] They argued that the Palestinian resistance must be broken in order to cement Israeli control.[41]

Prime Minister Netanyahu rode the populist wave for as long as he could, but it is noteworthy that those members of the Israeli government who most clearly and forcefully supported intensifying the conflict, rather than managing it, were politicians of Mizrahi origin.[42] These politicians draw a clear connection between the struggle against discrimination toward Mizrahim in Israeli society (perpetrated by Ashkenazi elites, most prominently the security elite, which is overwhelmingly Ashkenazi) and the struggle for Jewish national pride.[43] These politicians are not members of the Israeli security elite and have refused to bow to their recommendations, demanding that the security organizations

serve the political agenda of the government. Populist right-wing Israeli politicians invoke anger in their political speech and demand an end to the rule of the "old elite."[44] They rarely mention, however, that the Ashkenazi elite maintained its hegemony through a highly militaristic system, in which political and economic decisions were subordinated to military considerations and in which the minister of defense occasionally outranked the prime minister.[45] The attempt to dismantle the dominance of the Israeli Ashkenazi elites has dealt a major blow to the Israeli security elite, as the two elite groups are highly intertwined.

The protests around al-Aqsa Mosque, the popular support for the Israeli soldier Elor Azaria (who executed 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sharif at close range as he lay injured in Hebron),[46] the purchase of German submarines for the Israeli navy against the wishes of senior officials at the Ministry of Defense,[47] and other such events, demonstrate the growing tension between the rising populist right, anchored in Mizrahi politics and religious discourse, and the established militaristic tradition that is losing its hegemonic position. After the murder of 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sharif, then minister of defense Moshe Ya'alon warned against the military becoming "beastly."[48] Azaria's family and their numerous supporters criticized Ya'alon's statement as racist: comparing Azaria, who is Mizrahi, to a "beast" resonates with decades of racism against Mizrahim, which can be understood as a form of anti-black sentiment.[49] The deputy commander of the Israeli military, Major General Yair Golan, repeated the phrase "like beasts" in a speech delivered during a Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony and further warned of the populist right driving Israel in the direction of fascism. His speech was widely criticized and delegitimized by the government.[50]

The Temple Movement, an extreme populist religious-right Jewish movement seeking to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and rebuild the ancient Jewish Temple in its stead, also played a major role in instigating the crisis, the protests, and the disagreements within the Israeli government. The regulations forbidding Jews from praying in al-Aqsa is central among the Israeli security elite's policies toward the occupation. Relying on a theological concern of rabbis that Jewish prayer in the compound may lead to a desecration of the "holy of holies" of the destroyed Jewish Temple, the policy is in fact an effective way to keep a low Jewish profile in the sensitive religious area and avoid direct religious confrontations that could get out of control. The Temple Movement has been intensifying their provocations, defying most of the rabbis and the security elite to instigate a confrontation that will lead (so they hope) to replacing the more calibrated control mechanisms presently used by the Israeli security forces with a direct violent takeover and destruction of the mosque.[51] Since the occupation of the holy basin in 1967, only a handful of rabbis supported the construction of the "Third Temple," but the rise of the populist right has infiltrated religious institutions as well, and in 2016 the chief Ashkenazi rabbi David Lau (representing pro-Zionist Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox Jews) said that he would like to see the Third Temple built, hinting that the al-Aqsa Mosque must be destroyed.[52]

The growing tension between the different elite groups in Israel shows that the decline

of the Israeli security elite may not reduce settler-colonial violence toward the native Palestinians, but likely heralds the privatization and decentralization of this violence, now increasingly expressed in the form of individualistic religious and political violence, and decreasingly expressed as organized violence executed according to orders through the chain of command.[53]

Two Voices in the Israeli Government

Shortly after the removal of the cameras and metal detectors, two senior Israeli politicians, Minister of Culture Miri Regev and Coalition Whip David Bitan, vehemently criticized the GSS for its recommendation to reach a compromise. Regev called it "delusional" and Bitan described the GSS as "cowards who just want to return home safely."[54] Regev and Bitan argued that an unrelenting and uncompromising Israeli government would have forced the Palestinians to give up. Retired Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, interviewed on television in defense of the GSS, responded that "according to Darwin's laws, they say that man's origin is from the ape. The problem is that in the Israeli public life there are too many people who did not complete the transition."[55] Halutz's racist remark must be understood in the context of both Regev and Bitan being Mizrahi Jews of Moroccan origin.

Halutz himself is a classic representative of the faltering power of the Israeli security elite. Although he is himself of Mizrahi origins (his parents originate from Iran and Iraq), he has adopted Ashkenazi culture, accent, and social circles. His career has been an attempt to advance socially through paths of mobility created by and for the Israeli security elite. Despite rising to the top of the Israeli security elite, Halutz was among the first Israeli generals directly affected by the devaluation of military prestige in Israeli society. Former commander of the air force and of the Israeli army, Halutz was disgraced in the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.[56] He attempted unsuccessfully to enter Israeli politics on the force of his military credentials, joining the Kadima party, but he was never elected to the Knesset.[57] He has also failed to leverage his military credentials into success in the private sector: he served for three years as chairman of the company Jobookit, during which the company lost 70 percent of its value, prompting Halutz to resign.[58]

Halutz's attempt to defend the security rationale of the GSS was calculated to launch himself back into the public sphere, but when the opportunity arose to talk about the merits of the Israeli security experts, he resorted instead to a vulgar racist statement, exposing the weakness of the Israeli security elite discourse in the face of the Israeli (and the global) populist right. U.S. president Donald Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and his fulfillment of his promise to move the U.S embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, played into the hands of the Israeli populist right. It heightened the symbolic importance of Jerusalem on the agenda of the Israeli government and was used as "proof" that an uncompromising show of strength achieves better results than a calculated and careful strategy.[59]

Conclusion

While the Palestinian Authority maintains a clear policy rejecting the framing of Palestinian resistance as a religious movement, the Israeli government has increasingly adopted religious language to justify the occupation of the Palestinian territory. Two positions have emerged among Israeli authorities on the best approach for maintaining the occupation of Palestinian territory, especially East Jerusalem. The Israeli security elite has lost power within the government, but continues to express its opinion from its positions in the GSS and the military brass. It calls for a "rational" approach to the occupation, operating behind the scenes by relying on intelligence gathering, recruiting collaborators, and sowing divisions among Palestinian factions. The second approach, which is increasingly associated with the populist right and strongly represented in the present government, calls for a direct show of force. It considers Jerusalem to be of tremendous symbolic value, and therefore complete and open Jewish-Israeli control over the city, especially the Old City and the Temple Mount, trumps the security considerations of the Israeli security elite.

The Israeli security elite finds itself in its weakest situation since the establishment of the State of Israel. Recommendations by senior members of the security elite fall on deaf ears in the Israeli government, and public opinion favors the populist right. As a result, the sophisticated colonial administration apparatus that the Israeli security elite established to keep Palestinians under control and to take the sting out of their resistance is becoming riddled with internal contradictions. The Israeli authorities' increasing resort to brute force to attempt to crush the Palestinian resistance in Jerusalem, and elsewhere, has proven very limited in its effectiveness.

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The Books in My Life: A Memoir

Part 3

Tarif Khalidi

Once I launched *Arab Historical Thought in the Classical Period*, wishing it success, I returned to modern history. I was encouraged to study daily life in the Arab world during the two world wars as part of an edited volume covering the lives of ordinary people from various nations during that period.[1] I vacillated quite a bit before accepting the editors' invitation to contribute, as I was not an authority on that historical period. However, it soon became clear to me that the basic research material upon which I would draw would be the memoirs of those who lived during that time. In the past, I had taken great pleasure in reading such works – of which there are few comparable examples in the pre-modern Arab heritage[2] – and this encouraged me to accept the invitation.

Memoirs of the Arab Twentieth Century

I began reading memoirs from the first half of the twentieth century with great pleasure and curiosity, intending to include writers from the Levant, Egypt, and Iraq in my contribution. In a previous study of *al-'Irfan* magazine, I had become acquainted with Lebanon's history during World War I, finding that war's tragedy had not spread evenly throughout the country, but was confined to particular areas.[3] For example, the famine of Mount Lebanon did not repeat itself in southern Lebanon, just as Palestine did not experience the same disasters as those witnessed in the mountains of Lebanon. In Iraq, it seems that Baghdad did not suffer the same calamities as Mosul, and in Greater Syria, the coastal cities suffered more than those inland. These different experiences are given expression in memoirs. Of course, the memoirs to which we have access were

written by individuals in urban areas from social milieus that were not the worst affected by wartime tragedies.

Still, memoirists were often overwhelmed by feelings of hopelessness, utter helplessness in the face of events, apprehension toward the future, and profound ignorance of the causes of what was going on around them. They lived within a dark cloud. They record the violent shock of proximity to individuals reduced to skin and bones by starvation, or other horrific scenes. And they express great anger toward those responsible for these calamities, foremost among them Jamal Pasha, the Butcher of the Levant. Others describe desperate attempts by some to alleviate the pain around them. Generally, World War I led to the region's fragmentation, socially and psychologically. People retreated within restricted regions, travel became fraught with hardship and risk, and regions turned inward on themselves. Horizons narrowed and interest and consideration were limited to the immediate, the urgent, the daily. Time and space contracted.

I began with the memoirs of my late mother 'Anbara Salam Khalidi, *Jawla fi dhikrayat bayna Lubnan wa Filastin* (A Tour of Memories between Lebanon and Palestine).[4] These memoirs are of particular importance as the composition of a woman in a genre dominated by men. My mother, like other memoirists, belonged to a family that did not suffer the horrors of World War I directly, but the famine constantly hovered over them. Scenes of hunger and death are witnessed by a seventeen-year-old Beiruti girl, and remain in her mind despite the passage of time. She suffered not only from the wartime environment, but also from a suffocating social atmosphere that forced girls and women to fight for the most basic rights. The intensity of the memoir reaches its peak when, after her fiancé 'Abd al-Ghani al-'Uraysi was hanged by Jamal Pasha, she was then forced to stand before the latter to receive a speech about wartime relief work – a surreal scene.

From my mother's memoir, I embarked upon a vast number of memoirs of varied literary value and degrees of self-exposure. The most revealing were the memoirs of the Egyptian leader Sa'd Zaghlul, which are more like personal confessions than social memoirs.[5] Zaghlul details the torments of a spirit fond of politics, but torn by a serious addiction to gambling. The war was not one of his primary concerns, and he hardly mentions what was happening in the Levant – a reflection of the narrowed horizons mentioned above. In general, Egypt seems to have escaped the worst horrors of war – as did Sudan, as described in Babikr Badri's memoirs.[6] In the latter, the war features only as a distant event, its end celebrated by both the British occupiers and the Sudanese under occupation. 'Abd al-Wasi' Ibn Yahya al-Wasi'i's memoirs describe the disruption of Yemen's communications by land and sea, but he claims that the country turned inward, becoming self-sufficient and improving agricultural production, though sugar and kerosene remained unavailable.[7]

Rural memoirs from the Levant and Iraq vary in the horror of their accounts. Jabra'il Jabbur's memoir describes life on the edge of the Syrian steppe, where agricultural villages were not affected by the famine.[8] Far from the eyes of authorities, their crops safe from confiscation, the villagers only heard tidbits of war news from visitors. Anis Furayha's *Qabla an ansa* (Before I Forget) describes life in a Lebanese mountain village, much

closer to the scourge of war than other parts of the Levant.[9] Here, too, we are brought face to face with the horrors of hunger and the skeletal body of a child taken in by the writer's family until the orphanage opens its doors. But the village itself is described as overcoming most difficulties through the intelligent use of resources, the conversion of all available land to agriculture, and the return to traditional industries. These memoirs record in detail the villagers' opinions about the war going on around them, which are of value to the historian for comparison with urban memoirs.

In Beirut, Yusuf al-Hakim's memoirs hint at how hunger debilitated those afflicted, to the extent that the starving did not even turn to theft or attacks on stores of food.[10] They surrendered to fate and died, surrounded by the houses of the notables and the affluent, whose tables were laden with the most delicious foods. A somewhat sarcastic appraisal of the war's distortion of normal life is put forward by Khalil al-Sakakini, who in his diaries described the war as seen from his vantage point in Jerusalem.[11] Sakakini wrote that among the "advantages" of the war was that it pushed people to economize in all areas of life. Meat disappeared, followed by entertainment and fine clothes. In the realm of reading and writing, people read nothing but telegrams. (Most local newspapers had been shuttered and Egyptian newspapers were banned.) Thus, he noted sarcastically, people became accustomed to the telegraphic style, which required economizing speech and writing – another "advantage" of the war.

In Damascus, Khalid al-'Azm, from an Ottoman loyalist family, describes how, at thirteen years old, he and his contemporaries had completely lost faith in the Ottoman state's military announcements celebrating imaginary victories, leading the people to believe that the war would end in defeat.[12] In Iraq, the first Arab country to fall to the Allies, Sulayman Faydi describes the fall of Basra and how this occupation radically changed patterns of behavior.[13] New strata of merchants and contractors emerged, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the occupiers for profit, while the occupiers dismissed all those who refused to grovel before them.

Two memoirs in particular stand out, those of Rustum Haydar of Ba'lbak and Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza of Nablus, not only for their descriptions of World War I, but because of their significance for writing the modern history of the Arabs.[14] Haydar's memoirs open with a secret journey from Syria to the Hijaz, undertaken with comrades from the Arab nationalist movement to join the revolt led by Emir Faysal and the Hashemites. Haydar describes the regions through which they passed and the tribes that lived there in an "anthropological" style, with descriptions of customs, lifestyles, beliefs, food and drink, and so on. He then transports the reader quickly to Paris, where Haydar was among Emir Faysal's delegation to the Versailles peace conference, and the subsequent negotiations, talks, conspiracies, and betrayals by the French and British. It is like being in the Italian court of the Borgias or the Medicis, full of rumors, lies, intrigues, backstabbing, and treachery. Haydar stands out as a keen observer of the events taking place around him, envisioning a future of fragmentation and distress for the Arabs. At the same time, he sees Faysal acceding to concession after concession. Haydar was torn by a crisis of faith, wracked with doubt as to Faysal's honesty and commitment to

Arabism and questioning his understanding of the significance of the moment. Haydar, in Thucydidean style, is able to situate his political analysis of the Arab issue within a broader European arena, understanding the balance of power, in which weak states were mere chess pieces in the larger game of superpowers. He describes, with great insight and analysis, meetings with European political actors, such as T. E. Lawrence of Britain and France's Georges Clemenceau, illuminating their thoughts and understandings of issues. I was told that Haydar wrote further memoirs, which remain under wraps – if so, this criminal withholding diminishes modern Arab history.

The memoirs of Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, six volumes that extend over nearly a century, are similar. They provide, in precise detail and excluding little, a daily record of political and personal events around Darwaza. He documents every word and sound, every feeling, and every trip. He does not overlook any important document that passed before his eyes; neglect to describe any individual he met, privately or publicly; exclude any letter written or received; or fail to comment on any bit of news he read in a newspaper. Darwaza's intensive and comprehensive description ultimately draws in the reader, who soon begins to feel a certain affinity with the author. Darwaza's memoirs express ideas and emotions frankly, communicating to the reader the spirit of events. The six volumes, which some may initially find intimidating, pass quickly, capturing the reader's attention and, ultimately, admiration.

In the late Ottoman period, Darwaza was a member of the secret Young Arab Society (*al-Fatat*), which drew its members from all over the Arab world. Among the group's central aims were Arab unity and, of course, independence. Darwaza's memoirs, in keeping with this spirit, include comprehensive coverage of all of the Arab East and his wide network of friends in these countries. His nationalist ideology remained undiminished until his death, and the question of Palestine was for him inseparable from events in all other Arab countries. His memoirs thus provide information of great importance for the histories of Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt – material, especially detailed personal conversations with the most significant Arab politicians, that remains underutilized by historians. His evaluation of these figures, many of them Palestinians, is balanced and critical, even harsh, when necessary – his political and moral assessments determined on the basis of adherence to (or divergence from) principle and collaboration with colonial power. For these reasons and others, I consider Darwaza's the most important Arab political memoir of the twentieth century.

Jesus in Arabo-Islamic Heritage

In the 1980s, I began to be attracted by Jesus and his legacy in Arabo-Islamic literature. Again, I do not know the reason behind this interest: Was it nostalgia for my birthplace Jerusalem, where al-Aqsa Mosque neighbors the Holy Sepulchre? Did the war ravaging Lebanon fuel that nostalgia? Can Palestine not be Muslim, Christian, and (anti-Zionist) Jewish at the same time? After all, since my boarding school days in England, I have

Khalidiyya Library, ca. 1900. G. Eric and Edith Matson Photograph Collection.

been acquainted to no small degree with the New Testament, fortified through daily attendance of the school church and recitation of religious hymns, especially Christmas hymns, which still enthrall me to this day. A more direct reason, however, was that in books of *adab* and other sources I would occasionally come across sayings attributed to Jesus that bore no resemblance to what is found in the Gospels. Where did these come from? Did Muslim scholars invent them? If so, why? These were questions to which I found no answers at the time, but nevertheless I applied myself energetically to collecting these sayings. A friend encouraged me to make a book of them. This I did finally in 2001, in *The Muslim Jesus*, as part of a book series edited by the late Edward Said and with his support.[15]

These accounts and sayings can be found in a multiplicity of Islamic sources – in books of *adab*, asceticism (*al-zuhd wa al-raqa'iq*), morality (*akhlaq*), jurisprudence, theology, Sufism, and history – by the most important thinkers of Islamic civilization, including al-Jahiz, Ibn Qutayba, and (especially) al-Ghazali. I initially focused on Jesus's role in the political and moral debates between Islam and Christianity in the early Islamic period, delving into books of asceticism, hadith, and theology to illuminate how sayings attributed to Jesus were mobilized in this context. It became clear that these sayings had already played an important role among some Islamic groups that saw in them strong support for their arguments. It was also evident from studying chains of transmission that they likely originated in Kufa, perhaps due to its proximity to al-Hira, a major Christian

center in pre-Islamic Iraq. Their source remains obscure, however. Some are similar to what we find in the Gospels, others resemble the sayings of sages from Near Eastern civilizations, still others are like the gnostic and apocryphal gospels, and some offer no clue toward a putative source. But all bestow great Islamic reverence and admiration for, to borrow al-Ghazali's phrase, "the Prophet of the Heart," and all befit Jesus and attribute to him the utmost respect and love.

I would like to hope that these sayings can lead toward Islamic-Christian dialogue, affirming what unites these religions, not what separates them. This dialogue, in my view, desperately requires that we read our sacred texts – including the historical records replete with stories and sayings – together. It should also include what has been written about Jesus by the most important contemporary Muslim Arab poets, including Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, Muhammad al-Fayturi, and Mahmud Darwish.

Images of the Prophet in Islamic Heritage

I was subsequently approached by a major publishing house in the West to write a biography of the Prophet Muhammad. I was initially wary, as such a task poses great difficulties, and counter-proposed that I write a history of the various depictions of the Prophet through the ages: a historiography, not a history, that examined how and why these depictions changed from one generation to the next. This seems to be the trend in biographical writing – that is, the move away from writing the definitive history of an individual and toward a more historiographical approach. For example, it is increasingly common these days to find biographies bearing titles like *The Invention of X*, *Imagining Y*, or *Constructing Z*.[16] The reasons, it seems to me, are the considerable gaps in the records of all human lives that any biographer faces, as well as the complexities of human subjectivity, as articulated, for example, by the theories of psychology or the postmodern novel. Is it possible to construct a biography of a person that includes and reconciles the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the human personality? Virginia Woolf wrote: "A biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or seven selves, whereas a person may have many thousand."[17] In Julian Barnes's novel *Flaubert's Parrot*, a character compares the biographer to a fisherman: "The trawling net fills, then the biographer hauls it in, sorts, throws back, stores, fillets, and sells." He adds: "Consider what he doesn't catch: there is always far more of that."[18]

I thus returned to the subject of historiography, which I thought I had consigned to *Arab Historical Thought in the Classical Period*. Still, the biography of the Prophet is an irresistible subject for the historian of early Islamic thought, no matter how hard he or she tries to escape into modern history or other literary subjects. To begin, I put in place a plan that included the most important biographies of each era. I was not able to complete this massive corpus, nor even to read most of it. But as is said, *ma la yudraku kulluhu la yutraku julluhu* – what does not obtain all, does not relinquish most. I tried my best to select from these works the material that had an obvious impact

in its era, as well as that which I thought worthy of praise or into which I hoped to breathe new life.

I wanted to deal with the Prophet's biography from the beginning to the present. Some see this biography as "frozen," its main contours drawn from time immemorial and remaining unchanged. Even cursory research quickly dispels this view, as it soon becomes clear that successive generations formulated life narratives of the Prophet with different goals and to suit the different expectations. I found my net full of fish, revealing a rich historical heritage that required classification into different historical periods or overarching categories that summarized the particular focus of each era. I divided the book into ten chapters along these lines: The Turning Point, The Legislator, The Master Narrative, The Teacher of Manners, The Light of the World, The Model Mystic, The Prophet Canonized, The Universal Model, The Hero, and The Liberator. These proceed, as much as possible, chronologically, beginning with depictions of the Prophet in the Qur'an and hadith and concluding with contemporary biographies.[19]

The Emergence of the Prophetic Biography

Some contemporary Orientalists claim that the Qur'an does not contain clearly defined historical events or a chronological narrative of the Prophet's biography, and therefore tells us nothing about his life. This is an incomplete view. True, the Qur'an is not a historical text in the same sense as the Old and New Testaments – it is more interested in the lessons of history than its narration. But the definition of what is historical is not limited to narrative, especially when it comes to the life of the Prophet. We find in the Qur'an an abundant record of the Prophet's suffering, his great difficulty in communicating his message of revelation. This is of great significance in constructing the Prophet's biography, and cannot be ignored. It comprises what we might call the "turning point" in the Prophet's biography, painting a portrait for believers of the supreme example of suffering for the sake of faith.

The hadith portray a somewhat different image of the Prophet, at its core that of the Legislator who establishes for his community and the world an all-encompassing legal and ethical structure. In hadith collections of the Sunni tradition, two figures enjoy particular symbolic importance: 'A'isha, Mother of the Believers, and 'Umar bin al-Khattab. 'A'isha holds the dearest place in Muhammad's heart, eliciting his tenderness, his forgiveness, and his most intimate conversations. 'Umar is a strict believer, unafraid of truth no matter how censorious. These two images, of religious tolerance and religious zealotry, embody the two primary manifestations of faith. The hadith, generally, depict the Prophet within his community, identifying thousands of them by name and even some biographical information at times. However, this depiction is not historical or narrative in style.

We now come to early biographies, which established the "master narrative." The foundations of this narrative were laid by four works: *al-Sira al-Nabawiyya* (The Life of the Prophet) written by Ibn Ishaq and edited by Ibn Hisham; the account of

al-Waqidi and his scribe Ibn Sa'd, as collected in the first volumes of Ibn Sa'd's *Kitab al-tabaqat al-kubra* (The Major Classes); the first volume of al-Baladhuri's *Ansab al-ashraf* (Lineage of the Nobles); and al-Tabari's *Tarikh al-rusul wa al-muluk* (History of the Prophets and Kings). If the hadith present Muhammad the Legislator, from these biographies emerges Muhammad in history – that is, the story of Muhammad within his community. These foundational biographies are almost singular in structure. They begin with the Prophet's lineage, traced from Adam to Abraham and then to the Quraysh and their history, arriving at 'Abd al-Mutallib, then Abu Talib, then 'Abdallah, and finally Muhammad. It is as though God made the Prophet's biography a completed whole from creation. Or as one prophetic hadith puts it: "I was a prophet when Adam was between spirit and body."

After tracing his lineage, these biographies turn to Muhammad's birth, his childhood, and his youth, followed by the revelation of the Qur'an, and then his life in Mecca and Medina, all following a clear timeline. The hand of God is evident throughout, shepherding the Prophet, making him devoid of his parents' flaws, and granting him the angels' support in his darkest days. These biographies are "cinematic" in character, following the "hero" wherever he may be, even the bedroom, and tracking his spiritual and emotional vicissitudes, his joys and sorrows, and all incidents, great or small, in his life. They also describe in detail his physical and mental constitution, his words and deeds, his brilliance and dignity, his love of children and compassion for those in need, and so forth.

Perhaps most remarkable about these early biographies is that these "fishermen," their nets full of all kinds of fish, seemingly threw nothing back. They include accounts of incidents that may seem today, as they did for many later biographers, unsuitable for the Messenger of God. For example, Ibn Sa'd narrates that Khadija's father "had been drinking wine until it overpowered him" when he agreed to marry his daughter to Muhammad; when he recovered, he was angry, displeased with her marriage to Muhammad, but "they reconciled later."[20] Elsewhere, 'A'isha pokes fun at Muhammad, as in his last days when he expressed his wish that she die before him so that he can pray over her and she responded: "Wouldn't you like that? I can see you marrying some women on that day." Or there is al-Baladhuri's story of Muhammad's marriage to Asma' bint al-Nu'man, who, "when he approached her, said, I seek refuge in God from you" (*a'udhu billah minka*), so he divorced her. There is also the hadith in which Muhammad, before he received the revelation, offered a sacrifice to al-'Uzza, one of the goddesses of Mecca, suggesting that his faith was not unadulterated from birth. These and other such examples from these biographies raise the question: Why retain these stories, which do not seem worthy of the great Prophet? The answer may lie in these biographers' belief that a biography of such utmost importance should include all accounts, whatever the implications, remaining unabridged in any way. The duty of the biographer was fidelity to all accounts transmitted by sources, whether weak or strong; critiques of poorly substantiated accounts were sometimes placed beside them, but other times neglected altogether.

The Mature Biographical Tradition

Later narratives of the Prophet's life, pruning these earlier biographies, excised such stories. Biographies written by Shi'i scholars were ideologically rooted in the infallibility of the Prophet and the twelve imams, rejecting all accounts that even remotely entertained his imperfection. Infallibility was attributed to Muhammad from the creation of the world, as in al-Mas'udi's theory of Muhammadan Light (*Nur Muhammadi*), for example.[21] This gave Shi'i writers a kind of absolute truth not evident in the "founding fathers" of prophetic biography. In the Shi'i narrative, 'Ali is also given a pivotal role in fulfilling the mission of Islam from its beginning. The sixth imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, is the source of most such biographical narratives.[22] For him, the Prophet's biography is a prelude to the history of the imamate and the calamities it endured, on the one hand, and its conveyance of right guidance, glad tidings, and hope to believers, on the other. The prophetic biography among the Shi'a is thus theological in nature – there is no uncertainty and its key events are documented so as to avoid question or debate. However, Shi'i poets like al-Kumayt, al-Sayyid al-Himayri, and Di'bal al-Khuza'i played an important role in enriching the biography and enhancing depictions of the Prophet and his relatives, a significance underappreciated by historians. Whereas other depictions culminated in a clear victory for the Prophet, in Shi'i poetry this narrative is accompanied by mourning for the subsequent disavowal and persecution of his family.

Within the most important books of *adab*, the Prophet is depicted as a master of *adab* in the broadest sense, authentic in his morals, wisdom, and pursuit of knowledge.[23] They depict the Prophet as a cultured man who taught his community virtue and morals through his example and words, composed with a clear literary flavor and eloquence that imitates the miraculous, as though he exemplifies the well-known hadith: "I have been given words that are concise but comprehensive in meaning" (*u'taytu jawami' al-kalim*). The prophetic hadith in this literature thus includes a vast range of examples connected to daily conduct, modesty, humility, wisdom, poverty and wealth, eloquence, poetry, and other subjects ethically instructive for the cultured believer. Examples are numerous, including: "He who pours should be the last to drink"; "It is customary for a man to walk his guest to the door of the house"; "The greatest gift is from one in dire straits to another in the same"; "A man who seeks knowledge remains learned – he who believes that he has completed his learning is ignorant"; "Leave time between visits to increase love"; or "Knowledge is a treasury, questioning is its key."[24] These hadith, and many others, are not only directed toward individual behavior, but have political implications, urging rulers toward humility and justice and encouraging scholars to pursue knowledge rather than the approval of rulers.

Around the third century AH (ninth century AD), scholars became especially interested in prophetic metaphors. One of the most important books in this regard is *al-Majazat al-Nabawiyya* (Prophetic Metaphors) in which al-Sharif al-Radi selected 375 prophetic hadiths and explained their literary qualities and metaphors. As for poetry

and its central position in literature, the unfriendly image of poets in the Qur'an was gradually transformed by prophetic hadith expressing approval of poetry that extolled the merits of morality.[25] By the early tenth century AD, for example, Abu Zayd al-Qurashi writes in *Jamharat ash'ar al-'Arab* (The Multitude of Arab Poetry):

> The Prophet continued to be pleased by poetry, praising it and collecting it, and he said: it is the diwan of the Arabs. And the veracity of this is found in the hadith that we have received . . . the Prophet of God said: "There is wisdom in poetry and enchantment in metaphor."

In *al-'Umda* (The Support), Ibn Rashiq al-Qayrawani emphatically defended poetry, countering the arguments of those who claimed that the Qur'an and the Prophet disapproved of poetry by claiming that the Prophet only denounced obscene poetry.

The Sufi Tradition and Response

Among Sufis we find perhaps the most intimate and loving depictions of the Prophet in the entire Islamic heritage. Sufis viewed themselves as "the friends of God and the best among his creations" – and during the Prophet's lifetime "the recipients of his charity and, after his death, the best of his community," as Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi records in *al-Ta'arruf li-madhhab ahl al-tasawwuf* (Acquaintance with the Sufis' School of Thought). The Beloved (*al-Habib*) is one of the names of the Prophet favored by Sufis, and they believed themselves as the truest adherents of the Prophet's model, depicting him as wearing wool, riding on a donkey, and responding to the call of the weak. One of the clearest depictions of love of the Prophet is found in Abu Talib al-Makki's *Qut al-qulub fi mu'amalat al-mahbub* (Nourishment of the Hearts in the Conduct of the Beloved):

> From love of the Prophet proceeds love of his example (*sunnatihi*), as an opinion and a logical conclusion . . . and an indication of love is to follow him outwardly and inwardly (*dhahiran wa batinan*). Among the ways of following outwardly is the performance of obligations . . . to adhere to his morals and ethics in their entirety . . . asceticism in the world . . . love of the poor . . . And among the ways of following inwardly are the stations of conviction and witnessing the ways of knowing faith . . . and surrender, trust, desire, and love.

As Abu Hafs 'Umar al-Suhrawardi wrote in *'Awarif al-ma'arif* (Sages of Knowledge), Sufis were "the most fortunate of people in their emulation of God's Prophet, the most righteous in their revival of his model and adherence to his morals." The Prophet guided his community along the ascent to Sufism and his life story is the supreme example to Sufis, who are able to find in it meaning that others cannot. In *Ihya' 'ulum al-din*

(Revival of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazali writes: "If [the believer] follows the Prophet in learning his words and his deeds, and accepting them, he should be eager to understand his secrets . . . and should search strenuously for the secrets within these deeds and words."[26] Thus, important Sufi texts such as Abu Nasr al-Sarraj's *Kitab al-luma'* (The Book of Light) and Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri's *al-Risala* (The Message) include spiritual interpretations, revealed through Sufi practices, of the prophetic hadith. The most complex and difficult of these is found in the works of Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi, especially *al-Fatuhat al-Makkiyya* (The Meccan Revelations). Here, Muhammad becomes an element of existence with six attributes, including the attribute of "a perfect human . . . who provides each perfect human a divine or intrinsic law," and the "attribute of the Qur'an . . . for he who wants to see God's Messenger and did not attain this among his community, let him look to the Qur'an. For if he looks there, there is no difference between it and between looking at God's messenger."

The frequent tensions between Sufis and other Muslim scholars, especially jurists (*fuqaha'*), were no doubt exacerbated by this kind of Sufi "excess." It is likely that this tension led to new approaches to prophetic biography, which sought to establish a firm basis for claims, rationalize narratives, eliminate anthropomorphic elements from the conception of deity, extract its lessons, and canonize its traditions. Works of this kind – despite doctrinal differences – show a concerted interest in the history of the prophets and the place of Muhammad within it.[27] In particular, we see an interest in defining evidence of prophecy, especially prophetic miracles performed by Muhammad and others. These works are thus valuable to those interested in the apostles more generally, not only Muhammad.

The dawn of this new era in prophetic biography can be seen in Qadi 'Iyad's *al-Shifa bi-ta'rif huquq al-Mustafa* (Healing by Recognition of the Truths of the Chosen One). Such works did not emphasize the biographical narrative itself, but what should be included in it. This meant cleansing the biography of excitation, superstition, and wonders in order to bring its subject closer to the heart of the faithful. As Qadi 'Iyad wrote:

> The truth of love tends toward what is agreeable to man . . . whether because he takes pleasure in it upon coming upon it, as a beautiful picture . . . or through his sense of reason . . . as the love of the righteous, the scholars, and the people of knowledge . . . or what is agreeable because it benefits him . . . And if this is determined . . . I have perceived that he [i.e., the Prophet Muhammad] (peace be upon him) combines these three meanings of what motivates love.

Qadi 'Iyad belongs to the Andalusian school of biographers – which also includes Ibn Hazm, al-Suhayli, and perhaps Ibn Sayyid al-Nas – characterized by intensification of criticism and transformation of the prophetic biography into a record to guide the believer toward proper conduct, ethics, and the aims of *shari'a*. In *al-Rawd al-unuf fi sharh al-sira al-Nabawiyya li-Ibn Hisham* (The Virgin Meadows of Explanation of the Prophetic Biography of Ibn Hisham), al-Suhayli seeks to reconcile completely Ibn Ishaq's and Ibn

Hisham's biography of the Prophet with the Qur'an. The result is a biography that is coherent in terms of its logic and its harmonization of different narratives. Ibn Sayyid al-Nas's *'Uyun al-athar fi funun al-maghazi wa al-shama'il wa al-siyar* (Most Noteworthy Traditions in the Field of Meanings, Qualities, and Biographies) seems to me the most modern of the pre-modern biographies. It is recitative in nature, but designed as if by a modern historian. Ibn Sayyid al-Nas begins by mentioning his sources and critiquing them, then combining and synthesizing the foundational biographies, and adding the views of the scholars of his era. He provides a list of incidents from each year of the Prophet's life – elaborating on specific subjects such as Muhammad's miracles, his wives, his children, his attendants, and so on – before completing the work with a "bibliography" of his sources and how each reached him, and, finally, a word addressed to the reader – what we would now call an afterword or postscript.

The other major school of prophetic biography was the Damascene school, which flourished in the eighth century AH (fourteenth century AD) and includes al-Hafiz al-Mughaltay, Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi, Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi, Ibn Kathir, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who I believe to be the greatest. These biographies sought to combine in a single text the prophetic biography and hadith, or the prophet biography and *fiqh* in the case of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's *Zad al-ma'ad fi hadi khayr al-'ubbad* (Provisions for the Hereafter in Good Guidance for Worshippers), which follows the events of the Prophet's life in detail and derives from them various jurisprudential and ethical judgments with impressive skill.

From Pre-Modern to Modern

Depictions of Muhammad in pre-modern biographies oscillate between sanctification and humanization, but from the nineteenth century on, his biography, generally speaking, is that of a man. When European colonialism entered the Islamic world, it brought with it its Orientalist and missionary projects, one of the aims of which was denigration of the Prophet. This coincided with the emergence of nationalisms that produced an urgent need for history and its heroes. Networks of religious scholars broke down and authors increasingly came from the new professional class of doctors, engineers, university professors, journalists, lawyers, and the like. All of this led to a new kind of defensive biography.

The most important missionary/Orientalist biography that Muslim scholars attempted to rebut was British Orientalist Sir William Muir's *The Life of Mahomet*, first published in 1861.[28] One of Muir's methodologies was to accept accounts in the early biographies that were latter deemed unbecoming of the Prophet and excised, finding in their later omission proof of their veracity.[29] Muir's depiction is somewhat sympathetic to Muhammad in Mecca, but fiercely prejudiced against him after the hijra. He concludes by stating that "the sword of Mahomet, and the Corân, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilisation, Liberty, and Truth, which the world has yet known."[30] One still hears echoes of this view in the reactionary rhetoric of the American and European right, with the open encouragement of Israeli Orientalism.

The first to respond to this attack was the Indian Muslim writer Syed Ameer Ali, in *A Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed* (1873) and then *The Life and Teachings of Mohammed, or The Spirit of Islam* (1891).[31] Ali did not just refute European attacks on the Prophet, but presented evidence of the rationality and progressive character of his message, depicting him as a merciful and just educator, whose "devotion to knowledge and science" brought him "into the closest affinity with the modern world of thought."[32] The great Indian thinker Muhammad Iqbal also stressed the Prophet's modernity. In *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbal argued that the prophetic age closed with the life of Muhammad and the revelation of Islam, which blended the best of ancient and modern civilizations. Muhammad's message was the most salutary treatment for all of the modern world's ills, especially its material ones.[33]

In Egypt, the famous reformer Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905 AD) in his *Risalat al-tawhid* (Treatise on the Oneness of God) offered metaphysical and philosophical definitions of prophecy in general, and depicted the Prophet as an enduring example of the revival of rational thought and the struggle against superstition, political domination, and blind imitation. 'Abduh's students carried forward his ideas and laid down the rules for many biographies that remain influential today. Two books in particular adopted 'Abduh's rationality and his courage in criticizing dominant legacies and reinterpreting historical and religious concepts, thus paving the way for the renewed Egyptian biographical tradition: 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's *al-Islam wa usul al-hukm* (Islam and the Foundations of Political Power) and Taha Husayn's *Fi al-shi'r al-jahili* (On Pre-Islamic Poetry).[34] Shortly thereafter, two biographies reformulated the events of Muhammad's life in drama and fiction: Tawfiq al-Hakim's 1936 play *Muhammad, rasul al-bashar* (Muhammad, the Human Prophet) and Taha Husayn's 1933 novel *'Ala hamish al-sira* (On the Margins of Biography). These works are less remarkable for their literary value than for their historical significance and modern orientation. They do not adhere to the standard incidents of Muhammad's biography, and introduce a number of people and incidents not found in the classical life narrative, seeking to update it in line with the literary style of the period. Despite their limited literary value, they raise important questions about how to present the prophetic biography to the modern reader.

Four biographies published in the 1930s – by Muhammad Ahmad Jad al-Mawla, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Muhammad Farid Wajdi, and 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, respectively – offer a fairly representative view of the interests of biographers of the twentieth (and perhaps the twenty-first) century.[35] Their first concern was to counter Orientalists, on the one hand, and narrow-minded reactionaries, on the other. Second, they set out to cleanse the prophetic biography of myths and to interpret prophetic miracles – and the biography in general – in light of modern science. Third, they were interested in Muhammad's record and status in world history compared with others, especially the Christian record embodied in European colonialism. Finally, they introduced theories from psychology to interpret Muhammad's genius and his prophetic personality, claiming that the hadith embodied the most advanced thinking of the time in areas like public health, social policy, freedom of expression, and so on.

Egyptian writer Husayn Ahmad Amin treated these and other biographies harshly, and

with a healthy dose of sarcasm, in his brilliant *Dalil al-Muslim al-hazin ila muqtada al-suluk fi al-qarn al-ʿishrin wa dirasat Islamiyya ukhra* (The Sad Muslim's Guide to Conduct in the Twentieth Century, and Other Islamic Studies).[36] Amin praises early biographies for their frankness, and regrets its diminishment by those who sought to distance the reader from Muhammad's humanity and to emphasize the Prophet's holiness. He pours vitriol on twentieth-century biographies steeped in an "inferiority complex" toward the West, seeking to prove Islamic similitude with European scientific, political, and social theories. These biographers, fascinated with Europe, rushed to make Muhammad the embodiment of every modern European ideology, and the Qur'an a precursor of every modern scientific theory. "Socialists, your Imam is Muhammad!" Instead, Husayn Ahmad Amin proposed:

> A biography that is not defensive, apologetic, or ashamed ... that does not blur the facts or invent them ... A biography that does not omit that whose mention makes some uncomfortable, but does not seek to insult ... A biography that revives an historical era in its entirety and reconstructs its moral values ... so that the character of the Prophet and his actions appear clear in context ... A biography worthy of al-Waqidi and al-Tabari if they were to write today.

This is a tall order and few contemporary biographies rise to the task. Two, however, deserve praise: *Kitab al-shakhsiyya al-Muhammadiyya* (The Muhammadan Personality) by Iraqi writer Maʿruf al-Rusafi; and *Twenty-Three Years* by Iranian writer and politician ʿAli Dashti.[37] Al-Rusafi first directs his critical eye toward history, whose contradictions gave rise to the rival factions of Islam. He believes the biography of Muhammad should be based solely on the Qur'an and reason, seeing the Qur'an as "the word of Muhammad" and believing that study of its "underlying logic" can clarify the issue of revelation. Based on the Qur'an, al-Rusafi rejects all accounts of prophetic miracles in Muhammad's biography: Muhammad is a man of preternatural intelligence and imagination, but his achievements remain within the realm of the human. Part of a longer heritage of liberal thought, found, for example, in Abu Bakr al-Razi and later in the likes of Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, al-Rusafi's biography must be engaged seriously by anyone writing on the prophetic biography today.

Ali Dashti's biography is in many ways similar to al-Rusafi's, but it is constructed around a series of questions. Can we accept miracles attributed to the Prophet in his biographies despite the Qur'an's explicit denial of miracles? Was Muhammad really infallible, as some Muslims claim, even if many Qur'anic verses describe his weakness and human frailty? Did he love women? Without a doubt, but his love was sometimes stormy. Was he overly harsh in some rulings? Yes, for example, as in the case of Banu Qurayza. Dashti, like al-Rusafi, sees the Prophet as in "psychological continuity" with the Qur'an and describes this continuity as "prophetic rhetoric." He sees "the internal logic of the Prophet" as the quiddity of revelation. Any adulteration by superstition should be excised from the Prophet's biography, and only thus can we arrive at a depiction of the Prophet that fully illuminates his humanity and his genius.

Conclusion

These are some of the books with which I have had the privilege to travel during a long academic voyage, and which have been engraved on my mind – these histories becoming a part of my history, these biographies a part of my biography, these memoirs a part of my memoirs. These works contain insights and understandings that are deserving of continued interaction, allowing us to draw from them what is still worthy of reflection, critique, and interrogation. I have presented these works in the style of an autobiography, to indicate some measure of the identification and intimacy of my relationship with them, and perhaps to entice the reader. But my satisfaction will only be complete when other Arab academics who have reached retirement age, as I have, take the same path and record what they have learned from books worthy of consideration and revival. For we stand today on a heritage threatened by neglect, ignorance, amnesia, and cultural illiteracy.

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Endnotes

1 Tarif Khalidi, "The Arab World," in *The Great World War, 1914–45, Vol. 2: Who Won? Who Lost?*, ed. Peter Liddle, J. M. Bourne, and Ian R. Whitehead (London: HarperCollins, 2001), 291–308.

2 Calling upon my memory, I can think of *al-Munqidh min al-dalal* (Deliverer from Error) by al-Imam al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun's *al-Ta'rif* (The Definition), and *The Life of Ibn Sina*, though surely there are others that I have forgotten. In any case, autobiography is not a familiar genre in our classical literary tradition, or indeed any pre-modern tradition – a phenomena that calls for greater investigation into the precise definition of the concept of modernity and its relationship to the individual. See R. J. McCarthy, *Al-Ghazali's Path to Sufism and His Deliverance from Error: An Annotated Translation of* al-Munqidh min al-Dalal (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2000); Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ta'rif bi-Ibn Khaldun wa rihlatihi gharban wa sharqan* [The Definition of Ibn Khaldun and His Journey, West and East], ed. Muhammad Tawit al-Tanji (Cairo: Lajnat al-ta'lif wa al-tarjama wa al-nashr, 1951); and *The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition*

and Annotation Translation, ed. William E. Gohlman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974).

3 See Tarif Khalidi, "Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zayn and al-'Irfan," in *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939*, ed. Marwan R. Buheiry (Beirut: American Univeristy of Beirut, 1981).

4 'Anbara Salam al-Khalidi, *Jawla fi al-dhikrayat bayna Lubnan wa Filastin* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1978). Translated into English by the author as *Memoirs of an Early Arab Feminist: The Life and Activism of Anbara Salam Khalidi* (London: Pluto Press, 2013).

5 Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha, *Mudhakkirat* [Memoirs] (Cairo: n.p., 1900–1927). Reprinted recently as *Mudhakkirat Sa'd Zaghlul* (Cairo: Dar al-kutub wa al-watha'iq al-qawmiyya, 2011).

6 Babikr Badri, *Tarikh hayati* [The History of My Life] (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1959). Published in English as *The Memoirs of Babikr Bedri* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969–1980).

7 'Abd al-Wasi' Ibn Yahya al-Wasi'i, *Tarikh al-Yaman: al-musamma furjat al-humum wa al-huzn fi hawadith wa tarikh al-Yaman* [The History of Yemen: Meaning the Spectacle of Grief and Sadness in the Events of Yemen's

History] (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-salafiyya wa maktabatuha, 1927).

8   Jabra'il Sulayman Jabbur, *Min ayyam al-'umr* [From the Days of Life] (Beirut: Jam'iyat asdiqa' al-katib wa al-kitab, 1991).

9   Anis Furayha, *Qabla an ansa* (Tripoli: Jarrus Press, 1989).

10 Yusuf al-Hakim, *Bayrut wa Lubnan fi 'ahd al-'Uthman* [Beirut and Lebanon in the Ottoman Period] (Beirut: al-Matba'at al-Kathulikiyya, 1964).

11 Khalil al-Sakakini, *Kadha ana ya dunya* [Such Am I, O World] (n.p.: al-Matba'a al-tijariyya, 1955). An unabridged version of Sakakini's diaries, along with correspondence and other writings, were published in eight volumes by the Khalil Sakakini Center in Ramallah and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies between 2003 and 2010. See *Yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini: yawmiyyat, risalat, ta'ammulat* [The Diaries of Khalil al-Sakakini: Diaries, Letters, Reflections], ed. Akram Musallam (Ramallah: Institute of Jerusalem Studies and Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center, 2003–2010).

12 Khalid al-'Azm, *Mudhakkirat Khalid al-'Azm* [The Memoirs of Khalid al-'Azm] (Beirut: al-Dar al-muttahida lil-nashr, 1972).

13 Sulayman Faydi, *Mudhakkirat Sulayman Faydi fi ghamrat al-nidal* [The Memoirs of Sulayman Faydi in the Midst of the Struggle] (Beirut: Dar al-qalam, 1974).

14 Rustum Haydar, *Mudhakkirat Rustum Haydar* [The Memoirs of Rustum Haydar] (Beirut: al-Dar al-'Arabiyya lil-mawsu'at, 1988); Darwaza, *Mudhakkirat*.

15 Tarif Khalidi, *The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

16 See, for example: Mary Beard, *The Invention of Jane Harrison* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Maria DiBattista, *Imagining Virginia Woolf: An Experiment in Critical Biography* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Edmund Gordon, *The Invention of Angela Carter: A Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Geoffrey W. Gust, *Constructing Chaucer: Author and Autofiction in the Critical Tradition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and Alan D. Vardy, *Constructing Coleridge: The Posthumous Life of the Author* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

17 Virginia Woolf, *Orlando* (New York: Mariner Books, 1973), 295.

18 Julian Barnes, *Flaubert's Parrot* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 38.

19 I should note here the inspiration that I drew from the important book by the early Christian historian Jaroslav Pelikan, *Jesus through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).

20 Al-Waqidi disputes this story, claiming that it could not be correct because Khadija was given in marriage by her uncle, not her father, who had died before the marriage.

21 This theory describes a light that God cast upon his land with its creation, and which shone upon Muhammad, his family, and his followers, and which remains shining until the Day of Resurrection. See U. Robin, "Nūr Muḥammadī," in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., ed. Peri Bearman, Thierry Banquis, Clifford E. Bosworth, Emeri van Donzel, and Wolfhart P. Heinrichs (Leiden: Brill, 2012), online at dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_5985 (accessed 14 June 2018).

22 We see this, for example, in *I'lam al-wara bi-a'lam al-huda* by al-Tabrisi, one of the most important Shi'i scholars and exegetes.

23 See, for example, Ibn Qutayba's *'Uyun al-akhbar* (The Most Noteworthy Reports), al-Mubarrad's *al-Kamil* (The Perfect One), Ibn 'Abid Rabbih's *al-'Iqd al-farid* (The Unique Necklace), and Raghib al-Isfahani's *Muhadarat al-udaba' wa muhawarat al-shu'ara'* (Lectures of the Litterateurs and Conversations of the Poets).

24 For more examples, see Tarif Khalidi, *al-Kutub wa ana* (Beirut: Manshurat al-jamal, 2018), 153–54.

25 On poetry and poets in the Qur'an, see, for example, Qur'an 26:224 and 36:69: *wa al-shu 'ara' yattabi'uhum al-ghawuna* (And the poets – the tempters follow them); and *wa ma 'allamnahu al-shi'r wa ma yanbaghi lahu* (We did not teach him poetry, nor does this befit him). *The Qur'an: A New Translation*, trans. Tarif Khalidi (New York: Penguin Classics, 2008), 303, 359.

26 Among the incidents of Muhammad's life dearest to Sufis is the Night Journey (*al-isra' wa al-mi'raj*), which revealed to them many of the "secrets" on their path toward God.

27 See, for example: *al-Din wa al-dawla* (Religion and the State) by 'Ali Ibn Sahl Rabban al-Tabari, *A'lam al-nabuwa* (Banners of Prophecy) by Abu Hatim al-Razi, *Dala'il al-nabuwa* (Evidence of Prophecy) by Abu Na 'im al-Isfahani, *Ithbat nabawat al-Nabi* (Proving the Prophet's

Prophecy) by Ahmad Ibn al-Husayn al-Haruni, and *Tathbit dala'il al-nabuwa* (Proving the Evidence of Prophecy) by the Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar.

28 William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1861), 4 vols. An abridged version was published as a single volume in 1878.

29 See Muir, *Life of Mahomet* (1878), 593–94.

30 Muir, *Life of Mahomet* (1878), 535.

31 Syed Ameer Ali, *A Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1873); Syed Ameer Ali, *The Life and Teachings of Mohammed, or The Spirit of Islam* (London: W. H. Allen, 1891).

32 Ali, *Spirit of Islam*, 360.

33 First published in 1930 as *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Kapur Art Printing Works, 1930).

34 Taha Husayn, *Fi al-shi'r al-jahili* (Cairo: Matba'at dar al-kutu al-Misriyya, 1926). 'Abd al-Raziq's text was first published in Arabic in 1925, and was recently translated into English as Ali Abdel Razek, *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, ed. Abdou Filali-Ansary, trans. Maryam Loutfi (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

35 Muhammad Ahmad Jad al-Mawla, *Muhammad al-mathal al-kamil* [Muhammad, The Perfect Example] (Cairo: Matba'at dar al-kutub al-Misriyya, 1931); Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *Hayat Muhammad* [The Life of Muhammad] (Cairo: Matba'at dar al-kutub al-Misriyya, 1934); Muhammad Farid Wajdi, *al-Sira al-Muhammadiyya tahta daw' al-'ilm wa al-falsafa* [The Muhammadan Biography in Light of Science and Philosophy] (Cairo: n.p., 1939); 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, *'Aqbariyat Muhammad* [The Genius of Muhammad] (Cairo: Dar nahdat Misr lil-nashr, 2004).

36 Cairo: Dar Su'ad al-Sabbah, 1992.

37 Ma'ruf al-Rusafi, *Kitab al-shakhsiyya al-Muhammadiyya, aw hall al-lughz al-muqaddas* [The Muhammadan Personality, or the Solution to the Holy Riddle] (Cologne: Manshurat al-jamal, 2002); and Ali Dashti, *Twenty-Three Years: A Study in the Prophetic Career of Mohammed* (London: G. Allen, 1985).

The Taufiq Canaan Memoirs

Part 2

Taufiq Canaan

As soon as the German Deaconess Hospital reopened in 1924, I was put in charge of the internal diseases department. The hard and constant work gave me the opportunity to write many scientific papers in medicine, which were published in German and English and in local medical journals. Twice I went to Europe for postgraduate studies. The first time in 1937, I went to the Charité Hospital[1] in Berlin to study heart and lung conditions. In 1932, I went to Hamburg and later to London for tropical diseases. These postgraduate studies helped greatly to increase my scientific background and widen my circle of knowledge.

In Jerusalem my private practice increased and I was able to send my four children to Europe. The expenses were enormous but I was able to pay everything for them. I also bought several land plots and built two houses.

By the end of the First World War, I was recognized as the best internal diseases physician in the country. Thus I was made a member of several committees of the Palestine Health Department, and was called often to other cities in Palestine to treat patients. I went to Hebron, Bir Sab'a, and Gaza in the south, to Nazareth and Tiberias in the north, and Amman in the east. When King Husayn traveled from Cyprus to Amman, I was called to treat him. Other members of the royal family were also treated. Many of the highest British officials had me as their house physician. The Palestine Government recognized me as a specialist in internal diseases and consulted with me often for cases in their government hospital.

The period between the two world wars was the most productive. During this time, the Jerusalem Arab Medical Association was organized – and to a high standard – through my efforts. Later, I organized branches in Haifa, Jaffa, Nablus, and Gaza, which were joined under the name the Palestine Arab

Medical Association. I was chosen president of the Jerusalem association (until 1954) and president of the Palestine association (until 1948 when, after the start of the Arab-Jewish war, the association ceased to exist). To enlighten the public, lectures were given on the radio about sanitation and hygiene. The radio director paid us £P2 per lecture, which was collected by the association. The funds enabled us to do hospital work during the Arab-Jewish war. The Palestinian Arab Medical Association also published a medical journal, two thirds in English – of which I was the editor – and one third in Arabic. It was stopped after the Arab-Jewish war and the occupation of two thirds of Palestine by the Jews.

Even before the birth of the Palestine Arab Medical Association, a medical association in Jerusalem had been organized with members from all denominations. It did not survive very long due to the different viewpoints toward the Jewish members.

The Palestine Arab Medical Association had three triumphs. The first was a congress which most of the physicians of Palestine and Transjordan attended. It was such a great success that the Jews bitterly criticized the Palestine Health Department for having supported and assisted the Arab society. This accusation was somewhat true. The highest European and Arab personalities attended the opening ceremony of the congress. I headed the congress and gave two lectures.

The second great triumph was the turnover of four hospitals to the association: the government hospitals in the Russian complex [Muscobiya], the Austrian hospital for infectious diseases in Bayt Safafa, and the two mental hospitals in Bethlehem. The turnover ceremony took place in the Russian compound in 1947. Present were the assistant director of health and other government doctors, a gentleman representing the International Red Cross, and Dr. Mohammad Dajani and myself representing the Palestine Arab Medical Association. We were to run these hospitals as soon as the British Mandate power left Palestine, on 15 May 1948.

The third success was a lecture for doctors and scientists about penicillin, which had just been discovered.

On 15 May 1948, the British left Palestine and the war between the Arabs and the Jews began. The Palestine Arab Medical Association took over as operator of the hospitals. The Russian hospital was in a Jewish area. The bombardment was severe and many shells fell around it. Dr. Ra'ad Bishara was leading it and he saw the futility of its upkeep especially as there were scarcely any wounded Arabs to be treated. He wrote to me about his conclusions and I worked very hard with the Jordanian military governor of Jerusalem (Colonel Abdullah al-Tal) until, after long negotiations, he allowed me to ask the International Red Cross to evacuate all of the Arab doctors and nurses and staff out of the Russian hospital and to bring them to the Arab sector.

The Austrian Hospice hospital worked very hard; at times the doctors had to work through the night to treat the wounded that flocked from all directions. We had at times about two hundred patients – some were placed on the floor – and we did not have enough physicians since most had run away just before the hostilities began. The hospital was bombed a few times by the Jews and I complained directly to Count Bernadotte. In the first few weeks of running the hospital we became short in provisions and petrol. I used

the radio to announce our great need and asked for donations. Soon it seemed the whole population began to come bringing what they could spare, and through their donations we were able to continue.

My duty was to gather the money for the upkeep of the hospitals. I wrote to all directions, especially to the Arab High Commission in Cairo. My requests were endorsed by the military governor. Thus I received two payments totaling eight thousand Jordanian dinars. In addition, two persons donated five hundred dinars each, and several convents gave fifty to eighty dinars each. The Lutheran World Federation helped with fifty dinars monthly for five months. With the money gathered with great difficulty, I was ordered to help the Palestine Health Department and a children's hospital for the Arab National Society. Thus I was able to run all the hospitals for seven months. At the same time, I had opened a new hospital in Bethany. In the end, the Jordan Government took over the responsibilities of all hospitals. Only those of Bethlehem remained our responsibility while the hospital in Bethany was closed.

As soon as the responsibility for the hospitals fell from my shoulders, I was employed by the Lutheran World Federation and charged to open polyclinics for poor refugees and non-refugees. I was able to start one in Jerusalem, another in Bayt Jala, a third in Bethany, and a fourth in Hebron. A few months later another clinic was opened in al-Taybeh. In 1956, Mr. Christiansen, on the advice of Dr. Farah, opened a clinic in Bir Zayt for one day per week. I was not asked about my ideas and believed it absolutely useless to have a clinic only once a week in a place where there are no other polyclinics. In 1957, a morning clinic was bought and was opened twice a week in the villages. The benefit was so small that it did not compensate for the expense in any way. Another very important duty was to store the chemicals I received and keep them under lock. My principle was to economize as much as possible so no cupboard was ordered, but the boxes in which the medicines had been sent were made into cupboards into which shelves were placed. In this way I had more than three dozen cupboards, and all had their locks. My successor found everything ready.

In 1951, I left the [polyclinic] work completely, for my other duties were great. It was possible for me to help the Protestant Arab hospital in Nablus and the National Hospital in Bethlehem with drugs and material for dressing wounds, especially since many of these articles were not used in the polyclinics. It was a crucial help in a time of great need. I should mention that while leading the hospitals of the Arab Medical Association I had to arrange first aid stations in Jerusalem and to provide them with the necessary material. I visited all of these widely scattered stations regularly on foot. The young men in these stations served without any remuneration and served well.

In addition to my work in the polyclinic, I was appointed to the Board of Directors of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Jerusalem. Not everything went on as it should as the board was divided. On 1 May 1950, the LWF took over Augusta Victoria Hospital from the International Red Cross, which gave overall responsibility for its activities in the Near East for the refugees to the UN body, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). I had much work to do at the time, but the most difficult task was cutting the very high salaries. This was a condition set by UNRWA.

The hospital had 450 beds, all for refugees, and included departments for internal surgery, infectious diseases, children, gynecology, obstetrics, and tuberculosis. The hospital was equipped with the best laboratory in the country and a good x-ray department. The Lutherans contributed significantly for improvements, medicines, linen, the director's salary and additional sums to balance the budget.

In addition to directing all medical work, I managed the section for infectious diseases, which had between forty and fifty beds. During my service years in the hospital I was sick on two occasions, once I had a prostectomy and once for a slight heart attack. I am proud to say that I have been so honored and respected by the staff that nearly every member of the employees came from time to time to see me.

Palestinian Amulets and Folk History

In 1920 the Palestine Oriental Society was founded. I was the secretary of the society and the editor of its journal from 1920 to 1939. One important interest I had was the study and later the publication of *Folklore of Palestine*. My impulse for such a study was historical and biblical. I found that through a better understanding of the folklore one could understand much better the customs, superstitions, and wisdom of the Bible. It became rather easy to gather such material and slowly I began to publish articles in English and German journals. My first article was "Der Kalendar des Palästinensischen Fellachen" which was received so well that I was encouraged to write more. In all, I authored about thirty-five articles and five books.[2] This study gave me a name so that I was asked by European authorities about my ideas on several issues.

This interest in folklore study stimulated in me the desire to make a collection of amulets and talismans used in popular medicine to protect against and to cure disease. Slowly, I possessed the biggest collection from Palestine. Sir [Henry] Wellcome, the founder of the medico-historical museum in London, on hearing about my collection, asked through his friend Mr. Saint-John, to secure him one. I was able to send him a collection of 220 pieces.

My interest in folkloristic studies began early after graduation. Already in 1912 I had two articles published in the magazine of the American University of Beirut *al-Kulliya* about popular medicine, and in 1914 my first book *Aberglaube und Volksmedizin im Lande der Bibel*. One year earlier a long article "Der Kalender des Palästinensischen Fellachen" appeared in *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*.

Every year after the First World War, the students of the German Archaeological School came to my house where I gave them a lecture about Palestinian folk medicine and illustrated it from my collection. The members of the American School for Oriental Research came also, but not regularly every year. This activity on folklore gave me a good name in scientific centers. In 1957, I was asked officially by Professor Herzberg to help him issue the last volume of Dalman's *Arbeit und Sitte*. He had begun to write but died before finishing it. Professor Herzberg came to Jerusalem and we worked together on the book.

When we left our house in Musrara (in 1948) I had lost all of my folkloristic material that had not yet been published. I began to gather Arabic proverbs again, and was able to collect several thousand. My greatest loss was my not yet published book "Die arabische Frau v.d. Wiege bis zum Grab." For this I had brought together an enormous amount of unpublished and new material. Nevertheless, I began to gather the material again and to note every custom I heard about. My collection of stories was never published. I had so many that in social settings I could tell one story after the other – for one and a half to two hours. Many were the same stories heard from the peasants about high moral teachings. For my children I was able to write a few fables.

Activities with the YMCA in Jerusalem

My activities in the YMCA still need to be described. I devoted a very large part of my time to the YMCA. I was a member even before the First World War, in 1908, and in 1913 and 1914 I became the president. During the First World War all activities came to a complete stop. After the end of the First World War, it resumed under the auspices of the American Council. Soon we had one flat in a big building, a few years later two and later three flats. The activities of the YMCA increased. A hut was erected for meetings. I was a member of the board and remained so to the end of 1946. Twice I was president, for several years the vice president. Our general secretary was Dr. [Archibald Clinton] Harte, a fine Christian who was able not only to lead the association forward but also he raised sufficient funds to erect a building which was the most beautiful in Jerusalem, and in the Near East.

It was a real pleasure to see the building grow every day. At last it was ready for occupation and functioning. The swimming pool was unique in the Near East. The organ was one of the best. From the tower one could study the topography of the surrounding regions. Maps on the four sides explained the situation of the different sites. The main building had several rooms for the hostel.

The activities of the YMCA were varied and very practical with departments for adults and for children. Membership reached about two thousand members. Through the endeavors of our general secretary we had a good and large library.

The YMCA was a great blessing for the country. It brought young men of all religions and denominations together. It was a center for study: evening classes were given in English, Arabic, French, bookkeeping, accounting, shorthand, and typing. The evening classes swelled so much that there were no empty places. During the Second World War, first aid lessons were given. Through excellent lectures in Arabic and English the scope of knowledge was greatly widened. The concerts, religious and popular, refined the tastes of the members. The excursions combined with comprehensive talks about the site increased the knowledge of and the love for the country. The library was used by all members for reference and study. The political and scientific journals kept everyone informed about events, politics, and discoveries. The physical department, with its swimming pool, showers, and indoor and outdoor sports strengthened the body. Last but not least,

the religious work, such as lectures on religion, missionaries' moral subjects, religious concerts, Sunday meetings, and pilgrimages to the holy places helped members to tread on the right path. Thus our beloved institution was our pride as its blessings shown on Jerusalem and its surroundings.

Political Actions in Palestine (1920–48)

I never belonged officially to any political party. My first political work – if it can be called so – was to bring the Christians, who were the minority, nearer to the Mohammedans.[3] This was very difficult. The first thing to do was to know several important and influential Moslems. My visits to them were regular, at their feasts, in happy and sorrowful occasions. These visits brought me two advantages: first, I got to know, love, and respect them, and second, they saw in me a real friend. Slowly, the circle of Mohammedan friends increased. I began to take other Christians with me on my visits, and often invited members of both religions to my house. We never discussed religious questions in such meetings. The influence of the different convents and churches, especially the Orthodox, Armenians, Coptics, and Protestants, on the Mohammedans was good and slowly became better.

During the Turkish regime no parties were allowed and no one could speak about politics. After the English came the Arabs became anti-Zionist and anti-British. It is very curious how feelings changed completely from 1910 to 1920. Before the First World War, all the Arabs loved the British and wished them to come and free the Arabs from the heavy yoke of the Turks. At the beginning of the war – despite the fact that my wife was a German and my whole family had German education – we prayed for a British victory.

We had a friendly attitude with the Jews living in the Holy Land at the time of the Turks. I had many good friends among them. They lived in peace with the peasants and employed many Arabs in their colonies. All these conditions changed radically when the Zionist movement began. The British did not come as liberators, but as conquerors who wanted to rule and not to free the country.

At this time, two parties arose among the Arabs of the country. One was led by the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni and the other by Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, who was a former member of the Turkish parliament. The first followed an extreme policy and had the majority of the Arabs backing it. The second group was more moderate and was helped by the British Mandate. The mufti was the head of the Husayni family, while Raghib Bey was the leader of the Nashashibi family.

Haj Amin was very bright, but had a hard head. He rarely took the advice of anybody who did not belong to his most intimate circle. Already before the formation of the two parties, I had a collision with him. A few years after the First World War, the YMCA associations held their International Congress in Jerusalem on the Mount of Olives. The mufti began from the first day to attack the congress in his daily paper run by his cousin, *al-Jami'a al-'Arabiyya*. Every day a new and more severe attack appeared. In this way we lost the interest and sympathies of many members of Congress who came from all over

the globe. I tried several times to see the mufti, but he was very busy preparing for the al-Nabi Musa procession and feast. I had to go down to al-Nabi Musa, and spoke there with him very earnestly. He, seeing his mistake, gave at once orders to stop everything. But one chance of gaining the sympathies of the world was lost.

Great Britain was decided – to push the Balfour Declaration at any cost. Thus from the very beginning it favored the Jews: the new regulations were carried out so as to favor the Jews. But one must say that many a British official suffered very much under these abnormal and unjust ways. Slowly, the number of illegal immigrants was equal to, or even more than, the legal ones. All the Arab protests were shelved. Nothing was done to bring justice. One commission after another was sent. Their recommendations were in favor of the Arab cause, but the government never followed their advice. Naturally, demonstrations, strikes, and fights followed. The latter increased to a real guerrilla war. The Jews also formed bands for attacking Arabs and British. The latter were treated at times in a most disgusting manner. The British punished the Arabs in an inhuman manner. But the Jews were treated more or less gently.

I felt I had to do something for my country. The best was to open up the eyes of the world to the injustices done by the Mandate. I gave lectures, wrote pamphlets and books about the Arab cause. Some of my pamphlets were printed four different times and were translated into French and Arabic. My pamphlet the *Palestine Arab Cause* was reprinted by a member of the British parliament under his name (with my permission). The *Worker* published it also in two editions. My booklet *Conflict in Land of Peace* exploded like a bomb in the Jewish quarters. But what were my endeavors and those of many other Arabs in comparison to the world-wide Jewish propaganda? I gave a testimony before the UN Commission and proved that all of the Jewish propaganda – that the health of the Arabs became better, their mortality fell and their standards were raised and so on, due to [Jewish] immigration – was not true.

The Jews bombarded our hospitals several times. I had to take concerted actions and protested to Count Bernadotte, to the International Red Cross and once to the United Nations. My cable to the Syrian representative, Mr. Faris Khoury, was: "Beg to protest against repeated bombing of Arab hospitals, Jerusalem, by Jews. Stop. International Red Cross Committee had no results." The answer from Count Bernadotte reads:

> 2 August 1948
> Dear Dr. Canaan,
>
> Before I left Rhodes I received your letter of July 19th. Yesterday and today I had discussions with the Arab and Jewish Government in Jerusalem on matters of demilitarisation of the Jewish area. I hope that this matter, which has already been accepted in principle by both parties concerned shall be solved although it might take quite some time before all the details will be agreed upon. I therefore hope that bombing of hospitals and Christian and Mohammedan places will not occur in the future. You can be quite sure that

I am going to take up all violations in the spirit of the Truce and that if I am not able to straighten out the matter I promptly will report them to the Security Council for their action.

Sincerely yours,
Count Bernadotte

This noble man was killed soon after, treacherously by a Jewish hand.

Even after the Arab-Israeli war came to an end, I continued my political life as much as I could. In the first few days there was neither the opportunity or the people to whom I could speak, for there were few tourists. Later, I was able to speak to private tourists as well as to groups explaining the full facts. This was done repeatedly. Reports written originally to my daughter were sent to the LWF. I helped some European friends in sending reports and I wrote a few articles. With time my political library about the Palestine question was the largest.

My political activity put me on the black list of the Jews and accordingly that of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police Force. The British had me on the black list. I had been educated partly in a German school, my brothers and sisters were sent to Germany to have their higher education, I worked in the German Hospital and the Leper Home, which was at the time a German institution, and my wife was German. These were the external causes. The real cause was that I was a nationalist Arab.

During the First World War, they had no way to put me in any concentration camp, as I was in Aleppo when Aleppo fell. All Arab prisoners were understood to be the prisoners of emire Faysal, and the emir set them all free.

But no sooner was the Second World War proclaimed, then my wife, my sister, and myself were taken away. My sister and wife went in the women's prison in Bethlehem. I was transported to the prison of al-Mazra'a, north of 'Akka. I was released after two months' detention, my wife after nine months, and my sister after four and half years. I was brought once to a court, my wife twice, and my sister four or five times. Every court ordered our release. But as the High Commissioner had the right to refuse the judgment, it was not carried through.

During my detention, no Christian Arab came to my children to visit or help them. They were quite alone as I had no relatives whatsoever in Palestine. The really good friends were Mr. Miller, the Secretary of the YMCA, Mr. Najati Nashashibi, and some other Mohammedan friends who looked after them. Mr. Miller came every single day to see if they needed anything. No one in my family will ever forget his kindness. I am sorry to say that no Christian Arab ever came to see my children. We had the same experience during the First World War when, during my absence in the front line, no one except Mohammedan friends looked after my family. They visited them and supplied the house with some of the most important provisions.

It was due to efforts of Mr. Miller that my wife and my sister were evacuated from the prison in Bethlehem to the German Colony, Wilhelma, which was adapted into a

concentration camp for the Germans. Here we could visit them once a month. Two days after I was released I was allowed to visit my wife and sister [in Bethlehem]. It was a terrible sight, to know they were detained in such a dirty place. The occupants were criminals, bolsheviks, harlots, and the like. I went home heartbroken and wept like a child. In Wilhelma they were among good, educated people, and they could cook what they liked.

Soon after we got out, my son Theo had a position in Wadi al-Far'a to build one of Tegart's buildings. We visited him there, as we did in Jericho, when he was working in the ruins of Khirbat al-Mafjar [Hisham's Palace]. He then left to Beirut.

My practice soon returned to its former state. But the political conditions became more unsettled. In the third and fourth month of 1948, most physicians left Jerusalem – a very great shame. I, the oldest, decided not leave. My wife and I had no children with us. The girls were married and Theo lived in Beirut. As our house was in the firing zone, we decided to move. The Greek Orthodox convent gave us one furnished room. We carried a few things from home, hoping that we could soon return back. But our house was completely lost with all our furniture, my beloved library and several unpublished articles. One of them was a book on the Palestine Arab woman.

A few days after we moved to the Greek Convent, our house caught fire. When I saw it at 8 p.m. my heart bled. I did not believe it and so I went to the Franciscan convent. Here the custodian led me and I saw how the whole ceiling and upper story were in flames. Thus I had now no house, no furniture, no car and even the good sum of money which I had left there was lost. I was sorry for only a few hours and then I got over it and slowly forgot it. Although I took only fifteen Palestine pounds with me when I left my house, the Almighty helped me wonderfully and I had never to ask for help.

The four of us – my wife, sister, sister-in-law, and myself – lived in one room. It was our kitchen, sitting/dining/sleeping room and office for treating patients. But we were thankful for having a roof above our heads. It is a shame the LWF never thought of giving us any room in the Muristan [in the center of the Christian quarter in the Old City]. Soon the monks of the Greek convent gave us a second room which served as a sleeping room for my sister and sister-in-law and an office for me during the day. My work during this period was very hard. I went twice daily to the Austrian Hospice hospital, and to the Convent of the Soeurs de Sion, where I had my office for the Jordanian Red Crescent and Red Cross.

Our Son Theo's Life

Theo settled in Beirut and had a large circle of friends, most of them European. His architectural work began to develop and increase, and his name was overshadowing the names of his partners. Theo was often invited and made many invitations. In Jerusalem, he had a few undertakings: the Ambassador Hotel, the Jerusalem Cinema, and two buildings for the municipality. These brought him nearby often. The building of Aridah in Lebanon and the Ambassador in Jerusalem made him a real name. In his free time he went with

European friends and visited the different ruins in Lebanon. This inclination accompanied him from his youth when he had always showed a special interest in archeology. This love made him work for one year gratis in the repair of the platform of one of the theaters in Jarash. He had gathered real archeological skill during his work in Khirbat al-Mafjar.

He was a sweet boy. Every time he came to visit us he came with a shining happy face. He was greatly attached to us and to his sisters. Theo got excited with us only if we spoke to him about marriage. Why he refused even to think of it, we never knew.

He was inspecting the platform of the [Jarash] theater from an arch in front of it, when he must have slipped. He fell on a large slab of hard stones, and fractured his skull. He remained unconscious for about half an hour, then slowly stopped breathing and passed away. Theo surely did not feel any pain after the fall. His companion Ms. [Diana] Kirkbride, who was working with him on the repair, said he was smiling just before he fell and he continued doing so even after death. The Director of Antiquities in Amman, Mr. [Gerald] Harding informed Mr. Christiansen who gave the news to my sister. She told us that Theo was dangerously ill, after a fall. My wife and I ran to Mr. Christiansen. My first question was, "Is Theo dead?" He answered, "Dear Doctor. Yes, it is so." My wife and I broke down. Knowing that I had many duties I at once arranged for the transport of the body to Jerusalem. Mr. Abu Dayyeh was kind enough to go in a car to Amman and bring the body.

Our children Leila, Nada, and Sami in Beirut were informed. The local papers brought the sad news. The radio announced his death. The funeral was set for the next day which was a Sunday, 5 September 1953. The whole time on Sunday before noon people flocked in by the dozens to offer condolences. More than 130 wreaths were brought. Leila and Sami arrived Sunday before noon. The procession went from Jerusalem to Bethlehem. I hired three buses for the hospital personnel. More than fifty cars. The road was one continuous black line for a long distance. A great number of people from Bethlehem, Bayt Jala, and Bayt Sahur had gathered. Representatives of all churches and denominations were present. Nada arrived during the church ceremony. We were showered with a very great number of cables and letters expressing sympathy and great sorrow. And for weeks and weeks friends and others flocked into our home to console.

My wife and I visited the tomb nearly weekly for about one year, and then we went every two or three weeks, always with flowers. Doubtless it was and is the best cared for tomb.

My Activities in Retirement

In May 1955 I resigned from my work in the AVH where I was the medical director and the chief of infectious diseases section. Kaiserswerth gave me the so-called Gardner's House, saying in a letter that I may have it as long as I live. It was the lower flat of a small building, composed of four rooms and accessories. Thus we remain in the complex of the AVH but outside the hospital. This house had several advantages: it had the best

views of the whole complex and it lay far from the wards so that playing children would in no way disturb the sick. The house had a most beautiful view: in the east one saw the mountains of Moab, the Dead Sea (only part), and the wilderness of Judea; on the south we had Abu Dis, Bayt Faji, the Mount of Olives with the Russian tower, and on the horizon the ruins of Herod's tomb. If we walked about eighty meters to the west, we had the most beautiful panorama of Jerusalem. Our house was within the complex of Augusta Victoria and far from the hospital and barracks. On clear days part of the Dead Sea could be seen shining at two different places. The Moab mountains changed their hue from a blue-reddish to a rose color. Everyone who visited us enjoyed this view. For our grandchildren the house was perfect. They could roam in the fresh air, and play in the shadows of the trees without inconveniencing anybody.

Our friends came in and out. Some of them came repeatedly and took us out with their cars for a drive or to gather flowers. In the first year we had friends for food once or twice every week. It was so nice to have others with us. Slowly we had to stop this nice custom, because people started talking. We did not have many visitors in the evenings. We played cards, listened to the radio, read, and did other small jobs. As a rule, at nine I went to bed.

One year after leaving the hospital work I was engaged by the Lutherans to examine and treat the children in their schools with a small salary. Every year two visits were made in the autumn and in the spring, and every boy and girl was examined well. The second year I did the work gratis. In addition to this duty I could be of some help to Mr. Christiansen in the distribution to the Greek convents: St. George (in Wadi Qilt), Quarantal [Mount of Temptation], Mar Saba, St. Theodosius, Mar Elias, and Bethany. In autumn of 1956 I resigned from this work but Mr. Christiansen asked me to continue for 1957. For the 1956–57 school year I made the examination in the autumn. When I asked in the spring for a car, Mr. Christensen informed me that there was none available. After a number of further requests without a positive answer, I stopped bothering.

The period following my resignation was spent in studying, reading, writing notes, talks, preparing Christmas decorations, presents for Christmas, and flower pressing. The last were presented to Talitha Kumi, where the most beautiful flower cards were made. From 1954 to 1957, I pressed yearly many thousands of flowers. The proceeds from the flower cards were given to support the Talitha Kumi orphanage.

The political conditions in Jordan and in the Arab countries grew more and more tense. I had to keep up to date which I did from the following: reading one or two of the daily papers which appeared in Jordan; bringing daily, or whenever it was possible, the Egyptian and Lebanese papers; reading the cuttings from English newspapers which dealt with political questions in the Near East that my daughter Yasma always sent to me; reading the most important books and periodicals dealing with the Arab question; and direct and repeated contact with some of our best minds. In this way it was possible for me to be more or less up to date. Many Europeans and Americans visited me to know my ideas. Besides reading a lot, and keeping one of the best libraries about Palestine, I tried to help my country whenever I could. Thus I gave repeated talks to American and

German tourists; many tourists who were interested in the local situation came to my house. I published a few articles and gave material for publishing.

My connection with the government in Jerusalem, and to a somewhat lesser extent with Amman, was always very good. In the first five years after the armistice between the Arabs and Jews I was invited to every important official occasion in Amman. In Jerusalem also, in the years following the war I was invited to every important occasion. In this way I was able to help the LWF a great deal. The same cordial relations existed with all of the convents.

My medical practice lessened, as I did not care much for it. Ninety percent of all treatments were gratis. Medical journals continued to arrive and kept me informed of the most important advances in medicine. I had to discontinue my attendance at the medical meeting of the Palestine Arab Medical Association because they held their lectures in a third-floor room and it was difficult for me to climb the staircase.

[During my career I was given a number of awards.] In 1938 the German Empire presented me with the decoration of the Red Cross. The consul general pinned it to my chest in a soirée given by the German Deaconess Hospital.

On 30 November 1955, the patriarch of the Orthodox Churches in Jordan, Monsignor Timotheos honored me with the Golden Cross of the Holy Sepulchre. As he was sick in bed, Archimandrite Kyriakos, the custodian of the Holy Sepulchre, presented me this high decoration with a speech stressing that his beatitude the patriarch confers on me this great honor for the service I have done for the sick, to science, to the Orthodox convents all over the country and to the refugees, irrespective of their denominations.

In the autumn of 1957, the German ambassador to Jordan Herr von Schubert honored me in the name of West Germany with the "Golden Verdinst Kreuz, I Class" for the continuous help I offered to the German Missionary Institutions in Palestine during the last four decades. This happened to be on a Sunday afternoon on which the members of the German Archeological Institute were having tea with us.

On 10 May 1958 the Medical Association of the American University of Beirut decided unanimously that I should be the only recipient of the 1958 award. Dr. Amin Majaj from Jerusalem happened to be in Beirut and volunteered to present the golden medal.

Endnotes

1 Today the hospital is Europe's largest university clinic.

2 His five books are *Aberglaube und Volksmedizin*, *Dämonenglaube*, and *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine*, *The Palestine Arab Cause*, and *The Topography and Folklore of Petra*.

3 Although Canaan's usage of "Mohammedan" rather than "Muslim" may seem jarring to the contemporary reader, it is worth noting that this reflected Canaan's engagement with a Western academic tradition, within which the former term predominated well into the mid-twentieth century. However, as a local Arab whose scholarship indicates sensitivity to the nuance and breadth of Muslim religious and cultural practices in Palestine, it is important to distinguish between Canaan's usage of the term and its usage either by Western Orientalist scholars – with whom he engaged intellectually in the study of Palestine, but from a significantly different positionality – or by European Christian polemicists – who sought to discredit and disparage the Muslim faith by reducing it to a cult of Muhammad, portrayed in their writings as a false prophet, and with whom Canaan shared nothing in common, intellectually or politically.

The Insidious Power of Permits

Yael Berda, *Living Emergency: Israel's Permit Regime in the West Bank*. 130 pages, acknowledgements and notes to 144. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018. $12.99 paper.

Reviewed by Alex Winder

Those who study and experience the Israeli security apparatus are confronted with a certain tension. On the one hand, Israel seeks to refine its various technologies of surveillance and control to penetrate deeply into Palestinian society, to expand its reach in terms of both width and depth – that is, to assert control over as many people as possible and into as many aspects of each individual life as possible. The impression is of a totalizing effort. On the other hand, Israeli "security" is often unpredictable and arbitrary. When and where information is recorded and shared is unclear and restrictions can be enforced erratically and capriciously. How is it – or, more crucially, why is it – that such a system tends both toward totality and irregularity? *Living Emergency*, Yael Berda's compelling, detailed, and theoretically sophisticated analysis of the Israeli permit regime, resolves this apparent paradox of Israeli securitization with the concept of "effective inefficiency." Berda writes:

> Administrative flexibility, wide discretion, conflicting decisions, and changing decrees create constant administrative friction and uncertainty. While administratively inefficient, these characteristics of the population management control system achieve two important results for governing the West Bank: to create Palestinian dependency on the administrative system – to construct, maintain, and widen the scope of monitoring and control; and to create uncertainty, disorientation, and suspicion within Palestinian society through the prevention of mobility (35).

The personal frustration of dealing with an

opaque and unpredictable bureaucratic regime is thus amplified and expanded to frustrate communal goals: economic self-sufficiency, national unity, and, ultimately, sovereignty. Inefficiency serves rather than hinders Israel's totalizing security regime.

Berda's significant contribution to understanding Israel's permit regime is not just to explain its shifting purposes – that is, *why* it was put in place and evolved – but to examine in detail *how* it works – not just in theory, but in practice, for both Palestinians and Israelis. She is aided in this task by her previous experience as a lawyer in Israel, where she represented Palestinian clients classified as "security threats" and who were therefore denied permits. Berda opens and closes *Living Emergency* with revealing anecdotes from her legal practice, but the entire book is clearly informed by her attempts to maneuver within the permits system to access information (including about when, where, how, and by whom decisions were made) and produce change. Her extensive access to and interactions with the permit regime allow her to write with specificity and assert with authority that the examples she mobilizes "are not outliers but accumulated evidence of thousands of administrative interactions that are local yet over time became the mammoth institutional system I call the bureaucracy of the occupation" (12). Berda skillfully overlays these examples upon a framework rooted in history, political economy, and theoretical engagement with sovereignty, administration, and "emergency."

Israel's permit regime has its roots in the Defense (Emergency) Regulations enacted by the British Mandate administration in Palestine and quickly adapted by Israel after 1948 for the military rule of its Palestinian population. Berda's focus is on the West Bank, however, and thus the bulk of her analysis focuses on the period after 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the wake of the 1967 war, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were declared a "closed military zone" and, after a census taken in September 1967, every Palestinian resident sixteen years of age and older was required to register and carry an identification card. These actions are representative of the three powerful tools that Israel uses to control the Palestinian population: emergency laws, classification of the population, and spatial closure. The 1968 Entry to Israel Directive required Palestinians crossing from the West Bank and Gaza Strip into pre-1967 Israel – whether for work, medical care, family visits, education, or any other number of reasons – to obtain a permit issued by the regional military commander. In 1972, Israel's Ministry of Defense declared a "general exit permit" for West Bank and Gaza residents to pre-1967 Israel between 5:00 a.m. and midnight – largely to facilitate flows of low-wage Arab labor that Israeli employers could exploit – while maintaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip's status as a "closed military zone," thus allowing Israel to use curfews, deportations, and denial of entry to target individuals or communities considered active in political or military resistance (20–21). In 1968, 6 percent of the Palestinian labor force worked in Israel; six years later, this figure reached 32 percent. By the time Israel entered into negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the early 1990s, the Palestinian economy was locked into a relationship of dependency on Israeli employment.

The 1993 Oslo accords reconfigured the system of population control in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of which the permit regime was a cornerstone. As some aspects of control *within* the territories occupied in 1967 were handed to the fledgling Palestinian Authority,

measures to control movement *between* these territories and those across the Green Line (as the 1949 armistice line that served as Israel's de facto border until 1967, is known) expanded. The "general exit permit" was done away with, and permits became necessary for any and all Palestinian movement into pre-1967 Israel. Given the dependence of Palestinians' livelihoods on freedom of movement across the Green Line, the permit regime became "a powerful economic weapon for population management through distinction between labor and political status" (24–25). Some commentators hailed the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as a step toward Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, but, as Berda writes, "despite the structural shifts, the system for the Civil Administration's management of the Palestinian population, the security forces, and the degree of interest Israel took in the activities of that population (particularly on the intelligence-gathering level) only grew" (28). A downsized Civil Administration became more, not less, colonial; and shifting aspects of Palestinian civil affairs to the Palestinian Authority increased the power of Israel's General Security Service (better known as the Shin Bet) vis-à-vis the Civil Administration. In sum, the Oslo accords "ended Palestinian free labor movement across borders and directed such flows to suit Israeli security considerations" (82).

The power of the Shin Bet only intensified with the breakdown of negotiations and the outbreak of the second intifada, at which point every resident of the West Bank came to be seen as a potential security threat. Between October 2000 and 2005, the Shin Bet classified more than two hundred thousand Palestinians as "security threats" and the police classified sixty thousand more as "criminal security threats." In 2007, approximately 20 percent of the male population between sixteen and fifty-five were classified as "security threats." Of course, as Berda makes clear:

> "Security threat" was not a stable category; it was a fluctuating matrix of profiles sometimes based on age, gender, region, family, village, political affiliation, or intelligence information. As the blacklist expanded, so did the indices and measures of the security threat profile, which remained classified and unavailable to all agents of the bureaucracy except the agents of the Shin Bet (48).

With no clear criteria defining what could lead to being classified a "security threat," and the knowledge that being thus labeled was largely irreversible, Palestinians understandably sought to avoid any and all activities and personal associations that could conceivably lead to being denied a permit. This "generated a sense of paralysis and confusion," Berda writes. "The strongest effect of the restriction that remained constant across hundreds of people I questioned was the chilling effect on political activity and a belief that political participation and active citizenship would be criminalized and penalized by the Shin Bet or the Israeli military" (53). Israel also turned to closure as a method to punish the Palestinians for their uprising and asphyxiate its support among the population. In 2004, the West Bank experienced 240 days of closure. Such limitations on movement only increased the value of permits, and the considerable discretion wielded by Israeli administrators in granting permits, denying

permits, and imposing closure gave them enormous leverage over the lives of Palestinians.

Berda describes the permits system as a regime of privilege, not of rights, within which Palestinian lives were subject to the whims of Israeli officials, who were powerfully placed to trade on these privileges. In particular, granting or denying permits became tools in the recruitment of informants and collaborators. Put crudely, the Shin Bet was willing to trade permits for information. Not only did Israel pressure some Palestinians to accept this devil's bargain, but it also succeeded in generating fear and suspicion within Palestinian society, with devastating individual and communal repercussions. For individuals: "accepting collaboration means betraying your community and nation as well as risking you and your family's lives; declining can end any possibility of earning a living once and for all, relinquishing hope for economic survival" (69). Collectively, knowledge that Israel employs such methods breeds distrust within Palestinian society: the receipt of a permit – especially if one had previously been denied – raises suspicions of collaboration. The opacity of the process in combination with the practice of recruitment leads to paranoia, and sometimes attribution of fantastic superpowers to the Israeli security forces. The result, again, is a chilling effect on Palestinian political life.

Berda is also adept at exploring Israeli dimensions of the permit regime. This includes the rivalry and shifting power dynamics between the Civil Administration and the Shin Bet, as well as the involvement of Israeli courts, including the High Court of Israel, in sustaining the permit regime. It also includes less prominent institutions, such as the Payments Section of the Interior Ministry's Population, Immigration, and Border Crossings Authority, whose workings Berda uses to "illustrate how institutional routines create repertoires of uncertainty" (86). Berda includes a flowchart to map the convoluted interactions between Israeli employers, Palestinian employees, the Shin Bet, the police, middlemen, the Payments Section, the Ministry of Economy, the Civil Administration, and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). These overlapping sites of authority make it nearly impossible to locate decision makers within the system and feed into the personalization of decision-making. Berda writes, "approaching different clerks at different times by different applicants produced different outcomes because outcomes were the result of the identity of the decision maker, not of stable and standardized practices. This occurs despite meticulously detailed internal procedures that exist on paper, thus creating a fake transparency of governance through documents" (92–93). This frustrates Israeli employers – who are thus disinclined to hire Palestinian labor, even if this would otherwise be their preference – and fuels an informal economy around permits.

The informal permit economy is driven by middlemen, who thrive in an environment of opacity, confusion, and personalism. Where both Israeli employers and Palestinian workers find themselves stymied by an impenetrable labyrinthine bureaucracy, these middlemen, through personal connections and knowledge of institutional intricacies, are able to facilitate the issuance of permits – for the right price, of course. The power of the middleman is thus rooted in the inefficiencies of the permits system; his "livelihood depended on the illegibility of the labor permit process. His expertise was invaluable as long as there were no systematic practices one could count on" (96). The thriving black market for permits subjects Palestinians to yet another layer of exploitation. In 2014, the Israeli workers' rights

organization Kav LaOved estimated that one-quarter of Palestinian workers with permits had paid employers or middlemen for them. The lax prosecution of forgery and bribery in this informal economy, meanwhile, gives the lie to the security justification of Israel's permit regime. Instead, Berda cogently concludes:

> The bureaucratic cruelty of the permit regime, the disorganized mayhem that caused such suffering and despair, was incredibly efficient for achieving institutional and legal segregation between Jews and Palestinians, creating disorientation and atomization that turned life in the West Bank into a daily struggle within a perpetual emergency (109).

Finally, though *Living Emergency* focuses on the development and impact of the permit regime in the West Bank, part of its power derives from Berda's de-exceptionalization of Israel/Palestine. She acknowledges that the West Bank permit regime is an "extreme," not a "representative," case, but "it does reveal the institutional logic of other systems throughout the world to control and monitor populations through classifications of security" (9). European governments and the United States increasingly subscribe to a securitized approach that blurs the lines between terrorism, crime, immigration, and labor, with Israel often serving either explicitly or implicitly as a model in this regard. (The revelation that the acting deputy director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement was part of a delegation of U.S. officials to a "National Counter Terrorism Institute Seminar" in Israel is only a recent example of this phenomenon.) Those who seek to challenge this phenomenon globally might also look to Israel, therefore, for lessons on how to combat the encroachment of securitized bureaucracy more effectively.

Berda's assessment in this regard is sobering. In the book's powerful epilogue, she recalls realizing the futility of her efforts to combat the permit regime as a lawyer. "Even when we won the case, we lost," Berda writes, "as each case created more regulations, crafted better answers for the Civil Administration, and highlighted gray areas and loopholes for the secret service" (127–28). The bureaucracy of the occupation is like a hydra: each time a head is cut off, multiple others grow back in its place. Berda's hope is drawn from those whom she served as a lawyer, the "security threats" whose resilience and sheer humanity inspired her faith "in the possibility to change [Israel's] political regime and demand citizenship and equal rights for all the inhabitants from the Jordan River to the sea" (129). Where legal solutions are insufficient, political solutions point the way forward. This entails recognizing that labor rights, freedom of movement, and transparent governance are intertwined, and that all must be defended rigorously from the justification of "security" that seeks to undermine them. Yael Berda's *Living Emergency* is indispensable reading to better understand the proliferation and bureaucratization of securitization and to recognize the enormity of the struggle ahead to undo its pernicious effects, in Palestine and beyond.

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